Administrative law
As an entrepreneur, you may deal with government authorities at different moments. For example, when you need a permit, face an inspection or have to deal with enforcement. Such a decision can directly affect your business operations. That is why it is important to know quickly where you stand.
Administrative law concerns the relationship between your business and the government. This includes municipalities, regulators, provinces or other authorities that make decisions about permits, subsidies, supervision or sanctions. These decisions are often subject to fixed rules and short deadlines. Waiting is therefore usually not an option.
When you receive a decision from the government, you want to know what it means in concrete terms. Should you lodge an objection? Is consultation possible? Can you still submit additional documents or correct an error? And what are the risks if you do nothing? We quickly map out which steps are possible and what the best approach is for your business.
Administrative law can also play an important role in plans for growth, expansion or a new location. By checking in advance which rules apply, you can avoid delay, discussion or unexpected restrictions.
Our administrative law specialists help entrepreneurs with permits, enforcement, supervision, objections and appeals, among other matters. We look not only at the legal side, but also at the practical impact on your organisation. This means you quickly know what is possible, what is required and where there is room to manoeuvre.
Do you have doubts about a government decision or would you like to know in advance which rules apply to your plans? Contact us, and we will determine the best next step together.
SPECIALIZED LAWYERS
These are our lawyers who specialize in this area.
Is a right of usufruct on claims a meaningful alternative?
Is a right of usufruct on claims a meaningful alternative?
A right of usufruct gives the right to use goods belonging to another person and enjoy the fruits thereof. The Supreme Court recently handed down a judgment on the question whether a usufruct on receivables can serve to appropriate what has been collected. The case involved claims relating to rent payments. The Supreme Court is of the opinion that this is not possible. After all, that would be tantamount to the collected property being both the asset on which the usufruct rests and the usufruct at the same time.
What is a right of usufruct?
A literal example is if I establish a usufruct on my apple tree (the usufruct object) for the benefit of someone else. The holder of the usufruct (the usufructuary) may then use my apple tree and have the apples growing on the tree.
Suppose you want to put your property in the name of your children, but you yourself still want to continue living in the property, you can arrange this right of use by having a usufruct established.
What is a usufruct on a let property?
With a usufruct on a rented property, the usufructuary is entitled to the rental payments arising from it. In that case, the rental payments are the fruits.
Case of right of usufruct on claims
Simplified, the case that led to the Supreme Court’s judgment was as follows. KPN sometimes places telecom antennas on land belonging to landowners. In return, KPN must then pay rent to the landowners. Telecom Vastgoed has concluded agreements with the landowners whereby, in exchange for a one-off surrender sum, a usufruct is established for the benefit of Telecom Vastgoed on the rent payments owed by KPN.
The relevant article in Telecom Realty’s agreement with the landowner read:
“The right of usufruct rests on the periodic rental payments, as well as on all other pecuniary obligations arising as rights of claim of the Owner under the Lease.”
It is clear that it was intended that Telecom Realty would obtain a right to collect claims against KPN itself.
Telecom Vastgoed charged the rental fees to KPN. KPN, however, refused to pay Telecom Vastgoed and transferred the rental payments to the landowners.
Court and Supreme Court rule on usufruct on claims
According to the Court of Appeal, the manner in which Telecom Vastgoed has established usufruct, or at least wishes to implement it, cannot stand the test of criticism. The Supreme Court follows the Court of Appeal’s view. The main consideration of the Supreme Court is:
“Art. 3:201 BW stipulates that usufruct gives the right to use goods belonging to another person and to enjoy the fruits thereof. Whatever is received by collection of claims subject to usufruct belongs to the principal beneficiary and is also subject to usufruct (Art. 3:213 paragraph 1 of the Civil Code). It follows from these provisions that the usufruct on claims cannot serve to appropriate what is received by collection of those claims. After all, that would be tantamount to saying that what is collected is simultaneously the property on which the usufruct rests and the usufruct. The closed system of rights in property law entails that no usufruct can be created that does not meet the legal description.”
Thus, a usufruct on claims cannot serve to appropriate the collected. Going back the literal example of the apple tree: The usufruct on my apple tree gives the usufructuary the right to enjoy the apples of my apple tree. It does not give the right to appropriate my apple tree. The usufruct object cannot also be the fruit.
But what about the example of usufruct on the rental property? The important difference is that the usufruct object in that case is the house and not the rental payments themselves.
Claims can simply be assigned, right?
The case raises the question of why Telecom Realty did not simply have the claims of landowners transferred to it by deed (or assignment). Claims can, in principle, simply be sold and transferred, including future claims. It is conceivable that KPN, in its leases with the landowners, excluded (as a matter of property law) that the landowners could transfer their claims against KPN to another party (within the meaning of Article 3:83(2) of the Civil Code).
Lifting of Pledge Prohibitions Act
Incidentally, a bill is currently under discussion to make the non-transferability of receivables largely impossible (Lifting of Pledge Prohibitions Act). The idea is that there will be wider opportunities for (bank) financing of companies if companies cannot be restricted in transferring / pledging receivables to financiers.
Looking for property law lawyer in Rotterdam?
Thus, the Supreme Court has made it clear that usufruct on claims cannot serve the purpose of transferring the collected to the usufructuary. This made it clear that establishing a usufruct on claims is not a good alternative to the ordinary transfer of claims (assignment).
If you need advice or legal assistance in the area of property law, such as the transfer of property or the creation of security, please contact Peter de Graaf.
The judgment discussed can be found here.
Excessive lending. Court rejects claim Rabobank for repayment of residual debt
The breach of the duty of care of the bank in granting a mortgage loan may have far-reaching consequences for the bank, as can be seen in a decision of the “Midden-Nederland” court of 12 October 2016.
In its decision, the court argues that excessive lending was the case. Even more so, the court rules that Rabobank has severely breached its duty of care which is intended to protect against excessive lending. The result of this breach is that the client is not required to pay back the residual debt of
€ 485,599.95.
The heart of the matter
The case is as follows. In 2007, Rabobank granted a mortgage loan for the purchase of a house. Pretty soon, the client was no longer able to afford the monthly payments and, under pressure of foreclosure, the house was sold at a considerable loss. This left a substantial residual debt. The procedure was about whether the client was bound to pay the residual debt back to the bank. The client argued that there was a serious breach of the duty of care and that he would not have taken out the mortgage loan, had Rabobank warned him against excessive lending.
Duty of care bank
Even in 2007, a bank, being a professional credit provider, had a duty of care towards a private person, which intended to protect against excessive lending. This duty of care is also laid down in article 4:34 Wft (Financial Supervision Act) and applies to the pre-contractual stage, this is to say, the finance process.
This means that the bank, prior to the conclusion of the financing agreement, was obligated to check whether the client was sufficiently creditworthy, in view of his income and capital. In 2007, this general instruction was fleshed out by the joint banks in the Code of Conduct Mortgage Loans of 1 January 2007. According to the rules of this code of conduct, this mortgage should not have been granted this way.
Research by the AFM (Netherlands Authority Financial Markets) showed that, even then, other credit providers did not comply with the code of conduct as well and fines were imposed at that time.
This court ruling shows that, next to a fine, excessive lending may have other unpleasant consequences for the bank that does not take its duty of care seriously.
The client, who was assisted by Hein Kernkamp, is not required by the court to pay back the residual debt.
Information
If you would like more information on this subject, please contact Hein Kernkamp.
May you offset a negative leave balance?
Your employees are entitled to vacation days, but sometimes they take too many. May you set off excess vacation days against salary without consulting your employee?
Set off leave balance during employment
The law stipulates in which cases you as an employer may set off claims against wages during employment. This is allowed, for example, if your employee must pay compensation, has outstanding fines or has received too much pay. However, a claim due to excess vacation time is not included in the law. Setoff is therefore not allowed, unless a contractual provision allows it. So don’t forget to include this in the employment contract.
Set-off can only take place up to a maximum of one-tenth of the salary per month. Also, your employee must always receive at least the minimum wage. Any claims can therefore only be recovered from the wages your employee receives above the minimum wage limit.
Set off leave balance at the end of employment
The possibility of set-off at the end of employment is broader. Settlement with wages is possible, if those wages do not fall below the so-called ‘attachment-free foot’. This means, that you have to pay at least about 90% of the social security standard to your employee, so that your employee can at least pay his fixed expenses that month. Because of this broader set-off power, you and your employee can also agree by contract, that you will refund or set off excess vacation days at the end of employment.
What if you have no contractual set-off power?
That issue came up, among others, in an Oct. 18, 2021 ruling by the Central Netherlands District Court.
The common thread is that as an employer, you are responsible for the creation of a high negative leave balance, especially in the case of a temporary employment contract. You should not assume that this will be restored during the course of a subsequent year by working unpaid additional hours (the “time-for-time” system). The negative balance should not be so high that it cannot be made up by your employee during employment, with the result that you have to set off a (too) large amount against the salary. Of course, your employee also has his or her own responsibility in this.
In an employment relationship, where your employee works too few hours too quickly and where incentives are lacking to prevent arrears, this is primarily the responsibility of you as the employer.
Informing about and recording vacations
It is therefore in your best interest to regularly inform employees of their shortfall in accrued vacation days. In addition, you would be wise to lay down the settlement option by contract.
Conclusion
If you have any questions on this topic, please contact Richard Ouwerling, a lawyer specializing in labor law.
New regulation VAT supplements applicable as of January 1, 2025
New regulation VAT supplements applicable as of January 1, 2025
From January 1, 2025, a new obligation will apply with regard to VAT supplementations: if it is found that too little VAT has been declared and paid, this must be corrected within eight weeks by submitting a VAT supplementation to the Tax Authorities. This significantly tightens the replenishment deadline, or at least there is less room for ambiguity. Failure to comply with the replenishment obligation may result in the imposition of fines. In the case of intent or gross negligence, there may even be a fine of up to 100%.
How was replenishment regulated through 2024?
Since January 1, 2012, Article 10a of the Algemene wet inzake rijksbelastingen (hereinafter: AWR) stipulates that taxpayers are required to ‘spontaneously’ notify the inspector of inaccuracies or incompleteness in data and information relevant to the taxation, which are or have become known to them.
Article 15 of the Turnover Tax Implementing Decree 1968 (hereinafter: the Implementing Decree) stipulates that as soon as a taxpayer learns that a turnover tax return has been filed incorrectly or incompletely in the past five calendar years, resulting in an overpayment or underpayment of tax, he must still provide the correct and complete information, data or instructions. The appropriate way to do this is to file a supplement. This supplement must be filed before the taxpayer “knows or should reasonably suspect” that the inspector is or will become aware of the inaccuracy or incompleteness in question.
How is it regulated now?
The aforementioned provisions continue to apply in full. As of January 1, 2025, it has been added that the supplement must be filed no later than eight weeks after the taxpayer discovers the inaccuracy or incompleteness. In other words, if a businessman finds that too little VAT has been declared and remitted, he is obliged to correct this via a VAT supplement within eight weeks. Failure to do so could result in a fine. Up to and including 2024, the rule was that filing a supplement had to be done as soon as possible. As of 2025, this observation deadline is clearly defined: within eight weeks of the observation, the VAT supplement must be submitted.
How will the replenishment work in practice from 2025?
The cabinet decided to set the deadline for filing a suppletion at eight weeks from the moment it is established that a situation exists that leads to a suppletion. According to the Cabinet, this adjustment prevents entrepreneurs from sitting idle after preparing their balance sheet while knowing that they need to file a supplement. The new deadline of eight weeks is in line with the deadline for filing a correction notice for payroll taxes. Both regulations use the same deadline starting in 2025.
The eight-week period will apply as of Jan. 1, 2025. For entrepreneurs who have already found before this date that a VAT supplement is necessary, the period starts to run on January 1, 2025. This means that the VAT supplement must be submitted by February 26, 2025. If a VAT supplement leads to a VAT amount to be paid, tax interest will be charged.
For replenishments for tax year 2024, tax interest can be avoided by filing the replenishment before April 1, 2025. If it has previously been determined that a replenishment is necessary, it must be filed within eight weeks to avoid an overpayment penalty. The new rules for VAT replenishments from 2025 bring more clarity and uniformity, but also set stricter requirements for timely corrections.
Need help?
Do you have any questions? Please contact our tax advisor David Harreman.
Preliminary questions Supreme Court: Rent price change clause
On November 29, 2024, the Supreme Court gave a preliminary ruling on a rent modification clause in rental agreements with consumers. The Supreme Court answered the question of whether in the liberalized rental sector a rent modification clause with a surcharge of up to 3% (storage clause) in addition to an indexation clause is unfair. First, it is important to distinguish between the indexation clause and the storage clause. In principle, both the indexation clause under consumer price index and a storage clause with a maximum percentage of 3% are not unfair. The preliminary ruling is detailed below.
The facts
Underlying the Supreme Court’s preliminary ruling are two cases. These are between ASR as landlord and two different tenants who have fallen into rent arrears. The leases stipulate the following with respect to rent adjustment:
“10.2 The provisions of Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of this Lease and Article 18 of the General Provisions forming part of this Lease shall not apply. Instead, the parties agree as follows:
- The last applicable rent may be adjusted by Landlord for the first time as of July 1, 2016 and annually thereafter. Such adjustment shall be made by applying the monthly index figure according to the Consumer Price Index (CPI), all households series (2006 = 100), published by Statistics Netherlands (CBS). It is checked how the index figure for the calendar month that is four calendar months prior to the calendar month in which the rent is adjusted relates to the index figure for the calendar month that is sixteen months prior to the calendar month in which the rent is adjusted. That ratio shall be expressed as a percentage. The rent payable on the modification date shall be modified by that indexation percentage plus an additional surcharge to be determined by the lessor of up to 3% over the last applicable rent.
- If application of the provisions of this article under 1 cannot result in a rent adjustment of a maximum of 3%, the last applicable rent may nevertheless be increased by the lessor by a maximum of 3%, until, in the event of a subsequent indexation, the index figure of the calendar month lying four calendar months before the calendar month in which the rent is adjusted. That ratio shall be expressed as a percentage. The rent due on the modification date shall be modified by that percentage of indexation plus an additional increment to be determined by Landlord of up to 3% over the last applicable rent. (…)”
The question in both cases is whether there is an unfair term within the meaning of Directive 93/13. If it is, the provision must be annulled. In other words, then the provision is not valid.
As a result of these two cases and because there are questions about the scope and consequences of the annulment of such a clause, the subdistrict court submitted preliminary questions to the Supreme Court.
The preliminary questions
In summary, the Subdistrict Court submitted the following four questions to the Supreme Court:
1 A. Is the storage clause unfair?
1 B. Are the storage clause and the indexation clause separately reviewable clauses?
2. What are the consequences of disapplying an unfair clause?
3. What should and may a court do on its own motion if the rent modification clause is found to be unfair?
The Supreme Court’s answers
Answer to question 1B
First, the Supreme Court addresses question 1B. That question raises the issue of whether, for the purpose of assessing its unfairness, what is provided in Article 10.2 of the lease agreement about storage (‘the storage clause‘) is separate from what the same provision contains about indexation (‘the indexation clause‘). The Supreme Court held that the unfairness of the storage clause can and should be tested separately.
The indexation clause and a storage clause have different purposes. The purpose of an indexation clause is to compensate for monetary depreciation. As a rule, the purpose of a storage clause is to compensate the landlord for cost increases in excess of inflation and to keep the rent in line with changes in the value of the property.
Response to Question 1A
Question 1A raises the issue of whether a storage clause that requires the tenant to pay an annual surcharge on the rent of up to 3% over and above the indexation according to the consumer price index is unfair within the meaning of Directive 93/13. The Supreme Court rules that such a storage clause is not unfair.
The Supreme Court does note that when assessing the unfairness of a clause in a contract, all the circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the contract must be taken into account. The cumulative effect of all the terms in the contract in question must also be considered. In other words, when assessing the storage clause, consideration must also be given to what effect it has in combination with (inter alia) the indexation clause.
The storage clause is not unfair because its financial consequences are foreseeable for a tenant at the time the lease is concluded and the annual rent increase with a maximum percentage is usually within acceptable limits.
The Supreme Court also ties in with recent legislation:
“3.2.9 Dutch legislation for the liberalized rental sector is based on the premise that the landlord has a legitimate interest in changing the rent annually. The Maximum Rent Increases for Liberalized Rental Agreements Act (Wet maximering huurprijsverhogingen geliberaliseerde huurovereenkomsten), which came into force on May 1, 2021, and the Affordable Rent Act (Wet betaalbare huur), which came into force on July 1, 2024, assume the existence and permissibility of a rent modification clause. The Maximum Rent Increases Act and the Affordable Rents Act compulsorily regulate the maximum rent increase allowed annually, with a maximum percentage prescribed for surcharges on top of the rent indexation. Section 7:248 (3) of the Civil Code provides for leases of living space in the liberalized sector that to the extent that application of a rent modification clause leads to a more far-reaching increase in the rent than permitted by law, the clause is null and void to that extent and the rent is then deemed to have been increased by the maximum permitted increase.”
Answer to Question 2
Question 2 raises the issue of the consequences of disapplying an unfair term.
The Supreme Court rules that when a storage clause is found to be unfair, the clause must be disapplied. The tenant must be put in the situation he would have been in without that clause. Thus, a rent increase based on a storage clause that is found to be unfair is not possible. Not for the past nor for the future. Any rent increase a tenant has paid on the basis of an unfair storage clause is undue payment within the meaning of Article 6:203 of the Dutch Civil Code (undue payment), so the tenant can claim repayment thereof.
Answer to question 3
Question 3 raises the question of what the court may and must do ex officio if a storage clause is found to be unfair.
The Supreme Court ruled that when a landlord claims rent arrears, the court must ex officio deduct rent increases based on an unfair clause. The court may not ex officio set off a tenant’s rent debt against a tenant’s claim for undue payment in respect of past rent increases paid under the unfair storage clause. Indeed, setoff must be invoked.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court ruled that in the case of a rent adjustment clause, a distinction must first be made between a storage clause and an indexation clause. However, when testing the unfairness of the storage clause, the cumulative effect with the indexation clause must be considered. A consumer price indexation clause and a storage clause with a maximum percentage of 3% are, in principle, not unfair. Should a storage clause be unfair, it should be disapplied. The tenant can then claim repayment of the rent overpaid under the storage clause or invoke set-off.
Are you a landlord and would you like to know the consequences of this preliminary ruling on your real estate portfolio or would you like to have a provision in the lease reviewed or amended? If so, please contact LVH Lawyers.
High fuel prices and fuel shortages: what can airlines expect under Regulation (EC) No 261/2004?
In early May, the European Commission published guidelines intended to clarify how existing EU regulations (including airlines’ obligations to compensate passengers) should be applied. This followed the conflict in the Middle East, which has led to disruptions in the energy supply (high fuel prices and shortages).
This article first examines the implications of the current European Regulation. It then sets out the content of the guidelines and, finally, discusses the consequences for airlines.
Regulation (EC) No 261/2004
Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 protects passengers’ rights regarding compensation, care and reimbursement in the event of aviation disruptions, such as flight delays, cancellations or denied boarding. The Regulation sets out the rights to which a passenger is entitled. It also clarifies the obligations of an airline.
In the event of a flight cancellation, a passenger has the right to choose between a refund of the ticket price or rebooking onto another flight, and is also entitled to assistance at the airport. If the cancellation takes place within 14 days of the scheduled departure time, the passenger is, in principle, also entitled to compensation. This does not apply if the cancellation is caused by extraordinary circumstances that could not have been avoided, despite the airline having taken all reasonable measures. In that case, the airline is not obliged to pay compensation.
To clarify the concept of ‘extraordinary circumstances’, these are circumstances that are not inherent in the normal course of a carrier’s operations. The term ‘reasonable measures’ means that the carrier has taken all measures that could reasonably be expected of it to prevent or minimise the consequences for passengers.
High fuel prices and fuel shortages
The question is whether high fuel prices and fuel shortages can be classified as extraordinary circumstances. The European Commission has ruled that increased fuel prices cannot be regarded as extraordinary circumstances within the meaning of Article 5 of the Regulation, as fuel forms part of an airline’s costs and is therefore automatically subject to significant (price) fluctuations. Managing these fluctuations falls within the scope of an airline’s normal business operations, according to the European Commission.
The European Commission further states that a large number of airlines already hedge against these fluctuating fuel prices. According to the European Commission, airlines can anticipate this by passing on these costs in their ticket prices, referring in this regard to the system of free pricing.
The European Commission further emphasises that airlines may not adjust ticket prices retrospectively to compensate for increased fuel costs.
What may, however, be regarded as extraordinary circumstances is a local fuel shortage that prevents a flight from taking place. After all, such a shortage is not inherent to the normal operations of an airline. In such a case, the onus of proof rests with the airline to demonstrate that there was a fuel shortage and that this was in fact the cause of the cancellation.
Consequences for airlines
The foregoing implies that cancelling a flight due to high fuel prices cannot be regarded as an extraordinary circumstance, whilst a local fuel shortage may, under certain circumstances, qualify as such. This will always have to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. The guidelines therefore oblige airlines to carefully align their operational and commercial strategies.
The aviation team at LVH Advocaten advises airlines on the legal interpretation and practical application of these guidelines. Please feel free to contact Bram van Ruijven without obligation.
How does the termination of a lease agreement for medium-sized business premises work (Section 7:290 of the Dutch Civil Code)?
Lease agreements for shops, catering, take-away or delivery services and craft businesses are referred to as lease agreements for medium-sized business premises. Specific legal provisions apply to this type of lease. The starting point is a high level of protection for the tenant. After all, the lessee must be able to build up his business and generate income and goodwill. The protection of the tenant also means that lease contracts for medium-sized business premises cannot simply be terminated. This is subject to legal requirements.
In practice, we often receive questions about how a landlord (or tenant) can terminate this type of lease. On the other hand, the question is often asked whether a landlord has validly terminated the lease. This article therefore explains how the termination of a lease agreement for medium sized business accommodations works and which requirements apply.
When can a tenancy agreement be terminated?
A lease agreement for a mid-market office space can only be terminated towards the end of a certain rental period. The term arrangement applies to such lease agreements. The starting point is an initial rental period of five years. If not terminated, the contract will be extended by five years. Termination of the lease agreement for medium-sized business premises is only possible towards the end of the rental period, for example after the first five years.
From ten years onwards, continuation is for an indefinite period of time, unless a different duration has been agreed in the lease agreement. If the lease is for an indefinite period, it can be terminated by any date.
In many lease agreements for medium sized business premises, a provision is included preventing the landlord from terminating the lease agreement. In that case, the tenancy agreement stipulates that the landlord may not terminate the tenancy agreement, for example, after the first period of five. In such a case, the tenant is assured tenancy for that period.
How to terminate a lease agreement for mid-market office space?
If a landlord or tenant wishes to terminate the tenancy agreement, he must send a registered letter or have a court bailiff’s writ served. The reason for this is that it can be proved that the other party has received the letter of termination. The notice period is always at least one year. If a shorter notice period has been agreed in the lease agreement, it is not valid. However, a longer notice period may have been agreed for a lessor.
The lessor must also state the grounds for termination in the letter of termination. If there are no grounds for termination in the letter of termination from the lessor to the lessee, the termination of the lease is not valid.
What are the grounds for termination?
A landlord can only terminate the lease agreement if there are one or more of the grounds for termination referred to in the Dutch Civil Code, which grounds are limitative. In the case of a tenancy agreement with a term of ten years or more, a lessor has more grounds for termination at his disposal than in the case of a five-year lease.
Grounds for termination of a tenancy agreement for the first five years:
- the tenant’s business operations are not as befits a good tenant; and/or
- the landlord wants to put the rented property into sustainable use personally and urgently needs the rented property for that purpose (‘urgent personal use’).
Additional grounds for termination after ten years:
- the tenant does not agree to a reasonable offer to enter into a new tenancy agreement;
- the lessor wishes to realise a destination on the leased property pursuant to a valid zoning plan; and
- the landlord’s interests on termination of the lease outweigh the tenant’s interests on continuation of the lease (‘evaluation of interests’).
What are the consequences of terminating the lease agreement for mid-market business premises?
If the tenant terminates the lease agreement correctly, the lease agreement ends. If the lessor has terminated the tenancy agreement, the tenancy agreement will only end when the lessee has let us know within six weeks that he agrees with the termination. If no (positive) notice is received from the tenant within six weeks, the lessor may ask the court to fix the end date of the tenancy. The property law attorneys of Leeman Verheijden Huntjens can assist you in such proceedings.
Is the tenant entitled to compensation for the termination of the lease?
In four instances, the tenant is entitled to compensation upon termination of the lease of a mid-market office space. This is the case:
- an allowance for removal and furnishing costs;
- a compensation for goodwill;
- demolition of the rented property in the public interest; and
- dissolution due to realisation of the zoning plan.
If the parties are unable to reach an agreement among themselves, they can go to court.
In what other ways can the tenancy agreement end?
In addition to termination, the lease agreement for medium-sized business premises can also end in two other ways, namely by dissolution or by mutual consent. A tenancy agreement can be terminated because the tenant or lessor fails to comply with the obligations that apply to him on the basis of the tenancy agreement. The tenant or lessor can then ask the court to dissolve the tenancy agreement. Thereafter, the parties will no longer be bound by the agreement and the lease will end.
The tenant and the lessor may also agree on termination of the tenancy with mutual consent. It is often wise to lay down the agreement made in a settlement agreement.
Do you have a question about ending or terminating a lease agreement for medium sized business accommodations?
For all your questions about renting remote control space you can contact the commercial property tenancy law attorneys of LVH Lawyers. They can advise you, draw up a notice of termination letter for you, discuss with the other party whether or not there is a valid termination and litigate when necessary.
How does eviction protection work for a tenant when renting office space (and other business premises within the meaning of Section 7:230a of the Dutch Civil Code)?
Lease contracts for office space, storage or other business premises are often referred to as 7:230a leases. This name refers to the applicable legal provision. Tenants of these leases are entitled to eviction protection after termination of the lease.
How does a tenancy agreement for other business premises end?
This type of tenancy agreement is characterised by a high degree of contractual freedom between landlord and tenant. They can choose for themselves how long the tenancy agreement runs and how the tenancy agreement ends. The parties therefore follow the rules in the tenancy agreement. Additional statutory provisions only apply if the tenancy agreement does not provide for termination of the lease.
If the lease agreement has been entered into for a certain period of time (e.g. five years), it will end after this period of time (in the example after five years), without the need for termination. If the lease agreement has been entered into for an indefinite period of time (i.e. without an end date), it will end by notice.
Does the tenant have to leave the premises when the rent has ended before 7:230a?
The end of the tenancy agreement does not mean that the tenant has to leave the premises. If the landlord wants the tenant to leave the rented property, the landlord must also cancel the eviction. A notice of eviction must be in writing and sufficiently clear. The tenant must understand that he must evacuate the rented property. A clear letter or e-mail will suffice. The notice of eviction must state a date that is equal to the date on which the lease ends or must be a later date. In other words: a lessor may not request eviction while the lease is in effect.
When can the tenant claim eviction protection?
If the lease of other business premises is terminated by the lessor, the tenant can claim eviction protection. Tenants regularly lay claim to this because, for example, they have not yet found replacement business premises. To invoke eviction protection, the tenant must submit a petition to the court no later than two months after the time at which the eviction was terminated. Example: if the eviction is terminated by 31 January 2026, the petition must be submitted to the court no later than 31 March 2026. This is a hard deadline. Even if the parties agree to postpone the eviction date, this deadline still applies. It is therefore wise to have a rent lawyer advise you in good time.
What happens after a request for an extension of the eviction period has been submitted to the court?
Submitting the request suspends the obligation to evict. This means that the tenant may remain in the rented property until the court has decided. During the proceedings, the tenant and the lessor are subject to the same rights and obligations as set out in the tenancy agreement.
The judge weighs up the interests. He can only grant the tenant’s request if:
- the request has been submitted on time; and
- the interests of the tenant (and any subtenant) are more seriously harmed by the eviction than the interests of the lessor in the event of continued use by the tenant.
Even if both conditions are met, the request may be rejected by the court in the event of improper use or serious nuisance by the tenant or non-payment.
If the court finds in favour of the lessor, it will determine when the leased property must still be vacated. If the court finds in favour of the lessee, it will grant the request for extension. In that case, the tenant may continue to use the property for a maximum of 1 year after the notified eviction date. The tenant may submit a request for an extension of the eviction a maximum of three times for 1 year each time. No appeal is possible against the court’s decision on the eviction request.
When can the tenant not claim eviction protection with a 7:230a lease agreement?
The tenant is not entitled to eviction protection if he has terminated the lease himself or if he has agreed to the termination of the lease or the eviction by the landlord. It is therefore important for a tenant not to simply agree to the termination of a lease or the notice of eviction without seeking the advice of a lawyer in landlord and tenant law.
A tenant and landlord may also enter into a further agreement after entering into the tenancy agreement in which they agree that the tenant will not invoke eviction protection when terminating a 7:230a lease agreement. In that case, too, it is wise to have a lawyer inform you of this prior to the conclusion of such an agreement.
Do you have questions about eviction protection for 7:230a leases?
The commercial property tenancy attorneys of LVH Advocaten assist both tenants and landlords with all your questions regarding the termination of 7:230a lease agreements. On the one hand we can submit a petition on behalf of the tenant for the extension of the eviction period. On the other hand, we can submit a statement of defence on behalf of a landlord containing objections to the extension of the eviction period.
Rules on free choice of a lawyer under legal expenses insurance to be interpreted broadly
On 7 April of this year, the European Court of Justice has once again given two judgements on the free choice of a lawyer, in which the concept was more closely defined.
On 19 December 2013, we already reported the judgement of the European Court of Justice of 7 November 2013, which was that an insured person should always be allowed to choose his or her own lawyer in legal or administrative proceedings. On 7 April of this year, the European Court of Justice has once again given two judgements on the free choice of a lawyer, in which the concept was more closely defined.
In the cases that led to these judgements of the Court of Justice, the insurance company argued that dismissal proceedings before the Employee Insurance Agency (UWV) and an administrative objection to a rejection of a care needs assessment of the Care Assessment Centre (Centrum Indicatiestelling Zorg – CIZ) should not be considered “legal or administrative proceedings”, meaning that there is no right to free choice of a lawyer. In these proceedings, the Supreme Court asked the Court of Justice to give an opinion on the scope of the term “legal or administrative proceedings”.
According to the Court of Justice, the term “legal or administrative proceedings” must be interpreted broadly, and includes the abovementioned dismissal proceedings before the UWV and the abovementioned objection proceedings before the CIZ. In other words, the insurance companies lost out in these cases.
The conclusion of these judgements is that, in dismissal proceedings before the UWV and in objection proceedings before an administrative body, insured persons are entitled to free choice of a lawyer, which means that these insured persons may engage an external lawyer at the insurance company’s expense.
If you have a question about this subject, you can contact our office, +31 10 209 2777 or by e-mail info@lvh-advocaten.nl.
The reasonable compensation pursuant to the Dutch Work and Security Act
As of 1 July 2015, the Dutch Work and Security Act (Wet Werk en Zekerheid – WWZ) stipulates that, in the event of (involuntary) termination of his employment agreement, in principle, the employer owes the employee a transition compensation. In such case, the employment agreement must have lasted at least two years. The transition compensation is intended to compensate for the dismissal and ease the employee’s transition to another job. In extraordinary circumstances, the employee is entitled to a reasonable compensation in addition to the transition compensation. This is the case in the event of – for example – serious imputable acts or omissions on the part of the employer.
Transition compensation v. reasonable compensation
In calculating the transition compensation, the extent of the culpability of the employer is not taken into account. In addition, the level of the transition compensation does not depend on the reason for the termination of the employment agreement. This is different for the reasonable compensation. In calculating the reasonable compensation, the extent of the culpability of the employer is taken into account. The option of granting a reasonable compensation prevents the employer from being able to get away with committing imputable acts against the employee.
Level of the reasonable compensation
A claim for payment of a reasonable compensation must be submitted to the subdistrict court. Since the introduction of the reasonable compensation, many employees have claimed such a compensation. In determining the level of the reasonable compensation, the subdistrict court takes account of the seriousness and the culpability of the employer’s acts, but is not bound by a certain formula. It has, however, become clear that the salary and the length of the employment are not taken into account. In addition, the subdistrict court can take account of the employer’s financial situation.
So far, subdistrict courts have exercised restraint in granting the reasonable compensation. However, there have been a number of decisions in which the subdistrict court did grant a reasonable compensation. On 15 October 2015, a subdistrict court granted a reasonable compensation in connection with serious imputable acts on the part of the employer.
Subdistrict court of Amersfoort
In the relevant case, the employer terminated the employment agreement with the employee without observing the notice period and without the written consent of the employee. The employee submitted a claim for reasonable compensation.
The subdistrict court found that the employer terminated the employment agreement with the employee without her written consent. There had been no circumstances on the basis of which the employer was not required to ask the employee’s consent. According to the subdistrict court, legislative history shows that acts in violation of the applicable regulations constitute a serious imputable act. In the relevant case, the employer acted in violation of the statutory regulations, which meant that the employee was entitled to a reasonable compensation.
Conclusion
Only in extraordinary circumstances will the subdistrict court grant a reasonable compensation in addition to a transition compensation. This is the case in the event of – for example – serious imputable acts or omissions on the part of the employer. So far, there have been only a small number of decisions in which a reasonable compensation was granted. The above decision shows that termination of the employment agreement without the written consent of the employee constitutes a serious imputable act on the part of the employer, on the basis of which a reasonable compensation is owed.
Further information
For additional information please feel free to contact our office 0031 10 209 2777 or by e-mail info@lvh-advocaten.nl.
After two years of illness, no further holiday entitlement under a ‘dormant employment contract
On 5 February 2026, the subdistrict court in Dordrecht (ECLI:NL:RBROT:2026:1215) ruled that an employee who has been unfit for work for more than two years and has what is known as a ‘dormant’ employment contract no longer accrues new annual leave days. This ruling is therefore consistent with previous case law from, amongst others, the subdistrict courts in Groningen and Rotterdam. The decision differs from an earlier ruling by the Arnhem Subdistrict Court in 2025, which had held that holiday entitlement could indeed be accrued during a dormant employment contract. There now appears to be a consistent line in case law, and we await a similar ruling from a Court of Appeal.
What were the facts of this case?
The employee in this case had been employed by his employer since April 2017. In October 2022, he became unable to work and has not performed any work since then. Following the expiry of the 104-week qualifying period, he began receiving an IVA benefit on 9 October 2024. From that point onwards, the employment relationship was deemed to be ‘dormant’: the employment contract remained formally in force, but the core obligations – to work and to pay wages – were no longer being fulfilled.
The employee repeatedly asked his employer to cooperate in terminating the employment contract with the award of a transition payment (the so-called ‘Xella route’). When the employer refused, the employee took the matter to the subdistrict court. He sought the termination of the employment contract, payment of compensation equivalent to the transition allowance, and payment of outstanding holiday entitlement and holiday pay.
Termination and compensation
The subdistrict court ruled that the employer had no reasonable interest in continuing the dormant employment contract. In accordance with the principles of good employment practice, the employer should have cooperated in terminating it. The employment contract was therefore terminated and the employee was awarded compensation amounting to the net equivalent of the transition payment.
Accumulation and payment of holiday entitlement
The dispute centred in particular on the question of whether the employee had accrued any further holiday entitlement after the end of the waiting period. In total, the employee claimed 312 hours of unused holiday. Of these, 152 hours had been accrued before the end of the waiting period and 160 hours afterwards, i.e. during the dormant employment contract.
The subdistrict court judge drew a clear distinction here. The annual leave days accrued up to the end of the waiting period had to be paid out. For the period thereafter, however, the subdistrict court judge ruled that no annual leave had been accrued.
Section 7:634(1) of the Dutch Civil Code stipulates that annual leave is accrued only during periods in which the employee is entitled to wages. The employee argued that this provision should not apply as it conflicted with European legislation, in particular Article 31(2) of the EU Charter and Directive 2003/88/EC. The employee argued that the right to annual paid leave is a fundamental right under European law, which in principle continues to exist even during illness. He therefore contended that Article 7:634(1) of the Dutch Civil Code should not apply in this case and that holiday entitlement had continued to accrue even during the dormant employment relationship.
The subdistrict court did not accept this argument. Referring to case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the subdistrict court held that specific circumstances arise in the case of a dormant employment contract which justify a derogation from the fundamental right to annual paid leave.
No recovery function and no double entitlement
According to the subdistrict court, annual leave loses its core function in the case of a dormant employment contract. Annual leave is intended to allow an employee to recover from work performed. An employee with a dormant employment contract no longer performs any work and is not subject to any reintegration obligations. There is therefore no work from which to recover (the so-called ‘recovery function’).
Another factor is that, after two years of illness, the employee is entitled to a benefit (in this case an IVA benefit, part of the WIA), which also takes into account an entitlement to paid annual leave. If holiday entitlement were also to accrue with the employer during the same period, this would amount to a double entitlement. For this reason, the subdistrict court judge considers Article 7:634(1) of the Dutch Civil Code not to be in breach of European law.
The conclusion is that, after the end of the qualifying period, no further holiday entitlement is accrued and that the employee is not entitled to payment for these hours upon termination of employment.
Implications for practice
This ruling is in line with previous rulings by the subdistrict courts in Groningen and Rotterdam, which held that no further annual leave is accrued after two years of illness whilst on a dormant employment contract. This appears to indicate a consistent line of case law, although vigilance remains essential.
Would you like to know more or do you have any questions on this subject? Our employment law solicitors are on hand to advise you! Please contact Richard Ouwerling and Jamie Janssen, employment law solicitors at LVH Advocaten.
Breakthrough; corporate tax interest is unreasonably high, here’s what you can do.
Breakthrough; corporate tax interest is unreasonably high, here’s what you can do.
On 7 November 2024, the North Netherlands Court ruled that a tax interest rate of 8 per cent on a 2021 assessment is not reasonable. This landmark ruling opens up new opportunities for taxpayers who have faced high corporate tax interest rates. What does this ruling mean specifically for you, and what steps can you take now?
What is tax interest?
Tax interest is charged by the Tax Authorities when there is a delay in imposing a tax assessment. It is designed to encourage taxpayers to file their returns on time and prevent the Tax Administration from inadvertently acting as a savings account.
Interest is calculated from 1 July according to the year for which tax is due. Since 2022, tax interest has been set at 8 per cent for corporate income tax, and in 2024 it has even increased to 10 per cent. This high rate is based on the statutory commercial interest rate, but the court has now ruled that this link is not tenable.
Why is the tax rate too high?
The court has ruled that the 8 per cent rate violates the principle of proportionality. The principle of proportionality holds the measures taken by the government must be in reasonable proportion to the aim the government is pursuing with that measure. The aim of the measure is for taxpayers to file their tax returns. And so now the court has decided that the application of an 8 per cent tax interest rate leads to unnecessary adverse effects on taxpayers.
The court’s main considerations for this were:
Trade interest is not comparable: Tax interest is linked to trade interest, but taxation is not a business transaction between private parties. As a result, this comparison is not justified.
Unequal treatment: Tax interest is higher than that applicable to other taxes, such as income tax, for no good reason.
Default interest is different: Tax interest should not be compared to default interest, which is charged if an assessment is not paid on time. Instead, tax interest refers to situations where a final assessment has not yet been imposed.
Reduction to 4 per cent
The court ruled that tax interest in this case should be reduced to 4 per cent. This rate corresponds to the tax interest rate applicable to other taxes, such as income tax, until July 2023. This ensures fairer treatment of taxpayers.
Opportunities for action
Have you been charged tax interest? If so, you may be able to do the following:
Final or additional tax assessment
File an objection within six weeks of receiving the final or additional tax assessment imposed after 2022 if you believe the tax interest charged is unreasonable.
Provisional assessment
If tax interest has been calculated on a provisional assessment, you can file a request to review the interest within six weeks of the final assessment. Therefore, if tax interest has been charged on the provisional assessment, in addition to objecting to the final assessment, a request for review for tax interest on the provisional assessment must also be filed.
How to avoid tax interest?
To avoid incurring high tax interest in the future, you can do the following:
File a tax return on time: If your tax return is filed on time and the assessment is determined without amendments, no tax interest will be charged.
Apply for a provisional assessment: By applying for a provisional assessment in advance and making an accurate estimate of your taxable profit, you will avoid paying interest on an unexpectedly high tax assessment afterwards.
Check your estimates: Make sure your provisional assessment matches the final assessment. This will avoid unnecessary costs.
Need help?
Do you have questions about the implications of this ruling or would you like advice on how to limit tax interest? Please contact our tax advisor David Harreman. He will be happy to help you arrange your tax affairs efficiently and avoid unnecessary costs.
(Written) assignment agreement: in good faith or well regulated?
Entrepreneurs like to work together “in good faith.” In other words, agreements are made verbally and the parties immediately start working together. That’s great, after all we want to get to work quickly and deal with legal matters as little as possible. However, it only has to go wrong once and regrets surface. If only I had put that in writing in a commission contract with the contractor / client.
So too with the commission contract. Our advice to entrepreneurs is therefore: good faith is nice, but well organized is better! Discuss the conditions with each other and have them put on paper by a lawyer. An important message here is that a commission contract does not have to be pages long. You put the basic agreements on paper (can also be done by e-mail) and the law will fill in the rest.
In this article, we would like to provide some points that can be covered in the assignment agreement.
Duration and termination of assignment agreement
An important agreement that you should lay down is the duration of the contract. Will a specific assignment be completed or will the parties continue to work together for a longer period of time? This information is important, not only for the future perspective, but also for the possibilities of terminating the assignment.
For example, a contractor may, in principle, only terminate the open-ended contract and the fixed-term contract may only be terminated for important reasons. A client may cancel the assignment contract (indefinite and definite term), unless it concerns a professional client and deviating arrangements have been made. For example, the parties can agree that both parties can cancel the contract (possibly under certain conditions) with due regard for a notice period.
Compensation contractor
Of course, as a professional contractor, you also want to be paid. It is therefore wise to agree on that remuneration in writing. Are you going to work on the basis of an hourly rate, a piece rate or a fixed amount for the assignment. Also think about the expenses. Are they included in the fee or will they be for the account of the client or contractor.
If you do not agree on a fee, the contractor can still claim a reasonable fee. Of course, this is not a desirable situation and it is wise to put the agreed remuneration in writing.
Intellectual Property Contractor
As a contractor and client, you will have to deal with intellectual property rights. The main rule is that the creator (the one who delivers a creative performance) is the owner of the intellectual property rights, even if the client has commissioned the creation of a text, design or invention. It is possible to deviate from this main rule. After all, the client wants to use the intellectual property. So agree for what purpose the client may use the work delivered (user license) or arrange a transfer of copyright.
Please note that if the performance was created under the direction and supervision of the principal, then the copyright could lie with the principal. This depends on the instructions given and the freedom the contractor had.
Non-competition and relationship clause in assignment contract
We are all familiar with non-competition and non-solicitation clauses from employment contracts, but they can also be used in assignment contracts. Case law provides a similar test for assessing the legal validity of a non-competition clause. A non-competition clause is not automatically valid. It must be in writing and may not violate the fundamental right of free choice of employment (Article 19 of the Constitution). This may be the case if the duration of the clause is unnecessarily long or otherwise too broadly formulated.
The rule for the contractor is therefore: do not just sign a non-competition clause. And for the employer the following applies: a non-competition clause may be used to protect the business interests, but do not formulate the clause too broadly so that it does not infringe on the contractor’s freedom to choose his work.
Need help drafting assignment agreement?
We would be happy to help you draw up a contract of assignment so that you can focus on your business. Would you like more information or a free consultation about the possibilities? Please contact Richard Ouwerling of LVH Advocaten. She can tell you everything about working relationships, such as the commission contract.
Stalemate between directors who are also shareholders: what to do?
Stalemate between directors who are also shareholders: what to do?
A common situation. A limited liability company with two directors who are both equal shareholders. The relationship between the two becomes disturbed. Even after calling in a corporate finance advisor, no (third) investor is found who wants to take over all or part of the share capital. Despite an appraisal of the company’s value, no agreement can be reached between the two parties on a buyout. And of course a (clear) dispute settlement in the articles of association or shareholder agreement is also missing.
The parties want to part ways, but at the right price. Meanwhile, the business must be continued without loss of value. The parties want to part ways in a normal way by avoiding escalation, but are still forced to hire a lawyer. What to do in a deadlock between directors who are also shareholders? Corporate lawyer Justin de Vries tells you more.
Options for forced transfer of shares
Attorneys are cautiously pointing out a number of ‘possibilities’ to enable the transfer of shares. In “brackets,” because actually the law does not provide an adequate solution to this “deadlock situation.
Transfer of shares in inquiry proceedings
One option is to initiate inquiry proceedings before the Enterprise Chamber. Although the existing inquiry procedure does not have the forced transfer of shares as a provision,[1] submitting such a dispute can lead to a (forced) transfer of shares.
Transfer of shares through statutory dispute resolution
Another option is to use the statutory dispute resolution procedure. In this procedure, shareholders can file an expulsion or exit claim.[2] Case law shows that the exit ground is interpreted restrictively. Not only is the procedure time-consuming, but the onerous standard used is considered a major objection.
This is odd. Does the situation have to escalate further before an expulsion or exit claim can be granted? Is there no other way to separate efficiently? Is there a rule for the situation where parties have entered into an engagement with good intentions but have become stuck with no real hope of restoring original understanding? No, there is not (as yet). [3][4]
Procedure court deadlock situation
In the proceedings before the Gelderland District Court dated June 8, 2022[5] , the “deadlock” situation described above played out. One of the shareholders decided, albeit in the alternative, to use the statutory dispute resolution procedure. This is proceedings on the merits which, as mentioned above, can take a long time and the outcome of which is uncertain.
Claim for appointment of temporary director
To ensure a workable situation during the proceedings, the shareholder decides to file an incidental claim for the appointment of a temporary director. According to the shareholder, it is important that an independent third party be appointed as a director. This third party will play a positive stimulating role for the company and will be able to exercise a decisive vote if decision-making by the incumbent board cannot take place or takes too long. In the shareholder’s view, an “incompabilité d’humeur” has arisen. For non-francophiles: this means that there is insufficient basis for fruitful cooperation. The other shareholder who is also a director puts up a reasoned defense and believes that decision-making is not hindered by the poor relationship between the parties.
Power of court appointment of temporary director
The existence of an “incompabilitie d’humeur” is not the standard by which the court should judge the dispute. But then, what should be the standard? And does the court even have jurisdiction to proceed with the appointment of a temporary director? Or is this reserved for the Enterprise Chamber?[6]
To begin with the last question. In the proceedings, the court considers itself competent to rule on the incidental claim for the appointment of a temporary director of a private limited company. The court considers that this judgment is actually reserved for the Enterprise Chamber, but that the court can also anticipate the inquiry proceedings to be conducted at the Enterprise Chamber. The outcome is correct, but the path towards it questionable. In this regard, see also Mr. Kemp’s annotation to this ruling.[7] Although this is not clear from the literature, it can be assumed that the legislator’s intention was that the preliminary relief judge and the Enterprise Chamber should both have jurisdiction in such cases.[8] There is also the possibility of applying to the Enterprise Chamber for an immediate injunction, without the need for a subsequent investigation.[9] The latter is no longer desirable and too costly in many cases.
Immediate appeal to the Enterprise Chamber: speed
Incidentally, the impression should not be created that in the proceedings before the Enterprise Chamber no quick immediate remedy can be taken. This was not the option chosen in this case. The primary claim in the proceedings before the court concerned performance of an alleged agreement on the transfer of shares from one shareholder to another. With the idea that proceedings on the merits had already been initiated, it is not surprising that an incidental claim was filed in the same court.
Review standard appointment of temporary director
Then the substantive standard of review. By what should the court test whether a temporary board should be appointed? In this case, the court tests against the “mismanagement standard” of the inquiry procedure. This is remarkable. If a standard has to be reviewed at all, it should be the standard used by the Enterprise Chamber for immediate relief. This also fits the nature of the measure to appoint a temporary board. The maladministration standard does not fit this. In principle, this judgment follows only after completion of the investigation in an inquiry procedure.
Court’s review of ‘mismanagement standard’
The court ruled that the plaintiff did not sufficiently prove that the other shareholder was guilty of “mismanagement. That the claim is dismissed with the application of this onerous standard is not surprising. Although the wrong standard appears to have been applied, the outcome of the proceedings is easily digestible. The fact that there is a disturbed relationship between the directors does not automatically mean that it impedes decision-making. It is up to the plaintiff to prove this. Further, it is also not obvious that the appointment of the third-party director provides any guarantee of an improvement in the relationship. This too is up to the plaintiff to substantiate.
Conclusion
Back to the beginning. The underlying problem in a “deadlock situation” is a lack of a legal arrangement that allows the corporate relationship to be terminated in an efficient manner, without the company’s affiliated business having to suffer and without the tension rising so high that indeed an exit claim is granted in a dispute resolution case. The first step to avoid this is to include a proper contractual dispute resolution provision, preferably in the articles of association and/or shareholders’ agreement.
[1] Art. 2:356 BW.
[2] Art. 2:335-343c BW
[3] With regard to the dispute resolution scheme, I refer to interesting articles by Schreurs and Bulten: 1) mr. F. Schreurs, The revised dispute resolution scheme and the long road to a corporate divorce law, WPNR 2017/7158 2) and an article by Bulten: C.D.J. Bulten, ‘The dispute resolution scheme – I feel like a long-playing record’; De Wulf et al. in: Corporate Law in the Low Countries, What can we learn from the Belgians? (Institute for Business Law No. 117), pp. 143-161, Deventer: Wolters Kluwer 2020, ISBN 9789013155389.
[4] See Preliminary draft Law on Adjusting Dispute Resolution and Clarifying Admissibility Requirements Survey Procedure
[5] ECLI:NL:RBGEL:2022:2904.
[6] Art. 2:349a paragraphs 2 and 3 and Art. 2:356 sub c BW.
[7] JOR 2022/231 with annotation by Kemp, B.
[8] Incidentally, there is no unanimity in the literature on the question of whether the interim relief judge has jurisdiction to appoint a temporary director in addition to the Enterprise Chamber.
[9] It goes too far to go into that in depth in this article.
How to effectively terminate an agency agreement
Agency agreements under Dutch law are defined in book 7 of the Dutch Civil Code (DCC). Book 7 contains a number of specific type of agreements that need a specific form of protection. Agency agreements and employment agreements are examples of such specific agreements.
Agent agreement have specific protection such as termination of the agency agreement, damages, goodwill compensation and the notice period to terminate the agency agreement. Some of these provisions in the DCC are of a compulsory nature for both the parties concerned, meaning that these provisions cannot be deviated from.
Can you terminate an agency agreement?
In the event that the agency agreement falls within the definition of agency agreements set out in article 7:428 DCC, either party may terminate the agency agreement and the notice period for the principal must be the same as for the agent. The notice period must also be given at the end of the month, meaning that the termination notice needs to have reached the receiving party before the end of the month (article 3:37 (3) DCC). The length of the notice period of an agency agreement is dependent on whether the agency agreement contains a notice period in the agency agreement or not.
What if the Agency agreement does contain a clause with a notice period?
If the agency agreement is entered into for a fixed term with the right to terminate during the term, or if the agency agreement is entered into for an indefinite term, the agency agreement may be terminated by either party in accordance with the notice period provided for in the agency agreement. However, article 7:437(2) DCC states that a minimum legal notice period must be applied. This is one month for an agency agreement with a term of one year, two months for an agency agreement with a term of up to two years and three months with a term of three years or more. The notice period for both parties must be the same.
What if the Agency agreement does not contain a clause on a notice period
The general rule is that if the agency agreement is entered into for a fixed term or an indefinite term, and it does not contain a clause for termination, then a notice period of at least four months applies, article 7:437 (1) DCC.
This minimum legal notice period shall be increased by one month for every 3 years that the agency agreement has lasted since the date of commencement. So, the notice period for an agency agreement is five months (4 months plus one month) in the event that the agency agreement commenced 3 years ago. If the agency agreement commenced 6 years ago or longer, then the notice period is 6 months, which is the maximum legal notice period permitted by law.
What happens if the above legal notice period is not complied with?
If either party does not comply with the above legal requirements regarding the legal notice period without the approval of the other party, that party is under an obligation to pay damages provided that there is no urgent ground for terminating the agency agreement, article 7:439 DCC. The rule of thumb is that the damages payable is determined based on the provision that the agent would have earnt if the legal notice period was correctly applied. However, certain facts and circumstances may influence the actual amount further.
Which legal requirements need to be met in the actual notice period itself?
The notice is form-free but needs to have reached the other person (article 3:37 DCC). The wording of the notice is important as well as the facts and circumstances surrounding it. The courts will look at not only the wording but also the intentions of the parties to determine the meaning that the parties, given the circumstances at hand, reasonably could have attributed or expected at the time.
Are you looking for an attorney at law specialised in the termination of an agency agreement, please feel free to contact Madelon van Breemen.
Bill to lift pledge bans
On June 11, 2024, the House of Representatives adopted the Bill to Remove Pledge Prohibitions. As a result of the proposed regulation, it will no longer be possible to agree that receivables cannot be transferred or pledged. This article explains the proposed regulation.
Transferability claims
Virtually all claims are subject to assignment and pledge. There are some exceptions to this. In some cases, because of the nature of the claim, it is assumed that transfer is not possible. This is the case, for example, with a claim which the trustee in bankruptcy has against a director pursuant to Article 2:248 of the Dutch Civil Code regarding improper management.
Appointment exclusion portability
Under current law, parties may agree that a claim is nontransferable. For example, a party may state in purchase conditions that claims against that party are not assignable.
In a judgment dated July 1, 2022, the Supreme Court considered that it also follows from a clause to the effect that a claim is non-transferable that the claim cannot be pledged. In doing so, the Supreme Court referred to the law, which stipulates that a pledge can only be established on goods susceptible to transfer (Art. 3:228 BW).
It may be convenient for a party if a claim against him cannot be transferred or pledged. In that case, it is always clear to whom payment can be made and there is also no reason to change payment information in the records. In addition, the party with whom the contract is made is well informed about the situation, whereas an outsider (such as a factoring company) is usually less well informed.
It is important for lenders to obtain ample coverage for the credit extended through collateral provided. The more collateral that can be provided, the more credit can be obtained. In practice, pledging receivables is an important form of security. However, if two parties doing business with each other agree that assignment (and/or pledging) is not possible, then no pledge will be established.
Background bill lifting pledge bans
The restrictions imposed by the agreements on non-transferability and non-pledgeability of claims are seen by legislators as undesirable economic side effects. Added to this is the fact that in our neighboring countries the possibilities to limit transferability have already been abolished or further restricted. The rationale behind the bill is that by abolishing nontransferability and non-pawnability, there will be a significant widening of credit potential for business. This could then prevent unnecessary liquidity problems and provide more room for investment and innovation.
Consequences of bill to lift pledge bans
The bill contains a new provision. According to this provision, exclusion of transferability or pledgeability is not possible if it concerns a registered monetary claim arising from the exercise of a profession or business. Nevertheless, if it is agreed between creditor and debtor that such monetary claim is nontransferable or cannot be pledged, that agreement is void. This means that such an agreement has no legal effect.
An agreement aimed at preventing alienation or pledging is also void. This might, for example, be an agreement to the effect that the creditor is prohibited from assigning the claim and/or a penalty becomes payable if the creditor does so.
The provision therefore shows that it only concerns monetary claims arising from the exercise of a profession or business. Suppose someone provides a money loan from a private capacity, then it may be agreed that the claim for repayment is non-transferable.
There are additionally some exceptional cases mentioned in the bill. One example is the claim from a checking or savings account. If one has a positive balance in a bank account, this is considered a claim of the account holder against the bank. Banks may still stipulate that such claims are not transferable and cannot be pledged.
Written notice to debtor about assignment of claim
The bill provides that if a monetary claim (registered and arising from the exercise of a profession or business) is transferred, notice must be given to the debtor of the claim. This notice must be given in writing. Only after the notice has been given will the debtor have to pay to the new creditor. In this way, the legislature hopes to accommodate the debtor’s interest in having clarity about the payment address.
Effective date and effect on existing contractual non-transferability agreements
For now, the law will not take effect yet. First, the bill still has to pass the Senate. Once the law enters into force, it will also affect clauses in contracts concluded prior to the entry into force of the law. Three months after the entry into force of the law, clauses contrary to the law will become null and void.
Negative pledge still possible
A negative pledge clause means that the borrower promises to the lender not to create security interests in property owned by the borrower in favor of other creditors. For example, in liens on receivables, banks stipulate that the borrower/pawnbroker will not create liens on receivables in favor of others. Such agreements will still be permitted even after the new law comes into effect. The new law refers only to stipulations “between creditor and debtor.
Resuming Act on Lifting Pledge Bans.
After the Act on the Abolition of Prohibitions of Pledge takes effect, stipulations between creditors and debtors regarding the non-transferability and non-pledgeability of claims will no longer be legally valid. Whether this will actually have a significant positive economic effect will have to be seen in practice.
Looking for an attorney in the field of securities?
If you have questions about pledging, collateral and assignment of claims, please contact Peter de Graaf of LVH Lawyers.
Rejection of homologation request WHOA agreement
Rejection of homologation request WHOA agreement
The Homologation Underhand Arrangement Act (WHOA) went into effect on January 1, 2021. In the meantime, a substantial number of rulings have been issued on it. It remains to be seen how practice will develop and whether it can be said whether the introduction of the Act has been a success. To date, the number of (published) granted homologation requests is still relatively small.
Below I will discuss a decision of 10 November 2021 of the District Court of Midden-Nederland, which rejected the request for homologation of a WHOA agreement on several grounds.
What is the WHOA?
The WHOA offers the possibility for a debtor to have a creditors’ agreement compulsorily imposed by the court. The mandatory imposition of the agreement is called homologation. Such an agreement may include, for example, that the creditors have to settle for a smaller payment than they were entitled to. Before the introduction of the WHOA this was only possible in the case of suspension of payments and bankruptcy. The WHOA is intended to settle debts at an earlier stage, so that a moratorium or bankruptcy can be avoided.
You can read more on our website about what the WHOA broadly entails and the role of the restructuring expert under the WHOA.
Case: request for mandatory imposition of WHOA agreement
Five private companies belonging to the same group have asked the court to approve agreements. There is one creditor, anonymously referred to in the judgment as ‘company 1’, who has a substantial claim of €9.5 million against the five debtors, whereby there is joint and several liability. The joint and several liability entails that company 1 has the right to sue each of the five debtors for the entire debt.
Classification in WHOA agreement
In the applications of all five applicants, the creditors are divided into two classes, namely the preferential creditors (creditors with rights of priority) and unsecured creditors. The Tax Authority is the only creditor in the class of preferential creditors. The other creditors, including Company 1, are divided into the unsecured creditor class. Company 1 was included in this for the claim of €9.5 million in all five applications and represents by far the largest portion of the indebtedness in the classes of unsecured creditors. In the event of a vote in the classes, Company 1 therefore has a casting vote.
The settlement offered would pay ,021% of the claims of the unsecured creditors and 6,93% of the claim of the Tax Authorities. Due to the fact that company 1 is a creditor of all five applicants (because of the joint and several liability), it would in fact receive 5.1% of its claim based on the settlement.
Special conditions for discharge
Further, the case shows that Company 1 financed the group companies. In addition, Company 1 has imposed special conditions on the granting of discharge (i.e., cooperation with the arrangement). Company 1 will only grant discharge if the Arrangement is reached and if it will provide the new financing. Details of the provision of the financing were not disclosed. Furthermore, the agreement is conditional on final discharge being granted to Company 1 and the management.
Creditors’ objections to homologation of WHOA agreement
There are four creditors who object to the offered agreements. The following aspects are particularly important in this regard:
- The lack of information about, in particular, the position of Company 1;
- the chosen class division and, in that regard, in particular the influence that Company 1 will have as a result on the outcome of the vote; and
- The position of Company 1 and the board after the implementation of the agreement.
The importance of proper class scheduling in a WHOA agreement
Article 384 paragraph 1 Bankruptcy Act stipulates that a request for homologation of a settlement agreement can be granted, unless one or more of the grounds for rejection, referred to in Article 384 paragraph 2 to paragraph 5 Bankruptcy Act, occur.
The court indicates that this test lies primarily with the creditors themselves. Further, the court considers:
“With a proper class division, the voting result in principle gives democratic legitimacy to the agreement. When the creditors are divided into a limited number of classes, as in this case, and thus little distinction is made between the rights of creditors, there is a risk that the vote of one or a few large creditors will determine the outcome of the vote. The importance of protecting the dissenting minority is then greater. ”
As far as I’m concerned, it’s good that the court is aware of this.
WHOA agreement must meet disclosure requirements
Art. 384 paragraph 2 sub c Bankruptcy Act stipulates that a request for homologation of the agreement will be rejected if the agreement itself and the documents submitted with it do not contain all the information mentioned in art. 375 Bankruptcy Act. This section of the law enumerates which information a settlement agreement must contain.
Missing explanation on why shareholders are not covered by WHOA agreement
When offering a settlement agreement, creditors or shareholders not covered by the agreement must be declared. The offered arrangement did not include the shareholders. However, there was no explanation as to why the shareholders were not covered by the arrangement. Therefore, the court considers the provision of information on this point insufficient.
What are liquidation value and reorganization value?
When offering the settlement, the reorganization value and the liquidation value must be quantified, among other things. The reorganisation value is the value that is expected to be realised if the settlement is reached. The liquidation value is the proceeds that are expected to be realized in a liquidation of the debtor’s assets by a bankruptcy trustee in bankruptcy.
Comparison of liquidation value with offer from WHOA agreement
By comparing the liquidation value and what is offered to creditors with the agreement, it can be assessed whether creditors will be better off with the debtor’s bankruptcy or with compliance with the agreement. Article 384 paragraph 3 Bankruptcy Act states:
“At the request of one or more voting creditors or shareholders who have not themselves consented to the agreement or who have been improperly denied the right to vote, the court may reject an application for approval of an agreement, if it is summarily apparent that these creditors or shareholders are worse off on the basis of the agreement than they would be in a liquidation of the debtor’s assets in bankruptcy.”
This is called the Best Interest of Creditors test.
Insufficient information on liquidation value
In the discussed case, the liquidation value was calculated only concerning a limited number of applicants. One of the applicants is known to have inventory and claims on debtors, yet no liquidation value has been calculated. A liquidation value of another applicant has not been calculated either, while a balance sheet does show a claim on a related party of €5.7 million, without it being clear which party that is. It is also unclear what the value is of 100% equity interests held in other companies. At the hearing it was stated by the applicant that the shares are worthless, but the court cannot establish this. The court concludes that the information in the offered agreements is inadequate on this point.
Insufficient information on position funder agreement WHOA
Also, according to the court, the information provided about the position of Company 1 before and after the arrangement is inadequate. Company 1 is a creditor, but also the financier of the arrangement. According to the court, insufficient information has been provided about the financing and the conditions to be attached to it. Therefore the court concludes that too little insight has been given to enable the creditors to form an opinion about the arrangement.
Incorrect classifications under the WHOA
The court recalls that the request for homology should be rejected if the class division does not meet the legal requirements. Creditors must be assigned to different classes if their rights in a liquidation of assets in bankruptcy or those offered to them on the basis of the composition are so different that there is no question of a comparable position.
Creditors’ rights are too different in WHOA agreement
The court held that Company 1 should have been classified in a different class than the other unsecured creditors. Based on the arrangement, due to the joint and several liability of the five applicants, Company 1 would receive five times the distribution of 1.02% on the total claim (i.e. a total of 5.1%), while on the claims of other unsecured creditors, only once 1.02% would be distributed. Therefore, the rights of Company 1 are too different, according to the court.
Classification of SME creditors into separate class in WHOA agreement
According to the court, the SME creditors should also have been assigned to a separate class under the Bankruptcy Act. Furthermore, the court noted that with respect to one creditor, who was classified in the class of unsecured creditors, it applies that the claim is contractually subordinated. On this point, too, the class division is incorrect.
Severity of defects with respect to class assignment
Furthermore, the court ruled that it cannot be assumed that the defects with regard to the class allocation could not have led to a different outcome of the vote concerning four of the five applicants. In the case of four of the five Applicants, the unsecured class of creditors would not have agreed to the Arrangement if Company 1 had been classified in a separate class.
Grounds for rejecting homologation WHOA agreement
As can be seen from the foregoing, the court has found several problems, both with respect to the disclosure of the agreement, and the class certification. The court rejects the requests for homologation of the agreements.
Legal assistance with WHOA agreement
In addition to being able to cast a vote in the class of creditors, a creditor in a WHOA agreement also has the option (under certain circumstances) of requesting the court to reject the homologation of the agreement.
In the case discussed, four creditors raised various objections. The judgment shows that, based on some of these objections, the court has come to the conclusion that the request for homologation should be rejected.
Looking for a lawyer about WHOA agreement in Rotterdam?
If you need legal assistance in offering a settlement under the WHOA or if you wish to object to the settlement as a creditor, please contact Peter de Graaf.
Director’s liability for tax debts
Destruction of legal acts by the receiver
Directors of troubled companies are usually aware that acts performed in the face of bankruptcy (if it comes to that) will be examined by a receiver. Unobligatory legal acts that have harmed creditors may be reversed by the trustee.
Liability to the estate
Directors are also usually aware that it is important to publish financial statements on time and have the administration in order. After all, failure to publish financial statements (on time) or not having proper records can lead to directors’ liability. In these cases, manifestly improper management is established and there is a legal presumption that this improper management is a major cause of the bankruptcy. It is then up to the director to make it plausible that the bankruptcy was caused by something other than manifestly improper management. If this fails, the director will be liable for the estate shortfall. This is regulated in Article 2:248 of the Dutch Civil Code.
Liability towards the tax authorities
Less well known is that the Tax Collection Act also contains a regulation that may lead to liability of the director for tax debts. Directors of commercial legal entities are jointly and severally liable for (among others) payroll and turnover tax debts of those legal entities if the non-payment of those tax debts is due to improper management. There is a legal presumption of improper management if the director has failed to make timely notifications of inability to pay. Notifications of inability to pay must be made by completing and submitting the form on the tax authorities’ website. The notification must be timely, i.e. made within 2 weeks of the day the taxes due are due. This liability is regulated in Section 36 of the Tax Collection Act.
Two regulations but slightly different
The regulation under the Invorderingswet is similar to the regulation under the Civil Code:
- if you, as a director, have not (timely) fulfilled the publication obligation or have not fulfilled the accounting obligation, the director is liable for the estate deficit.
- if, as a director, you have not reported a payment default in time, then you are liable for tax debts.
Yet there is an important difference. The director held liable by a receiver can negate the legal presumption of mismanagement by making it plausible that there were other causes of the bankruptcy. But the director who is held liable by the receiver must first pass an important hurdle; he must make it plausible that the failure to report the inability to pay on time is not attributable to him.
With few exceptions, this is an almost impossible task. In any case, you cannot defend yourself by arguing that you had another task within the board.
Only if you, as a director, succeed in making it plausible that the failure to report in time is not attributable to you, you will be given the opportunity to rebut the presumption of improper management. If the director cannot make it plausible that the failure to report in time is not imputable to him, he will not be given this opportunity, even if there were objectively other causes of the bankruptcy. Because of this strict rule, there is a sanction here for failure to report in time rather than a sanction for manifestly improper management.
Background
It is somewhat harder to imagine in this day and age that the penalty for failure to report has such a large effect but this regulation was introduced as an anti-abuse provision in a period before the computer age. In those days, it could take a long time for the tax authorities to know about late payments. Hence, the idea; the director himself should quickly report that there is an inability to pay so that the tax authorities can quickly take recovery action.
But now we are many years down the line and, thanks to automation, the tax authorities are quickly aware of late payments. The force majeure notification actually plays no role in this. So is it still reasonable to impose such a severe sanction on what is in many ways a minor offence?
Is Section 36 Recovery Act still of our time?
Although in practice the regulation is applied less often and less strictly than the text of the Act suggests, there is resistance to the regulation and the question is whether the regulation does not violate European regulations, more specifically the principle of proportionality. The Supreme Court has now asked the Court in Luxembourg whether the rule of Section 36 of the Tax Collection Act, under which a director who has merely failed to report a payment default on time and therefore can hardly escape liability for high tax debts, is proportionate. The answer to this question will take some time. Meanwhile, the legislator would do better to align this regulation with the presumption of improper management in case the company’s administration is not in order. This is an equal criterion that also applies to receivers. This might also prevent a concurrence in which a director is held liable by both a receiver and a receiver or, on the contrary, only by the one of these parties because it happens to be in a better evidential position.
Looking for an insolvency lawyer?
Would you like to know more about the notification of insolvency or the liability of a director in case of bankruptcy? Feel free to contact Rob Steenhoek of LVH Advocaten. He specialises in insolvency and corporate law and will be happy to help you.
Airline liability
What if a passenger suffers bodily injury?
Montreal Convention
Liability in international air transport is regulated in particular by the Montreal Convention (hereinafter: the Convention). The Convention provides rules for European member states on when and for what type of damage airlines are liable. In doing so, the Convention covers both freight and passenger transport and distinguishes between different types of damage:
- property damage;
- damage to luggage;
- damages resulting from death or bodily injury to a passenger.
This article focuses on the latter type: damages for death or bodily injury to a passenger.
Damages for death or bodily injury to a passenger
With respect to these damages, the Convention provides that the air carrier is liable, “by reason only of the fact that the accident which caused the death or injury occurred on board the aircraft or during any act connected with the boarding or disembarkation of the aircraft” (Article 17(1)).
In other words, if something happens on or around the aircraft that results in death or bodily injury, the airline is liable. That’s the bottom line. So that liability goes pretty far.
There is an exception to this principle. Indeed, if there is fault or negligence on the part of the passenger concerned, the airline may be relieved of liability (Article 20). The airline will then have to prove that a) there was fault or negligence on the part of the passenger and b) that this fault or negligence caused or contributed to the damage. If this succeeds, the airline will not be liable for (part of) the damage.
Court ruling on personal injury passenger
The Court of Justice of the European Union recently ruled (C-589/20) on a case involving personal injury to a passenger. This was in response to a preliminary question – a request for interpretation – on the Convention raised by the Austrian court.
This case involved the question of liability for Austrian airline Austrian Airlines. In mid-2019, a couple flew to Vienna with their child. After arriving at the airport, the husband, while descending the airplane stairs, almost fell down. His wife walked behind him with both her arms full and fell, in the same spot. The woman broke an arm and thus suffered bodily injury. She is suing Austrian Airlines for damages.
According to the court, there was no evidence that anything was wrong with the stairs in question and the woman did not take any precautions to prevent her fall, despite seeing that her husband almost fell. The Austrian court rejected the woman’s claim. When the woman appealed, the Austrian Court turned to the Court of Justice for an explanation of the Montreal Convention.
Court’s interpretation of Montreal Convention articles
The Court explains that Article 17 of the Convention does not mean that an airline is only liable for damages resulting from a “typical aviation risk. Thus, the accident need have nothing to do with flying or the movement of the aircraft itself. When a passenger falls for a completely unclear reason on an aircraft staircase with which there is nothing wrong, there is already an accident. The airline may therefore be liable for this.
The Court then turns to the next question, namely on the interpretation of Article 20. It explains that the purpose of Article 20 is to strike a balance between the interests of both the airline and the passengers. The Court emphasizes that the airline may be relieved of liability to the extent that it proves, given all the circumstances of the case, that it was the fault or negligence of the passenger that caused or contributed to the damage suffered by the passenger. Whether this is the case in a specific case should be left to the national court, according to the Court. Indeed, the Convention does not provide any specific rules on this proof.
Dutch court on fault and negligence passenger in personal injury case
The national court will thus have to assess whether an airline has proven that the damage was (partly) due to fault or negligence of the passenger concerned. In doing so, all circumstances of the case will be taken into account, such as, for example, the attention that can be expected of a passenger (with or without children) or to what extent the passenger sought adequate medical assistance after the accident. In assessing these various circumstances, the Dutch court will look to the rules of national law.
Advice on aviation and law?
LVH Advocaten is experienced in assisting airlines against various types of passenger claims. Do you have any questions as a result of this article? If so, please contact Jacolien Leuvenink.
Receivers V&D ordered to surrender SENZ umbrellas
In a judgement of 10 May 2016, the Court in Preliminary Relief Proceedings of the District Court of Amsterdam ordered the receivers of V&D B.V. to surrender the umbrellas that Senz Umbrellas B.V. delivered to V&D and have not been paid to Senz Umbrella’s B.V..
The Court in Preliminary Relief Proceedings allowed Senz Umbrellas B.V.’s reliance on its right to file a claim in full, and found that the position adopted by the receivers was unacceptable based on the principles of reasonableness and fairness.
Temporary law on transparency turboliquidation
Temporary law on transparency turboliquidation
The Temporary Act on Transparency Turboliquidation came into force on 15 November 2023. The consequences of this law and the additional conditions that must be met have been written about before (see, for example, the article from 22 March 2023). Despite the increased requirements, turboliquidation is still a good tool for winding up companies with no operations and assets after 15 November 2023.
Nevertheless, in the run-up to 15 November 2023, a marked increase in the number of turbo liquidations has been visible. The enactment of this law combined with increased efforts by tax authorities to collect deferred corona tax debts seem to be important factors in this regard.
Impact on dissolutions before 15 November 2023
The Rotterdam District Court recently ruled on a turboliquidation that took place on 14 November 2023, i.e. 1 day before the new law came into force. The dissolution was registered in the trade register on 16 November 2023.
A creditor of the company then filed for bankruptcy of the now dissolved company on 8 December 2023. According to established case law, this is possible, provided there is prima facie evidence of facts and circumstances that make it plausible that there are still assets and that the other requirements for bankruptcy have also been met. Reference is then often made to a possible claim by the dissolved company against the director for mismanagement because financial statements were not published on time or because the company’s administration was allegedly not in order. This claim against the director is a ‘benefit’ to the company that can be realised by a trustee in bankruptcy. The applicant has argued the same in these proceedings but has not made it sufficiently plausible.
More interestingly, the applicant also pointed out that the rules following the Temporary Act on Transparency Turboliquidation had not been complied with by the company. Creditors had not been informed at all, nor had the director filed documents with the trade register. In the run-up to the oral hearing, the former director only sent an e-mail to the court stating that the company had been deregistered due to business termination. However, the court ruled that Act Temporary Transparency Turboliquidation Act does not apply to dissolutions that took place before 15 November 2023. Whether the rules of that Act were complied with is therefore irrelevant.
The conduct of the director in question may not be considered chic by everyone; it did not violate the (then applicable) law. With no summary evidence of possible gains, the bankruptcy petition is dismissed.
Looking for a corporate law lawyer?
Would you like to know more about the dissolution of a company, turboliquidation or a request to reopen the liquidation? Feel free to contact Rob Steenhoek of LVH Advocaten. He specialises in corporate law and will be happy to help you.
Problems when the lessor invokes a bank guarantee for vacancy losses due to bankruptcy of lessee
The Supreme Court recently passed an interesting ruling that provides more clarity about to what extent a bank can have recourse against the insolvent estate if it has paid an amount for vacancy losses within the framework of a bank guarantee.
In order to make sense of the ruling for non-lawyers, I will first give a brief explanation about two subjects that are relevant to this case.
Regulation about terminating the lease in the event of bankruptcy
Section 39 of the Bankruptcy Act [Faillissementswet] stipulates that if the bankrupt party is a lessee, both the receiver and the lessor can terminate the lease. They have to observe a notice period of three months. As from the bankruptcy date, the rent becomes part of the bankruptcy estate.
A bankruptcy estate has the highest priority in terms of payment in a bankruptcy case, but there may be mutual ranking differences in a bankruptcy estate. Payment to preferential creditors cannot be made until the entire bankruptcy estate can be paid. Ordinary creditors are paid once all preferential creditors can be paid. In short, a creditor of an insolvent company is in a much better position than a preferential or ordinary creditor.
A lot of leases contain clauses that stipulate that the lessee must pay the lessor compensation in the event of early termination of the lease, for instance in the case of bankruptcy. In a previous ruling of the Supreme Court (Romania), it was made clear that such an obligation to pay compensation cannot constitute a claim against the insolvent company and that it cannot be submitted as a(n) (ordinary) claim for verification purposes during the bankruptcy process either. As such, it has no effect against the insolvent estate at all. It may, for that matter, be that a bankrupt still has to pay the compensation after the bankruptcy date.
Unjust enrichment
Unjust enrichment was also discussed in the ruling in question. The tenet occurs when someone unjustly enriches himself at the expense of someone else. We can assume that enrichment is unjust when there is no just reason for it. To the extent reasonable, the person who has been unjustly enriched has to pay compensation to the aggrieved party.
The ruling of 17 February 2017
Summarising, the following facts led to the ruling. A lessor and a lessee had entered into a lease. A considerable bank guarantee had been furnished at the ABN AMRO Bank in favour of the lessor, to the extent of 12 months’ rent (€881,933). This meant that when a certain fact was to occur, the bank had to pay the lessor as if it were its own obligation. Along with the bank guarantee, a counter-guarantee had been issued in favour of ABN AMRO. An amount had been paid into a frozen bank account held by the lessee at ABN AMRO, which amount the bank was able to recover if the bank guarantee is used.
The lease included a clause that stipulated that the lessor was obliged to compensate the lessor, as his own debt, all damage that would arise as a result of early termination of the lease (i.e. vacancy losses) in the event of bankruptcy.
You’ve guessed it: the lessee went bankrupt. The appointed receiver cancelled the lease subject to a three-month notice period. The lessor invoked the bank guarantee which was paid out, also in terms of compensation for vacancy losses. The bank then sought recovery from the amount in the frozen bank account. This was done by means of a set-off on the basis of the counter-guarantee.
The receiver did not agree and started proceedings against the lessor, claiming that the amount received by the lessor for vacancy losses should be paid to the estate. He argued that the lessor was not entitled to claim the amount under the bank guarantee, as the transaction allegedly violated the purport and nature of Section 39 of the Bankruptcy Act. The Amsterdam Court of Justice agreed with the receiver’s point of view and allowed the claim on the basis of unjust enrichment.
The case was subsequently submitted to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court initially repeated the basic principle that termination by the receiver pursuant to the Bankruptcy Act is a valid termination. That meant there was no obligation to pay compensation at the expense of the estate. However, the Supreme Court also indicated that if a third party (ABN AMRO in this case) guaranteed fulfilment of a claim, the guarantee issued would not change as a result of the bankruptcy, unless stipulated otherwise.
The Supreme Court continued:
“Any recourse action against the bankrupt lessee ensuing from the fulfilment of the guarantee for the third party cannot be exercised towards the bankruptcy estate of the lessee. It does not matter how recourse against the estate is sought; given the above consideration regarding the deliberation that forms the basis of Section 39 of the Bankruptcy Act, the nature of the claim precludes that it is charged to the estate. If allowed under the conditions of the guarantee, the guarantor can derive a defence from this towards the lessor.”
So from this, we can deduce that the bank should not have used the deposit to get compensation for anything it had paid the lessor for vacancy losses.
However, the bank was not a party to the proceedings and the Supreme Court had to assess if the lessor was unjustly enriched. The Supreme Court ruled that this was not the case. After all, the bank guarantee issued for the lessor would have remained valid after the bankruptcy date. The fact that the bank then wrongfully sought recourse against the estate (namely, the amount regarding the counter-guarantee) – something which the curator did not obstruct – does not detract from that.
Conclusion
Banks are advised to check if there is no ‘gap’ between what they may have to pay pursuant to bank guarantees that have been issued and what they may seek recourse against in a bankruptcy case on the basis of a counter-guarantee. Receivers have to be aware of the fact that they need to intervene if a counter guarantee is claimed with regard to vacancy losses.
Information
If you have any questions and/or comments about this contribution, please contact Peter de Graaf.
The importance of the notice of default
Almost every entrepreneur has to deal with it at some point; a counterparty who does not fulfill his/her agreements. In this article Gentia Niesert, attorney at contract law, explains how you can act towards your counterparty in such a situation and what the importance of a notice of default can be.
The notice of default
Suppose you own a contracting company and have engaged a subcontractor to do work for you. The subcontractor gets to work, but does not perform his work in accordance with the agreements made. For example, the subcontractor does not deliver the desired quality and furthermore does not perform some of the work at all.
In such a case, it may be advisable to send your counterparty a “notice of default. This is a written reminder in which you give your counterparty one last reasonable period to fulfill its obligations under the agreement.
Default
If your counterparty does not comply with the formal notice, your counterparty is legally ‘in default’. Default is necessary to be able to dissolve an agreement and/or claim damages.
There are also cases, where a party is already legally in default and a notice of default can be omitted. This is the case, for example, if your counterparty has failed to meet a deadline and performance is permanently impossible.
In cases where your counterparty is not yet in default by operation of law (we can assess this for you), sending a notice of default may be essential to be able to take further steps, such as dissolving the agreement.
Important issues in a notice of default
It is important that the notice of default complies with a number of formalities. For example, the following are important:
- Describe clearly in the notice of default which obligations your other party has not fulfilled and which obligations he/she still has to fulfill (e.g. the proper painting of a window frame);
- In your notice of default, state a reasonable period within which your counterparty must comply (what constitutes a reasonable period depends on the circumstances of the case, on which we can advise you further);
- Send the notice of default in writing (preferably in a way that you can later demonstrate that your counterparty has actually received your notice of default).
Advice
Do you need help in drafting a notice of default or would you like advice on the notice of default you have received? Then you have come to the right place. Gentia Niesert, attorney at law in contract law, will be happy to assist you.
Consequences of Brexit for aviation: a brief overview
This article briefly discusses the consequences of Brexit for the aviation industry. On January 31, 2020, the United Kingdom officially left the European Union (EU). From that moment, a transition period started during which the United Kingdom continued to apply European law. In the meantime, negotiations for a Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TDA) took place.
At the end of 2020, the European Commission and the United Kingdom concluded on a Trade and Cooperation Agreement, which includes agreements on future cooperation with the EU. This cooperation also entails air traffic. This article discusses (1) the impact of Brexit on air transport and (2) the new cooperation.
Loss of aviation rights due to Brexit
By leaving the EU, the UK has lost several important rights:
- UK airlines will no longer participate in the fully liberalized EU aviation market. Consequently, they can no longer operate flights between EU destinations under the licences issued by the UK;
- The UK no longer participates in the drafting of European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) standards.
With EU membership, the UK had access to 44 countries, representing approximately 85% of international air traffic. This right expires, which means that UK airlines will not have unrestricted access to EU air routes. Indeed, this is reserved for EU airlines. An EU airline exists if more than 50% of the company belongs to an EU person who has effective control.
Trade and Cooperation agreement and aviation UK
The loss of those rights is partially addressed by the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TDA), but it does not equal the level of economic integration the UK had when she was a member state. The TDA includes a free trade agreement that provides for continuous sustainable aviation connectivity. It ensures equal competition between operators and protection of passenger rights. However, market access is not as good as the single market that member states have access to.
Specifically, the following benefits have been agreed on for UK aviation:
- Unlimited point-to-point air traffic is possible between EU and UK airports;
- EU member states can agree on a bilateral fifth freedom with the UK for additional EU air cargo;
- EU-UK cooperation in aviation safety, aviation security and aviation management continues;
- Ground handling, slots and passenger rights provisions have been agreed, in addition to horizontal clauses on environmental, social and competition equity.
Conclusion Brexit and international aviation
In short, the level playing field mainly remains. The United Kingdom can continue to fly within the European Union after Brexit without restrictions and passenger rights will remain protected. However, border control will change, which means that British airports will have a different layout.
LVH Advocaten specializes in aviation law. We regularly assists airlines in all kinds of aviation related issues. If you have any questions about the consequences of Brexit for aviation, please feel free to contact us.
Divorce in the Netherlands
Filing for a divorce is a stressful business, but getting divorced in a foreign country can be even more confusing and can lead to some unforeseen problems. Learn more about what is and isn’t possible when getting divorced in The Netherlands (also referred to as Holland).
If you are a foreign national, you can file for a divorce in The Netherlands in any the following circumstances, irrespective of your nationality or the country where you were married:
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If both parties reside in The Netherlands;
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If The Netherlands was the last place that parties had a marital home and one of you still resides in the Netherlands;
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If the defending party resides in The Netherlands;
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If the person filing for a divorce has been residing in The Netherlands for at least one year prior to their request.
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The Dutch courts do not have jurisdiction in the following cases:
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You were married in the Netherlands, but neither party now resides here;
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One of the parties involved is a Dutch national but neither party now resides here.
Divorce can be either petitioned jointly by both spouses or individually by one of the spouses. In both cases a lawyer is mandatory for filing the divorce petition. The only ground for divorce in The Netherlands is that the marriage has irretrievably broken down. The Dutch courts no longer actually demand proof of such. If one of the parties claims that the marriage has irretrievably broken down, the courts assume that such is the case and will hear the divorce.
If you are both in agreement about the divorce and its consequences a joint petition is the easiest and quickest option. It is usual that parties draft a divorce agreement before filing the divorce petition, in which they arrange matters such as the division of the marital property, spousal or child maintenance and future childcare. The courts will typically grant the divorce as a formality within six to eight weeks of submission of the joint petition for divorce.
If you cannot agree on the consequences of the divorce, it may be necessary to file a petition individually. If one or both parties are foreign nationals, there may, however, be certain complications. For example, if you were married in another country, a different legal system may apply to the division of the marital property. The Dutch courts may then have to apply foreign law when deciding how to divide any property. Also, if you do not reside in the Netherlands, the Dutch courts may not have jurisdiction to hear certain aspects of the case, such as child maintenance.
Advising both national and foreign clients concerning the impact of divorce forms part of our daily practice. We can advise you which aspects of your divorce should or shouldn’t be brought before the Dutch courts and we can take action quickly should injunction proceedings be necessary to secure your rights.
Information
For additional information please contact our office 0031 10 209 2777, or by e-mail info@lvh-advocaten.nl
Practical legal tips on International Contracts for the Sale of Goods
When you are trading with an international party, it may well be that the UN Convention on contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) is also applicable to the contract. Currently 97 countries are a member of this CISG, so there is a realistic chance that this CISG is also applicable to your contract of sale.
Article 1(1)(a) of the CISG states that if the parties have their places of business in different states, then the rules of this CISG are applicable. Article 1(1)(b) states that if the parties are situated in different states, then the CISG is also applicable if the local law of a member state is applicable to the contract, either if parties have expressly agreed to it. For example, if Dutch law is applicable to a contract of sale of goods with another party registered in Greece, then the CISG is applicable in addition to Dutch law.
The CISG is not applicable in the event that:
- one of the parties is a consumer;or,
- the contract is for the sale of services or fixed assets such as ships, aircrafts etc; or,
- parties have contracted out of the applicability of the CISG.
What are the pro’s and con’s of the applicability of the CISG in the event of international trade?
- There is unified application and interpretation of CISG;
- CISG is supranational law and applies over and above national law;
- CISG provides for a better enforcability in negotiations with international contracting parties due to its widespread use and also clarity on formation of a contract, payment of the purchase price, delivery and consequences of a breach;
- CISG is available in many different languages such as English, Chinese, Arabic, Spanish and Russian;
- CISG is seller friendly when it comes to a breach, which needs to be material. Also the complaint period under the CISG is very strict. Both of these are beneficial if you are the seller.
What are your rights under CISG in the event of breach of contract?
CISG is quite strict on rescission of the contract due to breach. The breach needs to be a fundamental breach, whereas under Dutch law this is any breach. This makes it more difficult under the CISG to rescind the agreement. The goods delivered need to be examined for non-conformity within a reasonable time after discovery of the non-conformity. Reasonable time depends on the type of goods. This right lapses after 2 years (article 39(2) CISG). The notice of non-conformity also needs to be specific. The remedies under CISG are specific for the seller (article 45 to 52 CISG) and the buyer (article 74 to 77 CISG). Inclusion or exclusion of CISG cannot be regulated under the General Terms and Conditions of either contracting party.
CISG and General Terms and Conditions
What happens if both contracting parties state in the contract that their own General Terms and Conditions (GTC’s) are applicable? The question is which GTC’s apply in this instance. This is what is called a “battle of forms”.
The CISG states that the GTC’s are applicable in accordance to the rules of offer and acceptance (article 18(1) of the CISG).
In the event that your offer states that your GTC’s are applicable, and the other party reacts by acceptance under the condition of the applicability of their GTC’s, then there is a potential conflict issue. The CISG tends to resolve this by treating acceptance as performance of the contract. Quite often this means that the GTC’s of the last party are applicable.
Under Dutch law however the “first shot” principle is applied in this situation. This means that the first party declaring their GTC’s to be applicable goes first provided the provisions of article 6:265 (3) of the Dutch Civil Code have been met. This means that the other party should expressly reject the applicability of GTC’s of the other party. Case law has shown that by merely adding wording to your company’s GTC’s is not sufficient and my advice is to include specific wording in your offer to the other party. It needs to be extremely clear to the other side that your company will and is rejecting their GTC’s.
As you can read, there are some challenges to be met in the event that your business enterprise regularly contracts with international parties.
If I can help you in relation to the above, please feel free to contact Madelon van Breemen.
Claim for damages against a truck manufacturers’ cartel
On 19 July 2016 the European Commission imposed the largest fine ever on European truck manufacturers. The manufacturers were part of a cartel. This is the case for the manufacturers MAN, Volvo/Renault, Daimler, Iveco and DAF.
They have kept their prices artificially high. On them a combined fine of 2.9 billion euros was imposed [Press release EU]. Scania is being examined by the EU as well, but this procedure is pending. Unlike the other 5 manufacturers, Scania has not admitted to any participation in the cartel.
The cartel made the illegal price agreements in the period 1997 to 2011. The agreements were made for medium trucks (6 – 16 tonnes) and heavy trucks (over 16 tonnes). Because of the huge size of the cartel, 9 out of 10 medium and heavy trucks produced in Europe are covered by these price agreements. The European Commissioner for Competition, Margrethe Vestager, has indicated that the record fine is sending a clear message that the formation of cartels within Europe is unacceptable.
In addition to price agreements, the cartel also made agreements on when they would introduce emission reduction technology. This technology was to be introduced due to increasing (stricter) requirements within the EU. Furthermore, the cartel agreed that the costs for the emission technology would be passed on to the truck buyers.
Because of the cartel agreements, thousands of transport companies may be affected negatively as they have paid too much for their trucks. This also affects leased trucks. The damage suffered by truck buyers is the difference between the price paid and the hypothetical price the truck would have cost without the cartel.
On behalf of several of its Automotive clients, the trade association LVH Automotive of law firm Leeman Verheijden Huntjens is currently preparing a claim for damages against the truck cartel. If you as an entrepreneur are also interested in recovering your damages from the truck manufacturers, please contact our office.
How final is the final discharge in termination agreements?
How final is the final discharge in termination agreements?
If employer and employee wish to terminate an employment contract by mutual agreement, they sign a termination agreement. A termination agreement often includes a final discharge clause. A final discharge clause ensures that parties do not have to renegotiate rights and compensation after the execution of the termination agreement. But how final is the final discharge clause in a termination agreement?
This article first discusses the importance of a final discharge clause in the termination agreement. It then discusses when a claim falls under the final discharge and the best way to formulate a final discharge clause. Finally, an illustrative reference is made to a judgment of the Court of Appeal of Den Bosch.
The importance of the final discharge in a termination agreement
Once employer and employee have decided to part company by mutual agreement, it is undesirable to have to renegotiate rights and obligations at a later date. The final discharge agreed in a termination agreement is intended to ensure that the parties have nothing more to claim from each other.
However, the final discharge in the termination agreement is not always final in practice. There are situations in which a discussion can arise about the question whether a claim does or does not fall under the final discharge, for example in the case of a “forgotten” claim.
What is covered by the final discharge in a termination agreement?
To determine whether a claim is subject to final discharge, the circumstances of the case must be considered. When interpreting the termination agreement the Haviltex-criterion is applied, which means that a judge not only interprets the final discharge clause linguistically, but also looks at the intentions of the parties and what they were entitled to understand between themselves. Various circumstances will be assessed, such as: the extensiveness of the negotiations, assistance by an agent, the knowledge and position of the parties and whether reservations were made.
Formulation of final discharge in a termination agreement
The discussion about which claims are subject to final discharge should therefore be limited as much as possible. This can be done first of all by recording in the stipulation what the parties have discussed. In other words, record all subjects which, according to the parties, are covered by the final discharge. This way the stipulation can be explained. In addition, specific subjects can also be excluded, so that there need not be any discussion about them.
Court of Appeal on the question: Does immaterial damage as a result of burn-out fall under the final discharge?
The Court of Appeal of Den Bosch ruled on the question whether immaterial damage as a result of an employee’s burn-out was covered by the final discharge clause. Employer and employee had entered into a termination agreement to end two proceedings. In 2015, employee fell on the job, after which she had to reintegrate. Later, after her full reintegration, a disrupted employment relationship arose and proceedings followed regarding the dissolution of the employment contract. The employee also instituted preliminary relief proceedings. During the hearing the parties agreed on an amicable settlement. The parties concluded a final discharge and only excluded personal injury. After concluding the termination agreement, the employee claimed non-material damages as a result of burnout. The Court of Appeal ruled that the damage relating to the burn-out was not part of the concept of injury as expressed in the final discharge clause. The reason was the background and contents of the two proceedings. For instance, the parties agreed that the ban on giving notice due to illness did not apply, there were no medical limitations according to the company doctor and furthermore, the employee had indicated that her stress-related complaints were no longer an issue. Furthermore, there was no evidence of negotiations on this point prior to the conclusion of the termination agreement.
Need advice from a lawyer in Rotterdam regarding final discharge of termination agreement?
As has become clear in this article, it is important to think carefully about the wording of a final discharge clause. The parties can limit the discussion as much as possible by formulating it correctly and appropriate to the circumstances.
Are you involved in negotiations about a termination agreement and do you want to know how to formulate the final discharge or are you having a discussion about a claim while you have agreed on a final discharge? Contact Richard Ouwerling, an employment lawyer at LVH Advocaten in Rotterdam.
Sebastiaan Knook
Legal assistant aviation
+31 (0)10 209 27 52
knook@lvh-advocaten.nl
(more…)
Land grabbing: the legal options when losing ownership of land
Land grabbing: the legal options when losing ownership of land
There may be a dispute between neighbors about who owns a particular piece of land. Such a dispute may arise if at any time one of the neighbors places a yard fence in such a way that it takes possession of a piece of land owned by the other. The owner has the option of claiming his property (or filing a revindicatory action). However, such a claim cannot be brought after a period of time due to acquisitive prescription.
Recently, the Supreme Court issued a judgment on a tort claim against the party who acquired the property at the expense of the other. Compensation in kind was claimed, in the form of redelivery of the land. In this article, I explain the relevant legal regulations and discuss the recent Supreme Court ruling and also an earlier ruling on land grabbing.
What is meant by ownership and possession?
In land grabbing judgments, the concepts of ownership and possession are important. I briefly explain these legal concepts.
What is a property right?
The right of ownership is the most comprehensive right a person can have over a thing (Article 5:1 paragraph 1 Civil Code). In principle, the owner is free to use the thing to the exclusion of all others (Article 5:1 paragraph 2 BW).
What is possession?
By “possession” is meant that a person keeps a good for himself (Art. 3:107 paragraph 1 BW). Whoever keeps a good is presumed to keep it for himself (Art. 3:109 BW). Possession can be obtained by taking possession. One takes possession of a good by exercising actual power over it (Art. 3:113 paragraph 1 DCC). If possession is provided to another person, the acquirer is enabled to exercise the power over the thing that the provider of possession could exercise over the thing (Art. 3:114 BW). Whether someone is a possessor must be answered according to the conception of traffic, the legal regulation on the subject and, for that matter, on the basis of external facts.
Ownership and possession may be in different hands
Ownership and possession need not be in one hand. Suppose I own a piece of land, but my neighbor, by erecting a hedge, has actual power over a piece of my land, I am still the owner, but my neighbor is the possessor of the piece of land he has demarcated for himself.
How can you claim your property?
An owner of an object is authorized to claim it from anyone who holds it without right (Art. 5:2 Civil Code). This is called a revindicatory claim. This claim can also be brought in court. So in the example of my piece of land that has been taken into possession by my neighbor, I can claim that the land be returned to my control. This will then mean that the hedge must be removed so that I regain actual power over my piece of land.
Loss of property due to acquisitive prescription
As mentioned above, ownership and possession sometimes diverge. The legislature intended that such a situation should not continue indefinitely. The legal and factual situation must come together again at some point, is the idea. The legal situation then follows the factual situation (and not the other way around).
Therefore, the law provides that a possessor in good faith acquires rights to the property at a certain time (Art. 3:99 paragraph 1 of the Civil Code). If a person thinks in good faith to have become the rightful owner of a movable thing (and bearer or order rights), he can acquire the right to the good after possession of three years, other goods by an uninterrupted possession of 10 years. There is a different rule for cultural goods. On this good faith possession I will not go into further detail.
Loss of property to bad faith possessor
Even a possessor who is not bona fide can obtain the good. Indeed, Article 3:105(1) of the Civil Code states, “He who possesses a good at the time when the prescription of the legal action terminating the possession is completed shall acquire that good, even if his possession was not in good faith.”
Statute of limitations for bad faith possession
The limitation period applicable in that case is twenty years (art. 3:306 BW). It concerns a claim for termination of possession by a non-owner. The period starts to run on the day following the day on which the immediate removal of that situation can be claimed (Article 3:314 paragraph 2 BW).
Thus, in the example concerning my neighbor placing a hedge on my land, the term begins to run on the day after the hedge is placed. Thus, my neighbor who is not in good faith can acquire ownership of my piece of land after 20 years of being a possessor of it. This also means that I can no longer bring a revindicatory action (after all, only an owner can bring such an action).
Tort claim as remedy for land grabbing
In 2017, the Supreme Court issued a ruling on acquisitive prescription. In that case, the municipality of Heusden had lost its title after 20 years to persons who had not taken possession of a plot of forest land in good faith. A plot of over 400 m2 belonging to the municipality had been fenced off by the persons behind their own plot, with the strip of land only accessible through a small gate that the persons could lock. In this way, de facto power had thus been exercised by the persons over the piece of land.
In a superfluous consideration, the Supreme Court indicated that the municipality may still have a claim in tort. In doing so, it indicated that it would be obvious that compensation would be claimed in the form of transfer of the property to the person who lost ownership.
Case of loss of property by acquisitive prescription
The Supreme Court recently handed down a judgment on a dispute between neighbors, where it was already established that one neighbor (“A”) had lost a piece of land to his neighbor (“B”) as a result of acquisitive prescription. The case was abbreviated as follows.
When a vacation park was still under development (March 1991), B purchased a plot of land at that park. Attached to the deed of conveyance was a drawing showing a plot with a rectangular shape. A only later (in 2000) became the owner of an adjacent plot of land on the park. He bought the plot from someone who in turn bought it while the park was still being developed.
In early March 1991, the Land Registry measured the cadastral boundaries. Then the boundaries were made visible in the field with iron pipes driven into the ground with wooden pickets. Also in June 1992, the boundaries of the plot were measured. On a drawing accompanying the account of it, the plot looked like a rectangle.
The cadastral boundaries of the plot
B was still not comfortable with the size of his plot around August 1992. He then asked the sales agent to designate the boundaries of the plot. He then installed 50 conifers around September 1992 to demarcate the plot and a much larger number in May 1993. This property boundary was sloping (i.e. this did not line up with cadastral data).
In December 2012, A had a boundary reconstruction performed by a company and later (in 2014) again by the Land Registry. This revealed that the cadastral plot boundary did not correspond to the plot boundary that was actually present (the conifer hedge). B had actually added 46 m2 of land that (later) belonged to A to his plot.
In a judgment dated March 30, 2016, the Limburg District Court ruled that the strip of land in question became B’s property by acquisitive prescription.
Tort claim for taking possession of land in bad faith
A then commences proceedings in which he claims from B that, by way of compensation in kind, the strip of land that belonged to him should be delivered back to him in ownership. A hereby argues that B acted unlawfully by taking possession of the strip of land between September 1992 and May 1993 in bad faith and then keeping it for a period of 20 years (or the limitation period for acquisitive prescription under Article 3:306 of the Civil Code). The court granted the claim.
The dispute in the proceedings centers on whether the action was unlawful and, in particular, whether B knew that he had taken possession of a piece of A’s land.
What does the wrongful conduct consist of?
To answer this question, the Court considers various factual circumstances. From these, the Court draws the conclusion that, at least until June 2, 1992, B actively knew where the boundary between his plot and the neighboring plot ran. B knew that he had a rectangular plot, but nevertheless constructed an angled yard fence. In this way, and by subsequently maintaining possession of the plot of land for 20 years, B acted culpably unlawfully. The court’s judgment granting A’s claims is thus upheld.
Supreme Court sticks to doctrine on damages claim after acquisitive prescription
B appealed in cassation to the Supreme Court and argued that the Supreme Court should reverse the judgment concerning the Municipality of Heusden. In that judgment, as explained above, it was held that a person who has lost ownership of a property as a result of unlawful seizure by another person may still have a claim for damages against that other person based on tort. The Supreme Court sees no reason to return to that ruling.
It was further argued in cassation that the Court of Appeal did not find that B had acted in bad faith. However, the Supreme Court is of the opinion that the Court of Appeal meant that B knew that the strip of land belonged to the neighboring parcel and that that judgment implies that B was acting in bad faith. The cassation appeal is therefore dismissed.
Can tort claims also be time-barred?
The claim in tort may also be time-barred. In land grabbing situations, it should be seen as follows: not only the unlawful taking of possession, but also keeping possession for a period during the 20-year statute of limitations is unlawful conduct. After all, by keeping possession for 20 years, the consequence (loss of ownership by the aggrieved party) eventually occurs. Thus, the wrongful act ends only at the time of transfer of ownership.
Thus, it is certainly not the case that the compensation claim is time-barred at the same time as the revindication claim.
What is the statute of limitations for tort claims in land grabbing?
The limitation period for claims based on tort is regulated in Article 3:310 (1) of the Dutch Civil Code. In view of this section of the law and the judgments discussed, the following applies with respect to prescription:
- a five-year statute of limitations begins to run from the time the aggrieved person became aware of his property loss;
- but in any case, the claim lapses twenty years after the completion of the limitation period of Article 3:314(2) of the Civil Code.
Thus, when property is lost to a bad faith possessor, one has the opportunity to revindicate the property for 20 years, after which there is still the possibility of recovering the lost property with an action in tort for a period of at most 20 years.
What to do as a victim of land grabbing?
Thus, there is still an ample period of time for an aggrieved person to take legal action against land grabbing. Nevertheless, the sooner one takes action against an unjust taking of land the better.
Lawyer needed for loss of property due to land grab in Rotterdam
If you have questions about property law, including situations concerning taking possession of parcels of land (land grabbing) and limitation periods, or tort claims, please contact Peter de Graaf.
The Supreme Court ruling discussed can be found here.
The end of the Wob and the arrival of the Woo in a nutshell
Public access to government information
As of May 1, 2022, the era of the Open Government Act (“Wob”) has come to an end. After years of serving as the legislative framework for the right to government information, the Wob has been replaced as of May 1, 2022 by a new law, which entered into force under the name of the Open Government Act (‘Woo’).
The departure of the Wob will not cause the public in need of information too much heartache. Not infrequently the Wob proved in practice to be a legal “shield” behind which a closed government evaded or tried to evade public scrutiny. In administrative practice, the Wob has therefore not been able to fully live up to the promise of a transparent government. The courts have regularly had to confirm or enforce the citizen’s fundamental right to information in judgments.
Purpose of the de Woo
The Woo has an ambitious goal. The new regime is intended to initiate an open administrative culture and a more accessible government apparatus. To put this intention into practice, the Woo provides for several changes – of a more or less substantial nature – compared with the old regime (Wob). First of all, there is a shift in emphasis in the approach to government information; an active disclosure obligation will apply to a large group of information types. For types of information whose disclosure must be requested, the Woo procedure shows some innovations of a procedural and substantive nature. In addition, the Woo modifies on a number of points the assessment framework used by the administrative body to decide whether information should be disclosed and, if so, in what form. We discuss the most relevant changes below.
Starting point of the Woo: active disclosure
Under the Wob, the so-called Wob request was the focal point. The duty of disclosure only took shape if a request was made. Beyond that there was only a best-efforts obligation to disclose information of one’s own accord, compliance with which could not be enforced and which therefore left the administrative body free to decide at its own discretion. Article 3.3 of the Woo does away with this when it comes to information belonging to one of the categories mentioned there. If an information type falls into one of these categories, the administrative authority must make the information public of its own accord.
In part, this relates to information that administrative bodies already tend to disclose, such as decisions of general application, generally binding regulations and administrative reports. However, the Woo goes further than is usual in current practice, for example by stipulating that draft decisions on which external advice has been requested must be made public, as must the external advice and the accompanying request for advice. Also of importance is that investigation reports about the performance of an administrative body’s duties will be subject to the active disclosure obligation. At least as valuable is the obligation to actively disclose a series of types of decisions, such as, and perhaps most important for practice, the environmental permit.
The information must be sufficiently accessible to the public. Article 3.3 of the Woo regulates that the relevant documents are made accessible through an online platform. The platform, called PLOOI, is a central location where all public government information should be able to be consulted by the public.
With this duty of active disclosure, the Woo aims to set in motion a cultural change. Administrative bodies will have to keep track of information and organize it so that it is regularly made public.
Disclosure on request under the Woo
Anyone can request an administrative body to disclose information, without the requester having to declare an interest. This does not change with respect to the Wob.
The Woo brings the formalities concerning the submission of requests into line with the requirements of the digital age by explicitly providing that a request for information may be submitted electronically. Although submission by electronic form or email is now quite common, the Wob allowed administrative bodies to demand an old-fashioned written submission. Consequently, various administrative bodies continued to cling to a dated formality. The Woo will put an end to this.
If the administrative body intends to grant a request, the disclosure is automatically suspended if a third party wants to prevent it and requests a preliminary injunction against this from the administrative court. Pursuant to Section 4.4, subsection 5, of the Woo, the suspension lasts until the preliminary relief judge has ruled or the request has been withdrawn. Suspension was already common practice under the Wob, but was not prescribed by law. Because the internal coordination within the government bureaucracy sometimes failed, publication was sometimes a fait accompli. The new provision in Section 4.4 guarantees the protection of third parties more explicitly.
In addition, the procedural differences between requests for environmental information and other information in the Woo have been eliminated as far as possible. For example, the deadline for responding to an environmental information request has been made the same as the deadline for any other information request.
Grounds for refusal under the Woo
The Woo maintains most of the grounds for refusal from the Wob in the assessment framework for information requests.
To this, the Woo adds a new ground for refusal, according to which the administrative body can withhold the disclosure of information if the interest of doing so is outweighed by the protection of the environment. For example, it may be necessary not to share with the public information about reproduction areas and the habitat of rare species. The Woo also stipulates that disclosure can be refused if the interest of disclosure does not outweigh the proper functioning of the State, other public law bodies or administrative bodies. In practice, this new ground for refusal amounts to a statutory elaboration of existing case law, which has been applied for years in assessing whether the administration was right to refuse a request for information in order to prevent disproportionate harm to the government.
Under the Wob, the prevention of disproportionate harm or advantage was a ground for refusal so widely used that it degenerated into an all-purpose excuse for withholding information. The Woo is intended to change this. Information may no longer be refused on the grounds of disproportionate benefit to those involved or third parties, as was the case in the Wob. In addition, if the environment is not at stake, information may only be refused on the grounds of disproportionate harm to those involved or third parties in exceptional cases. The ground for refusal may therefore no longer be used as a “catch-all” provision.
In determining whether information should be refused because of competitive sensitivity, the Woo provides for a minor change. Environmental information that has not been provided to the government in confidence is no longer covered by this ground for refusal.
Abuse of the Woo
The Wob had its excesses. On the far side of the closed government, stood the private querulant or opportunist, who abused the Wob as a means to stall and harass the public administration with an endless influx of information requests. This was already a reason for the legislator to break the link between the Wob and the Late Payment and Appeal Act in 2016. The legislator added an anti-abuse provision in the Woo. If it is evident that the requester’s objective in the context of the Woo is other than to obtain public information, or if the request does not concern an administrative matter, the administrative body may decide to ignore the request altogether. Practice will have to show how administrative bodies will interpret this anti-abuse provision, and more specifically the “obviousness”.
Expectations of the Woo
It is not the intention to continue the existing Wob practice under a new banner. The legislator has a structural change in the handling of information in mind. Ultimately, a certain balance must be struck between transparency and the careful handling of other public objectives. The approach of the Woo seems realistic in this respect, by emphasizing shifts in emphasis and not striving for lofty reforms.
Within 5 years of the Woo’s entry into force, the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations will share an evaluation of the law with First and Second Chambers of the States General. This will have to show the extent to which the objectives of the new law have been achieved.
Information
This article was written by Ben van Nieuwaal of LVH Advocaten. If you have any questions about this article, please contact us at our general number +31 10 209 27 77.
Claims from ignored entrepreneurs in private invitations tot tender
Sometimes, government institutions issue private invitations to tender for a contract. This means that a select number of interested parties is invited to submit a tender. In such a situation, there is no subsequent public invitation to tender. This tendering procedure is permitted for contracts of which the value does not exceed the European threshold amounts.
In principle, parties not invited to submit a tender are expected to just accept that. The government is free to select parties as it sees fit. This is the prevailing view.
However, there are exceptions, for example if the objective of the invitation is to submit a contract to all the local entrepreneurs with a certain knowledge and expertise. In such case, it is unlawful for one of those entrepreneurs to be left out.
This means that the ignored entrepreneurs can claim compensation. To that end, the relevant entrepreneur will have to convince the court that it would probably have been awarded the contract. If it succeeds in that, it can claim compensation to the amount of the benefit it would have obtained from the contract.
Further information
For additional information please feel free to contact Daniël van Genderen.
End of an addicted employee’s employment contract?
Abuse of alcohol or drugs can lead to major problems in the workplace. Think of unsafe situations, dysfunction and regular and/or long-term disability. The employer sometimes wants to unilaterally terminate the employment contract in such a situation. What are the possibilities.
Dissolution by the subdistrict court?
Of course, whether dissolution is possible depends on the circumstances of the case.
If addiction is an issue, it is often assumed on medical evidence that the employee is incapacitated. The employer then runs up against the ban on notice (during illness). Since the introduction of the WWZ, the subdistrict court tests whether the reasons for termination are related to the ban on notice. If there is the slightest connection to this prohibition on notice, a request for dissolution (for example, on the grounds of primarily culpable conduct and, in the alternative, a disrupted working relationship) will fail.
However, when an employee fails to fulfill his reintegration obligations without good reason, the prohibition on notice can be set aside. This can of course consist of not cooperating with a plan of action or not following the instructions of the occupational health physician. If the employee seeks treatment for his addiction or terminates his treatment (without good reason) prematurely, this also qualifies as a violation of these reintegration obligations.
If, for example, the (rehab) clinic would argue that the treatment is no longer of any use because the employee keeps relapsing into his addiction, then dissolution could also be considered.
Instant dismissal as an alternative?
Drunkenness or other debauched behavior (drug use) can also be an urgent reason for summary dismissal. If the behavior is serious enough, weighed against the personal circumstances of employer and employee, in the majority of cases the summary dismissal will stand. The employer does not face a notice prohibition when summary dismissal occurs.
However, often the transitional compensation must still be paid.
On the one hand, it is established case law of the Supreme Court that no culpability is required for the acceptance of a summary dismissal. In case of addiction, often no culpability will be assumed, but this therefore does not affect the urgent reason. On the other hand, there is always a silver lining. If there is no serious culpability (i.e. in the case of addiction), the employee retains his entitlement to the transitional compensation.
Thus, a summary dismissal followed by the offer of a settlement agreement containing the transitional compensation can be a good alternative to a complex and unlikely dissolution procedure (with appeal).
More information?
Are you dealing with an addicted employee and would you like to know more about reintegration, dismissal or a legally valid ADM policy? Then take part in LVH Advocaten’s latest labor law meeting on October 26. Other current labor law developments will also be discussed.
Conflicts and conflicting interests between shareholders
Conflicts and conflicting interests between shareholders
The relationship between shareholders in a corporation is sometimes like a marriage. Often things go well, but it also happens often enough that after a short or long time a conflict arises between shareholders and parties no longer want to continue with each other. Like a marriage, this can lead to a “fighting divorce” or “parting as good friends” and everything in between.
In an earlier article “Stalemate between directors who are also shareholders: what to do?” it was pointed out that the law does not as yet offer an adequate way out for shareholders in a relationship crisis. There is, however, a bill in which a shareholder can be obliged to leave via the Enterprise Chamber of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal (Overheid.nl | Consultatie Wet aanpassing geschillenregeling en verduidelijking ontvankelijkheidseisen enquêteprocedure (internetconsultatie.nl). It is expected that this bill will be submitted by the end of 2023. However, it remains to be seen to what extent this legislation will be able to provide fast and adequate solutions for shareholders in a conflict situation. What is certain is that every situation is different. In court, all the circumstances of the specific case always play a role.
This article discusses various points to consider during a relationship crisis.
The shareholders and the board
In the SME business, the shareholders are often also the directors of the company. But this does not always have to be the case.
Of importance is the board’s own role. Although shareholders own the company and therefore feel that they are in control, policy is set by the company’s board. Minority shareholders who are not directors have only limited rights.
The independent role of the board means that in a conflict between shareholders, the situation can easily arise where the shareholder who is not a director feels aggrieved. The shareholder who is a director tends to think that his personal interest is equal to the interest of the company. For example, consider the situation where the company needs new business premises and “coincidentally” the director has a property available for lease by the company.
If the director agrees an excessively high, non-market rent on behalf of the company with himself in his capacity as owner and lessor of the property, that is a legally valid agreement, but one that puts the company at a disadvantage. This is not allowed and in order to prevent such situations, a director must comply with the legal regulation on conflict of interest (The legal regulation of conflict of interest in a B.V. (and foundation and association). Often the articles of association or shareholders’ agreement also contain provisions intended to protect the company. If such provisions are violated, the director may be liable to the company in private.
On the other hand, it may be precisely the minority shareholder who has a priority other than what is best for the company. For example, when long-term investments need to be made while the minority shareholder would rather receive short-term dividends or a good price for his shares. Each shareholder is free to vote as he wishes in the General Shareholders’ Meeting. Because shareholders, unlike directors, are not obliged to serve the interests of the company, the conflict of interest rule does not apply. According to the Enterprise Chamber, however, the decision-making process within the company must proceed with due observance of the standards of reasonableness and fairness applicable between the shareholders. What that means in the concrete case is always something that can be discussed.
Information in the event of a conflict between shareholders
In the SME company, the shareholder who is not a director is not only entitled to information during the Annual General Meeting of Shareholders. Information must also be provided to this shareholder outside the AGM. Carefulness, transparency and openness by the board is required, according to the Enterprise Chamber. The company has a duty of care to the minority shareholder and must also provide information proactively. This applies especially in special situations, such as when the company is in financial dire straits, when investments have to be made or when other important decisions are being made.
At the same time, the management’s policy freedom must be respected. The shareholder does not determine the company’s policy. When his rights are respected, the court must be cautious in reviewing the decisions taken by the company’s board. For example, the board may not want to provide certain information for sufficiently compelling reasons. Consider, for example, business-sensitive information that a shareholder could use to compete with the company after his departure.
Competing activities and corporate opportunities
In a conflict situation, a shareholder may tend to want to independently exploit business opportunities that arise. Viewed in isolation, it is not prohibited to set up new activities. But it may be different if these new activities compete with the company’s activities. Or when they are activities that are in line with what the company is already engaged in and which could therefore also be developed by the company. Business opportunities that are part of the possible activities of the company should not be exploited outside the company. This will put the company at a disadvantage and it can take action against it.
On the other hand, shareholders in a conflict situation who want to part company will also want to be active and continue doing business in the future. Restrictions on competition and not being allowed to use the company’s corporate opportunities can stand in the way of this or, on the contrary, create new conflicts. The line between what is not allowed and what is allowed is thin. However, the consequences of just or just barely crossing this line are great.
The business and profitability of the company
Whereas in a fighting divorce the children are often the victims, in a conflict between shareholders it is often the company. Time, negative energy and costs associated with the conflict have a negative impact on the company’s operations and profitability. From that perspective, the common interest of shareholders in a conflict situation is not to escalate the conflict into endless wrangling, but to bring it under control and resolve it as quickly as possible. This can be done by making agreements, but also by a legal procedure in which the knots are cut by a judge. Sometimes there is a tendency to think that, above all, there should be no litigation and matters should be settled amicably, but the very act of continuing to negotiate, discuss and fruitlessly attempt to strike a deal can involve an enormous amount of time and negative energy. It can also be very pragmatic to clearly write down the positions on both sides. The court can then decide or – in urgent cases – order interim measures to bring the situation under control.
How to deal with a conflict between shareholders?
There is no golden rule on how best to handle conflict between shareholders. Account must be taken of the rules set by the law and the courts. Conflicts should be kept under control as much as possible and escalate as little as possible. Negotiating a settlement can be useful. However, legal action may also be the remedy that is appropriate and necessary. Emotions are a poor counsellor and the true interests of all parties involved should be considered and sought as much as possible.
In a long-term conflict, an involved shareholder once made the statement, “I feel like I have been driving around the traffic circle for years and there is no exit in sight.” Such a situation should be avoided as much as possible. This is best done by having a clear approach and strategy, making the right choices in time, and responding appropriately and pragmatically to actions of the other party.
Information
Would you like assistance and advice on how to handle a conflict between shareholders as wisely as possible? Then please contact Bouwe Bos.
My debtor won’t pay
My debtor won’t pay.
Being right and being right are two different things, it is sometimes said. This is not entirely true, but it shows that a court ruling is not always considered satisfactory. If the verdict remains the same even on appeal to the Supreme Court, there is not much that can be done about it. The judgment must be enforced. If a company has been convicted, it is up to the director of the company to do the same. At most, it could be considered whether a payment arrangement can be made, a commercial solution can be found or the damage can be passed on by holding someone else liable for it.
But what if a debtor fails to comply with a court order? Then the bailiff can be called in and measures for collection can be taken, such as attachment of the company’s bank account, stocks or real estate. The bank must pay the seized money in the bank account to the bailiff, stocks and real estate can be sold by auction, etc.
In practice, a judgment is usually obeyed and paid voluntarily after the court’s ruling. Sometimes it is necessary to involve the bailiff. But this does not always lead to the desired result, for example because the company is in financial difficulties and there is simply nothing to collect. The approach with the best chance of success then is to file for bankruptcy of the company, so that the few financial resources that may be left are used to pay your claim instead of that of another creditor with more patience.
Unwillingness to pay
However, it may also be that the company that needs to pay does have the ability to do so, but chooses not to take advantage of it while the company is structured in such a way that collection measures by the bailiff cannot be effective. Consider, for example, a structure in which all the assets of the operating company are owned by the holding company and leased to the operating company, while also the financial resources – at the discretion of the holding company – may or may not be made available to the operating company or the specially formed project company. Such a construction can be clever and permissible, but it can also get a little too clever. If this is abused, the director may be liable in private for the amounts that cannot be collected from the operating company or project company.
Inability to pay
Liability of the director can also arise in a situation where there is no more money and thus no situation of unwillingness to pay. Then there is force majeure, but is it right for a supplier or other creditor to be the victim of this?
The director of a company can be held personally liable by a creditor if he entered into obligations on behalf of the company at the time he knew or should have understood that they would not be met and the company would have no recourse. An example is the director who receives an order on behalf of his limited liability company from a new customer. He immediately sends an invoice for the first installment, but at that time the bank has already cancelled the credit or there is a huge tax debt for which subpoenas have been received. The customer pays the first installment, but a few weeks later the company goes bankrupt and cannot fulfill its obligations to the customer. For the customer’s damages, the director may be liable in private. The relevant question is whether, at the time of sending his invoice, the director still had a realistic prospect of a solution, for example because another meeting was scheduled with the bank at which a proposal would be discussed or because a deferral of payment could still be obtained from the tax authorities. Depending on the exact situation, a director in such a case may or may not be sued privately to compensate the damage suffered by the customer because he has paid an invoice but has not received delivery. Or to compensate the damage of a supplier who delivered in good faith when the director should have already known that things would go wrong and the company would not be able to pay the invoice for this delivery.
Something else again is the situation where the company cannot fulfill its obligations, but the director knowingly allowed this situation to arise. The director can also be held privately liable for the resulting damages. For example, consider the situation where you buy a property from a company, but it is not delivered because the director decides to still sell this property to another party who apparently made a better offer. If this goes wrong and the damages you suffer as a result cannot be collected from the company, the director may be liable in private.
Selective payment
What is allowed is selective payment of certain creditors and leaving others unpaid. This is different again when the company has decided to cease its activities. Then it may not choose to pay claims from related parties (e.g. those of a shareholder) and leave claims from regular creditors unpaid in part because there is too little money. Or to pay off the bank debt for which the director stands surety and not to pay a supplier or to pay only part of it.
Under circumstances it may be that the director should have taken future liabilities into account, for example by making a provision for them. If the director fails to do so and spends money that is not actually there, he can also be held personally liable for this. Again, this is especially true in a situation where related parties do get paid or debts are paid off in which the director has a personal interest, such as the aforementioned example of the bank debt for which he stands surety.
Questions about debt collection or director liability?
If you are dealing with a customer who does not pay or a contracting party who does not fulfill its obligations, we can help you. Even if the regular collection process fails, there may still be possibilities to obtain payment or compensation for your damages.
If, on the other hand, you are the director who, in your opinion wrongfully, is held privately liable, we are also there to defend your position.
Whether a director is just liable or not always depends on the specific circumstances. Doing business is also taking risks and that is allowed, according to the Supreme Court. But if someone can be personally blamed, he must privately compensate for damages. The dividing line is thin and this is where we can make the difference for you. If you need us to do so, please contact Bouwe Bos.
Maxime Visser
Manager backoffice
+31 (0)10 206 17 84
visser@lvh-advocaten.nl
(more…)
Request for debt restructuring and Corona: the tax collector thinks along
Request for debt restructuring and Corona: the tax collector thinks along
Requests for restructuring of tax debt
Until further notice, the Tax Authorities will approach requests for restructuring of tax debts with a flexible attitude. This applies in particular to requests from entrepreneurs whose businesses are fundamentally sound and who have been affected by the Corona crisis. For these entrepreneurs, the generous corona deferral policy may prove to be of no avail. But other entrepreneurs are also eligible for the more flexible approach. The flexible approach applies to all tax debts.
What does the flexible approach entail?
An important condition for the restructuring of tax debts is the existence of a viable enterprise. Whether this is the case must be assessed by an external party deemed suitable. This party should be the bank, an auditor or a restructuring expert. The assessment will include a forecast of the capacity to meet the costs of running the business, (re-)financing the business and the company’s remuneration. In addition, the forecast must show that the costs incurred during the reorganisation can also be paid. In some cases, the recipient may investigate the viability on his own initiative.
Entrepreneur cannot pay the tax debt
In addition to the fact that a viable enterprise must be present, it must also be shown that the entrepreneur is not or not fully able to pay the tax debts. Not even with the help of the generous deferral scheme in connection with the corona crisis. It should be noted, however, that the tax debt for which the restructuring is requested may not have arisen as a result of serious culpable acts or omissions on the part of the entrepreneur.
What is a debt restructuring proposal?
There is a reorganisation proposal. This means that unsecured creditors must also agree to the restructuring of the debts to those creditors. Only when that condition is met and the offer to the recipient is substantial and at least double the percentage offered to the unsecured creditors, can one speak of reorganisation of the debts.
How can the reorganisation be requested?
A request for debt restructuring can be submitted to the tax authorities using a prescribed form. A request will only be processed if it is actually complete. If the request is not complete, the tax collector will give the applicant 90 days to complete or rectify it.
What does a request for remediation comprise?
A complete request for restructuring includes, in addition to the prescribed form, a positive external assessment of the viability, an agreement from all creditors, a motivated statement from the entrepreneur about the cause of the financial problems and a liquidity forecast for the next 24 months. If the entrepreneur is also included in the COVID-19 deferment scheme and the associated payment scheme, the forecast must show that this payment scheme will also lead to the full payment of the tax debts.
When will a request for restructuring be granted?
A complete request will be assessed by the recipient, whereby the recipient may also examine the viability of the enterprise. If all conditions are met, the recipient will grant the application. The tax collector will reject the request if there is evidence of bad faith on the part of the taxpayer. In addition, the tax collector will reject the request if during the application no new obligations have arisen, the required declarations have not been submitted, there are multiple taxpayers, the taxpayer has been granted a moratorium on payments or is in a state of bankruptcy, and/or the Dutch Natural Persons Debt Rescheduling Act (WSNP) applies to the taxpayer.
In addition to a request for restructuring for a company that is being continued, the tax collector can also process a request for restructuring if there is a desire to terminate the company.
Granting the request for reorganisation
If the request meets the conditions and the recipient agrees with the request, the recipient will grant the reorganisation by means of a decision. This decision includes the condition that the reorganisation amount must be paid in one lump sum. In addition, in specific cases, it is possible to request a payment scheme in which the agreed amount is paid in 12 equal monthly instalments.
When can the decision be revoked?
The decision to grant remission is a conditional decision and can be revoked if it appears that the entrepreneur provided incorrect information which he knew or should have known was incorrect, if the entrepreneur is declared bankrupt, is granted a suspension of payments or is admitted to the WSNP. In addition, the decision can also be withdrawn on the basis of other conduct on the part of the taxpayer. For example, not meeting the tax obligations and not complying with the payment scheme for the agreed amount.
The tax collector can, however, give the entrepreneur the opportunity to rectify the shortcomings within a certain period of time.
In the end, a nice arrangement has been made whereby the recipient has the motto: in case of doubt, grant. Although collecting in case of doubt is not always the most sensible thing to do, at times it may be really necessary to try and avoid bigger problems.
Need advice from a lawyer in Rotterdam?
Do you have any questions about the collection rules regarding the tax debt arising from the corona postponement? Then please contact our lawyers Rob Steenhoek and David Harreman.
Action on taxation in box 3
Action on taxation in box 3
As we all know, there has been a lot of recent movement on box 3 taxation. Box 3 primarily taxes savings, investments and real estate. The assets in this box were previously taxed on the basis of a flat rate of return: the tax authorities set an assumed percentage, regardless of the actual return.
This meant that many taxpayers paid taxes on a return they had not actually received. You may also have overpaid taxes in the past. If so, chances are you may be eligible for legal redress!
A quick look back at what happened
- In 2017, the levy system was changed. Flat rate returns and a notional distribution of assets were introduced depending on the size of the assets.
- In late 2021, however, the Supreme Court, in the so-called Christmas Judgments, ruled that this system was untenable. The assumptions on which the taxation was based turned out to be legally incorrect.
- This led to a compensation scheme for those affected and the introduction of a new, more detailed system for box 3. This system serves as a temporary solution until a system is introduced in which the actual return is taxed.
- In June of this year, the Supreme Court also ruled on this temporary scheme, stating that investors are still disproportionately taxed.
- The current compensation round targets this group of taxpayers. It is up to them to prove that their actual return is lower than the calculated fixed return.
Whether you are eligible for the so-called restoration of rights depends on the actions you can still take (this year). In addition, restoration of rights is only possible if the actual return turns out to be lower than the fixed return. Our tax expert David Harreman can advise you and his clear approach ensures that you will soon know what you can do.
What this means for you per tax year
Tax year 2019
Only if your final assessment was not yet irrevocably established on December 20, 2021, and you submit a request for ex officio reduction before the end of 2024, you will be eligible for the rebuttal scheme in tax year 2019.
Tax year 2020
Only if your final assessment was not yet irrevocably established on December 20, 2021, and you submit a request for ex officio reduction before the end of 2025, you will qualify for the rebuttal scheme in tax year 2020.
As of tax year 2021 and beyond
The Tax Office has not yet determined the final assessments for 2021, therefore it is certain that you are eligible for the rebate scheme. A revised return can still be filed for this year(s), if the actual return turns out to be lower than the fixed return.
Why request an ex officio reduction
By submitting a request for ex officio reduction, you actually indicate to the Tax Authorities that you do not agree with the amount of the imposed assessment. You can submit this request no later than five years after the assessment was imposed. After five years revision is no longer possible. This means that the amount of the assessment is final. Even if you can prove that you have paid too much tax because the standard return was higher than the actual return. A missed opportunity.
Counter evidence scheme
The methodology as applied by the Supreme Court in recalculating the actual return is embraced by the State Secretary. This methodology will be laid down in legislation that is expected to be introduced in June 2025. From then on, this methodology can actually be used, and the rebuttal rule can be applied.
Do you want to make sure you do not miss out on your right to legal recovery for the years in which you may have overpaid taxes?
Then contact David Harreman or Maxime Visser for personal advice. They can help you take the right steps in time to ensure that you make optimal use of the compensation possibilities.
Liability of foundation director in case of rained-out festival
Liability of foundation director in case of rained-out festival
A director of a foundation can also run the risk of being held personally liable. This is nothing new, but is demonstrated once again by a recent judgment of the East Brabant District Court. The director of a foundation set up to organise a festival had entered into new financial commitments a day before the start of the festival, while weather forecasts were poor. This resulted in personal liability of the director towards the relevant creditor. This article explains the case and discusses the legal framework. The case provides a nice example of a situation where the court found that a director was personally culpable.
Festival budget
In early 2019, a foundation was established and the director was appointed. This foundation aimed to organise a festival to mark the 200th anniversary of Best municipality. The festival would take place from 16 to 18 August 2019. The municipality provided €200,000 for the organisation of the festival. Furthermore, the budgeted revenue of €849,000 largely consisted of expected revenue of €500,000 from coin sales.
Budget of festival does not materialise due to bad weather
Festival will be organised. In early August 2019, a tender from a security company is accepted and a down payment is made. The director has purchased additional security services from the security company on behalf of the foundation on 15 August 2019 (the day before the start of the festival) and on 19 August 2019 (the day after the festival).
The weather is very bad during the festival. Audience attendance is much lower than expected. Income from coin sales is very disappointing. The foundation is unable to pay all creditors. Available funds are still being distributed to creditors. In that context, the security company receives 15% of the outstanding invoice amounts. In October 2020, the foundation was declared bankrupt.
Foundation director liable to creditor?
The security company holds the director personally liable for the unpaid invoice amounts. These include amounts arising from the acceptance of the first offer, but also the amounts that have become due as a result of giving the (additional) orders of 15 and 19 August 2019. As the director disputes the liability, proceedings will be initiated against him.
The legal framework for directors’ liability
The court sets out the legal framework for external directors’ liability. A director’s liability can only exist if he can be blamed for a serious personal wrongdoing. The court logically refers to the standard from the Supreme Court’s Beklamel judgment and considers:
“There can be serious personal culpability on the part of a director, leading to outside directors’ liability, if, when entering into that commitment, he knew or ought reasonably to have understood that the company would be unable to fulfil its obligations and would have no recourse, except in circumstances to be adduced by the director on the basis of which the conclusion is justified that no serious reproach can be made against him personally in respect of the wrongdoing (see, inter alia, HR 6 October 1989, ECLI:NL:HR:1989:AB9521, NJ 1990/286 (Beklamel)). In essence, this so-called “Beklamel criterion” entails the requirement that the director knew or should have understood, when entering into the commitment, that the company’s creditor would suffer damage as a result of his actions (see HR 5 September 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:2627).”
You can read more about the Beklamel standard here.
Did the director know or should have known that the foundation could not fulfil obligations?
The court assesses whether, at the time the obligations were entered into, the director knew or should have known that the foundation would not be able to fulfil its obligations to the security company. The court sees no harm in entering into the first offer. At that time, the director could not have known that coin sales during the festival would be severely disappointing due to unusually bad weather.
The assessment is different regarding the commitments made on 15 and 19 August 2019. According to the court, the weather forecasts on 15 August 2019 for the following days were already bad. Thus, the director should have realised that, due to the predicted bad weather, attendance would be low and revenue from coin sales would be disappointing. At the time of signing the tender for additional work on 15 August 2019, the director should have reasonably understood that the foundation would not be able to meet its obligations to the security company. The same applies to the order given on 19 August 2019. At that time, the festival had already been held, so the director certainly should have reasonably known that the revenues were much lower than the budget.
Director ordered to pay damages
Thus, because of the wrongful act committed against the security company, the director is personally ordered to pay the invoice amounts arising from the orders given the day before and after the festival (to the extent that they have not been paid).
The ruling has strong similarities with a judgment of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal concerning the festival 200 years Stadsrechten in Zaandam. That case also concerned a rained-out festival, where the director had still entered into obligations when (according to the court) he should have understood that the foundation would no longer be able to fulfil the obligations. In that case, too, the verdict was that the director was personally liable.
VAT in claim for damages?
The security company also claimed the VAT amounts from the unpaid invoices in its claim for damages. This was also defended by the director. The director disputes that the VAT would have been remitted and furthermore, the security company could reclaim this VAT. This has not been refuted by the security company. The court therefore honoured the director’s defence on this point. Again, this judgment is not surprising.
The director could also have argued that there is no VAT-taxed supply against the compensation. VAT is only charged on compensation for goods or services. It is only because of the fact that the security company suffers damage that the compensation is claimed. Therefore, this is not a VAT-taxed supply.
If it is certain that a receivable is irrecoverable, the VAT already paid from the relevant invoice can be reclaimed from the Tax Authorities. In any case, a claim will be considered uncollectible as soon as 1 year has passed since the final payment date.
Incidentally, a claim for compensation may be subject to VAT under certain circumstances.
External liability director foundation
The case discussed concerned external liability towards one creditor. The claim was based on the tort law article (Section 6:162 of the Civil Code) and the legal framework was further developed in case law (jurisprudence).
Act on Management and Supervision of Legal Entities and directors’ liability for foundations
In the area of liability of foundation directors, quite a lot has changed with the introduction of the Management and Supervision of Legal Entities Act 2021. Section 2:138(1) of the Dutch Civil Code, concerning liability of a director of a public limited company for clearing the estate deficit if the bankruptcy was caused by improper management, now applies to all foundations. Previously, the liability scheme only applied mutatis mutandis to foundations subject to corporate income tax.
Presumption of directors’ liability for a foundation
Article 2:138 paragraph 2 of the DCC contains a presumption of proof that the bankruptcy was caused by improper management if there is a failure to file annual accounts or if the obligation to keep administrative records has not been met. This presumption of proof only applies (by virtue of Article 2:300a paragraph 2 of the DCC) to the foundation in the following cases:
- a foundation subject to corporation tax; or
- a foundation required by or under the law to prepare financial statements that are equal or equivalent to annual accounts.
You can read more about the presumption of evidence and the possibility of overturning it here.
The volunteer director of a foundation because of idealistic objectives
Thus, a board member of a foundation should be aware that there is a lot of responsibility involved in the board position and that board liability may be lurking under some circumstances. This can apply to a large commercial foundation with a professional board, but also to the small foundation with an (unpaid) board member who only wants to contribute because of idealistic objectives. People who want to take on such a board position should reconsider whether they are suitable for it. This was therefore one of the objectives of the new legal regulation.
Incidentally, the court still has the option to moderate the director’s liability. You can read more about that here. Possibly, the court will be a bit more lenient in the case of the unpaid director (and who, incidentally, has not enriched himself either) who took up the position because of idealistic objectives.
Corporate and insolvency law lawyer in Rotterdam
If you have questions about directors’ liability or have a conflict with a receiver, please contact Peter de Graaf.
Managing director and works council: how to achieve effective cooperation?
Managing director and works council: how to achieve effective cooperation?
The works council is an important body within the organisation. They represent their members and have the necessary powers to do so, such as the right to consent and the right of advice. Effective cooperation makes it easier to implement important decisions within your organisation and ensures that those decisions are also supported within your organisation. So there is every reason to work on the cooperation with the works council, but how do you achieve that? The interests of the works council and the director are sometimes opposed, and the works council is therefore often seen as an opponent of the director. In this article we will tell you how to get closer to an effective cooperation.
Inform yourself in time about the rights of the Works Council
If you are aware of the rights and obligations of the works council, it will be easier for you to cooperate with the works council. After all, there need be no (or at least less) discussion about the content of those rights and duties. Do you have doubts about these rights and how far they extend? Please contact an employment lawyer to have this checked before communicating with the works council. Also give the works council the opportunity to turn to an employment law specialist.
Works council rights
Right to information: This means that the works council is entitled to information to enable it to perform its duties. The works council can request information itself (active information right) and the employer is obliged to provide information about the financial and economic position of the company and the social policy pursued (passive information right).
Consultation right: The managing director and works council are obliged to meet in a consultation meeting within two weeks after a reasoned request by one of them. Compliance can be requested from the subdistrict court.
Right of initiative: The works council has the right to make proposals. The works council cannot force the director to accept these proposals.
Right to advice: The Works Council has a right to advise on certain intended decisions. Section 25 of the Works Councils Act contains a list of decisions about which advice must be requested.
Right of consent: The Works Council has a right of consent to certain proposed decisions. Section 27 of the Works Councils Act contains a list of decisions for which consent must be requested.
Facilities: the works council has the right to call in experts, the right to training, the right to retention of salary while working for the works council and the right to conduct legal proceedings free of charge.
Regularly involve the works council in decision-making
Sparring informally
In addition to the rights under the Works Councils Act that have just been discussed, a director can also involve the Works Council in issues other than those on which it has the right to advise and consent. After all, the Works Council has a stimulating task with regard to subjects that affect the staff, such as terms of employment, working conditions, equal treatment and more. The more regular the consultation with the works council, the better. The works council should not feel like an afterthought; that creates the idea that the works council has no influence on decision-making. Regular and timely involvement of the Works Council creates trust. This can be done simply by planning a fixed moment to consult.
Works council involvement without right to advice or consent
Please note: is the works council involved without the right to advice or assent? As a director, it must be made clear that no advice or assent is requested, but that the director merely wants the works council to think along on a certain subject. Therefore, always assess first whether the subject requires advice or consent. Uncertainty? Richard Ouwerling of LVH Advocaten will be glad to help you.
Works council agreement
The powers of the Works Council can also be extended through a Works Agreement. The involvement of the Works Council can thus increase and this can be positive for your organisation. Primary employment conditions, for instance, are not a subject on which the Works Council has the right to advice or consent. However, the managing director could agree with the works council that the terms of employment are submitted to the works council for approval. This could make it easier for the staff to accept.
Formation of a tacit business agreement
Please note: a company agreement can be created tacitly. If the directors repeatedly request consent or advice, in writing, unambiguously and without reservation, on a subject that falls outside the right to consent and advice, a corporate agreement may be created. Therefore, always make a reservation if you, as a director, wish to informally spar with the works council and state that no consent or advice is requested.
Need a lawyer in Rotterdam in the field of works councils and employee participation?
Co-determination is a promising tool for every manager if it is used correctly. Richard Ouwerling of LVH Advocaten in Rotterdam is happy to help you set up works councils in the right way within your organisation. Richard Ouwerling can help you with the establishment of the works council, the conclusion of a works agreement, as well as he can guide you in the process of advice and consent.
Turboliquidation
The government expects that as a result of covid-19, a significant number of entrepreneurs will want to end their business in the short term using the turbo liquidation. The government fears abuse and has drafted a proposal to protect the position of creditors and to increase transparency on this scheme. This proposal has been submitted for consultation.
Dissolution of a legal person
Legal persons can be dissolved. Dissolution occurs, for example, after the liquidation of a bankruptcy or may, subject to conditions, be effected by order of the Chamber of Commerce. It also frequently happens that a legal person takes the decision to dissolve on its own initiative. After the decision to dissolve has been made, for example, by the board of directors (in the case of a foundation) or shareholders (in the case of a private limited liability company), the legal entity continues to exist in so far as this is necessary for the liquidation of its assets. This liquidation is carried out by a liquidator. The legal entity ceases to exist when the liquidator has finished and all assets have been distributed. If there are no assets, there are also no assets to liquidate and there is no role for a liquidator. In that case, the time of dissolution coincides with the decision to terminate the legal entity. This is also called the turboliquidation. From one moment to the next the legal person ceases to exist, without creditors being informed. Because of the lack of supervision of such a dissolution, abuse is lurking.
Temporary Turbine Liquidation Transparency Act
With the bill Temporary Act on Transparency of Turbine Liquidation the Minister aims to protect the position of creditors. According to the new rules, in the event of a dissolution without income, the board of directors must deposit a balance sheet and a statement of income and expenditure with the commercial register within 10 working days. This must be accompanied by a written statement of the reasons for the lack of assets at the time of dissolution and the non-payment of creditors. If creditors have been satisfied prior to the dissolution, a final distribution list must also be filed. In addition, the latest financial statements must be filed and finally, creditors must be notified promptly after this information is filed. Currently, all of these requirements do not apply.
The idea is that, as a result of the new rules, creditors will be better able to assess whether assets have been withdrawn from the legal entity prior to the resolution to dissolve it.
Penalties for liquidation in violation of the new law
The (temporary) law not only provides additional rules, there are also sanctions. At the request of the public prosecutor’s office, the court can impose an administration ban in the event of a dissolution without income in the following cases:
- If the board has not filed the documents mentioned above;
- If the board has prejudiced creditors;
- If the board has been involved in a dissolution without income at least twice before in the 2 previous years.
Looking for a corporate law attorney?
At this time, it is not known when the Temporary Turboliquidation Transparency Act will actually be filed and take effect. Would you like to know more about the dissolution of a company or turboliquidation? Please feel free to contact Rob Steenhoek at LVH Advocaten. He specializes in corporate law and will be happy to assist you.
Limitation period for spouse’s power to annul legal acts performed without consent
Limitation period for spouse’s power to annul legal acts performed without consent
For certain legal acts, one spouse requires the consent of the other spouse. If this consent is not given, the other spouse may annul the legal act. In short, this applies to decisions regarding the family home, gifts, security (such as guarantees) and hire purchase. In an earlier judgment (concerning the Dexia share lease affair), the Supreme Court already ruled that consent is also required for securities leasing, because this is in fact a form of hire purchase (or purchase by instalments). A limitation period of three years applies to invoking annulment. The Supreme Court recently handed down a judgment on the question of when this period begins to run. This judgment is discussed in this article. This judgment also relates to the Dexia share lease affair.
Legal provisions spouse’s consent, annulment and limitation period power of annulment
The cases in which a spouse requires the consent of the other spouse are listed in Section 1:88 of the Civil Code. In 2008, the Supreme Court ruled that securities leasing also falls under this provision. Article 1:89 of the Civil Code stipulates that the non-acting spouse may annul a legal act (such as entering into a securities leasing agreement) that has been performed without the necessary consent. Upon annulment, the agreement is deemed never to have existed. Article 3:52(1), preamble and under d, of the BW stipulates when the limitation period begins and ends. The legal claim to invoke annulment expires:
‘three years after the power to invoke this ground for annulment has become available to the person entitled to it.’
This phrase could give rise to three possible starting points:
- The moment at which the legal act is performed (in the case of securities leasing, this is the moment at which the agreement is concluded);
- The moment at which the other spouse becomes aware that the legal act has been performed;
- The moment at which the other spouse is both aware that the legal act has been performed and aware of the right (i.e. the legal authority) to annul the legal act. This therefore also requires legal knowledge and insight.
It was already clear that moment 1 did not apply. However, the Supreme Court has now clarified whether moment 2 or moment 3 applies.
Securities leasing without the consent of the spouse
The case in this matter was fairly straightforward. In 1999, a husband entered into a share leasing agreement with (a legal predecessor of) Dexia, but without the consent of his wife. The payments for the share lease agreement were made from a joint account. In February 2006, the spouse invoked annulment. Dexia invoked the statute of limitations.
Court of Appeal’s ruling on limitation period for right of annulment
Both the District Court and the Amsterdam Court of Appeal ruled that Dexia could not invoke the limitation period. The District Court declared that the lease agreement had been validly annulled and ordered Dexia to repay the sums of money. The Court of Appeal upheld this judgment.
The Court of Appeal first referred to a judgment of the Supreme Court of 10 July 2015, in which the Supreme Court ruled that the limitation period should only start to run when the non-acting spouse becomes aware of the existence of the lease agreement. The moment of awareness of the legal right to invoke the annulment therefore did not play a role. However, the Court of Appeal considered that, after 2015, views on when actual awareness can be assumed to exist had evolved. From a judgment of 12 January 2024 of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal concluded that it has also become important when the entitled party had the knowledge and insight necessary to consider taking measures in response to the facts. According to the Court of Appeal, the burden of proof therefore rests with Dexia to demonstrate that, prior to 13 March 2000, the spouse was not only aware of the lease agreement, but also had the knowledge and insight to understand that her consent was required. According to the Court of Appeal, Dexia has failed to do so.
The date of 13 March 2000 is relevant because that was when a class action was initiated, which suspended the limitation period. Incidentally, it is difficult to imagine that the spouse had knowledge and understanding of the right to invoke annulment before that date. The Court of Appeal noted that it was not until 2002 that the view that share leasing is in fact hire purchase became public. And it was not until a judgment of 28 March 2008 that the Supreme Court confirmed this.
The limitation period commences at the moment when the spouse becomes aware of the legal act
Dexia is appealing to the Supreme Court. Dexia’s complaint is that the Court of Appeal failed to recognise that, for the limitation period to commence, it is sufficient that the non-acting spouse is actually aware of the lease agreement. The Supreme Court considers the complaint to be well-founded. The Court of Appeal’s ruling, to the effect that it is relevant that the non-acting spouse had the knowledge and understanding that the conclusion of the agreement required his or her consent, is incorrect. Requiring that such knowledge and understanding be present would not be in accordance with the proper course of legal transactions.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court notes that the case law of the Supreme Court to which the Court of Appeal referred does not alter this. According to the Supreme Court, that case law also refers to actual knowledge of facts and circumstances relating to the existence of damage.
When are knowledge and understanding of legal position important?
It is remarkable that the Court of Appeal believed that the Supreme Court had changed course, but the Supreme Court indicates that this is not the case.
In the judgment of 12 January 2024, to which the Court of Appeal referred, the Supreme Court ruled:
‘When assessing whether the injured party was actually aware of the inadequate or incorrect conduct of the liable person, the court must take into account whether the injured party had the knowledge and insight to be able to assess the soundness of the conduct.’
This case concerned incorrect advice that had been received. It was only when the injured party realised that it had received incorrect advice that it actually became aware of the negligent conduct of the liable person and realised that damage had been caused as a result of that negligent conduct.
Start of the limitation period for the power of revocation in the case of a guarantee
As mentioned above, a spouse sometimes also needs the consent of the other spouse when entering into a guarantee. This applies to private guarantees. Without consent, the guarantee is voidable. You can read more about the difference between a commercial and a private guarantee here.
In view of the Supreme Court ruling discussed above, we can assume that the limitation period for invoking the power of annulment also commences at the moment when the other spouse becomes aware of the guarantee. The moment at which that spouse first becomes legally aware of the power to invoke annulment is irrelevant.
Lawyer Rotterdam
If you would like advice on securities, such as guarantees, please contact Peter de Graaf.
The judgment discussed concerns Supreme Court 18 July 2025, ECLI:NL:HR:2025:1168.
David Harreman
Deferral of tax payment during corona
Deferral of tax payment during corona
During the corona crisis, the Emergency Measures Corona Crisis Decree included conditions under which a deferral of payment could be requested from the Tax Administration. In order to qualify for this scheme, the entrepreneur had to meet these conditions. One of these conditions is that no dividend may be paid at the time of the deferral. In addition, no bonuses may be paid.
As of April 1, 2022, all new payment obligations must be met again
As of October 1, 2021, the special deferral of payment expired. As a result, taxpayers who had special deferrals due to the corona crisis must again meet all new and current tax payment obligations. A new payment obligation exists if a tax return is filed on or after April 1, 2022. For example, the VAT return for the first quarter of 2022 falls under this, as this return for this quarter must be made after April 1. This also applies to the wage tax return for the month of March.
Tax debt payment schedule effective October 1
As of October 2022, the tax debt deferred as a result of the special deferral scheme must be repaid. For this purpose, a payment scheme has been established. Entrepreneurs pay off the debt in 60 monthly equal installments. After these 60 months (on October 1, 2027), the tax debt must be completely repaid. A question that arises is whether during this payment scheme there are still conditions that the entrepreneur must observe, such as the condition that no dividend may be distributed.
May dividends be paid during the payment plan?
The Decree on Emergency Measures in the Corona Crisis states that no bonuses and dividends may be paid until the moratorium is withdrawn. So the question is when can it be said that the deferral has been withdrawn. On October 1, 2021, the deferral was withdrawn and on October 1, 2022, the repayment of the debt begins.
Taking this into account, dividends should be allowed to be paid again. However, it seems that the State Secretary thinks differently about this. In the latest version of the decree it has been included that the previously mentioned conditions apply in full during the payment scheme* and that no bonuses and/or dividends may be distributed.
If the conditions are not met, the payment arrangement may be terminated
If the entrepreneur does pay dividends or bonuses or does not meet the other conditions, the Recipient can claim that the conditions have not been met. The payment scheme may then be terminated. It follows from the Parliamentary Letter Monitoring fiscal measures in connection with covid-19 that if the conditions for the payment scheme are not met, the entrepreneur will be contacted to see if there are possibilities to meet the payment scheme after all. The entrepreneur therefore does not have to be afraid that without consultation the entire tax debt will suddenly have to be repaid.
Need advice from a tax lawyer in Rotterdam?
Do you have questions about the implications of the payment plan? If so, please contact our tax attorney David Harreman.
* Decision on emergency measures for the corona crisis, Decision of the Secretary of State of January 26, 2022, no 2022-20850, Government Gazette 2022-1588, par 3.1
Director’s liability for breach of obligation under purchase agreement to deliver crane
In principle, if a company fails to fulfill a contractual obligation, only the company is liable for the resulting damages. Thus, the basic principle is that the director is not liable. Under special circumstances, a director may nevertheless be liable. An example of such circumstances was at issue in a matter on which the Rotterdam District Court recently rendered a judgment. The director was personally ordered to pay €250,000 to an aggrieved party.
Case non-delivery sold construction crane
A buyer purchased a construction crane from a limited liability company (I call it “Seller B.V.”) for €250,000 in July 2022. The estimated time of delivery of the construction crane to the buyer was August 2022. The purchase price was paid to Seller B.V. by the buyer. Seller B.V., in order to deliver the crane to the buyer, still had to purchase the crane itself.
However, delivery to the buyer remains undelivered. Seller B.V. keeps the buyer on hold for a while longer. In January 2023, a substitute agreement is made according to which Seller B.V. repays the purchase price of €250,000 received to the buyer. This agreement is also not fulfilled by Seller B.V. Not a penny is repaid.
The buyer starts proceedings, claiming payment not only from Seller B.V., but also from the director (jointly and severally). The claim against the director is based on tort (Article 6:162 of the Dutch Civil Code).
Evidentiary position of creditor in director’s liability case
In the case of director liability, it is in principle up to the creditor to prove that the director acted unlawfully. This can be a difficult position to prove. The bar for directors’ liability is high. Case law has crystallized some types of situations in which directors’ liability can be assumed. For example, there is directors’ liability if the director knew or should have known at the time of entering into the agreement that the company would not fulfill the obligation under the agreement and would have no recourse for the non-performance (the Beklamel standard). Another type of situation is where the director frustrated remedies. Selective default (unwillingness to pay) can also be considered. In all of this, the creditor usually has no insight into the debtor’s administration and financial affairs. This complicates the position of proof.
Director had B.V. pay other due debts
However, the judgment of the Rotterdam District Court shows that the director himself provided the necessary information in the proceedings. He has stated that the €250,000 received was used to satisfy various creditors of Seller B.V.. An amount of €70,000 was paid to the Tax Office because of an impending bankruptcy. An amount of € 55,000 was paid to the accountant because he ceased his activities. And €20,000 was paid to transporters. The remaining 105,000 was used during the year 2023 to pay various other current debts.
Court ruling on directors’ liability
The court finds that the director of Seller B.V. is personally at fault. The court agrees with the buyer that the director did not respect the buyer’s interests by using the amount received from the buyer, which was intended to buy a crane from, for other purposes. The court further considered that the money was used to deal with acute financial problems. The director did not ensure that sufficient funds remained, or could be realized, to still fulfill the purchase agreement with the buyer or to fulfill the subsequent repayment agreement.
The director still argued that there were many orders in the pipeline at the time. The court considered that this had not been concretized by the director, whereas it would have been in his path, since that information was in his domain.
Furthermore, the court held that the director put the buyer on the line, while in the meantime using the purchase price to make ongoing payments. In doing so, the director did not demonstrate that Seller B.V. would be able to fulfill the contractual obligations (including the later agreed repayment) or provide recourse for this. The court considers this contrary to what is socially acceptable.
Directors’ liability and the Beklamel standard
The fact that an agreement on repayment (or, for example, a payment schedule) is not fulfilled by the company need not, in principle, lead to directors’ liability. In my opinion, in the matter discussed, the harm had already been done at the time of entering into the purchase agreement with the buyer. Apparently, at that time there were already significant debts to the Tax Office and the accountant. The company was already at risk of bankruptcy. The purchase price received was used to pay the most pressing debts, but the consequence was that the crane could no longer be purchased (and it could not be delivered to the buyer). And in all this, the director was apparently unable to convince the court that he had a reasonable expectation that funds would still come in to purchase the crane. In my view, the conclusion that the director acted unlawfully is based primarily on the Beklamel standard: the director is liable if, at the time of entering into the agreement, he knew or ought to have known that the company would not fulfill the obligation under the agreement and would have no recourse for the non-performance.
Lawyer corporate law and insolvency law in Rotterdam
If you have questions about directors’ liability or have a conflict with a trustee please contact Peter de Graaf.
Ina Erwich
LVH Advocaten opts for an open culture and moves to modern premises: World Port Center in Rotterdam.
In order to realize her mission on how a law firm can best serve her clients, Leeman Verheijden Huntjens Advocaten will move to a new location on 1 March 2020: the World Port Center (WPC) on the Wilhelminakade in Rotterdam.
A joint effort with a common goal
“We are not a law firm where client, lawyer and support staff are adjacent from each other. We strive for a flat organization where everyone is equal and each person has his or her own task in our common goal to serve the client as best as we can. A modern building where all employees are located on one floor fits in with this common goal, because cooperation is essential. In order to achieve our common goal, it is important to see each other frequently and easily in order to be able to act quickly,” says Bouwe Bos, partner at Leeman Verheijden Huntjens Advocaten.
Time for a next step
The monumental building in the Scheepvaartkwartier, where the law firm has been housed for the past 10 years, is therefore no longer in line with this vision. “We have always had many compliments about the beautiful building and enjoyed working there, but it is time for the next step. The fact that we are allowed to end up on Wilhelmina Pier is the next step. We already think this is one of the most vibrant living and working areas in Rotterdam and this will only get better in the coming years with the planned developments on the pier and the Rijnhaven district”, says Bouwe Bos.
World Port Center
The WPC building was the first tower on the Wilhelmina Pier and is known as housing for the Port of Rotterdam Authority. The tower is now developing into a multi-tenant building. LVH and the owner are of the opinion that an open character and hospitable experience is of great importance to its visitors. A complete renovation and refurbishment of the entrance will be carried out in 2020, in which hospitality will be paramount.
Sustainability is another important pillar for the WPC building. For example, it is on the list for Breeam and Well certification. An example of a smart sustainability solution are the cooling systems that obtain their cooling capacity via the water from the river Maas.
LVH will occupy 887 m² of office space which is located on the 27th floor of the World Port Center. From 1 March 2020, the office will officially move to this new location.
About Leeman Verheijden Huntjens Advocaten
Leeman Verheijden Huntjens Advocaten is a Rotterdam law firm that focuses on providing legal services to companies. It goes without saying that our services are of high professional quality. At least as important is the way we do our work: involved, clear, and fast.
The quality we deliver is a team effort and not the sum of individual performances.
Our success is determined by the level of satisfaction of our customers and employees. We are only satisfied when a client is convinced that he or she is in good hands with us and recommends us to other parties. And also when our employees encourage acquaintances to come and work for us.
As a company we strive for qualitative growth. Everyone contributes to this. We naturally encourage our employees to be among the best in the business. But also to actively contribute to the growth and good name of our company. Contribute in a way that best suits each individual employee. Because only then can our employees optimally develop their talents and best succeed in our common mission: to bind our clients to our company by meeting and, where possible, exceeding their expectations.
Received a subpoena? Five points of attention
Received a subpoena? Five points of attention
Have you received a subpoena from the bailiff and are you wondering what to pay attention to when studying the subpoena?
In this article, we will give you five tips for studying a summons.
You can infer a lot from a summons, such as by what date you must respond to the summons, what happens if you don’t respond, and whether or not you are required to be assisted by a lawyer.
1. Parties in the subpoena
A writ of summons first of all states on behalf of which party (plaintiff) the bailiff has issued the writ of summons to you. From the summons, you can therefore deduce by whom the proceedings against you have been initiated. If that party is assisted by a lawyer/authorized representative, this will also be mentioned in the summons.
We advise you to always check carefully whether you are the right party being summoned by the plaintiff. For example, it is possible that you are director of several companies, but that the other party has subpoenaed the wrong company from you.
2. Roll date and appearance in court
Furthermore, the subpoena will also include by what date and before what court you must appear. Below is an example of such a passage:
“to appear, in person or represented by an agent, at the public hearing of the District Court of Rotterdam, Subdistrict Section, location Rotterdam, on Wednesday the twenty-eighth of August, at 10:00 a.m., sitting there at Wilhelminaplein 100-125 in Rotterdam”
The date, as mentioned in the summons (in the example 28 August 2022), is also called ‘the court date’. By this date, you must respond to the summons, barring any postponement. In subdistrict litigation, you may defend yourself orally before the court on the date and time stated, but it is also possible to submit a written defense (called a ‘statement of claim’) to the court by this date.
In the case of a commercial case, your lawyer will have to file a statement of defence. In most cases, you will also be able to request a postponement of the delivery of the Opinion.
Please note: does it concern a summary proceedings subpoena? Then the date mentioned in the summons is the date on which you must appear in court.
3. Assistance from a lawyer
In the same passage in the summons, you can also read whether or not you are required to be assisted by a lawyer. For example, in commercial and civil appeal cases you are required to be assisted by a lawyer. In subdistrict cases, on the other hand, you may litigate in person or be assisted by an attorney. Of course, it is often advisable to be assisted by a lawyer.
4. Notice
The summons will also contain a ‘notice’. This will state, among other things, whether and how you can respond to the summons (see also paragraph 2. Roll date and appearance in court). It will also state whether a court fee will be charged if you appear in court. It will also explain what will happen if you do not appear in court. Finally, the notice will state whether or not you are required to be assisted by a lawyer (see also paragraph 3. Assistance by a lawyer).
5. The petitum (the conclusion of the summons)
Finally, it is important to carefully study the conclusion of the summons. This is also referred to as the ‘petitum’. The petitum of the summons states what the plaintiff claims from you. An example of a petitum reads as follows:
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: your court may order the defendant to pay a principal sum of € 10,000.00 by way of a judgment, executable in law.”
Need legal advice with a summons?
Have you received a subpoena and do you want advice about it or do you want to subpoena a party yourself? Do not hesitate to contact us. Gentia Niesert, attorney at law, will be happy to help you.
Dismissal during illness versus dismissal due to illness
Dismissal during illness versus dismissal due to illness
The employment contract of a sick employee can (despite the prohibition on giving notice during illness) be dissolved by the subdistrict court. That is, if (a) there is a legal ground for dismissal (for example, a disturbed working relationship or dysfunction) and (b) the request for dissolution is not related to the illness.
Dismissal not related to illness
When is there no connection? In practice, this connection is interpreted differently by judges. Ranging from no connection, secondary connection, sufficient connection, to even decisive connection.
An employer had better take a safe course. And explain that and why the facts and grounds on which a request for dissolution is based, are completely separate (can be abstracted) from the employee’s disability.
Example 1: no dismissal due to illness
An employee is dysfunctional in the opinion of the employer. The employee disagrees. During an improvement process initiated by the employer, the employment relationship becomes seriously and permanently disturbed. As a result, the employee becomes unfit for work.
In this example, there is first a disturbed working relationship and then disability. For this reason, there is no connection between a request for dissolution to be filed by the employer and the circumstances covered by the prohibition on notice. Unless the employee’s conduct that led to the disrupted employment relationship was the result of the employee’s incapacity for work
Example 2: yes dismissal due to illness
Employer and employee have a disagreement about the employee’s disability. The working relationship becomes disturbed as a result.
A request by the employer to dissolve the employment contract will not be successful in this case. After all, the disturbed working relationship is not completely unrelated to the disability.
Exception to ban on notice during illness
When a sick employee does not fulfill his reintegration obligations, even after the employer has stopped paying wages for that reason, the employment contract with the employee can be dissolved. While in that situation, the dissolution request is not independent of the employee’s disability.
Address and address potential grounds for dismissal in a timely manner
It is up to the employer to make it plausible that the facts and grounds of a dissolution request are completely unrelated to the employee’s disability. It is important (also) for this reason, that the employer addresses, addresses and documents a situation of dysfunction or a disturbed working relationship in a timely manner.
More information about dismissal during illness versus due to illness?
If you have any questions about this article or about this topic, please contact Peter Verheijden, employment law attorney at LVH Advocaten.
How does rent protection work for tenants of medium-sized business premises upon termination of the lease?
How does rent protection work for tenants of medium-sized business premises when terminating the lease?
There are two different lease regimes for the lease of business premises: lease for middle-range business premises, such as stores and catering establishments (7:290 business premises) and other business premises (7:230a business premises). This article discusses rent protection for tenants of middle business space, such as stores, catering and crafts (7:290 business space) . The rules that apply here assume a broad degree of protection for the tenant. This is because it is important for the tenant to be able to build up a business and generate income and goodwill. Rental protection is expressed in particular in the fixed lease terms, the limited termination options for the landlord, the system of rent adjustment and the right of substitution. This article specifically discusses the rent protection a tenant has when the landlord wants to terminate the lease for medium-sized business premises.
When may a lease be terminated?
A lease for medium business premises may only be terminated by the end of a specified lease term. The term regulation applies to such leases. The starting point is an initial lease term of five years. If the lease is not terminated, it is extended by five years. Notice of termination of the lease for a medium-sized business premises can only be given at the end of the lease term, for example, after the first five years.
From ten years, continuation is indefinite, unless a different duration is agreed upon in the lease. If the lease runs indefinitely, it can be terminated by any date.
How should a lease for medium business space be terminated by the landlord?
If a landlord wants to terminate the lease, he must send a registered letter or have a bailiff’s writ served. This way, the landlord can prove that the tenant has received the termination letter. The notice period for the landlord is always at least one year. If a shorter notice period is agreed upon in the lease, it is not valid. For a landlord, however, a longer notice period may be agreed upon, for example one and a half years or two years. For the tenant, a shorter notice period may be agreed upon, for example six months.
Example:
Thus, if a lease runs from April 1, 2020 to March 31, 2025, the landlord must ensure that the termination letter reaches the tenant before March 31, 2024.
The landlord must also state the grounds for termination in the termination letter. If there are no grounds for termination in the landlord’s termination letter to the tenant, the lease termination is not valid.
What are the grounds for termination in medium-sized business premises?
A lessor can only terminate the lease if one or more of the grounds for termination listed exhaustively in the law are present. For a medium-sized business premises lease with a duration of ten years or more, a landlord has more grounds for termination at his disposal than for a five-year lease.
Grounds for termination of lease agreement first five years:
- the tenant’s business practices are not as befits a good tenant; and/or
- the landlord wants to personally take the leased property into permanent use and urgently needs the leased property for that purpose (“urgent own use”).
Additional grounds for termination after 10 years:
- the tenant does not agree to a reasonable offer to enter into a new lease;
- the landlord intends, pursuant to a current zoning plan, to achieve a zoning on the leased property; and
- the landlord’s interests in terminating the lease outweigh the tenant’s interests in continuing the lease (“balancing of interests”).
What are the consequences of the landlord’s termination of the lease for medium business space?
If the landlord has terminated the lease, the lease will only end if the tenant has given notice of consent to the termination within six weeks. If no (consenting) notice is received from the tenant within six weeks, the landlord may ask the court to fix the termination date of the lease. In such proceedings, the landlord may only invoke the grounds for termination stated in the termination letter.
Is the tenant entitled to compensation for terminating the lease?
In four cases, the tenant may be entitled to compensation upon termination of the lease of a medium business space. These are:
- an allowance for moving and furnishing expenses;
- an allowance for goodwill;
- demolition of the leased property for the public interest; and
- rescission due to realization of zoning plan.
If the parties do not agree between themselves, they can go to court for this.
When temporarily leasing medium business space, a tenant has no rent protection
Importantly, when the tenant and landlord of medium-sized business premises enter into a lease for the duration of two years or less, there is no rent protection for the tenant. The idea is that parties are free to do what they agree for a certain duration. The tenant and landlord of medium-sized business premises may, in the case of a lease for two years or less, choose how the agreement ends. This can be done, for example, by giving notice, by the occurrence of a resolutive condition or by operation of law after the expiration of the agreed contract term. When the landlord terminates a temporary lease, the landlord is not bound by the legal grounds for termination. Nor does the temporary lease for medium-sized business premises end only after the court is called in to determine the end date (if the tenant does not agree to the termination). Thus, a tenant of a middle business space with a temporary lease has no rent protection.
Lease term of two years or less must be expressly stated in the lease for medium business space
A tenant of medium-sized business premises is not entitled to rent protection if the lease expressly states that it is a temporary lease (pursuant to Section 7:301 of the Dutch Civil Code). In practice, this does not always go well. For example, a five-year lease with an interim termination option after two years does not always prevent the tenant from claiming rent protection. It must also be explicitly stated that the first two years are intended to be a temporary lease for the duration of two years. If it is not explicitly stated that there is a temporary lease, the tenant of medium business premises does have rent protection.
The summary proceedings in brief
In my previous article ‘Receiving a Subpoena? Five points of interest’ I discussed five points of interest for studying a subpoena. Among other things, I mentioned that one can be summoned in summary proceedings. In this article, I will take a closer look at ‘summary proceedings’ also known as ’emergency proceedings’.
I will discuss what summary judgment is, how to apply for summary judgment and the process of summary judgment.
Do you want to file an interlocutory appeal or have received an interlocutory subpoena? If so, consult an lawyer.
What is summary proceedings?
Because regular proceedings often take a long time, but one sometimes simply does not have that time, the possibility of ‘summary proceedings’ exists.
An interlocutory injunction is an emergency procedure in which the judge in preliminary relief proceedings (the judge in interlocutory proceedings) may grant a provisional injunction. ‘Provisional’ because, in principle, the decision of the preliminary injunction judge will stand until the claim in the main action is decided.
Examples of summary proceedings
An example of a situation in which you may initiate summary proceedings is when a prejudgment attachment has been placed on your bank account while you are required to make payments. Also, summary proceedings may be desirable if the seller/buyer refuses to cooperate with the transfer of a property or if there is a foreclosure sale scheduled that you want to stop.
For example, summary judgment may also be desired if something is published at short notice that you do not want published.
How is summary judgment requested?
Requesting summary judgment works as follows. An attorney prepares a draft summary judgment subpoena. That summons states what the plaintiff is claiming from the defendant (opposing party). It should also state why there is urgency to that claim.
The summary proceedings form
Meanwhile, a lawyer will ask the other party for the dates of the hearing to be scheduled. After doing so, the lawyer will send the draft summons to the preliminary relief judge of the court in question. To this, the lawyer attaches the so-called ‘summary proceedings form’. This form can be downloaded from the website of De Rechtspraak. The form includes the parties’ details and dates of prevention.
The judge in preliminary relief proceedings, in turn, completes the form further, indicating the case number, when the summary judgment hearing will take place and before which preliminary relief judge. Then the lawyer finalizes the summons.
The bailiff goes on the road
After the summons is final, the bailiff is sent out to serve the summons on the opposing party. The bailiff then announces to the opposing party when the hearing will take place.
The summary judgment hearing
Finally, the preliminary relief hearing takes place. Until no later than 24 hours before the hearing, the parties may bring further documents into the proceedings.
During the summary proceedings hearing, the parties are usually given the opportunity – by means of speaking notes – to tell their story. In most cases, the judge in preliminary relief proceedings pronounces judgment within 14 days after the hearing.
Need assistance from a lawyer in summary proceedings?
Have you received a summons or do you want to initiate summary proceedings yourself? Do not hesitate to contact us.
Every cloud has a silver lining
On the last day of 2015, one of the Netherlands’ largest department stores has been declared bankrupt. V&D’s bankruptcy had negative consequences on various parties. For example on Senz, a supplier of storm umbrellas. Senz had supplied V&D with umbrellas of which a large part remained unpaid.
Right of recovery: legal means in case of non-payment
Payment is not a legal requirement for the transfer of an article. A buyer becomes the owner of a product if it is delivered on the basis of a purchase agreement by a competent seller. Through the supply, V&D became the owner of the Senz umbrellas.
Non-payment
What can a seller do in case of non-payment?
The legislation offers sellers the possibility to recover non-paid products through a written statement to the buyer. Sellers have a so-called right of recovery. This right may be asserted if the buyer does not fulfil his obligation to pay and is in default. A seller can legally be in default if the agreed term of payment expires or if the buyer informs the seller that he will not make any payments. Invoking the right to recovery results in the termination of the purchase agreement between the buyer and seller. Through the exercise of the right of recovery, Senz became once again the owner of the umbrellas and could claim them to be handed over. Moreover, a bankruptcy does not affect the right to recovery.
The right to recovery
The right to recovery cannot be invoked if the buyer has already sold the products to an unsuspecting third party. Therefore, it is advisable not to agree on long payment terms with buyers and to monitor these terms. Furthermore, it would be wise to give each individual item a mark, so it can be identified in case of a recall.
Result in interlocutory proceedings
In Senz’ case, the V&D curators refused to hand over the storm umbrellas to Senz. They stated that no distinction could be made between paid and unpaid umbrellas. In interlocutory proceedings, the judge in interlocutory proceedings ruled in Senz’ favour. In the end, V&D had to hand over the umbrellas to Senz. In short, every cloud has a silver lining.
If you have any questions regarding this subject, please contact our office +31 10 209 2777 or by e-mail info@lvh-advocaten.nl
What are the rights, obligations and liabilities of contractors and principals in contracting work?
A construction assignment to a contractor is considered a contract for work. This is an agreement whereby the contractor, on the instructions of the client – outside of employment – realizes and delivers a work of material nature. The legal relationship between the client and the contractor is – unless otherwise agreed – governed by the statutory rules for contracting work. This concise legal regulation can be found in the first section of title 7.12 of the Dutch Civil Code (art. 7:750 ff. of the Civil Code). This article explains the rights, obligations and liabilities of the parties to contracting work on the basis of the statutory regulations.
Contractor’s rights and obligations in a construction project
Under the statutory scheme, the contractor has only two obligations. Firstly, he has to complete and deliver the work and secondly, he has to warn about obvious shortcomings in the design or regulations that come from the client. In short, the contractor has a delivery obligation and a warning obligation. The contractor’s delivery obligation means that if he builds according to the client’s design he must carry out the construction work as indicated in the specifications and the drawings and possibly according to the instructions of the management. Only when the contractor builds according to his own design does he also have the obligation to hand over the work in accordance with the requirements of good and sound workmanship. The work must be suitable for its normal purpose and must meet any further quality requirements which the client set when the contract was granted. In such a case, it can be said that there is an obligation to produce a certain result. After all, only then does the contractor have full control over whether a sound result can be achieved.
The duty to warn is a refinement of the obligation to deliver. The contractor must warn of any design faults or incorrect instructions on the part of the client that he could reasonably have recognized. If the contractor builds to a design originating from the client’s side, the responsibility for the design lies with the client. A good performance of the contractor’s duties entails that he does not execute the design blindly, but first takes a good and critical look at it. However, this does not mean that he has to redo the work of the architect. The contractor must test the design against the standards that apply in construction. The duty to warn is thus derived from the obligation of careful execution by the contractor. This duty to warn on the part of the contractor already applies at the time of entering into the agreement, i.e. before the actual construction work begins.
Contractor’s responsibility for building materials and auxiliary persons
During construction, the contractor is responsible for the materials he uses and the subcontractors or auxiliary persons he engages. This may be different if a defect arises as a result of building materials, subcontractors or suppliers prescribed by the client. In short, such a defect is attributable to the client and he cannot hold the contractor liable for it.
Responsibility for warning of cost-increasing circumstances
After entering into the building contract, the contractor also has an obligation to warn of cost-increasing circumstances, such as unexpectedly rising construction costs. If the contractor should not have taken the cost-increasing circumstances into account when concluding the construction contract, he can ask the court to increase the price the client has to pay. The contractor can only claim the price adjustment from the court if he has warned the principal in time about the cost-increasing circumstances. After all, the principal must have been given the opportunity to limit or simplify the contract, for example by choosing other materials or not to have certain parts of the work performed. The contractor may adjust the price which the principal must pay without the intervention of the courts if the cost increase is the result of incorrect information provided by the principal which is relevant to the determination of the price, unless the contractor should have discovered the incorrectness of that information before the price was determined.
Who pays for additional work when contracting for work?
If a client wants to make additions or changes to the agreed work, there may be additional or reduced work. Additional work is an extension of the specifications. Reduced work involves a reduction of the specifications. Based on the law, the contractor can only claim an increase in the price from his client in connection with additions or changes to the work if he has informed the client in good time of the need for a resulting price increase. This is only different if the client himself should have understood that the adjustments would lead to a price increase. This is the case, for example, if the client suddenly wants golden taps installed everywhere instead of standard taps. The client must then understand that he will have to bear the extra costs involved. It is not permissible to deviate from the statutory regulation that requires the contractor to warn of the costs of the additional work that are not obvious to the client before he can charge for them. On the other hand, it is not required that the contractor make such a warning in writing. The latter is often wise. After all, it often happens that after completion a discussion arises about whether or not to pay for the additional work. You can read more about who should foot the bill for additional work in the article “When are the costs of additional work to be borne by the client in the case of contracting work?”
Rights and obligations of the client during the construction process
Against the contractor’s obligation to complete the work is the client’s obligation to pay a price as a result. Often a fixed price will have been agreed prior to the work; the contract price. If no contract price has been agreed, the contractor is entitled to a reasonable price under the law. In determining a reasonable price, account is taken of the prices usually stipulated by the contractor and the expectations he has aroused with regard to the presumed price. If no price agreement has been made, but the contractor has stated a recommended price, the law stipulates that the contractor may not exceed the recommended price by more than 10%. However, the 10% limit may be exceeded if the contractor has given timely warning of the excess. After such a warning the client then has the opportunity to limit or simplify the work.
If it is difficult for the contractor to estimate in advance what the costs of the materials and the execution of the work will be, the work can be carried out ‘on a cost-plus-basis’. The contractor then receives a fee for the costs incurred, such as labor and materials to be increased by a profit percentage. Sometimes the choice is also made to carry out the work on a cost-plus basis, because it is expected that the costs to the client may be lower than if a fixed price is agreed in advance.
Completion in case of contracting work
As described above, the contractor is obliged to deliver the work. The law states that the completion procedure starts with the contractor’s notification that the work is completed. Usually, the parties then agree on a date when the completion of the work will take place. The client must then inspect the work. He can then accept the work (possibly subject to the repair of defects) or refuse it, indicating the defects. If the client does not inspect the work within a reasonable period of time, the client will be deemed to have tacitly accepted it. After completion, the work will be at the client’s risk. After completion, the contractor will no longer be liable for defects that the principal should reasonably have discovered at the time of completion. The time of completion is therefore important for both parties. It is therefore wise to check the work carefully and to note down any completions points accurately on the completion report.
The contractor remains liable for hidden defects even after completion. Think, for example, of defects in the construction. The principal can also claim against the contractor after completion. The contractor must first be given the opportunity to repair the defects. Only if the costs of repair are so high that the contractor cannot be expected to carry out the work, will the principal have to settle for compensation.
Limitation of legal action after delivery
A legal claim for a defect in the completed work lapses two years after the client has complained to the contractor about that defect. If the client has subsequently granted the contractor a period of time to remedy the defect, the limitation period only begins to run at the end of that period or if the contractor has refused to remedy the defect. In any event, a legal action is time-barred after a period of twenty years from the date of completion.
End of the building contract
A building contract can also end before completion has taken place. The principal may terminate the building contract in whole or in part at any time. However, the client must then pay the entire agreed price, reduced with any savings made by the contractor as a result of the termination. If no price agreement has been made, the contractor, after notice of termination by the principal, is entitled to the costs incurred, compensation for hours worked and the profit that the contractor would have made on the entire work.
The principal may also have the construction contract terminated by the court if it has become clear to him that the contractor will not deliver the work (on time) or not properly. The contractor, in turn, can also apply to the court to have the building contract rescinded. He can do this if it becomes clear that the principal will not comply with his obligation, for example because he has stopped paying or if there is force majeure, as a result of which the contractor can no longer be required to complete the work.
General terms and conditions for contracting work
General terms and conditions are widely used in the construction industry. The most commonly used (and recent) general terms and conditions for contracting work are the Uniforme Administratieve Voorwaarden voor de uitvoering van werken en van technische installatiewerken 2012 (UAV 2012). The UAV 2012 regulates the legal relationship between the principal and the contractor according to the ‘traditional model’. In other words, the principal gives the contractor a design and the contractor carries out the work according to the design. If a building contract is concluded between a contractor and a consumer, the Consumentenvoorwaarden Verbouwingen van Stichting BouwGarant (Covo2010) are often declared applicable.
Right to consent of Works Council: what to do in case of refusal by Works Council (WC)?
A Works Council (WC) has a right to consent with regard to proposed decisions to adopt, amend or repeal a regulation pursuant to Section 27 of the WOR. But what if the Works Council refuses to give its consent to the implementation of the resolution? Is that reasonable, or do the interests of the employer outweigh the interests? And what can the entrepreneur do? In this article we answer these questions by discussing the right of the Works Council to consent and the possibilities open to the entrepreneur in case of refusal.
Is the decision subject to assent?
The first question the entrepreneur must ask himself is whether the decision requires consent at all. It must be a regulation. That regulation must relate to a sufficiently concrete subject with a permanent character that applies to a group of persons in the company. There is no right of consent for primary employment conditions; this is reserved for the trade unions. Nor is there a right to consent with respect to subjects that are exhaustively regulated in a collective bargaining agreement.
Extension of Works Council powers
Another point of attention is that the advisory right of the Works Council may have been extended in a collective agreement or a company agreement. If the consent of the Works Council has been requested several times in writing, unambiguously and without reservation, and the Works Council has responded to this request in writing, a corporate agreement may have come into being.
Next steps in case of refusal of WC consent
If the decision requires the employee’s consent, the employer must start the consent procedure. After the request for consent and the consultation meeting(s), the Works Council must respond to the request. If the Works Council does not give its consent, the entrepreneur is faced with a stalemate. An entrepreneur has three options: (1) renounce the decision, (2) amend the decision or (3) ask the subdistrict court for substitute consent?
When is substitute consent granted?
The latter, asking for substitute permission after being refused by the WC, is what the company QBuzz did. QBuzz wanted to adjust the roster due to the declining number of passengers because of the corona pandemic. In that roster, more weekend and late shifts should be driven. QBuzz asked the Works Council for its consent. The Works Council refused because the roster would mean that drivers who work broken shifts and therefore do not have to drive at the weekend would still have to drive weekend shifts. QBuzz then went to the subdistrict court in order to distribute the extra shifts among all the drivers.
In this ruling, the Subdistrict Court further explained the method of review. The Subdistrict Court considered that the interests of the employer and employee must be weighed against each other. This does not concern the mere determination of a weighty interest on the part of the employer.
Which interests carry the most weight?
The Subdistrict Court ruled in the present case that the Works Council had not acted unreasonably by not giving its consent. However, when weighing up the interests of both parties, the Subdistrict Court concluded that the Works Council should have granted its consent. The Subdistrict Court did not consider it plausible that the burden of the drivers with broken shifts became heavier than that of their colleagues with a regular schedule. After all, the drivers with broken shifts can go home in between. The conclusion is therefore that QBuzz has a legitimate interest and is allowed to implement the new duty roster, which means that the extra shifts can be distributed among all drivers. This outweighs the interest of the Works Council that wants to stand up for drivers with past benefits.
Conclusion: what can an entrepreneur do?
The refusal of the works council may be unreasonable or the interests of the entrepreneur may outweigh its own. If the works council refuses to give its consent to the implementation of the decision, the entrepreneur may go to the subdistrict court to ask for substitute consent. The subdistrict court will then weigh the interests against each other.
Looking for more information about the right to consent? Please feel free to contact Peter Verheijden or Richard Ouwerling of LVH Advocaten. They specialize in labor law and will be happy to assist you.
How does rent protection work for tenants of medium business space when terminating the lease?
How does rent protection work for tenants of medium business space when terminating the lease?
There are two different lease regimes for the lease of business space: lease for medium business space, such as stores and catering establishments (7:290 business space) and other business space (7:230a business space). This article discusses rent protection for tenants of middle business space, such as stores, catering and crafts (7:290 business space) . The rules that apply here assume a broad degree of protection for the tenant. This is because it is important for the tenant to be able to build up a business and generate income and goodwill. Rental protection is expressed in particular in the fixed lease terms, the limited termination options for the landlord, the system of rent adjustment and the right of substitution. This article specifically discusses the rent protection a tenant has when the landlord wants to terminate the lease for medium-sized business premises.
When may a lease be terminated?
A lease for medium business premises may only be terminated by the end of a specified lease term. The term regulation applies to such leases. The starting point is an initial lease term of five years. If the lease is not terminated, it is extended by five years. Notice of termination of the lease for a medium-sized business premises can only be given at the end of the lease term, for example, after the first five years.
From ten years, continuation is indefinite, unless a different duration is agreed upon in the lease. If the lease runs indefinitely, it can be terminated by any date.
How should a lease for medium business space be terminated by the landlord?
If a landlord wants to terminate the lease, he must send a registered letter or have a bailiff’s writ served. This way, the landlord can prove that the tenant has received the termination letter. The notice period for the landlord is always at least one year. If a shorter notice period is agreed upon in the lease, it is not valid. For a landlord, however, a longer notice period may be agreed upon, for example one and a half years or two years. For the tenant, a shorter notice period may be agreed upon, for example six months.
Example:
Thus, if a lease runs from April 1, 2020 to March 31, 2025, the landlord must ensure that the termination letter reaches the tenant before March 31, 2024.
The landlord must also state the grounds for termination in the termination letter. If there are no grounds for termination in the landlord’s termination letter to the tenant, the lease termination is not valid.
What are the grounds for termination in medium-sized business premises?
A lessor can only terminate the lease if one or more of the grounds for termination listed exhaustively in the law are present. For a medium-sized business premises lease with a duration of ten years or more, a landlord has more grounds for termination at his disposal than for a five-year lease.
Grounds for termination of lease agreement first five years:
- the tenant’s business conduct is not as befits a good tenant; and/or
- the landlord wants to personally take the leased property into permanent use and urgently needs the leased property for that purpose (“urgent own use”).
Additional grounds for termination after 10 years:
- the tenant does not agree to a reasonable offer to enter into a new lease;
- the landlord intends, pursuant to a current zoning plan, to achieve a zoning on the leased property; and
- the landlord’s interests in terminating the lease outweigh the tenant’s interests in continuing the lease (“balancing of interests”).
What are the consequences of the landlord’s termination of the lease for medium business space?
If the landlord has terminated the lease, the lease will only end if the tenant has given notice of consent to the termination within six weeks. If no (consenting) notice is received from the tenant within six weeks, the landlord may ask the court to fix the termination date of the lease. In such proceedings, the landlord may only invoke the grounds for termination stated in the termination letter.
Is the tenant entitled to compensation for terminating the lease?
In four cases, the tenant may be entitled to compensation upon termination of the lease of a medium business space. These are:
- an allowance for moving and furnishing expenses;
- an allowance for goodwill;
- demolition of the leased property for the public interest; and
- rescission due to realization of zoning plan.
If the parties do not agree between themselves, they can go to court for this.
When temporarily leasing medium business space, a tenant has no rent protection
Importantly, when the tenant and landlord of medium-sized business premises enter into a lease for the duration of two years or less, there is no rent protection for the tenant. The idea is that parties are free to do what they agree for a certain duration. The tenant and landlord of medium-sized business premises may, in the case of a lease for two years or less, choose how the agreement ends. This can be done, for example, by giving notice, by the occurrence of a resolutive condition or by operation of law after the expiration of the agreed contract term. When the landlord terminates a temporary lease, the landlord is not bound by the legal grounds for termination. Nor does the temporary lease for medium-sized business premises end only after the court is called in to determine the end date (if the tenant does not agree to the termination). Thus, a tenant of a middle business space with a temporary lease has no rent protection.
Lease term of two years or less must be expressly stated in the lease for medium business space
A tenant of medium-sized business premises is not entitled to rent protection if the lease expressly states that it is a temporary lease (pursuant to Section 7:301 of the Dutch Civil Code). In practice, this does not always go well. For example, a five-year lease with an interim termination option after two years does not always prevent the tenant from claiming rent protection. It must also be explicitly stated that the first two years are intended to be a temporary lease for the duration of two years. If it is not explicitly stated that there is a temporary lease, the tenant of medium business premises does have rent protection.
Work-at-home policies and the role of the works council
Since the beginning of the corona crisis, hybrid working has been the norm. The number of corona infections is slowly increasing again. It is not inconceivable that some companies will soon again require their employees to work wholly or partially from home.
Agreements on working from home
Employers and employees should make their own arrangements for an appropriate division between on-site and home work. Currently, only half of companies have a home-working policy. Research shows that a large majority of employees believe that working from home should be well regulated. Flexibility in this policy is a must, even given the ever-changing government recommendations.
Role of works council
The works council (OR) can also play an important role here. Not only can the Works Council push for an adequate complete homework policy, but it has a right of consent under Section 27 of the Works Councils Act (WOR) when introducing or changing a homework policy or arrangement. After all, these are regulations on working conditions and conditions of employment. For example, a homeworking policy will often include rules on working hours, working conditions, assessment systems and employee tracking systems. Even though homeworking is not mentioned as such in the WOR, the Works Council is still required to give its consent because this policy affects working conditions and terms of employment.
No consent
Without consent, the business owner cannot implement the work-at-home policy, which looks at the above points. Does the entrepreneur do this anyway? Then the Works Council can invoke the nullity of this decision within one month after the announcement of the homework policy. The entrepreneur may be able to go to the subdistrict court for substitute consent if the Works Council withholds its consent.
‘Right of initiative’ works council
If the employer does not want to introduce a homework policy or homework regulation, the Works Council can take the initiative with the so-called ‘right of initiative’. A proposal to this end must be substantiated in writing by the Works Council (and discussed at least once in a consultation meeting). The employer is not obliged to implement the Works Council’s initiative proposal, but must give reasons why it refrains from doing so.
Advisory right
The strange thing is that for a new home-working policy to be introduced, the Works Council is also obliged to advise on certain points (see Article 25 WOR). For example, if working from home leads to an important change in the organization of the company or to the introduction or modification of an important technological facility (think of switching to a new work system). Or perhaps the home working leads to important investments for the entrepreneur and he must therefore seek advice.
Conclusion
In short, it is important for both the entrepreneur and the works council to consider the consequences of hybrid or home working and what rights (consent or advice) may be associated with it. In smaller companies, the staff meeting or staff representation may have certain co-determination rights. It is therefore important to involve these co-determination bodies in the process about working from home at an early stage.
More information or advice on a work-at-home policy?
Would you like to know more about the rights of the Works Council with regard to homeworking policies? Or do you want to introduce such a policy within your company and have it drafted or monitored? Contact Richard Ouwerling, employment law attorney at LVH Advocaten.
Seizure of a ship: an odd duck in the crowd
Seizure of a ship: an odd duck in the crowd
Ships are an unmistakable part of the Rotterdam landscape. Even ‘our’ view from the World Port Center is a daily reminder that Rotterdam is a true port city. In this article, we discuss the attachment of ships.
The requirements for garnishment
A garnishment order from the preliminary injunction court is required for the levying of a prejudgment attachment, an attachment for security purposes. For this, we as lawyers submit a petition. Want to know more about prejudgment attachment in general? Then read this article by our colleague Gentia Niesert.
Attachment to collect or enforce a claim can be done at a later stage. This requires a court judgment awarding that claim against the debtor. This judgment must also have been served on the debtor.
A separate category
Under the law, an attachment must be made in a different way on an object that can be moved (movable) than on an object that cannot (immovable) and may also be mortgaged.
A vessel is an object that can move. At the same time, a ship may also be a registry property and may be subject to a right of mortgage. Since ships are a special category, the legislator has made a separate regulation for the attachment of an object with the purpose of floating: a ship.
If a ship is part of the debtor’s assets, it can be attached. If a ship is registered – this is usually the case with larger and/or commercially used ships – the ownership of the ship can be established with the help of the Land Registry.
How does ship seizure work?
Ship seizures must be made on board the vessel. It is therefore important to locate the ship first. If that location is not known to the seizing party (or lawyer), the bailiff can find out where the ship is and when it enters the Rotterdam port, for example.
If it becomes known that the ship is here or will dock soon, the bailiff can move quickly and be there within a short time. The bailiff contacts the harbour master to make sure she can enter the port and get onto the ship. On board the vessel, the bailiff serves the judgment – or attachment order – on the captain or operator present there. The relevant captain (or any third party appointed by the bailiff) is then entrusted with the custody of the vessel. The attachment report is then served on the owner of the vessel. The arrest of a registered ship is also registered in the public registers.
Once the arrest has been made, the ship is no longer allowed to sail. Putting the ship in chains, as used to be the case, is out of the question nowadays. The custodian and Rotterdam port authorities prevent the ship from leaving.
Closing
In Rotterdam, ships can usually be seized easily and quickly. Would you like to receive advice on the (precautionary) attachment of a ship or on your possible subsequent options? If so, please contact us. Jacolien Leuvenink will be happy to assist you.
Litigating on behalf of a company: a legal pitfall?
Litigating on behalf of a company: a legal pitfall?
Under company law, a legal entity can participate independently in legal transactions. This implies, among other things, that a company can conduct legal proceedings. However, conducting proceedings on behalf of a company requires careful compliance with both internal decision-making rules and rules on external representation. It may sound like a minor detail, but it can make the difference between an admissible claim and a painful rejection by the court. A recent ruling by the Limburg District Court on 18 December 2024 illustrates this.
The case: internal management dispute
In the case in question, two shareholders, who were also directors of a company, got into a conflict. One of them instructed a lawyer to assist her in her capacity as a shareholder. The lawyer then drew up a summons, not only on behalf of her client personally, but also on behalf of the company itself.
The defendant, i.e. the other director, rightly objected to this. The defendant argued that the company’s claims were inadmissible, as no legally valid decision had been taken to initiate proceedings. After all, the lawyer had been engaged by only one director, while the articles of association stipulated that the board was only authorised to act jointly. The other director had not granted power of attorney.
What went wrong?
The court made a clear distinction between two aspects:
1. External representation
External representation concerns acting on behalf of the company towards third parties, such as engaging a lawyer. According to the articles of association, both directors had to act jointly. In this case, only one director instructed the lawyer.
However, this did not lead to inadmissibility, as an appeal on the grounds of unauthorised representation under Section 2:240(3) of the Dutch Civil Code can only be made by the company itself.
2. Internal decision-making
Internal decision-making concerns the taking of decisions within the board, such as initiating legal proceedings. This is where things went wrong. The company’s articles of association stipulated that a board decision had to be taken by an absolute majority of votes of all directors entitled to vote. If a director has a conflict of interest, as was the case here, the decision must also be taken by the general meeting of shareholders (GMS). In this case, no board meeting had been held at all, let alone a board decision, nor had a GMS been convened. The court therefore ruled that the company’s claims were inadmissible due to the lack of a legally valid internal decision.
And what about the lawyer?
A striking detail in this ruling is that the defendant is also a director and shareholder of the company and, naturally, does not want the company to bear the legal costs. The defendant therefore requested the court, pursuant to Article 245 of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure, to order the plaintiff’s lawyer to pay the legal costs. This was because the company did not appear in court in a legally valid manner, as an unauthorised co-director acted on its behalf and gave the instruction to bring legal proceedings. The court granted this exceptional request.
Practical implications
This ruling emphasises that directors must be aware of the formal requirements when initiating proceedings on behalf of the company. Failure to comply with the rules laid down in the articles of association can have far-reaching consequences, including inadmissibility and personal liability for legal costs.
If a director wishes to initiate proceedings against a fellow director, but the articles of association require joint decision-making, the conflict of interest rule may offer a solution. If it is established that the other director has a conflict of interest, he or she may not participate in the decision-making process. The decision can then be validly taken by the competent body, for example the general meeting of shareholders.
Bruna must honour the franchise and lease agreement (for now)
A franchisee has successfully brought interlocutory proceedings against his franchisor Bruna. The court in interlocutory proceedings has judged as a preliminary measure that Bruna has to honour the franchise and (sub)lease agreement it terminated.
Introduction
Franchisee has operated a Bruna shop for over twenty-five years on the basis of a franchise and (sub)lease agreement. Both the franchise and the (sub)lease agreement contain a link, which means that if the franchise agreement ends, the (sub)lease agreement ends as well and vice versa.
At Bruna’s request, the bailiff has served by writ on 27 January 2017 a letter to the franchisee in which both the franchise agreement and the (sub)lease agreement were terminated per 31 January 2018 and 1 February 2018, respectively, without stating the reason for the termination. A month earlier, Bruna demanded payment from the franchisee for his arrears in payment of over eighty thousand euros to be paid within thirty days. Otherwise, Bruna threatened to stop deliveries.
The conflict
Following Bruna’s letter of notice, the franchisee brought interlocutory proceedings to compel Bruna to honour the franchise and (sub)lease agreement fully and properly. The franchisee had operated a Bruna shop for over 25 years and wished to continue this after 31 January 2018. Within this framework, the franchisee indicated that he depends on the continuation of the franchise agreement with Bruna for his and his family’s livelihood and that Bruna would be able to take over this shop virtually for free.
Furthermore, the franchisee stated that, in regard to his age in combination with his illness, it would be hard to find another job.
Moreover, the franchisee argued that he is still a more than excellent franchisee and that a reasonable ground for the termination of the franchise agreement is lacking.
During the interlocutory proceedings, Bruna made it clear that the termination of the franchise and (sub)lease agreement has not been dictated by the arrears in payment of the franchisee, but that it seriously doubts that the franchisee will be able to operate the Bruna shop in a profitable way. Due to his illness, the franchisee had not been able to work in the shop full time and was, therefore, forced to incur additional personnel costs. According to Bruna, this was the reason that the personnel costs were (too) high for a profitable operation.
Judgement
In the opinion of the court in interlocutory proceedings, substantive proceedings must show if the foregoing is a reasonable ground for the termination and whether it is plausible that the court in substantive proceedings will judge that not being able to operate the Bruna shop in a profitable way is a reasonable ground for terminating the franchise agreement. “In the context of these interlocutory proceedings, it is as yet unclear if that is the case”, says the court in interlocutory proceedings. Therefore, as a preliminary measure, Bruna must fully honour the franchise and (sub)lease agreement until the outcome of the substantive proceedings.
Consequently, franchisors should take heed when (intermediately) terminating the franchise and (sub)lease agreement.
For more information on franchise and lease agreements, please contact Sabriye Ort.
Government support agreement 2.0 for tenants and landlords in the retail sector
Following the agreement reached in April 2020 between the real estate and retail sectors on rent suspension for retailers due to the consequences of the corona crisis, there is now a support agreement 2.0.
The support agreement 2.0 of 3 June 2020 offers retailers in particular tools to reach agreements with lessors of retail space. Parties involved are the Association of Institutional Investors in the Netherlands (IVBN), Vastgoed Belang, association of private investors in real estate, VastGoedOverleg (VGO), INretail and Retail Netherlands. The starting point is that parties tackle problems together and show understanding for everyone’s interests in a period of great uncertainty and concern.
The aid agreement provides for a partial waiver of the rent for retail space
The most important agreement is that tenants and landlords of retail space propose to waive half of the rent for the months of April and May 2020 and that half of the June rent will be carried forward to next year.
However, agreements remain tailor-made between the lessor and the lessee of the retail space and can therefore not apply as a general rule to all parties. Often additional or alternative (custom) agreements have already been made between the lessor and the lessee of retail space.
The government support agreement calls on landlords and tenants in the retail sector to make agreements on
The government support agreement calls on landlords and tenants who have not yet made agreements to do so. It should be noted that the agreements as laid down in the first Support Agreement and its elaboration are sufficient and have been able to count on sufficient support from all stakeholders. In practice, the Support Agreement therefore provides workable tools for making agreements about rent payments in times of corona.
The government support agreement appeals to all stakeholders in the Dutch Retail sector
In addition to a guideline for talks between tenants and landlords of retail space, all stakeholders within the retail sector are called upon to work together constructively and to find solutions during the corona crisis:
“The Dutch spatial retail structure is unique and forms the basis of the way we live together in the Netherlands and is therefore partly decisive for how and how strongly we as the Netherlands can emerge from this crisis. In order to protect the quality of life in inner cities and central areas and the unique finely-meshed retail structure of the Netherlands, all stakeholders make an urgent appeal to give this subject all possible (political) attention in constructive consultation. Given the implications of social distancing and the uncertainties of the future, help each other where necessary and look for solutions together during this crisis”.
The support agreement is supported by the government and banks
Government and banks support the agreement and have taken measures to support entrepreneurs and businesses. According to the parties to the Aid Agreement, these measures are currently making a substantial contribution to the acute impact of corona on the retail sector.
Corona and the future for retail
The Government Support Agreement states that the consequences of Covid-19 will last longer than initially thought and cannot yet be sufficiently overseen. It has been agreed that the stakeholders will continue to follow the developments regarding corona closely together.
Debt collection in the Netherlands
LVH Advocaten offers professional debt collection services for any size commercial debts in the Netherlands. The firm has ample experience in collecting outstanding debts for our international client base and is committed to pursue debtors in the Netherlands quickly and efficiently to ensure a maximum return at a minimum cost.
Why use a Netherlands Law Firm?
It’s a fact that both consumers and companies experiencing financial difficulties will normally prioritise their creditors for payment. This suggests those creditors who demonstrate the seriousness of continued non-payment are most likely to be paid first.
The use of a local Dutch Law Firm is an excellent way of demonstrating the seriousness with which you will pursue continued non-payment of an account. We can take them to court in their own jurisdiction, and the debtor knows it. Making use of our services is one of the most efficient and cost-effective ways of prioritising an account for payment and recovering bad debt.
What we do to recover your debts
Before starting the collection procedure, we will check the information supplied. Normally, we only require the identity of the debtor and details of the debt (for example, copy invoices) in order to initiate recovery.
Assuming that the information is sufficient to enable us to proceed, We obtain payment of your overdue accounts using an established combination of letters, emails and telephone calls each aimed at bringing about the early settlement of your account. Where appropriate, we will agree to a payment scheme with the debtor and monitor the fulfilment of this scheme. In such case you will receive regular quarterly updates on the debt recovered. Most assignments are completed at this stage without further litigation.
Should these initial steps fail to result in payment of the claim, we will, with your prior consent, take appropriate legal action, and initiate legal proceedings.
Cost effective service
In as far as is possible we will also collect interest, legal penalties and charges from the debtor, in order to ensure that successful debt collection is a cost effective or even beneficial exercise for the client.
Before commencement of our activities, we will communicate the applicable fee structure and we will await your consent to our proposal.
Information
If you have any questions on this subject, please contact our office 0031 10 209 2777 or by e-mail info@lvh-advocaten.nl.
Corona SME helpdesk (for non-Dutch enterprises)
The coronavirus cannot be ignored and many countries are taking huge measures that impact each and everyone of us. It affects how we do business, and affects how we have done business in the past.
For that reason LVH Advocaten have launched a special Corona legal support desk for non-Dutch enterprises to help you through these difficult times. The Dutch government has implemented many measures that restrict business and force us to redefine our parameters. The Dutch government has also shown that it is there to help and to make the transition a little less painful.
Emergency measures issued by the Dutch government on 17th March 2020.
On 17 March 2020 the Dutch government came with extensive measures to support businesses operating in the Netherlands to help them through these difficult times. Broadly speaking, these can be categorised as follows.
- Salary compensation for employers to avoid dismissal of employees.
- Temporary financial support for freelancers whereby the government grants welfare benefits and/or loans for working capital.
- Extending the dead-lines for payment of taxes and reducing the rent on tax payments to 0,01 %.
- Extension of government guarantees for loans entered into by the enterprises. The government is prepared to act as guarantee for loans entered into by medium to large enterprises.
- Credit provider, Qredits, supports small enterprises with interest arrears.
- Extending government guarantees for SME agricultural enterprises.
- Reducing or stopping tourist taxes and made to measure solutions for the cultural sector.
- Emergency help desk especially for enterprises in the sectors that have been hit hard.
- Extension of the Guarantee tax ruling for SME enterprises, known as the “BMKB-regeling”.
General measures that LVH Advocaten can assist Non-Dutch enterprises with.
Furthermore, due to the Corona virus, enterprises are forced to start behaving differently in the market. Please find below some examples
- What rights does the entrepreneur have under the Dutch Civil Code?
- Are these rights extended or restricted, if permitted, in the commercial contracts?
- Has the current situation been reflected into the contract by way of a force majeure clause or unforeseen circumstances?
- If a force majeure clause or other clause can be invoked, which requirements need to be met and what are the rights of the entrepreneur
- Is there a provision in place that enables the entrepreneur to terminate or postpone the contract? If so, what are the requirements that need to be met and what will this mean for the entrepreneur.
- Is there an obligation in place which obliges the entrepreneur to mitigate its damages. If so, which measures need to be taken and in which order.
- If the contract with the customer cannot be performed, then what other issues does the entrepreneur need to consider. Examples are purchase contracts or sub-contracting agreements or loan agreements etc. The non-performance of the contract has many different implications which all need to be considered.
- Is there an insurance in place to cover this and does the other side have an insurance in place.
- Communication with the other contracting party is essential. What do you communicate and how? What are the do’s and don’ts in this situation.
LVH has compiled a special Corona legal support just for non-Dutch enterprises. This is to address the specific need for legal support of non-Dutch enterprises that are registered in the Netherlands.
Madelon van Breemen originates from the UK and can help your enterprise understand what remedies the government has offered you at this time. Madelon van Breemen is the primary point of contact for all Corona legal support and she has a whole team of specialised lawyers behind her to give you the support that your enterprise needs.
Watch this space!
LVH Advocaten will inform you on a daily basis using all available forms of digital communication to help your enterprise to survive. So watch this space!
Do you need immediate help with understanding and applying for the remedies that the government has provided?
Please contact Madelon van Breemen, on (+31) (0) 10 2092756 or by email vanbreemen@lvh-advocaten.nl.
External entrepreneurship is fully taken into account when assessing pseudo self-employment
External entrepreneurship is fully taken into account when assessing pseudo self-employment
The Supreme Court has made an important ruling on the employment relationship between Uber and its drivers. This ruling has far-reaching consequences for self-employed people without employees and the question of whether they are truly self-employed or pseudo self-employed.
In the Deliveroo ruling, the Supreme Court mentioned 10 circumstances that are important in assessing whether an employment relationship is an employment contract or not. One of these criteria concerns the entrepreneurship of the worker. The question was whether this entrepreneurship also applies to the relationship outside of that with the client. In other words: do you also behave as an entrepreneur in ‘economic traffic’? The Supreme Court has now ruled that external entrepreneurship must also be considered as a circumstance in the assessment of false self-employment. So: external entrepreneurship is therefore a fully-fledged criterion.
How does this appear in practice?
- The worker has several clients per year;
- The worker spends time and/or money on acquiring a reputation and finding new customers or clients.
- The worker has business investments of some significance.
- The worker behaves administratively as an independent entrepreneur, is registered with the Chamber of Commerce, is a VAT entrepreneur and/or is entitled to the tax benefits of entrepreneurship (such as entrepreneurial facilities).
In a bill (‘VBAR’), external entrepreneurship (C+) only played a role if it could not be determined on the basis of the other assessment criteria whether there was an employment contract or a contract for services. Now the Supreme Court deviates from this.
In addition, the ruling means that when the activities of the self-employed person are embedded (the same as those of employees), this does not necessarily mean that there is likely to be disguised employment. After all, if the self-employed person can demonstrate his external entrepreneurship, he is also there.
Fortunately, this means that it is easier for the self-employed person to prove that he is truly self-employed. Client happy, contractor happy because he does not want to be an employee.
Information?
Would you like to know more or do you have questions about this subject? Then please contact Richard Ouwerling, Employment Lawyer at LVH Advocaten.
The House for Whistleblowers Act has come into effect
On 1 July 2016, the Dutch House for Whistleblowers Act (Wet Huis voor Klokkenluiders) came into effect. Pursuant to this act, employees who have a suspicion of abuse within the organisation for which they work can turn to the House for Whistleblowers if the employer does not have a (adequate) procedure in place or the employer has failed to handle an internal report correctly.
The act aims to improve the conditions for reporting abuse, by making it possible for abuse to be investigated and providing better protection to those who report abuse.
As of 1 July 2016, employees who have at least 50 employees are obliged to adopt regulations on handling reports of suspected abuse within their organisation. These regulations must in any case include the following:
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the manner in which the internal report is handled;
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when there is a suspicion of abuse (which definition must be based on the legal definition);
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to which designated officer(s) the suspicion of abuse must be reported;
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the obligation of the employer to treat the report confidentially if the employee so requests;
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the fact that the employee has the option of consulting an advisor confidentially about a suspicion of abuse.
The criterion of having ‘at least 50 employees’ is in line with the number criterion that applies to the set-up of a Works Council. The Works Council has been granted a statutory right of consent with regard to the decision to adopt, amend or revoke the internal whistleblowers regulations. The Advice Centre for Whistleblowers has created an information and implementation package and has made it available via its website. This website also contains model regulations.
With the abovementioned regulations, primary responsibility for dealing with abuse rests with the employer. If the internal report fails to lead to a solution, the employee can turn to the House for Whistleblowers, which will investigate the matter and provide the reporter with advice and support.
Furthermore, the law stipulates that employees who make a report are offered legal protection. The law introduces a ban on prejudicing employees who have an employment agreement or official position. The employer may not terminate the employee’s employment agreement based on the fact that he has reported the abuse properly and in good faith. In addition, if the investigation shows that it is plausible that there has been an abuse, the employer is forbidden from terminating the employment agreement based on circumstances related to the report within a year of completion of the investigation. In addition, the employee may not be prejudiced in connection with a report. In all cases, the employee must have reported the abuse properly and in good faith in order to be entitled to the abovementioned legal protection.
In short, the House for Whistleblowers Act aims to bring abuse to light faster by offering whistleblowers protection. In addition, the law allows for social abuse to be investigated.
If you have any questions about this subject, you can contact our office 0031 10 209 2777 or by e-mail info@lvh-advocaten.nl
A dynamic incorporation clause remains in place during a transfer of an enterprise
A dynamic incorporation clause relating to a collective bargaining agreement is an agreement in the employment contract whereby the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement, as they will read from time to time (hence the term dynamic), are declared applicable to the employment relationship.
Employees transfer by operation of law and under the same terms and conditions of employment
With the transfer of all or part of an enterprise (within the meaning of Section 7:663 of the Civil Code), employees of the transferring party enter the employ of the acquiring party by operation of law. This takes place under the same terms and conditions of employment.
Collective bargaining agreement also continues to apply
This means that a dynamic incorporation clause will also apply to the employment relationship between the employees of the transferring party and the acquiring party. In other words, the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement that applied to the employment relationship between the employees and the transferring party will apply to the employment relationship between the employees and the acquiring party after the transfer of the enterprise. Óeven if the acquiring party’s enterprise does not fall within the scope of the collective bargaining agreement.
Terms and conditions of employment may not be changed at or because of the transition
It is important to note, that the acquiring party cannot prevent this by offering the employees at the transfer of the company a new employment contract that does not include the dynamic incorporation clause. Not even if the transferring party’s works council has agreed to it.
The reason is that the terms of employment may not be changed at the time or because of a transfer of all or part of an enterprise. Modification of terms and conditions of employment after the transfer of the undertaking is, however, permitted.
Post-transition adjustment via unilateral modification clause
This is possible, for example, if the (transferred) employment contract contains a so-called unilateral modification clause, which allows the transferee to modify provisions in the contract if the transferee has such a compelling interest in doing so that the interests of the transferred employees must reasonably and fairly give way.
Post-transition adjustment due to good employment practice
If the employment contract does not contain a unilateral modification clause, the transferred employees may under circumstances be required by the standard of good employee character to accept a reasonable proposal from the transferee to modify the terms and conditions of employment.
Include the effects of the dynamic incorporation clause in negotiations with the transferor
It is therefore uncertain, whether a dynamic incorporation clause can lapse after the transfer of the business. The consequences of “bringing in” collective bargaining provisions, even when the transferee itself does not fall within the scope of the collective bargaining agreement, can be great. For example, the transferee may be obliged to increase the salaries of the transferred employees in accordance with the collective bargaining agreements. It is therefore important to give due attention to these issues prior to the transfer of the business and to include the consequences in the negotiations with the transferring party.
Information
If you have any questions about this article or this topic, please contact Peter Verheijden, an employment law attorney at LVH Advocaten.
Liability for acting on behalf of a private company in formation
Legal acts can already be performed on behalf of a private limited company in incorporation. However, caution is required, because the person who has performed the acts on behalf of the B.V. under formation may be personally called upon to fulfil the obligations entered into.
First, I will go into the legal regulations and then discuss a recent example from the jurisprudence.
Statutory regulation acting on behalf of B.V. in formation
Legal acts can already be performed on behalf of a private limited company in incorporation. The company can only become bound to this if it ratifies the legal acts after its incorporation. The ratification can take place explicitly or tacitly. As long as no ratification has taken place, the persons who performed the legal act on behalf of the private limited liability company to be incorporated will remain jointly and severally bound, unless expressly stipulated otherwise. The term ‘jointly and severally liable’ means that all connected parties may be sued by the creditor for the full amount.
The Arnhem-Leeuwarden Court of Appeal has rendered a judgment on this arrangement. It concerned the following.
Case: no confirmation of a legal act performed on behalf of B.V. in formation.
On behalf of a B.V. in formation, lease agreements have been concluded concerning vehicles. The person who performed these legal acts on behalf of the B.V. under formation (hereinafter referred to as ‘the intended driver’) has hereby stipulated that a third party (a Swiss company) is jointly and severally liable for the obligations arising from the agreements.
The B.V. is ultimately not incorporated and therefore no ratification can take place. The lease company appeals to the intended director.
The intended driver defends himself by stating that it has been expressly stipulated that he is not jointly and severally liable. This would appear from the agreement that the Swiss company guarantees compliance with the obligations. The Court had to assess whether this defence was valid.
Liability for juridical act performed on behalf of B.V. in incorporation, despite stipulated guarantee of third party
The Court of Appeal is of the opinion that the fact that it has been stipulated that the third party is jointly and severally liable does not mean that the intended director has stipulated that he is not (also) liable. If the proposed director had wished to stipulate that he is not liable, he should have done so explicitly. He is therefore ordered to pay to the lease company.
If you wish to exclude liability for legal acts on behalf of a B.V. under formation, you must explicitly stipulate that you are not liable.
This shows that a great deal of caution is required when acting on behalf of a company to be incorporated. If the person performing the legal act on behalf of the B.V. under formation wishes to exclude that he is (jointly and severally) associated, he must explicitly stipulate so.
Should you have any questions about legal acts on behalf of a B.V. in formation, please contact one of our corporate lawyers.
A right to compensation after termination of cohabitation without a contract or marriage?
The Supreme Court issued an interesting judgment on the question whether a partner is entitled to compensation from the ex-partner after ending cohabitation without a contract (also referred to as: informal cohabitation).
Right to compensation of ex-partner in case of termination of cohabitation without contract or marriage?
The case is clear. A man and a woman lived together without a marriage, registered partnership or cohabitation contract. They have a child together. The partners lived in a house owned by the husband. The (mother of the) woman took care of an expensive renovation (€ 74,000) of the man’s house. The man was financially unable to take care of the renovation himself. The partners did not agree on the costs of the renovation. Subsequently, the relationship was broken off. The question is whether the woman has a right to compensation towards the man concerning the costs she paid for the renovation.
Judgment of the Court of Justice on the right to compensation of ex-partner
The Court rejected the woman’s claim because they saw no legal basis for the claim. There is no contractual basis, because there is no cohabitation contract or agreement on the costs of the renovation. Article 1:87 of the Dutch Civil Code, which deals with compensation rights between spouses and registered partners, does not apply either, because there is no marriage or registered partnership. Nor can there be a corresponding application of the article. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal notes that on the basis of what has been stated by the woman he cannot establish that there is a claim on the basis of unjust enrichment.
Judgment of the Supreme Court on the right to compensation and the role of reasonableness and fairness in informal cohabitation
The Supreme Court upholds the judgment of the Court of Appeal. In order to accept unjustified enrichment, it is necessary to establish that if the woman had not borne those costs, the man would have made those costs himself or would have been obliged to make them. Since the man did not have financial means to incur the costs, there is no reason to believe that he would have incurred them. Therefore, the mere fact that the woman incurred costs does not automatically lead to the conclusion that the man saved himself the costs.
However, according to the Supreme Court, the above does not alter the fact that there is a legal relationship between informal cohabitants that is partly governed by reasonableness and fairness. It continues:
“Even if, with regard to certain expenses, a right to compensation from one cohabitant to another cannot be assumed on the basis of an agreement concluded between the parties or on the basis of the other legal figures regulated in Book 6 of the Dutch Civil Code, such a right to compensation may, in connection with the special circumstances of the case, arise from the requirements of reasonableness and fairness referred to in Article 6:2 paragraph 1 of the Dutch Civil Code”.
The Supreme Court considered that it would then have been up to the woman to establish the special facts and circumstances which, according to standards of reasonableness and fairness, imply that she has a right to compensation towards the man. The woman catches the bone after all:
“The documents of the proceedings allow no other conclusion than that the woman has not stated any special facts and circumstances which, assuming that the man was financially incapable of paying the costs of the renovation himself and that the renovation has not enriched her, may nevertheless mean that she has a right to compensation towards the man resulting from the demands of reasonableness and fairness”.
In this specific case, therefore, no compensation is granted in the event of termination of cohabitation without a contract.
No agreement, but a legal relationship between informal cohabitants
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the legal relationship between cohabitants is interesting. Apparently, the Supreme Court does not assume that cohabitation creates an agreement, but it does create a legal relationship that is governed in part by reasonableness and fairness.
Do you have any questions about your rights when ending informal cohabitation? Please contact Peter de Graaf or Hans Rijntjes.
Dismissal of ill employees due to unsatisfactory performance, imputable acts or a damaged working relationship
The consequential effect of the prohibition on termination of employment during an employee’s illness
Article 7:669 of the Dutch Civil Code stipulates that an employer can terminate an employment agreement if it has reasonable grounds for doing so. An exhaustive list of these grounds is contained in subsection 3 and – in summary – consists of:
a) dismissal on commercial grounds
b) dismissal of an employee who has been ill for longer than two years
c) regular absenteeism with unacceptable consequences for the business operations
d) unsatisfactory performance
e) imputable acts or omissions on the part of the employee
f) refusal to do a particular job due to conscientious objections
g) damaged working relationship
h) other circumstances due to which the employment agreement cannot be maintained.
If an employee does not agree to a dismissal, the employer can, in the case of ground a) and b), terminate the employment agreement with the permission of UWV WERKbedrijf. If one of the other grounds applies, the subdistrict court can set aside the employment agreement at the request of either party. In this case, it is not considered a termination.
Article 7:670 of the Dutch Civil Code stipulates that an employer cannot terminate an employment agreement while the employee is ill. This is the so-called prohibition on termination of employment due to an employee’s illness. Termination is possible if the occupational disability has lasted longer than two years.
But what if an employee is ill, but a reason other than that illness is behind the request for setting aside the employment agreement?
Subdistrict Court of Zwolle, 11 October 2012, LJN BY0583
This was the case in the decision of the subdistrict court of Zwolle of 11 October 2012. The employer requested that the employment agreement be set aside as the employee’s performance was grossly inadequate. The employer argued that this request for setting aside the employment agreement was not related to the prohibition on termination of employment during an employee’s illness, even though the employee was ill at the time.
Legal framework
In cases like this, the subdistrict court must first determine whether there are grounds for termination, such as d) unsatisfactory performance, e) imputable acts or omissions on the part of the employee or g) damaged working relationship. If one of these grounds is involved, the subdistrict court must subsequently determine whether the request for setting aside the employment agreement was made in connection with the occupational disability of the employee.
Grounds for setting aside: unsatisfactory performance
In June 2010, the employer met with the employee to discuss his performance as a financial director. It was decided to have the employee go through a coaching process, and the employee even drew up a list of points for improvement himself. On 20 June 2011, the employer informed the employee that it was still dissatisfied with his performance. Concrete shortcomings were listed, and it was determined that continued coaching would be required. The director took it upon himself to coach the employee.
On 26 April 2012, there was an incident. The employer was unable to make payments, as the credit limit had been exceeded. This came as a complete surprise to the other board members. This was the employee’s responsibility. The incident was a serious mistake on the part of the employee, as it was an embarrassment to the management and it damaged the employer’s reputation as a solvent and solid company.
In addition, statements from the fellow board members were submitted. The picture these paint of the employee is that he was no longer fit for the position and things could not continue the way they were.
The subdistrict court considered it likely that the employee’s performance had been substandard for some time.
Connection between the setting aside and occupational disability
It then had to be determined whether the request for setting aside the employment agreement was made in connection with the employee’s occupational disability.
It is not in dispute that the employee has Parkinson’s disease The company physician examined the employee on 3 May 2012, and found him to be fully unfit for work. Given the chronic nature of Parkinson’s disease, the occupational disability of the employee is almost certain to have set in before 3 May 2012.
The company physician has drawn up a problem analysis, outlining the employee’s limitations: limited ability to concentrate and divide his attention, very limited memory and a limited ability to act independently.
The shortcomings that, according to their statements, his fellow board members noticed in the employee, are in line with the limitations as described by the company physician, which, in fact, completely explain the problems.
In addition to that, the report of the potential analysis of 1 September 2011 describes the employee as a competitive person, who is ambitious, strives to perform to the best of his ability, and was fully fit for his position. This is an indication that the employee was sufficiently capable of performing his duties, and that his unsatisfactory performance had to be due to the fact that, due to his illness, he had become less and less able to make full use of his capabilities.
For the subdistrict court, the above was sufficient reason to find that the shortcomings in the employee’s performance were due to his illness. Therefore, the prohibition on termination of employment during an employee’s illness was deemed to have consequential effect, as those shortcomings were the grounds for the request for setting aside the employment agreement.
Conclusion
Once again, this decision shows that a request to set aside an employment agreement may have nothing to do with the prohibition on termination of employment during an employee’s illness. In cases in which the employee is ill, the subdistrict court will be reluctant to set aside an employment agreement.
Information
If you require further information in connection with this article, you can contact Mieke Bestebreurtje.
Sexual transgressive behavior in the workplace: is it seriously culpable?
Sexual transgressive behavior in the workplace: is it seriously culpable?
Sexual transgressive behavior in the workplace unfortunately occurs regularly. As an employer, you would think that this is an irrefutable reason for dismissal and that the behavior is seriously culpable, so that no transitional compensation is owed to the employee and the employee cannot claim unemployment benefits. However, practice is more recalcitrant. Case law shows that there is discussion about the (serious) culpability in the case of sexually transgressive behaviour. The role of the employer may be decisive in this respect.
In this article we first discuss when there is (serious) culpability. Next, we discuss the developments in case law concerning sexually transgressive behavior in the workplace. Finally, we will discuss the steps that every employer can take when transgressive behavior occurs in the workplace.
When is sexual harassment and transgressive behavior seriously culpable?
If there is evidence of (seriously) culpable behaviour, the employer can have an employee’s employment contract dissolved through the courts. There must be culpability. This means that the employee must be at fault for his/her actions or omissions. All circumstances of the case are reviewed by the judge when the employer requests the dissolution of the employment contract. For example, the position of the employee, the frequency of the behavior, the policy of the employer, the public nature of the impermissible behavior, etc. are considered.
It follows from case law that one form of culpable conduct is sexual harassment and transgressive behavior. Whether it is “seriously” culpable depends on the further circumstances. It depends on the seriousness of the act and against whom it is directed, as well as the concrete warnings or instructions from the employer in this regard.
Case law on sexually transgressive behavior
It follows from case law that judges do not agree on what conduct is seriously culpable and what conduct is merely culpable. This is an important difference. In the event of seriously culpable conduct, an employee is not entitled to transitional compensation and unemployment benefits. Below, we will discuss two legal cases concerning sexually transgressive behavior.
A case concerning the dismissal of a senior lecturer in exercise science is before the Supreme Court for the second time. In the first instance the subdistrict court ruled that there was serious culpability. Several students reported that they did not feel safe. The teacher had been warned in 2006 and 2010, prohibiting any form of physical contact. Nevertheless, the school received reports again. One of the reports concerns a buttock slap to a student and the other report concerns a student to whom the teacher twice gave a full body massage. This was followed by a dismissal. Given the behavior and dependent relationship between the teacher and the students, as well as the earlier warnings, the subdistrict court dissolved the employment contract without transitional compensation.
The Court of Appeal of Den Bosch, on the other hand, overturned the decision of the subdistrict court and dissolved the employment contract with the award of transitional compensation. The Court of Appeal was of the opinion that the facts and circumstances stated were insufficient for the conclusion that the employee was seriously culpable. One of the reasons for this is that the school itself would have had a share in what had occurred. The school has not been clear about what is and what is not acceptable in terms of transgressive behavior. The school would have thought too easily that in the absence of new signals “it would be all right”.
The case subsequently reached the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court set aside the order of the court of appeal and referred the case to another court. One of the reasons for this was that the Court of Appeal had not indicated why the lack of clarity regarding the limits to be observed was relevant to the seriousness of the reproach that could be made against the teacher. Nor was it shown that the failure to monitor the teacher detracted from the seriousness of the teacher’s conduct.
The Arnhem-Leeuwaarden Court of Appeal also ruled that there was no question of serious culpability. According to the Court of Appeal, the high exceptional provision of Section 7:673 subsection 7 under c of the Dutch Civil Code (which states that there is no entitlement to transitional compensation in the event of seriously culpable conduct) was not met. There is a question of culpable behavior in view of the biltik and the massages, but this is not seriously culpable. The massage was given in 2010 in violation of the ban. However, the massage lessons were part of the curriculum, it served a didactic purpose in the context of the profession and the school was aware of this. According to the court, the above makes the sexually transgressive behavior culpable, but not seriously so.
As mentioned, the case will go to the Supreme Court again. Thus, it remains unclear what is meant by seriously culpable behavior. It is clear that all circumstances play a role, including how the employer acted. In view of the above, the advice to employers is to take the steps listed below.
What steps can an employer take in the event of sexually transgressive behavior?
Rules of conduct regarding (sexually) transgressive behavior in the workplace
A first step employers can take is to draft a policy with clear rules of conduct. These rules of conduct should describe what conduct is inadmissible, i.e. sexually transgressive conduct and what sanctions are imposed when this conduct occurs.
Investigation after suspected (sexually) transgressive behavior in the workplace
If there is a suspicion that this behavior is occurring, it is recommended to conduct a careful investigation and to suspend the employee – if necessary – in the meantime.
Sanctions after (sexually) transgressive behaviour in the workplace
Then, depending on the situation, it can be determined what sanction is appropriate. This could be a written warning or termination of the employment contract.
When giving a written warning, it is very important that it is made clear in the warning which behaviour is undesirable and what the consequences are if the behaviour occurs again.
Monitoring the employee after (sexually) transgressive behavior in the workplace
Finally, the previously discussed judgments show that, depending on the circumstances, it may be beneficial to monitor an employee’s behavior or provide the right guidance to ensure that the sexually transgressive behavior does not recur.
Need help with transgressive behavior in the workplace?
Case law is currently unclear about when sexually transgressive behavior in the workplace is seriously culpable. This makes it all the more important for employers to take the right steps. Don’t wait, set up a policy, take preventive measures and take timely action.
Do you need help drawing up a policy or do you have a situation of transgressive behavior? Contact Peter Verheijden and Richard Ouwerling of LVH Advocaten in Rotterdam. These labor lawyers are happy to help you. They can draft a policy for you, they can assess situations of sexual transgressive behavior and implement sanctions.
Directors and officers liability towards third parties: The Beklamel-Standard
The corona crisis can cause difficulties for your company. It may not be able to supply all its customers with products, pay all its suppliers on time or otherwise fail to meet its obligations towards its contracting parties and other third parties. As a director of such a company, you may wonder which agreements you can still enter into and which risks you can still take with a view to the continuity of the company you manage.
On top of this, the question may arise as to whether the decision you take may have consequences for your private situation. Can a situation arise in which you are held personally liable for debts of the company?
As a director of a legal entity, you are in principle protected against liability for the company’s debts towards a contracting party or other third parties. However, this protection is not absolute. In some cases, the liability of the company may be transferred to you as a director, so that you are personally liable.
Director’s liability towards third parties
As a director, you may be held liable by the company itself, by the receiver in the company’s bankruptcy estate, but also by creditors of the company. This article discusses this third form of directors’ and officers’ liability.
What is the Beklamel standard?
In principle, directors’ and officers’ liability always requires that the director himself or herself is personally and seriously at fault. The Supreme Court has ruled that there can be such a serious personal accusation if the director is accused by a creditor of having entered into obligations in the name of the company towards the creditor when he knew or should have known that the company would not be able to meet its obligations and would not be able to recover the damage suffered by the creditor as a result. The Beklamel standard is this standard formulated by the Supreme Court for the acceptance of a personal serious accusation, on the basis of which directors’ liability can be established.
The application of the Beklamel standard
As a director, it is therefore important that you do not enter into such obligations on behalf of the company. It is understandable that, especially at a time like this, this can cause a director concern. As a director, are you still allowed to make risky decisions? When will you know, or should you know, that the company will no longer be able to meet the obligations you enter into? In some cases, difficult decisions have to be made, but if this can lead to personal liability, you as a director may be deterred from doing so. The following are therefore some examples of the application of the Beklamel standard in legal practice. The aim is to show how the Beklamel standard is applied in practice so that the somewhat cryptic description of the Supreme Court becomes more tangible.
1. Hopeless situation and insufficient continuity perspective in the case of directors’ and officers’ liability
In the case of a company which, clearly for the director, was in dire straits and placed new orders while in the meantime older invoices were left unpaid, the judge ruled that the Beklamel standard had not yet been met. There was no serious personal accusation to be made against the director. The judge ruled that personal liability requires that the company is in a hopeless situation at the time of entering into the obligation and actually has insufficient prospects of continuity.
The latter criterion was also used in a judgment from 2006, in which the court ruled that the circumstance that the company on whose behalf the commitment was entered into had negative equity capital and the parent companies and subsidiaries associated with this company also had negative equity capital does not yet mean that there was a hopeless situation and an insufficient continuity perspective. This required additional circumstances, which were lacking here. The director was not personally to blame.
2. Complaint standard and serious personal blame
A ruling from October 2019 concerned a case concerning directors who had already been involved in several bankruptcies. They always made use of several interconnected companies that at first sight looked alike, with one company being used to win orders and collect amounts of money while the obligations were entered into by another company and subsequently not complied with. In this situation, the court logically ruled that the directors were personally to blame and personally liable for the debts.
3. Complaint standard and obligations towards creditors
The court ruled in 2008 that the fact that the liquidity position of the company in question was precarious and the tax authorities had seized the ground does not necessarily mean that the director should know that the company will not be able to fulfil the obligations it has entered into, at least not within a reasonable period of time. However, at the time when the company no longer complied with the settlement with the tax authorities, this company (and also its director) had to assume that the tax authorities would proceed with the enforceable sale of the goods affected by the seizure of the land and that, as a result, it would have to discontinue its business operations. From that moment on, the court ruled, the director should reasonably have known that the company would no longer be able to fulfil its obligations towards its creditors entered into after that date. The director was personally liable for the damage suffered by the creditors in question.
Taking entrepreneurial risk does not lead to personal liability
The text of the Beklamel standard is sharper than its application in practice. Moreover, it is not always the case that where there is smoke, there is also fire. At least, that is difficult for creditors to prove. As a director, you therefore need not fear that taking a – not even negligible – entrepreneurial risk may lead to your personal liability. According to case law, restraint is required in deciding whether the director knew or should have known that the company would not be able to fulfil the obligations entered into. The mere knowledge of a risk is not sufficient for directors’ and officers’ liability. However, if at the time of entering into the obligations the management board member knew or should have known that the risk would turn out incorrectly and the company would not be able to recoup the damage suffered as a result, he can be blamed personally and severely. In that case, the director should not have taken the decision and should not have entered into any obligations. If a company is in a critical phase, the dividing line is thin and it is wise to obtain legal advice on whether you still have to conclude a certain agreement and to what extent there is a risk of private liability.
Possible statutory basis for the Dutch Franchise Code
Minister Kamp of Economic Affairs is looking into the possibility of enshrining the Dutch Franchise Code in the law. This is stated in a letter he has written to the Dutch House of Representatives. It means the Franchise Code may come to play a role in legal proceedings involving franchise disputes.
Reasons
The reason behind this statutory basis is an increase in the number of disputes between franchisors and franchisees that are being brought before the courts. This includes – for example – disputes regarding unfair competition, the division of the income or unilateral changes in the formula. The Franchise Code is intended to lead to less inequality in the balance of power between the parties. The Minister attaches great importance to compliance with the Code and is therefore looking into the possibilities of providing a legal deterrent.
Content of the Dutch Franchise Code
The Dutch Franchise Code describes how parties should behave when entering into, performing and terminating a franchise agreement. In addition, the Minister wishes to support the sector in setting up a disputes committee. The idea behind this is that the parties themselves have the greatest understanding of the nature and extent of a dispute. It will enable franchisers and franchisees to find a fitting solution themselves, before the court has to get involved.
Influence of the code on new franchise agreements
Franchise agreements that are entered into or extended after implementation of the Dutch Franchise Code must meet the requirements of the Code. For existing franchise agreements, the Code will serve as a guideline in assessing the behaviour of the parties.
If you have a question about this subject, you can contact Bouwe Bos.
Forfeited penalty payment can serve as a support claim
Forfeited penalty payment can serve as a support claim
A creditor can proceed to file for the bankruptcy of a debtor. To do this, an application must be filed with the court. To do so successfully, hoForfeited penalty payment can serve as a support claim weaver, the creditor must make it plausible that the debtor is in a state of cessation of payments. This always requires another claim (a support claim) in addition to the claimant’s claim. The Supreme Court recently handed down a judgment on whether a claim in respect of a forfeited penalty payment can serve as a support claim.
The penalty payment in bankruptcy
Creditors of the bankrupt can submit their claim to the trustee for verification. The trustee places the claim on the list of creditors. If sufficient estate assets are realised, a distribution can be made to the creditors.
The legislator has stipulated that penalty payments may not participate in bankruptcy (Art. 611e Code of Civil Procedure). A penalty payment cannot be forfeited during bankruptcy. And penalties forfeited before the declaration of bankruptcy may not be included in the liabilities of the bankruptcy. So this means that this claim cannot be included in the list of recognised creditors.
In 1996, the Supreme Court issued a judgment in which it held that a bankruptcy petition cannot be based solely on a claim for payment of forfeited penalties. The idea is that that creditor has no reasonable interest in the bankruptcy. After all, that creditor cannot expect payment from the bankruptcy.
If a claim in respect of penalty payments may not participate in bankruptcy, can it serve as a claim in support of the bankruptcy petition? This is in fact the question the Supreme Court addressed in the recent judgment.
Support claim in bankruptcy petition
The Supreme Court has always strictly adhered to the requirement of a support claim. In 2017, the Supreme Court issued a judgment on the situation where the bankruptcy petitioner had a claim against the debtor of €2.1 million, but there was no support claim. The Supreme Court ruled that the bankruptcy petition was rightly rejected by the court and the court of appeal. It pointed out that the purpose of bankruptcy is to distribute the debtor’s assets to its joint creditors. With that purpose, declaring bankruptcy of a debtor who has only one creditor is contrary. The Supreme Court saw no reason to go back on established case law.
No high requirements are imposed on the support claim itself. If the bankruptcy petitioner has a claim due and payable, the support claim does not have to be a claim due and payable. Of course, it does always apply that the court will have to assess whether there is a state of cessation of payments. In the 2015 Berzona judgment, the Supreme Court ruled that for a support claim to be valid, it is sufficient that it is a claim that can be submitted for verification in bankruptcy.
Forfeited penalty payment as maintenance claim?
Now back to the recent Supreme Court judgment. The bankruptcy applicant in that case had a money claim and also argued that the Flemish government had a claim against the debtor (of no less than €260,000) for forfeited penalty payments. The court declared the debtor bankrupt and, on appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld this judgment. The Court of Appeal ruled that while it may be the case that a penalty payment may not participate in the bankruptcy, it can be used as a basis for claiming that the debtor is in bankruptcy.
The debtor also argued that in the Berzona judgment, the Supreme Court held that a support claim must always be a claim that can be submitted for verification.
However, according to the Supreme Court, this is not how the Berzona judgment intended. In short, the Supreme Court indicated that Section 611 e Rv. does not prevent a third-party claim in respect of forfeited penalty payments from being used as a support claim by the applicant.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court has clarified that a forfeited penalty payment can serve as a support claim in a bankruptcy petition.
A bankruptcy petition can be a good lever to force payment by a debtor. As lawyers, we assist both parties seeking to file for a debtor’s bankruptcy and parties seeking to defend against a bankruptcy filing. If you have any questions on this topic, please contact Peter de Graaf.
When are the costs of additional work to be borne by the client in the case of contract work?
In a building contract between a contractor and a principal a contract price is usually agreed upon. It often happens that the principal wishes all kinds of changes or additions to the work during the execution. This is then extra work. But are the costs of this extra work for the account of the contractor or the principal?
The costs of additional work shall be borne by the client
If changes or additions to the work result in a price increase, the contractor may charge the costs of this additional work if:
- he has warned the principal about the price increase resulting from the additional work commissioned; or
- the principal himself should have understood that the additional work would lead to a price increase.
Example of the need to increase prices
For example, a client should understand that the price for the work will be higher if he asks the contractor to install gold taps everywhere instead of standard taps.
The contractor does not have to give such a warning in writing about a price increase as a result of additional work. Nor does the contractor have to provide insight into the extent of the price increase or the (concrete) additional costs to be expected (Supreme Court 1 July 2022). The latter applies both to the case where the contractor has warned about the price increase and to the case where the client himself should have understood that the work would turn out to be more expensive as a result of the additional work.
In other words: if the client has been warned by the contractor about the higher costs resulting from the extra work, or if the client should have understood that the extra work would involve higher costs, the bill for the extra work is for the client. In such a case the contractor does not have to indicate how much more expensive the work will be as a result of the extra work.
Client must ask for the costs of additional work
If the contractor has warned about the higher costs resulting from the extra work, or if the principal should have understood the necessity of the price increase himself, the principal must ask the contractor about the extent of the price increase (read: the costs of the extra work). Then the principal can decide whether or not he wants to carry out the additional work.
The principal must pay the contractor a reasonable price for the additional work
If the contractor has informed the principal in time of the price increase resulting from the extra work (without mentioning a concrete amount) or if the principal himself should have understood that the extra work would lead to a price increase, the principal must pay a reasonable price for the extra work. If a recommended price has been determined, this recommended price may not be exceeded by more than 10%.
Important for contractor and client to properly record agreements on the price of additional work
In order to avoid a discussion about the price of the extra work it is important that the agreements between the parties are properly recorded. Although a contractor is not obliged to warn in writing of a price increase as a result of the extra work, nor to indicate in concrete terms what the costs of the extra work will be, it is wise to inform the client of this in writing (or by e-mail) prior to the work.
Suspension and annulment of non-competition and non-solicitation clause: the balancing of interests
In a previous article, we wrote about the actions employees can take against a non-competition and/or non-solicitation clause. A non-competition clause can be challenged by employees if the clause unfairly disadvantages the employee. But how should an employer defend against this? In this article, on the basis of a concrete example, a judgment from the Amsterdam Court of Appeal, we examine in more detail the suspension (interlocutory proceedings) and nullification (proceedings on the merits) of a non-competition and non-solicitation clause and the balancing of interests that takes place.
Amsterdam Court of Appeal ruling: suspension of non-competition clause balancing interests
What was going on? The employee had been employed as a Trader Analyst for about 9 months when she terminated the employment contract. The employee then entered into a settlement agreement with the (former) employer in which they terminated the employment contract by mutual agreement and agreed that the non-competition clause would remain in effect. Just under a week later, the employee informs the employer that she will be working at another company as a Quantative Trader Associate. The employer responds, stating that the non-competition clause does not allow for this. The employee still joined the new employer.
The employee claimed before the subdistrict court, primarily, complete suspension of the non-competition clause and, in the alternative, that the clause be limited to such an extent that she could enter the service of the new employer. The subdistrict court granted the subsidiary claim. The former employer appealed.
Appraisal of suspension of non-compete clause on appeal
On appeal, the former employer put forward several arguments as to why the non-competition clause should be enforceable. The court of appeal thus began to assess whether the employer has an interest in enforcement. In particular, it was important whether the former employer could make it sufficiently plausible that the employee’s transfer would affect the former employer’s business. The court concluded that the employee did not have such knowledge of relevant commercial and technical information or unique work processes, or competitively sensitive information that the new employer could use. In doing so, the court considered it important that although the companies were both active in the field of cryptocurrency, at the ex-employer the employee was only active as a Trader Aanalyst in the Equity Options team and not in the Crypto Derivatives team. Thus, there was no evidence that the employee had gained knowledge and experience in cryptocurrency options trading and could disadvantage the ex-employer.
It follows from these considerations that the mere fact that employers are in the same industry does not prevent an employee from making the switch. The employee’s position and knowledge are of great importance in determining whether the non-competition clause can actually be enforced, even if the clause is validly agreed upon. The court then went on to weigh the parties’ interests. Among other things, the court found it significant that the employee had been employed for less than nine months and had only started working on equity options after four months. The court also considered that the employee had a clear interest in free choice of employment and that the employee’s financial position had improved significantly.
This balancing of interests led the court to conclude that the employee’s interest in being released from the non-competition clause outweighed the employer’s interest in maintaining it, and that the employee was unfairly disadvantaged by the clause. Indeed, the employer could not make the concrete disadvantage caused by the transfer plausible.
Defense of employer for enforcement of non-compete and non-solicitation clause
As an employer, do you want to enforce the competition and relationship clause? If so, first have the clause reviewed by a lawyer or employment law attorney to determine the validity of the clause. Next, see if the clause is applicable to the situation. Finally, you can see if the clause can be enforced. It is important that the departure of the employee to a competitor can cause actual damage to the organization in connection with the knowledge and skills acquired during the employment.
Information about competition and relationship clauses?
Want to know more about the legal validity, applicability or voidability of competition and relationship clauses? Contact Richard Ouwerling, employment law attorney at LVH Advocaten in Rotterdam. He advises and litigates on competition and relation clauses.
Conflicts between shareholders
Between the shareholders of the public limited company, and the limited liability company, conflicts on a variety of fields may occur. Usually, the shareholders can work the matter out, for instance, by discussing the matter in a general meeting of shareholders. The supervisory board, if any, may also be of use.
Sometimes parties cannot resolve the matter, however. This may have serious consequences on the company, but on the shareholders as well. In the legislation, several regulations have been incorporated to achieve a solution to the conflict. Below you will find several of these discussed briefly.
The Enterprise Section of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal
Many procedures concerning conflicts between shareholders are brought before a specialised court of justice: the Enterprise Section of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal. Not just regular judges have a seat in the Enterprise Section, but experts on economic fields as well, such as (chartered) accountants.
Inquiry at the Enterprise Section
(Minority) shareholders that do not agree with the company’s policy may address the Enterprise Section to request internal rules (“immediate relief”). The requesting shareholders should jointly hold at least 10% of the shares. The Enterprise Section is free in the choice of relief measures and uses these generously, if “the state of the company” so requires. These could be the suspension of directors, of board decisions, or even a shareholder’s voting rights.
In case of “mismanagement”, the Enterprise Section may also take definitive measures, as far as dissolution of the company. Violation with the principles of sound administration means mismanagement, but under certain circumstances also a deadlock between shareholders or directors.
An inquiry procedure is not just possible for limited liability companies and public limited companies, but also for foundations, associations, and cooperative societies.
Squeeze-out settlement at the Enterprise Section
Having to deal with other shareholders may prove to be unwelcome or difficult for a shareholder. Some examples: if there is more than one shareholder, general meetings of shareholders (GMS) must be convened according to the statutory rules; the other shareholders may frustrate the consolidation of the annual accounts with other group companies; in general, forming a tax entity is not possible. Through a so-called squeeze-out procedure, it is possible to unite all shares to a single party.
The majority shareholder that holds at least 95% of the shares can eliminate the other shareholders (with the exception of priority shareholders). The eliminated shareholders will receive a fair price, that is to be determined by the court. That price is determined by the Enterprise Section, after advice from an expert (chartered accountant).
Arbitration rules
This procedure is held before a regular court. One or more shareholders, who jointly hold at least one third of the shares, may demand that another shareholder transfers his shares (or voting rights) to them, or just the other way round. In short: “he goes, or I go”. The downside of this procedure is that it is procedurally complex and includes appeal, and appeal to the Supreme Court, while the shares can only be transferred after a judgement in favour has become irrevocable. This might take years. Therefore, arbitration procedures hardly ever occur.
Regulations in accordance with the articles of association; voting agreements
It is possible to record the manner in which certain issues need to be resolved in the articles of association. In particular, this goes for rights of first refusal. These clauses originate in the United Kingdom and the United States. They have evocative names such as “Russian Roulette Clause”, “Mexican Shoot Out”, “Texas Shoot Out” or “Dutch Auction”.
These arrangements may also be recorded in a separate agreement instead of the articles of association. This usually goes for voting agreements. Voting agreements are permitted within certain limits. However, they should never conflict with public order or morals.
Information
You need a lawyer who will consult, but also who litigates, if necessary. He can advise you how to approach a conflict between shareholders, set a course together with you and, if necessary, represent you at the Enterprise Section or in other procedures.
Is your personnel handbook up to date?
As an employer, it is important to record all internal rules within your company in a personnel handbook. Even if you only have a few employees, it is important to clarify what you do or do not accept within your company. Therefore, make sure you have a personnel handbook or regulations that includes your terms and conditions of employment and rules of order. This will prevent discussions and problems.
Dutch labor law is constantly evolving. For companies seeking to establish themselves in The Netherlands, it can be a challenge to implement their terms and conditions within the framework of Dutch labor law. Having your personnel handbook prepared or audited can be a great way to accomplish this.
Elements of the personnel handbook
If your company is not covered by a collective labour agreement, the personnel handbook lays down the (additional) terms of employment and other rules within your organization.
Does your company fall under a collective labour agreement? Then the personnel handbook is a handy elaboration or explanation of the collective labour agreement. It is also necessary to lay down, for example, sick leave regulations or other rules or regulations.
Has a works council been established? Then consultation with the works council is necessary before the personnel handbook can be introduced. This is because the personnel handbook almost always contains subjects, for which the works council has a so-called right of consent.
Why a personnel handbook?
- All agreements clearly laid out in one document;
- Contributes to a clear and consistent personnel policy;
- Clarity for employees about rights, obligations and additional terms of employment;
- Outlines the rules within which your staff performs their daily work;
- In case of incidents, such as dismissal, you can fall back on the regulations or policies in the personnel handbook;
- Provides guidance, clarity, transparency, certainty and convenience.
Have your personnel handbook prepared or audited for a fixed price
We can prepare a personnel handbook for your company or check the current handbook for changed laws, regulations or any applicable collective labour agreement. You have several options.
Do you want a personnel handbook in which all the rules and conditions of employment are legally defined? Then our employment lawyers will do this for a fixed price instead of an hourly rate.
- Auditing starting at € 1.250,- excluding VAT;
- Drafting starting at € 1.500,- excluding VAT.
Information?
Would you like to know more? Then contact one of our employment law specialists Jamie Janssen or Richard Ouwerling.
Qualification of the employment relationship: management agreement or employment contract?
The qualification of an employment relationship is of great importance. It determines which rights and obligations the parties have towards each other. The relationship between employer and employee is very different from the relationship between client and contractor. If possible, it is wise to make as clear as possible an agreement about the relationship. This prevents problems in the future. But what if the parties have a different opinion about the qualification of the employment relationship?
In this article we discuss the qualification of the employment contract and management agreement. A recent judgment of the Rotterdam District Court is discussed, in which the qualification of the employment relationship was central.
When is there an employment contract?
The existence of an employment contract can be determined on the basis of Section 7:610 of the Dutch Civil Code. Section 7:610 of the DCC contains the elements of an employment contract: (1) work, (2) wages, (3) authority and (4) during a certain time. All elements must be met in order for there to be an employment contract. All circumstances of the case are considered together.
Position of authority
An important condition is authority. An employee performs work for an employer and must comply with the instructions of the employer, for example with regard to the work schedule and working hours. The relationship of authority between the two parties also follows from the fact that the employer bears the entrepreneurial risk for the work performed by the employee.
This relationship of authority is considered together with the other elements when qualifying the employment relationship.
Court case on the qualification of labour relations
In this judgment the parties had already entered into three fixed-term employment contracts with each other. In January 2021, they concluded a fourth contract, this time with the title management agreement. The parties had agreed that there would be no new employment contract, but a management agreement because the ex-employee wanted to take over the company from the ex-employer. The parties therefore concluded a management agreement for the period of three months in order to negotiate the takeover. During that period, the ex-employee worked for the ex-employer and was engaged in negotiations about the terms and conditions of employment of employees. The negotiations ultimately did not lead to a result.
The ex-employee subsequently argued before the Subdistrict Court that an employment contract existed and he requested payment of fixed damages, the statutory transitional allowance, equitable remuneration, as well as payment of holidays and allowances.
Review of elements of employment contract by Rotterdam District Court
The subdistrict court then qualified the employment relationship on the basis of Section 7:610 of the Dutch Civil Code, which in this situation focused on whether or not there was a relationship of authority. The Subdistrict Court ruled that there was no employment contract, because there was no question of a relationship of authority. After all, the objective of the parties in entering into the management agreement was not to continue working together as before, but to effect a takeover. In that situation the ex-employee was no longer subordinate, but equal to the ex-employer. The fact that ex-employee had worked in the meantime (and had therefore worked for a certain time) did not alter this. That work was in his own interest and at his own request. After all, in the event of a takeover, the ex-employee benefited from this work.
In short, the fact that the parties had previously agreed on three employment contracts does not mean that there was once again an employment contract. The employer-employee relationship was absent this time with a view to the takeover talks.
Want to know more about qualifying employment relationships?
The employment lawyers at LVH Advocaten in Rotterdam will be pleased to assist you in entering into a variety of employment relationships, terminating such relationships and/or qualifying the employment relationship. For more information please contact Richard Ouwerling or Peter Verheijden. They will be happy to assist you further.
Use of smartphones by drivers: prevent liability!
Recently, there was an article in Nieuwsblad Transport on a test performed by transport insurance company TVM, intended to improve safety on the roads. According to the article, research had shown that in many cases (or, according to the article, in no less than 71% of accidents) distractions play an important role, which distractions include the use of smartphones.
In addition to a safety issue, this is an important liability issue for transport companies.
Even if using (or even holding) a telephone while driving a motor vehicle has been forbidden by law for years now, as the employer, the transport company is obliged to give the driver the instructions reasonably required to prevent the driver from suffering a loss in the discharge of his duties.
In performing his duties, the driver is obliged to – to the best of his ability – see to his own safety and health, and that of others. In this context, ‘to the best of his ability’ means ‘based on his training and the information and work instructions provided by the employer’.
Therefore, it is important to provide clear (safety) instructions, for example in the form of company regulations and a safety manual.
The transport company must subsequently monitor compliance with the instructions for safe and healthy work. Possible methods for that include – among others – toolbox meetings, performance reviews and random checks.
If a driver does not abide by the instructions, the transport company must take measures. The measure must be proportionate to the possible danger to people and the surroundings that is involved in the failure to honour the agreements. The measures may range from a warning (oral or written) to a sanction (fines or, as a final resort, dismissal).
In addition, it is important to make the driver aware of the possible consequences (by including the sanctions in the instructions), and for the transport company to keep a record of what it has done to persuade the driver to follow the rules. Finally, it is important not to let the safety policy “slide”, to avoid creating a culture of toleration.
When it comes to distractions, this means that the transport company must expressly forbid drivers from using smartphones while driving, and must attach consequences to violation of this prohibition. It is also important to inform drivers of the risks involved in such behaviour.
In the absence of such a prohibition, sanctioning policy and training, the transport company may be held liable for the consequences of an accident in which – for example – it is determined that the driver was using his smartphone right before the accident. The company may in fact be held liable not only for the consequences for third parties, but also for the (health) consequences for the driver himself!
Further information
For additional information please feel free to contact Peter de Graaf.
The old-age pensioner (AOW): retaining or hiring?
The position of the old-age pensioner has changed with the introduction of the WWZ (Wet Werk en Zekerheid – Work and Security Act) on 1 July 2015, which means there is little to no employment protection for this employee. Subsequently, on 1 January 2016, the Wet Werken na de AOW-gerechtigde leeftijd (Working beyond AOW entitlement Act) came into effect. This act limits the obligations of the employer in the case of illness of an old-age pensioner.
Right to terminate employment and chain regulation
When an employee reaches retirement age, the employment contract, which was entered into prior to the AOW entitlement age, may be terminated without the intervention of UWV (Employee Insurance Schemes Implementing Body) or the subdistrict court. The chain regulation has also been expanded for employees entitled to old age pension. You may enter into 6 fixed-term employment contracts up to a maximum of 48 months, before an employment contract for an indefinite period of time arises. Normally, it is possible to enter into 3 fixed-term employee contracts for a period of 24 months at the most.
Transition compensation
If the employment contract ends due to reaching the AOW entitlement age or after reaching the AOW entitlement age, the employee will have no right to transition compensation.
Obligation to continue the payment of wages in case of illness and prohibition of termination
The introduction of the Wet Werken na de AOW-gerechtigde (Working beyond AOW entitlement Act) has considerably shortened the obligation to continue the payment of wages in case of the illness of an old-age pensioner. Instead of 104 weeks, an employer merely has to continue paying wages for 13 weeks. The act will be evaluated after 2 years, after which the objective is to further cut back the obligation to continue the payment of wages in case of the illness of an old-age pensioner to 6 weeks. In anticipation, the period of 6 weeks has been incorporated in the act. However, the transitory law stipulates that this will be 13 weeks for the time being. The prohibition of termination in case of illness has also been shortened from 104 to 13 weeks for old-age pensioners. The objective is that the prohibition of termination will also be applicable for the duration of 6 weeks in the future. This means that the employer may terminate the employee contract with an old-age pensioner after 13 (in future 6) weeks.
Obligation of vocational rehabilitation
The obligations for the vocational rehabilitation of an employer in case of illness of an old-age pensioner have been limited too. The employer is not obligated to draw up an action plan. Furthermore, the employer is not bound to vocational rehabilitation in the second track, namely external reintegration at a different employer. The obligation for internal vocational rehabilitation will remain in effect.
Regarding the above-mentioned, it has been made more attractive for an employer to hire an employee who is entitled to old-age pension or to let them work for an extended period of time.
If you have a question about this subject, you can contact our office 0031 10 209 2777 or by e-mail info@lvh-advocaten.nl
How does a purchase/contracting agreement work in real estate?
What is a purchase/contractor agreement?
When parties agree that one of them will provide a piece of land and construct or finish a building on it for a fee, there is a contract for the purchase of the land on the one hand and a contract for work on the other hand with regard to the building. The part relating to the purchase of the land is governed by the legal rules of sale. On the part that relates to contracting work (building and delivery), the rules of contracting work apply. Therefore, it does not make much difference in practice whether one speaks of two linked contracts (purchase and contracting) or of one compound contract to which the rules for purchase and the rules for contracting apply in part.
Consumer protection in a purchase/contracting agreement for a home
If there is a purchase/contract between a consumer and a contractor for the purchase of land and the construction of a home, specific legal rules apply. This article will therefore specifically deal with the purchase/contracting agreement between a consumer and a contractor or project developer for the purchase of land and the construction of a property intended as a home. These rules are there to protect the consumer. Therefore, the parties may not deviate from these legal rules.
Legal rules for a purchase/contracting agreement between a contractor and a consumer for the construction of a (new) home
An order to contract work for the construction of a home commissioned by a consumer must always be entered into in writing. The consumer then has a reflection period and can dissolve the purchase/contracting agreement without consequences within three days. This statutory cooling-off period a consumer buyer also has when buying a house. Furthermore, the law provides that the principal is only obliged to make payments to the contractor that correspond to the progress of the construction or the value of the goods transferred to him, such as building materials. However, the principal may be required to deposit 10% of the contract sum with the notary or provide substitute security, such as the provision of a bank guarantee. Conversely, the client may withhold 5% of the contract sum from the last instalment or final payment and deposit this amount with the notary. The last instalment often has to be paid to the contractor only after completion. If the client does not find any defects within three months of completion, he can ask the notary to transfer the deposit amount to the contractor. The consumer owes no interest on the deposit amount over that three-month period. If the consumer does discover any defects, or if he wants to suspend payment for any other reason, the consumer must inform the notary of the amount to be deposited. If it is decided through a binding decision that the amount must be released to the contractor, for example following an (arbitration) procedure, or if the contractor provides substitute security, such as a bank guarantee, or if the client agrees to the payment, the notary can also proceed to pay the deposited amount to the contractor.
Model purchase/contracting agreement and common agreements
Most purchase/contracting agreements for the purchase of land and the construction of a home are concluded using a model agreement. If the client is a consumer, the model agreement may not deviate from the above legal regulation. Furthermore, the purchase/contractor agreement will also contain provisions on the purchase price and contract price, what the payment terms are, when the construction must be completed (the number of workable days) and when the delivery must take place. Usually there is also a guarantee or deposit scheme included and the liability of the parties is regulated as well as what should happen if the parties disagree (a dispute resolution). There may also be resolutive conditions in the purchase/contracting agreement, such as a reservation on financing.
Real estate lawyer Rotterdam
Do you have more or other questions about your purchase/contract agreement? Or has a dispute arisen between client and contractor, please contact the real estate lawyers of LVH Lawyers. They assist both contractors and principals and can provide you with legal advice. If necessary, we will initiate proceedings.
Requirements for CO2 reduction in state aid to KLM?
An important topic in aviation is the reduction of CO2 emission. Aircraft burn kerosene and therefore emit CO2. Recently, the preliminary relief judge of the District Court of The Hague issued a judgment in the context of CO2 reduction by the Dutch airline KLM and the state aid that KLM received due to the corona pandemic. What conditions for CO2 reduction can be attached to that state aid?
Claim for CO2 reduction in aviation by Greenpeace
Greenpeace brought a claim before the District Court for stricter climate conditions to be attached to the state aid granted to KLM. The State aid was provided by the Netherlands in order to guarantee the continued existence of KLM after the corona pandemic, in view of its importance to the Dutch economy. Conditions relating to sustainability and quality of life are attached to this aid, which are in line with the climate objectives that apply to international aviation.
Rejection of Claim for Stricter Climate Conditions in State Aid to KLM
The Court in preliminary relief proceedings has rejected the claim of Greenpeace. Greenpeace wants a reduction of emissions that goes beyond the international agreements and objectives. Contrary to Greenpeace’s assertion, the Court in preliminary relief proceedings found that the UN climate treaties, the ECHR and the judgment of the Dutch Supreme Court in the Urgenda case do not require the State to do more to reduce KLM’s CO2 emissions.
Greenhouse gas emissions from international aviation
According to the Court in preliminary relief proceedings, the UN Climate Conventions do not relate to the emission of greenhouse gases as a result of international aviation. Since KLM’s emissions are almost entirely due to international flights, the state has no duty to intervene. The responsibility for reducing CO2 emissions lies – on the basis of the Kyoto Protocol, among other things – with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Furthermore, the Court in preliminary relief proceedings considered that the reduction in CO2 emissions that Greenpeace is demanding goes beyond the agreements that have been made at an international level.
In the Urgenda judgment mentioned above, it was ruled that the State must reduce the emission of greenhouse gases on the basis of the UN Climate Convention and the duty of the State to protect citizens. However, Greenpeace’s reliance on this judgment does not succeed because that judgment only relates to the emission of greenhouse gases in the Netherlands. KLM’s CO2 emissions relate to international flights.
Also considering the fact that the Court in preliminary relief proceedings may only judge the State with restraint (marginal review) and the fact that the State has already attached conditions to the aid, Greenpeace’s claim was denied.
Are you looking for a Dutch lawyer in Aviation Law?
For legal questions in the field of aviation, please contact LVH Advocaten. LVH advocaten will be happy to advise you on all kinds of aviation law related issues.
Cooperation between LVH and AeroDelft – Attention for CO2 reduction
The aforementioned statement does not alter the fact that within the aviation sector there is considerable attention for the reduction of CO2 emissions. Since 2020 LVH Advocaten has been a partner of AeroDelft, a foundation dedicated to making aviation more environmentally friendly. With Project Phoenix, students from Delft University of Technology have set to work within AeroDelft to build the first aircraft to fly on liquid hydrogen. The goal is to completely eliminate CO2 emissions during flight. A progressive initiative that LVH Advocaten is happy to support.
Self-driving and truck platooning: a modification of legislation is required
We read about it in the news so often: accidents – fatal or otherwise – with self-driving cars. One of the questions that arise is: who is liable for such accidents? This is a phenomenon not (yet) provided for by current legislation.
Truck platooning
This issue is not limited to self-driving cars but also covers truck platooning. Truck platooning means that several trucks are electronically linked to each other on the basis of specific software. Only the first truck is manned by a driver. This front truck determines the speed and route, with the other trucks following him automatically. There are no drivers in the following trucks. Interventions, such as swerving to avoid something, can only be made by the front truck (with driver). This too is subject to various legal and insurance-related questions. What if one of the following trucks unexpectedly has to swerve and then causes damage? What if the front truck makes an error (of judgement) and the trucks behind automatically follow? Who is liable: the driver, the manufacturer of the truck or the manufacturer of the software? How are dangerous weather conditions dealt with? What if the computer system of the vehicle is hacked? In other words: legislation needs to be modified for these technical developments. It is also necessary for the layout of public roads to be modified for self-driving vehicles. Examples include traffic signs, road and other markings and exit and entry slip roads.
Insurance
It is not just the liability rules and road layout that need adjusting, so does insurance law. After all, self-driving vehicles are almost impossible to insure at the moment. There is still a lot of uncertainty about the extent of the premium for such insurance. On the one hand, it is argued that self-driving cars cause a lot less damage because the concept is supposedly a lot safer than normal driving. On the other hand, the expensive technology and software may cause premiums to rise.
Modification of legislation
Legislation will have to be modified in the short term. TLN (Transport and Logistics Netherlands) and Rijkswaterstaat (the Directorate-General for Public Works and Water Management) want to test truck platooning on the public roads between now and a year. In Germany, developments with semi-self-driving (i.e. still using a driver) are more advanced: a legislative proposal is being prepared and a first drive with a semi-self-driving truck among regular traffic was made at the end of last year. The driver is required to remain in the cabin, enabling him to immediately take over the controls of the truck in an emergency. The German government is also considering making black boxes (like those in airplanes) mandatory.
There is a fear that the European Union will be unable to have legislation in place in time, as a result of which technical developments are hampered. We are keeping a close eye on the developments in this field.
Information
If you have any questions and/or comments about this contribution, please contact our office 0031 10 209 27 77 or by e-mail info@lvh-advocaten.nl
Division of marital property
The Netherlands is currently one of the few countries in the world that has an absolute community of property regime upon marriage. Unless parties have expressly agreed otherwise, all property, whether acquired before or after marriage, automatically becomes communally owned by both spouses. Upon divorce both parties are entitled to 50% of the marital property. Parties may deviate from this principle when agreeing a divorce settlement. However, if the divorce is contested, a court will hold fast to the equal division of property.
One of the main arguments in favour of this system is that (in theory at least) it is easy to divide the marital property upon divorce and both parties always receive an equal share. The system is transparent, but in some cases can lead to unequitable results. For example, if one of the spouses contracts certain debts without the knowledge of the other spouse, the other may still liable of the debt after divorce even though they may never have benefitted from the original debts.
The only way to avoid marrying in community of property in The Netherlands is to conclude a prenuptial agreement before a notary public. If, for example, one of the spouses owns their own business, this will protect the other spouse from automatically becoming liable for any debts incurred through the business. Postnuptial agreements can also be concluded after marriage, but in that case you will have to divide the community of property first.
The most common form of prenuptial agreement involves creating only a partial community of property for certain goods, such as the marital home and contents thereof. All other property is deemed to be privately owned by the spouse that acquired said property. Some prenuptial agreements exclude any communal property, but may or may not contain certain clauses to mitigate the effects of this for the spouse with the lesser income or property. The agreement may either contain an annual setoff clause, requiring the spouses to compensate each other at the end of each year, or there may be a setoff clause requiring the spouses to compensate each other upon divorce. In both cases, conflicts can arise during the divorce proceedings regarding which income or property must be involved in the annual or final settlement.
Advising both national and foreign clients concerning the impact of divorce forms part of our daily practice. We can advise you on the consequences of your marital regime and the status of any prenuptial agreement. We specalise in advising business owners, entrepreneurs and professionals about the consequences of a divorce and minimising the effects of such on their business.
Information
For additional information please feel free to contact our office 0031 10 209 2777, or by e-mail info@lvh-advocaten.nl
Dismissal due to social media use
Social media use has changed the world. A single Twitter message can suddenly prove very popular and be retweeted so often that the number of readers exceeds that of the entire circulation of the national newspapers. While this is usually not the case, it is wise to take account of the fact that people are always looking over your shoulder. According to case law, social media use can have job consequences as well. Employers are reading it too, and employees have already been fired over it. The lines between public and private are becoming blurred.
What can go wrong when employees use social media? Below are a few examples that you can click on for more information on this subject:
- Using Facebook or other social media during working hours.
- Posting messages that are offensive to the employer or a colleague.
- Proof of breach of a non-competition clause.
- Failure to comply with internal guidelines on social media use.
Using Facebook or other social media during working hours.
When you are on the boss’ time, you are expected to work. However, not everyone with a computer at their disposal can resist the urge to update their Facebook page or post comments on friends’ Facebook pages – which friends may, for example, include colleagues.
Spending a lot of time on non-work related internet sites during working hours may be cause for dismissal. See, for example, this decision of the subdistrict court of Arnhem of 27 March 2012. In this case, the employee had acknowledged that he had spent a lot of time on gambling sites and sexually charged websites during working hours. Given this circumstance, the subdistrict court found that dismissal for urgent cause, without compensation, was justified.
Of course, it is advisable for employers to set clear rules for Internet use, and actually enforce them.
Posting messages that are offensive to the employer or a colleague.
If you are angry at your supervisor or your employer, expressing your displeasure on social media is not a good idea. A decision of the subdistrict court of Arnhem of 11 April 2012 involved an employee of JK Vloerverwarming, who had posted the following on his Facebook page:
“And yet again I get to work with the black guy tomorrow jesus ffs if they keep this up I am done #JK”
“What is coloured and does not work hard?”
‘Sheesh is this working day over yet? Please free me from this retard what an idiot!! #Ineedtheweekendffs’
Based on this, the subdistrict court found that the employee had made very negative and discriminatory comments about a colleague. Therefore, the subdistrict court set aside the employment agreement. The employee was given a neutral compensation, as his performance had otherwise been satisfactory and he had not been given a warning before.
Another example involved an employee of the Blokker retail shop, who joined Blokker as a warehouse worker on 2 January 2012. Two weeks later, he requested an advance on his wages, which request Blokker rejected. The employee reacted to this by making negative comments about Blokker and misbehaving on the work floor. The employee received an official warning for that. Exactly one month after joining the company, he posted the following message on his Facebook page:
“blokker what a shithole of a company I totally regret getting a job here you won’t believe the people that work there especially my team leader what a sneaky fake copper from nijmegen he is you can tell by the rotten tricks he plays that he is from nijmegen and used to be a copper that asshole but my day will come and believe me those fags will be crying”
In connection with this post, Blokker requested that the employment agreement be set aside. The subdistrict court found that the employee had grossly offended Blokker (decision of 19 March 2012). This post had nothing to do with freedom of speech. Facebook can only be considered the private domain of an employee to a limited extent. On Facebook, the term “friends” should be used loosely. Freedom of speech is limited by the due care that employees should exercise. As a good employee, he should have known better than to post this message. He had apologised to the team leader, but that was of no avail. There was urgent cause for dismissal within the meaning of the law, and the employment agreement was terminated with immediate effect, without compensation.
Proof of breach of a non-competition clause.
One of the major problems involved in enforcing a non-competition clause is getting the required evidence. It is hard to prove that the employee carried out competing work, or is approaching or has approached relations. If the employee makes use of social media for this, and LinkedIn in particular, this may provide a means of proving the breach. Below are a number of examples of cases in which this was at hand:
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The court in preliminary relief proceedings of Arnhem (8 March 2011) ruled that a former employee had breached the non-competition clause on two occasions, among others by using LinkedIn to contact a relation of the former employer.
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The Court of Appeals of The Hague (21 February 2012) ruled that an employee tweeting messages on behalf of his new employer did not constitute ‘maintaining business relations’ within the context of a non-competition clause.
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The court in preliminary relief proceedings of Arnhem (24 November 2011) ruled that corresponding with business relations by email and via Twitter, which included asking for a résumé, constituted a breach of the non-competition clause.
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The subdistrict Court of Utrecht (20 January 2010) ruled that a general activity that did not specifically target the region protected by the clause did not fall under the scope of the non-competition clause. This included having a participating interest in or being a co-owner of Vandaagwerkt B.V. i.o., which included being listed as the owner on LinkedIn and activating the website.
Failure to comply with internal guidelines on the use of the Internet, email and social media
To a certain extent, employees have the right to make use of the email and internet facilities made available by the employer for private purposes. In the Copland case, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that telephone, email and internet use comes under the definition of ‘private life’ and ‘correspondence’. Under certain circumstances, this use may be monitored. In the Netherlands, when monitoring this use, an employer has to comply with the conditions of the Dutch Personal Data Protection Act (Wet Bescherming Persoonsgegevens). It is advisable for an employer to draw up a guideline for internet and email use. This should contain a chapter on the circumstances under which and the manner in which the use will be monitored.
The same should apply to social media use. In most cases, the employer will have to allow limited personal use.
Information
If you require further information in connection with this article, you can contact Mieke Bestebreurtje.
No forced takeover of Corendon due to Covid-19
On the 7th of December 2020, the Court of Amsterdam dismissed the claim relating to the takeover of tour operator Corendon in an interim injunction.
In December 2019, Sunscreen (Sunweb) and industry partner Corendon Holiday entered into a purchase agreement in respect of the shares in Corendon Holiday. Sunscreen would acquire these shares for € 146 million. However, in October 2020, Sunscreen terminated the agreement for the underlying reason that not all suspensive conditions would have been met. In response, Corendon initiated interim injunction proceedings.
Corendon requested cooperation closing Sunscreen
In Court Corendon claimed full and unconditional cooperation from Sunscreen, including payment of the purchase price and acceptance of the shares. In the preliminary proceedings the Court dismissed Corendon’s claims, despite the fact that it had become sufficiently plausible that the Court in following main proceedings will come to the conclusion that Corendon has complied with all conditions.
Reasons for rejection in preliminary relief proceedings were the interests involved, like the particularly extensive and possibly irreversible consequences that such a forced takeover could entail. These consequences, including a possible bankruptcy by having to pay the purchase price to Corendon, are a result of the Covid-19 crisis. That crisis affected the entire travel industry. It is therefore clear from this ruling that the Court has taken the consequences of the Covid-19 crisis into account.
Consequences of the corona crisis on the travel sector are weighed
Interestingly, the interim relief judge did not rule out that “the real motive for Sunscreen to exit the transaction is not in the AOC Conditions, but the Covid-19 crisis, in particular the impact of that crisis on the results of the company (Sunweb) and on the attitude of the shareholders (in particular Triton) towards the acquisition of a company in a sector which has been hit very hard by the Covid-19 crisis and whose recovery is currently uncertain”.
The foregoing implies that the Court in preliminary relief proceedings cannot grant a forced takeover. The consequences of the corona crisis are incalculable. However, the interim relief judge did consider that the parties should continue with their negotiations in order to adapt the deal to the changed situation. After all the judge ruled that Sunscreen cannot simply evade the deal.
Approval of the ILT to fly – Air Operator Certificate (AOC)
Another interesting part of this ruling was found in the AOC conditions. Corendon had to request approval for the permit to fly from the Inspectie voor Leefomgeving en Transport (ILT: the Dutch Aviation Authority) on the basis of the purchase agreement. In the event of a takeover such as this, the ILT can check the new flight company. Sunscreen therefore requested security from the ILT regarding the AOC. Corendon, on the other hand, took the view that these arguments were merely a smokescreen for abandoning the takeover and that the AOC conditions had been met. The Court in preliminary relief proceedings concluded that it was not likely that a new AOC would have to be submitted for approval. The judge also concluded that there is no obligation for ILT under EG Regulation 1008/2008 to give a confirmation prior to closing and that ILT will in any case check after closing whether the confirmation given in advance is correct. For the time being, therefore, the objections of Sunscreen did not hold.
Legal questions about the aviation industry?
The aviation industry was hit hard by the Covid-19 pandemic. This ruling just shows that the consequences of the corona crisis on the continuity of these companies were taken into account, which is a good outcome for companies in this sector.
In case you have any questions about this article or you are looking for assistance in corporate or aviation law related issues? Please feel free to contact LVh advocaten. W regularly assists parties in the aviation industry.
Aviation Act: Objection against tariffs and conditions for Schiphol Airport
Airlines rely heavily on airports. Therefore, the way an airport is operated affects airlines. This occurs, among other things, when airports set their rates and conditions. A dispute arose between the airline easyJet and the Authority for the Consumer and Market (ACM) concerning the setting of rates and conditions for Schiphol Airport. This article discusses this dispute and looks at important aspects of setting airport rates and conditions.
Determination of rates and conditions at Schiphol Airport
The Aviation Act and the Schiphol Airport Operations Decree 2017 prescribe how the operator of Schiphol Airport must determine the rates and conditions. An important part of this is to consult with users and representative organisations (legal entity designated by ministerial regulation to represent the interests of users);
Prior to the determination of the rates and conditions – which takes place once every three years in accordance with Article 8.25d paragraph 1 of the Aviation Act – the operator issues a proposal for the rates and conditions. This proposal must be accompanied by a substantiation of the effects of the new rates and conditions proposed.
Influence of users on determination of rates and conditions
Users – such as easyJet – can make their views known to the airport operator within four weeks (Article 8.25da paragraph 2 Aviation Act). The operator must include the views in its determination and indicate whether the views have led to any changes.
It also follows from the Aviation Act that the charges and conditions must be reasonable and non-discriminatory (Article 8.25dc paragraph 1 Aviation Act) and that charges may be differentiated for reasons of public interest, including environmental protection.
Users and representative organizations may – if necessary – submit an application to the ACM to establish that the operator’s rates and conditions are contrary to the Aviation Act. The ACM must take a decision on the entry into force of the rates and conditions within four weeks and a decision on the application within four months.
Case at Board of Trade Appeals:
Do the Schiphol 2019 rates and conditions violate the Aviation Act?
In this case with judgment on 14 September 2021, easyJet was of the opinion that the Schiphol rates and conditions as determined as of 1 April 2019 were in conflict with the Aviation Act and the Operating Decree. easyJet therefore submitted an application to the ACM as described above. The ACM rejected the application and ruled that there was no conflict. Consequently, easyJet lodged an appeal with the Dutch Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal (CBb).
In this case the CBb assessed whether the rates and conditions had been determined according to the correct procedure and whether users had been correctly involved in view of the views they had expressed. It also assessed whether the tariffs met the requirements of reasonableness, non-discrimination and cost-orientation.
Objection easyJet: 2019 fares and conditions are contrary to Aviation Act
easyJet put forward three reasons on the basis of which it believed the ACM had wrongly rejected its application. First of all, the users were allegedly insufficiently involved in the determination of the rates and conditions. Secondly, the users were insufficiently involved in the determination of the investment program. Finally, the tariffs and conditions would be unreasonable and discriminatory. The CBb ruled that these grounds for appeal of easyJet do not succeed.
Involvement in rate setting
easyJet was first able to express its views on the rates and conditions proposal. The statement that there was no involvement is therefore incorrect. The fact that the quality indicators in the proposal were drawn up without easyJet’s involvement does not detract from this.
Rate Structure Sufficiently Reasoned
The CBb also disagrees with easyJet’s argument that insufficient reasons were given why Schiphol did not want to change its rate structure. In fact, Schiphol did respond to easyJet’s view and argued that it was not appropriate in view of the existing congestion at the airport. EasyJet was also consulted on the further content.
Objection investment choices unfounded
With regard to the investment programme, Schiphol also responded to easyJet’s view. The investment choices were further explained in response to the view.
Furthermore, the CBb considered that Schiphol did indeed violate Article 16.1 opening words and under (b) of the Exploitation Decree by not mentioning a certain effect in the investment programme. However, this mere breach does not justify the conclusion that the rates and terms and conditions are contrary to the Aviation Act and the Exploitation Decree, because compliance with this section does not result in material changes.
When are rates and conditions reasonable and non-discriminatory ?
Finally, easyJet argued that the tariffs and conditions are both unreasonable and discriminatory for Low Cost Carriers, such as it. It believes that the tariff structure is unreasonable and discriminatory since it does not use all facilities, but does have to pay for them. Also, the facilities of the different piers are different, but the same tariffs apply.
However, the CBb ruled that this chosen structure is not unreasonable or discriminatory, since the facilities are available. The fact that easyJet has made the choice not to use them does not make this any different. It is not by definition unlawful that differences exist between the piers. That the capacity and/or facilities of certain piers should be increased is not the subject of these proceedings. What is at issue, after all, is the lawfulness of the determination of the rates and conditions.
Deviating Facilities Do Not Lead to Conflicting Rates or Conditions
According to the CBb, users such as easyJet are sufficiently involved in the determination of the rates and conditions, as the ACM previously ruled. The fact that easyJet in particular uses a certain pier (H/M pier) and the facilities are different from other piers does not make the rates and conditions contrary to the Aviation Act and the Operating Decree.
Want to know more about the Aviation Act and the Operating Decree?
Please contact LVH Advocaten in Rotterdam if you would like to know more about aviation law and, more specifically, the setting of tariffs. LVH advocaten regularly assists airlines in all kinds of legal matters.
Actions against non-competition agreements
Many employees have a non-compete agreement, and many employers come into contact with potential employees who have a non-compete agreement. The question that then arises is, can the employee join a new company? Or in other words, is the non-competition clause legally valid, can the current employer successfully invoke the clause, or can the non-competition clause perhaps be (partially) voided? These questions and more are addressed in this article. We also briefly discuss the judgment of the Court of Appeal of Amsterdam of 16 February 2021.
Legally valid non-competition clause?
A non-competition clause protects employers’ business assets and can prevent damage by preventing an employee or former employee from joining a competitor. Suppose that the employer has legally agreed to a non-competition clause with an employee, are the employee and potential new employer empty-handed?
No, in some situations a validly agreed non-competition clause may nevertheless lose its validity or the employee may challenge a valid non-competition clause by requesting its annulment.
Annulment of non-competition clause
An employee may apply to the subdistrict court for the whole or partial annulment (or suspension in summary proceedings) of the non-competition clause if the employee is unfairly disadvantaged. Whether the employee has been unfairly disadvantaged must be determined by weighing up the interests. The interests of the employer may be (1) fear of disadvantage, (2) degree of competition and (3) investments made in the employee. Interests of employee may be (1) improvement of position, (2) bondage to industry and (3) freedom of employment choice.
The annulment or suspension of a non-competition agreement can already be requested when the employee is still employed by his current employer. This prevents the employee from forfeiting any fines when joining the new employer. Whole or partial annulment may also be raised during dismissal proceedings.
Judgment on balancing interests of unfair disadvantage
The previously discussed balancing of interests was also an issue in the appeal before the Amsterdam Court of Appeal. The employee felt he was unfairly disadvantaged in relation to the interests of the employer. In the judgment, the court first emphasized that the mere fact that the employee goes to work for the competitor does not mean that the employer’s business is affected. We only speak of an impairment of the business activities if the new employer can compete because the employee brings in essential information about products, services and/or work processes, or that, because of customer loyalty to the employee in question, customers switch.
In short, the employer can protect its business assets – being know-how and goodwill – but the employee cannot be tied to the business. That is not what a non-competition clause is for. In this judgment, the employer could not demonstrate that the employee possessed competitively sensitive information and there was insufficient evidence of investment in the employee. On the contrary, employee had an improvement in position, so employee was allowed to join the new employer.
Moderation of non-competition clause
The court can also moderate a non-competition clause in terms of scope (duration, geographical area and activities/relationships). This is also assessed on the basis of the aforementioned balancing of interests.
Legally valid non-competition clause lapses due to change in employment relationship?
A legally valid non-competition clause may cease to apply if the employment relationship changes. The change must be (1) unforeseeable and far-reaching and (2) the change must hinder the employee in finding a new job. This might include a major job change or organisational change which would make the non-competition clause ‘considerably more burdensome’.
Settlement agreement upon leaving the company
In some situations, it may be worthwhile for the employer and employee to make agreements about the non-competition clause when they leave the company. These agreements can be set out in a settlement agreement. For example, the parties could agree that the non-competition clause should lapse in whole or in part, or that it should be converted into a non-solicitation or anti-solicitation clause. The employer may also give the employee permission to join the competitor, possibly subject to certain conditions.
Lawyers specialized in special clauses
The employment lawyers at LVH Advocaten in Rotterdam are regularly confronted with questions on special terms such as non-competition and non-solicitation clauses. If you have any questions about this article or about special clauses, please feel free to contact Richard Ouwerling and Peter Verheijden of LVH Advocaten.
The Environment Act & Damage Compensation A new regime & terminology
Introduction
From 1 January 2024, the Environment Act will come into force. With its entry into force, it has been said that the biggest legislative operation has been completed since the introduction of the Dutch Constitution in 1848. Several previously existing separate laws and regulations have been combined into one law and four AMvBs with the Environment Act. With a legislative operation of such magnitude, (principle) choices are naturally made that bring about a change compared to the previously applicable law. So too in the context of the Environment Act. One area of the Environment Act where (principled) differences between the old and new law are also abundantly clear is planning damage law. In a number of separate contributions, some of these changes will be discussed in more detail and the (possible) consequences for practice will be considered.
This first contribution will consider some telling terminological differences between the old law and the Environment Act. It will focus on Chapter 15 of the Environment Act, entitled: ‘Damage’. Attention will also be paid to the connection with Section 4.5 of the General Administrative Law Act (Awb), which also entered into force on 1 January 2024.
Later contributions will address differences with regard to the reference date, the (planning) comparison to be made, the concept of damage, assumption of risk, normal social risk and transitional law. In each of these topics, there will probably still be an important task for the courts to settle points of principle (of dispute). That aspect, combined with the fact that the old law will remain in force under transitional law for quite some time, will undoubtedly create a lot of dynamism in case law in the coming years.
Plan damage
One imaginative example under the old law of planning damage was the amendment of a zoning plan that changes the surroundings of, for instance, someone’s residential property. Where previously there was an unobstructed view of, say, farmland or a forest, this changes to a view of, say, a new housing estate or a residential tower. This development may result in a decrease in the value of the property for a nearby owner (indirect damage). If, as a result of a new zoning plan, the zoning of an owner’s own plot (also) changed, resulting in a decrease in value, this is direct damage.
Under the old Spatial Planning Act (‘WRO’), compensation for planning damage was still referred to. With the introduction in 2008 of the now defunct Spatial Planning Act (‘Wro’) as a result of the Environment Act, this changed to compensation for damage. In other words, the idea of full compensation in the WRO was abandoned by the legislator with the introduction of the Wro. Under the Environment Act, it is expected that even less will be granted to compensation for damages. Among the reasons for this are the changed level moment, the new planning equation and normal social risk. Later contributions will address each of these topics separately.
Whereas planning damage law under the old WRO was already to a large extent judicial law, this line has been continued under the Wro. This is also nicely illustrated in the summary judgment of the Administrative Law Division of the Council of State (‘the Division’) of 28 September 2016 (ABRvS 28 September 2016, ECLI:NL:RVS:2016:2582). In this ruling, the Division, because of “the need in legal practice”, gave a nice and practice-useful overview of its case law in the area of planning damage law. It is expected that this overview ruling, in parts, will also serve well under the Environment Act. In addition, this overview ruling will in any event remain important for cases that will still be dealt with under the old law in the coming years under the transitional law of the Environment Act. This transitional law will also be discussed in more detail in a later contribution.
Environment Act
With the entry into force of the Environment Act, goodbye to the ‘zoning plan’. Instead, with the entry into force of the Environment Act, the ‘environmental plan’ makes its appearance. In addition, with the entry into force of the Environment Act, the concept of ‘physical living environment’ also made its appearance. Incidentally, the legislator did not specify what exactly is meant by the physical living environment. However, the legislator has made it clear in Section 1.2 of the Environment Act what it means in any case (including buildings, infrastructure, water, soil, air and nature).
Compared to the zoning plan, the environment plan has a broader scope in which it can also regulate subjects for which there was previously no place in a zoning plan under the Wro. With the environmental plan, for instance, the legislator offers a municipality more room to provide customised solutions for each location (flexibility and room for consideration) and thereby enable certain spatial developments based on (intended) faster decision-making. In particular, the wider scope and flexibility of the environmental plan are the reason why Chapter 15 of the Environmental Law introduced the necessary (far-reaching) changes to what used to be called planning damage law. Among other things, new damage-causing decisions have been brought under the scope of the Environment Act, such as, for example, a rule from the environmental plan, a tailor-made regulation, an environmental permit or a project decision (section 15.1 Environment Act).
Damage compensation
Under the law in force before the Environment Act, planning damage law was housed in section 6.1 of the Wro. In addition to the planning damage law in the Wro, there was also a separate system of loss compensation. There were similarities between the two systems, but certainly also differences.
Whereas the legislative process of the Omgevingswet had already started in 2010-2011 and its entry into force thus lasted until 1 January 2024, the legislative process of section 4.5 Awb (the Compensation for Damage Act) was running almost simultaneously. The choice was made to introduce Section 4.5 Awb at the same time as the introduction of the Environment Act. This was based on the idea that the entry into force of section 4.5 Awb prior to the entry into force of the Environment Act, could possibly result in an increase as well as widening of claims for loss compensation. In the Environment Act, Article 15.1(1) explicitly states that the regulation of Title 4.5 Awb only applies to the causes of damage as included in the exhaustive list in Article 15.1 of the Environment Act. This provision ‘curbed’ fears of an increase and widening of claims for loss compensation.
With the entry into force of Chapter 15 of the Environment Act, the term ‘plan damage’ was dropped and replaced by the term ‘loss compensation’. Thus, where previously there was a distinction between planning damage and loss compensation, there is no longer any such distinction and, for the purposes of the Environment Act, only loss compensation is referred to.
Concluding remarks
In the foregoing, the old planning damage law (WRO / Wro), the distinction between direct and indirect damage and the new system under the Environment Act with ‘loss compensation’ as a central concept have been discussed. The next contribution will discuss the changes brought about by the Environment Act in the context of the reference date and (planning) comparison.
More information
This contribution was written by Ben van Nieuwaal of LVH Advocaten. If you have any questions about this contribution, please contact us via the general number 0031 10 209 27 77.
Amend model employment contract in 2022? Implementation of EU Directive on transparent and predictable terms of employment
In June 2019, the European Parliament adopted a Directive on transparent and predictable working conditions. The Directive grants new rights to employees and this thus affects employees’ employment contracts, as well as any employment conditions regulations. This may lead to employers having to change their (model) employment contracts and employment conditions regulations in 2022.
In this article we discuss the changes contained in the bill and consider the changes employers must make to their (model) employment contracts.
Implementation of Directive 2019/1152
The directive must be implemented in Dutch law. The government published a bill on 12 November 2021. The intended entry into force of the law is 1 August 2022. Thus, we recommend to review the employment contract of your employees and applicable regulations before that time.
Legislative amendments from Directive on transparent and predictable employment conditions (2019/1152)
Training costs clause
Employers already had a training obligation, but it is expanded by the Directive. Employers can no longer agree on a study costs clause for training that is necessary for the performance of the job. The employer must offer this training free of charge and the time an employee spends on the training is working time.
The question is therefore, what constitutes training that is necessary for the job? In any case, this concerns a training which the employer is obliged to offer based on the law or collective bargaining agreement.
Side-activities clause
An ancillary activities clause in the employment contract is possible from August 2022 only if the employer can justify it on the basis of an objective reason. If there is no such justification, the clause is null and void. Note: The justification does not have to be given at the conclusion of the employment contract or be included in the employment contract. The justification may already be included in the employment contract, but may also be given at a later date. So does an employee request permission to perform ancillary work? Then the employer can still provide the justification at that time.
The rationale behind this change is that an employee is free outside of working hours to work for another employer or to work for himself. Thus, an employee may have multiple jobs unless the employer can justify a prohibition. A justification could be, for example, the threat of a violation of the Working Hours Act, the protection of confidential business information or the health of the employee.
Employer information obligation
The information obligation of employers is expanded. Employers must, in addition to the information in Section 7:655(1) of the Civil Code, also provide information about:
- Working hours;
- Work place(s);
- Wage components (bonus and allowances);
- Procedural aspects in the event of termination of the employment contract;
- Right to training;
- Leave arrangements(s).
The employer can include this information in the employment contract, terms of employment regulations and/or personnel handbook.
On-call agreement
Employees are only obliged to work unpredictable working hours if the employer has made these working hours known at the start of employment. The employer is therefore given a more extensive information obligation in this area. An on-call worker must therefore know at what times he is obliged to work. This can be included in the employment contract.
Request for predictable work
Furthermore, after 26 weeks a call employee can submit a request for predictable work. Employers do not have to agree to this and the work must be available. Employers must respond to the request within 1 month (or within 3 months for small employers) with a written motivation. If the response is lacking, the employee’s request must be acted upon.
Prohibitions on giving notice
There is a new prohibition on giving notice. An employee who invokes the above new rights cannot be dismissed for that reason.
Posted workers in the EU
If an employer wants to post an employee from the Netherlands within the European Union, certain information must be provided. The employer must inform the employee about the wages, allowances and reimbursement of expenses to which he is entitled. This can be included in the employment contract or terms of employment.
Need help updating your employment contracts?
It is always wise to have your model employment contract checked regularly by an employment lawyer. Labour law is constantly changing and this year too there are changes, namely the implementation of the EU Directive on transparent and predictable terms of employment. Richard Ouwerling of LVH Advocaten in Rotterdam will be happy to help you evaluate and adjust your employment contracts. He can also tell you more about the upcoming changes in employment law.
Dismissal of directors of foundations: new risks and opportunities under the WBTR!
With the introduction of the Management and Supervision of Legal Persons Act (WBTR), the legislature has taken important steps to improve the management and supervision of foundations. One of the most notable changes concerns the expansion of the grounds for dismissal for directors of foundations. In this article, we discuss the new statutory regulation, illustrate the regulation with a practical example, and explain the implications for directors and stakeholders.
The new statutory regulation (WBTR)
Given the old regulation, dismissing a foundation director was often difficult. According to the old legal text of Article 2:298 of the Civil Code, a director could only be dismissed in case of evidently wrongful acts or (financial) mismanagement. These strict requirements ensured that dismissal rarely occurred in practice.
With the amendment of the law, the possibilities for dismissal have been broadened. The new Article 2:298(1) of the Civil Code offers several grounds for dismissal. A director may be dismissed by the court in case of i) neglect of his duties, ii) other weighty reasons, iii) circumstances of which the continuation of the directorship cannot reasonably be tolerated, or iv) failure to comply or to comply properly with an order of the interim relief judge.
The request for dismissal must be made by an interested party or the Public Prosecutor’s Office. This regulation also applies to foundation commissioners.
A practical example
A recent ruling by the Arnhem-Leeuwarden Court of Appeal illustrates the expanded possibilities of the new law. Two nature lovers, simultaneously with their marriage, established a foundation together to support nature. Years later, without her husband’s knowledge, the wife decides to cut down some trees. The husband is furious. He decides to register the foundation in the Trade Register, with only himself as the sole and independently authorized director. This violates the articles of association, which stipulate that the husband and wife would be jointly authorized as directors.
The lawsuit
The wife, who could not register as a co-director with the Commercial Register without her husband’s cooperation, turned to the court and claimed her husband’s dismissal as a director of the foundation pursuant to Section 2:298 of the Civil Code. The court rules in her favor. The husband had neglected his duties by focusing on his own interests rather than the interests of the foundation. Moreover, he had acted in violation of the articles of association and the Trade Register Act, which required him to ensure that the information in the trade register was entered correctly and completely at all times.
As a result, the husband was dismissed and the wife, at her request, was appointed as a director. It is noteworthy that the foundation was not registered in the trade register until 20 years after its establishment, resulting in an economic offence under Article 1 WED, as directors are obliged to register the foundation within a week of its establishment under Article 20 of the Trade Register Act.
Implications for directors and stakeholders
This ruling shows that the WBTR can actually contribute to better governance of foundations. Indeed, the dismissal in the above ruling was granted on the basis of dereliction of duty, one of the new grounds for dismissal introduced by the WBTR. Directors must take their responsibilities seriously and ensure that they do not neglect their board duties. Interested parties now have greater opportunities to request the dismissal of a director through the courts.
Court of Justice: a supervisory director of a foundation is not a VAT entrepreneur
According to a judgment of the European Court of Justice on 13 June 2019, a member of a supervisory board (SB) of a foundation does not have to pay VAT on the remuneration for his activities as a member of the supervisory board.
This was decided by the European Court of Justice following a preliminary question on the subject from the Court of Appeal of ‘s-Hertogenbosch.
Why is a commissioner a VAT entrepreneur?
As of 1 January 2013, many members of supervisory boards of housing corporations are subject to VAT. After all, a supervisory board member’s position with one supervisory board is regarded as an economic activity on which VAT is due. Since 1 January 2013, housing corporations that have the legal form of a foundation therefore pay 21% VAT on the fee received by a supervisory director.
What facts underlie this case?
This case concerned a supervisory director who is a member of the supervisory board of a foundation with the objective of permanently offering accommodation to those in need of help. In addition, the man is employed as a civil servant. The supervisory director in question disagreed with the fact that he had to pay VAT on the fee he received from the foundation. He therefore submitted a letter of objection against this tax, which was rejected by a decision of the Tax and Customs Administration. The appeal lodged by the commissioner with the District Court of Zeeland-West-Brabant was declared unfounded by judgment.
How are the proceedings before the court?
The commissioner in question does not leave it at that and appeals against the verdict to the Court of Appeal in ‘s-Hertogenbosch. In dispute at the court of appeal is the question whether the commissioner for his activities at the foundation should be considered as an entrepreneur for VAT purposes or not.
In this respect, it is not disputed that as a member of the Supervisory Board, the supervisory board member concerned permanently participates in economic transactions and therefore performs an economic activity. The decisive factor, however, is the answer to the question of whether the activity is carried out independently or not.
The Court of Appeal has doubts about how this question should be answered and submits the question to the European Court of Justice. This is called a preliminary question.
The Court of Justice determines: Commissioner is not self-employed and therefore not a VAT entrepreneur
In answering the question, it is first examined whether the activity as a member of the supervisory board of a foundation should be regarded as ‘economic’ and then whether that activity is carried out ‘independently’.
The Court of Appeal decided that the supervisory directorship must be regarded as economic because it is performed on a permanent basis (the supervisory director is appointed for four years) and he receives remuneration for this.
With regard to independence, the Court of Appeal ruled that a member of the Supervisory Board, unlike an entrepreneur, does not bear any business risk. In addition, he performs his duties by virtue of his position and therefore not in his own name, for his own account and under his own responsibility. The SB member receives the fee regardless of his participation in a meeting or his actual hours worked. In addition, the auditor’s fee is a fixed amount. An auditor therefore has no direct influence on the remuneration. For these reasons, the Court of Justice decides that the auditor does not carry out the activity independently. This means that the activities carried out by the commissioner for the foundation do not lead to VAT entrepreneurship.
What to do with the VAT obligation for supervisory directors and supervisors after this ruling?
After this preliminary question has been answered, the Court of Appeal of ‘s-Hertogenbosch still has to rule in the proceedings.
For supervisory directors and other supervisors, the judgment means that they may no longer be regarded as VAT entrepreneurs. They will then no longer have to submit a VAT return.
Whether this will actually be the result depends on the ruling and the question whether the State Secretary will come up with a revised policy. For the time being, supervisory board members with usually one supervisory board member will still be able to make use of the small entrepreneurs scheme or opt for a fictitious employee status with a foundation. In all cases, it is wise for a supervisory board member to continue to act in accordance with the Tax and Customs Administration’s policy if he or she is currently regarded as a VAT entrepreneur. This means that a supervisory director must pay VAT (and charge it to the housing corporation or foundation) and then object to this tax.
Important changes in Dutch employment law in 2020
From the 1st of January 2020 a number of changes in Dutch employment law will come into force. These changes will bring new attractive benefits as well as new risks that need be taken into account by both employers and employees.
In this overview we will briefly inform you on the changes in Dutch employment law in 2020 with a focus on the employers perspective. This, due to the fact that our firm is specialized in corporate law. For more information please visit our website or contact Lisa Kloot via kloot@lvh-advocaten.nl or +31(0)102092777.
New Dutch employment act in 2020
The new employment act called “Wet arbeidsmarkt in balans” will enter into force on the 1st of January 2020. This new law should make it more attractive for employers to offer employees an employment contract for an indefinite period of time. The most significant changes are:
- In case of the termination of a contract, the employee will be entitled to a transition fee (“transitievergoeding”) from the first day of employment. The right to a transition fee already exists but it is only applicable if the employee has worked over two years. The new (extended) right of an employee also applies to a dismissal during the probationary period. The increased accrual for older employees, on the other hand, has been deleted;
- There will be an additional legal ground for dismissal. Due to this new so called cumulation ground (“cumulatiegrond”) in article 7:669 paragraph 3, sub i Dutch Civil Code, the current legal dismissal grounds can be combined. The chance of a dismissal being granted by the court will therefore be higher. However, the downside is that the transition fee that can be assigned by the court, can be increased to 150% in case of a dismissal on a combined ground instead of the regular 100%;
- The duration of temporary contracts, before they automatically turn into an indefinite contract, is prolonged from 2 to 3 years (“ketenregeling”</em>);
- The rights of on-call workers are being expanded. For example, after a working period of 12 months the employer must offer the on-call workers an employment contract with working hours that are equal to the hours that the employee has worked in the previous period of 12 months;
- A new system for insurance premiums for unemployment benefits will be introduced (“WW-premie”). There will be a lower unemployment insurance premium for employees with a written employment contract for an indefinite period of time (this does not include on-call workers);
The definition of Payrolling will be adjusted, so that the overlap with the temporary employment structure will disappear completely. Payroll employees will be entitled to the same employment conditions as employees who are employed by the client itself. Payroll is therefore merely a reduction of the administrative burden for the employer.
Compensation of transition fee for long-term incapacitated employees
On the 1st of April 2020 employers can claim compensation for the transition fee that has been paid to long-term incapacitated employees. This new scheme in Dutch employment law applies with retroactive effect to transition fees that have been paid since the 1st of July 2015 to long-term incapacitated employees.
Employers can request compensation up to six months after payment of the full transition payment. If the transition payment is paid in instalments, then the application can only be submitted after the final payment has been made. If the transition payment has already been paid before the scheme comes into effect, the employer will have six months after April 1, 2020 before the application needs to be submitted.
Director and works council: how to achieve effective cooperation?
Director and works council: how to achieve effective cooperation?
The works council is an important body within the organisation. They represent their members and have the necessary powers to do so, such as the right to consent and the right of advice. Effective cooperation makes it easier to implement important decisions within your organisation and ensures that those decisions are also supported within your organisation. So there is every reason to work on the cooperation with the works council, but how do you achieve that? The interests of the works council and the director are sometimes opposed, and the works council is therefore often seen as an opponent of the director. In this article we will tell you how to get closer to an effective cooperation.
Inform yourself in time about the rights of the Works Council
If you are aware of the rights and obligations of the works council, it will be easier for you to cooperate with the works council. After all, there need be no (or at least less) discussion about the content of those rights and duties. Do you have doubts about these rights and how far they extend? Please contact an employment lawyer to have this checked before communicating with the works council. Also give the works council the opportunity to turn to an employment law specialist.
Works council rights
Right to information: This means that the works council is entitled to information to enable it to perform its duties. The works council can request information itself (active information right) and the employer is obliged to provide information about the financial and economic position of the company and the social policy pursued (passive information right).
Consultation right: The managing director and works council are obliged to meet in a consultation meeting within two weeks after a reasoned request by one of them. Compliance can be requested from the subdistrict court.
Right of initiative: The works council has the right to make proposals. The works council cannot force the director to accept these proposals.
Right to advice: The Works Council has a right to advise on certain intended decisions. Section 25 of the Works Councils Act contains a list of decisions about which advice must be requested.
Right of consent: The Works Council has a right of consent to certain proposed decisions. Section 27 of the Works Councils Act contains a list of decisions for which consent must be requested.
Facilities: the works council has the right to call in experts, the right to training, the right to retention of salary while working for the works council and the right to conduct legal proceedings free of charge.
Regularly involve the works council in decision-making
Sparring informally
In addition to the rights under the Works Councils Act that have just been discussed, a director can also involve the Works Council in issues other than those on which it has the right to advise and consent. After all, the Works Council has a stimulating task with regard to subjects that affect the staff, such as terms of employment, working conditions, equal treatment and more. The more regular the consultation with the works council, the better. The works council should not feel like an afterthought; that creates the idea that the works council has no influence on decision-making. Regular and timely involvement of the Works Council creates trust. This can be done simply by planning a fixed moment to consult.
Works council involvement without right to advice or consent
Please note: is the works council involved without the right to advice or assent? As a director, it must be made clear that no advice or assent is requested, but that the director merely wants the works council to think along on a certain subject. Therefore, always assess first whether the subject requires advice or consent. Uncertainty? Lisa Kloot of LVH Advocaten will be glad to help you.
Works council agreement
The powers of the Works Council can also be extended through a Works Agreement. The involvement of the Works Council can thus increase and this can be positive for your organisation. Primary employment conditions, for instance, are not a subject on which the Works Council has the right to advice or consent. However, the managing director could agree with the works council that the terms of employment are submitted to the works council for approval. This could make it easier for the staff to accept.
Formation of a tacit business agreement
Please note: a company agreement can be created tacitly. If the directors repeatedly request consent or advice in writing, unambiguously and without reservation on a subject that falls outside the right to consent and advice, a works agreement can be created. Therefore, always make a reservation if you, as a director, wish to informally spar with the works council and state that no consent or advice is requested.
Need a lawyer in Rotterdam in the field of works councils and employee participation?
Co-determination is a promising tool for every manager if it is used correctly. Lisa Kloot of LVH Advocaten in Rotterdam is happy to help you set up works councils in the right way within your organisation. Lisa Kloot can help you with the establishment of the works council, the conclusion of a works agreement, as well as she can guide you in the process of advice and consent.
Who is entitled to the petrol station at the end of the lease agreement?
The law provides a rule for answering this question, but the lease agreement may include different agreements. In practice that happens, but these agreements are often unclear or undated, creating opportunities and threats.
Statutory rules
In essence, the statutory rules are as follows:
- The owner of the plot also owns the structures that are on the plot, for example a petrol station;
- With building rights, the ownership of the petrol station can be allocated to somebody other than the plot owner;
- At the end of the lease agreement, the lessee may remove, in other words demolish, the changes and improvements he introduced, for example the petrol station he built;
- The lessee is only entitled to do this on condition that the leased property is returned to the ‘original condition’ in which it was made available at the time of starting the lease;
- The lessee may only remove the changes and improvements he applied and not anything that was applied by a predecessor;
- If the lessee decides not to demolish the petrol station, but to leave it behind he may ask the plot owner for compensation.
Complications
In practice this is marred by all manner of complications, such as:
- Building rights were not established;
- It is unclear whether this concerned the lease of undeveloped land or the lease of 7:290 business premises;
- The lease agreement deviated from the statutory rules, but the agreements could be interpreted in several ways;
- After commencing the lease agreement, the existing petrol station was demolished and a new petrol station was built;
- After commencing the lease agreement there were investments, including a 15-year reinspection;
Opportunities and threats
Having, keeping or acquiring a petrol-station site is of commercial and financial importance. Towards the end of the term of a lease agreement, there are opportunities and threats for the lessee, plot owner and competing fuel suppliers. It throws up issues, such as:
- Could the petrol station be demolished if it was built by a previous lessee?
- What is the ‘original condition’ if the old petrol station that was there at the start of the lease was replaced by a new petrol station?
- What is the ‘original condition’ if investments, such as a 15-year reinspection, took place?
- Is the lessee protected if the wording of the lease agreement says that undeveloped land was leased, but the petrol station was already there on entering or renewing the lease agreement?
- Did the lease agreement contain an agreement that the plot owner is entitled to acquire the petrol station, for example by paying the ‘book value’?
- What is the ‘book value’?
All this means that:
- At the end of the lease agreement, the lessee of a petrol station could be required unexpectedly to leave the petrol station behind for a competitor for a limited amount of compensation at best;
- On the other hand, threatening or actually exercising the removal (demolition) right could be a means to encourage the plot owner to renew the lease agreement under favourable terms;
- For the plot owner there could be opportunities to actually acquire possession of a petrol station for a small fee that could be leased to a different fuel supplier;
- The competing supplier has opportunities to acquire a point of sale at relatively low costs.
- Good insight into the various legal points of view that could be adopted ensures that opportunities and threats are identified in time and that the correct strategy can be determined to capitalise on those opportunities and to avoid any threats.
Information
If you have any questions about this subject, please contact Bouwe Bos.
Disproving the legal presumption concerning director liability in bankruptcy
A director is liable to make good the deficit in the bankruptcy if the board has manifestly mismanaged the company and it is likely that this was a major cause of the bankruptcy. There is a legal presumption that improper management is a major cause of the bankruptcy if the obligation to file or keep accounts has not been met. The Supreme Court recently issued an interesting ruling on the question of whether the acts or omissions of one or more directors, which in themselves do not constitute improper performance of duties, may be sufficient to negate the statutory presumption. In this article I will discuss the judgment.
Directors’ liability in bankruptcy due to improper management
Article 2:248 of the Dutch Civil Code concerning improper management is relevant in the event of bankruptcy of a private limited liability company (Article 2:138 of the Dutch Civil Code in the case of an NV). On the basis of this article, each director is jointly and severally liable towards the estate to make good the estate deficit if the board has manifestly mismanaged its duties and it is plausible that this was a major cause of the bankruptcy. In other words, there is collective liability.
Only the bankruptcy trustee can make such a claim. The trustee will have to state the facts and circumstances from which the improper management can be inferred. Next, the trustee must make it plausible that the improper management is a major cause of the bankruptcy.
Presumption of proof that improper management was an important cause of the bankruptcy
On the basis of paragraph 2 of article 2:248 Civil Code, the trustee in bankruptcy is assisted in his position of proof if the annual accounts have been filed too late or if the administration does not provide the required insight. In such cases, improper management is established and the legal presumption applies that the bankruptcy was caused by improper management.
Division of the burden of proof according to the Supreme Court
In the Blue Tomato judgment, the Supreme Court elaborated on how the burden of proof and the burden of proof should be divided:
“A reasonable interpretation of Article 2:248 (2) DCC implies that for the refutation of the presumption laid down therein, it is sufficient for the director under appeal to make it plausible that other facts or circumstances than his improper performance of duties have been an important cause of the bankruptcy (HR 20 October 2006, NJ 2007,2). If the director puts forward an external cause, such as in this case the refusal of the fire insurer to compensate the damage of the company as a result of a fire, and the director is criticized by the trustee for failing to prevent the occurrence of that cause, the director will have to put forward facts and circumstances and, if necessary, make a plausible case that this failure does not constitute improper performance of duties. If he succeeds in doing so, it is up to the trustee to make it plausible on the basis of the first paragraph of Section 2:248 of the Dutch Civil Code that the apparent improper performance of duties is nevertheless also a major cause of the bankruptcy.”
There will be a case of the aforementioned omission resulting in improper performance of duties if no other reasonable thinking director would have acted in this way under the same circumstances.
Case on directors’ liability in bankruptcy
The case that led to the recent judgment was – simplified – as follows.
Three private limited companies have gone bankrupt. The trustee in bankruptcy has established that the accounting records are faulty, so that improper management is established and the legal presumption applies that improper management is a major cause of the bankruptcy. The trustee seeks a declaratory judgment that the accounting records did not meet the legal requirements and that the directors are liable to settle the estate deficit.
The directors defend themselves by claiming that the bankruptcy was caused by the actions of another director.
Legal presumption of management board liability: judgments of the District Court and Court of Appeal
The district court ruled that the directors had sufficiently rebutted the “presumption that the administration conducted in the second half of 2010 or the failure to timely file the 2009 financial statements contributed significantly to the bankruptcy.”
Improper administration or other factors as a major cause of the bankruptcy?
The trustee appeals. The Court of Appeal rightly finds that the District Court did not correctly apply the system of Article 2:248 of the Dutch Civil Code. The Court of Appeal notes that the violation of the accounting obligation across the board implies improper management. It is then up to the directors to make it plausible that other facts or circumstances than that improper performance of duties (i.e. not limited to keeping a bad administration) have been an important cause of the bankruptcy.
The directors still put forward contentions concerning the actions of another director. For example, they argued that sending a certain mailing to customers of the company was a major cause of the bankruptcy. The Court of Appeal is of the opinion that these assertions disregard the principle of collective liability. If the mailing can already be seen as an important cause of the bankruptcy, then this action was also taken by a fellow director, according to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal concludes from this that the directors addressed are in principle liable for the bankruptcy deficit.
Supreme Court ruling on mismanagement and bankruptcy
The directors go to the Supreme Court. They argue that the judgment of the Court of Appeal has misjudged that acts of a fellow director which in itself cannot be regarded as improper management can also constitute “another important cause of the bankruptcy”, which means that the presumption of proof of Article 2:248 (2) of the Dutch Civil Code has been worked out in principle.
The Supreme Court agrees. The Supreme Court considered that in addition to external causes, acts or omissions by one or more directors which in themselves do not constitute improper performance of duties – and in respect of which it cannot be said that no reasonable director would have acted in the same way under the same circumstances – may be sufficient to refute the legal presumption of Section 2:248 (2) of the DCC.
In this respect the Supreme Court recalled that the starting point of the article of law is not to make the directors liable for the entire shortfall by the mere fact of improper management, even if this has not led to the bankruptcy.
Therefore, the Court of Appeal should not have ignored the directors’ contentions concerning the other director’s actions. Therefore, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the Court of Appeal and referred the case to another Court of Appeal for further proceedings.
Refinement by the Supreme Court of the doctrine of directors’ liability
With this judgment the Supreme Court has applied an important refinement to the interpretation of Section 2:248 of the Civil Code.
However, the curtain does not necessarily fall on the bankruptcy if it is established that mismanagement was an important cause of the bankruptcy. Paragraph 3 of article 2:248 DCC stipulates that the managing director who proves that he cannot be blamed for the improper performance of duties by the managing board and that he has not been negligent in taking measures to avert the consequences thereof, is not liable. It will not often be possible to successfully appeal to this, but it is possible, for example, if the director who is sued can prove that he was misled by another director.
Lawyers in corporate law and insolvency law
If you have questions about directors’ liability or have a conflict with a fellow director, please feel free to contact one of our corporate and insolvency law specialists.
Fiscal support measures during Corona crisis
On the 17th March 2020, the Cabinet announced a large number of measures. These measures are aimed at supporting companies and freelancers. The measures include measures to maintain employment on the one hand and measures to ensure that companies do not go bankrupt and that self-employed people can maintain an income on the other hand.
The package of measures includes the following elements:
– A reduction in employers’ wage costs to avoid redundancies
– Temporary income support for the self-employed
– Relaxation of tax deferrals
– Increase in the guarantee for business financing
– Interest rebates for loans contracted with Qredits
– Widening the guarantee for SMEs – Agricultural Credits
– Extension BMKB scheme
– Open emergency counter for entrepreneurs in affected sectors.
What can LVH’s lawyers help you with?
We can advise you on all measures. Ultimately, most measures are measures that have an effect and offer support in the somewhat longer term.
Measures that may have an immediate effect
Postponement of payment
In the short term, the measure of requesting deferral of payment of the various taxes in particular has a direct effect. This measure makes it possible to request deferral directly. It frees up resources that can be spent on keeping the company afloat.
Reduction of provisional assessment
At the beginning of the year, a large number of companies were subject to a provisional assessment of income tax (for IB entrepreneurs) or corporate income tax. This assessment relates to the tax year 2020 and is based on an expected profit for the year 2020. For a large number of the companies that have received such an assessment, it now appears that, as a result of the corona crisis, they will make no or significantly less profit than previously estimated. On this basis, the provisional assessment can be reduced.
If the amount of the provisional assessment has already been paid, the reduction will result in a refund.
We would be pleased to discuss with you which measures can help you further and how we can support you in doing so. For questions and/or advice you can contact David Harreman via harreman@lvh-advocaten.nl or 010-2092756.
Netherlands Franchise Code (NFC)
On 12 April 2017, the outgoing Minister of Economic Affairs published a bill which legally embeds the NFC. It is possible to respond to the bill until 25 May 2017. By legally embedding the NFC, the Minister wants to strengthen the position of franchisees and bring more balance to the interests of franchisees and franchisors.
Contents of the NFC
The NFC contains rules of conduct franchisors and franchisees must abide by when establishing, executing and terminating the franchise agreement. The NFC may be declared voluntarily applicable to the franchise agreement. It is only if the NFC is a part of the franchise agreement that its compliance may be sought from the court.
The Minister wants to strengthen the franchise relationship by giving the NFC a legal basis. Legally embedding the NFC means that the NFC changes from a non-binding regulation to an enforceable one, regardless of what the franchisor and franchisee have contractually agreed upon.
Obligation to perform to the best of one’s ability
The NFC contains clear obligations (to perform to the best of one’s ability) for both parties. For instance, the franchisor may only enter into agreement with a franchisee who, “after reasonable enquiry” has demonstrated to possess enough ability to operate the franchise “in a sound and responsible manner”. If, in hindsight, it turns out that this reasonable enquiry has not been carried out, this may be invoked against the franchisor in case of unsatisfactory performance of a franchisee. Furthermore, the franchisor has an aggravated duty of disclosure of information towards the prospective franchisee. Information on the financial position of the franchisor and other relevant information that may be of importance to a franchisee must be made available within a reasonable period prior to the conclusion of the franchise agreement. However, the NFC does not compel the franchisor to draw up an operating forecast. If the franchisor does draw this up, then naturally the forecast, based on the current legislation, may not be flawed. Moreover, the franchisor is obliged to do everything in its power to improve and further develop the franchise formula.
On the other hand, the prospective franchisee also has a duty to investigate of his own and must, therefore, examine whether the operation is feasible and whether the content of the given information is correct.
Franchisor and franchisee must take note of the NFC when entering into a franchise agreement to check which information must be provided or requested beforehand and assess what the consequences are of verifiable non-compliance with the obligations (to perform to the best of one’s ability).
Information
We may be of assistance to you herein. For more information, please contact our office 0031 10 209 27 77 or by e-mail info@lvh-advocaten.nl.
New ROZ model Huurvereenkomst Winkelruimte en andere bedrijfsruimte in de zin van Artikel 7:290 BW (Dutch Civil Code): the changes and focal points in outline
In December 2022, the Real Estate Council (“ROZ”) adopted a new model for the lease of retail space. The model is intended for the lease of retail space and other business premises within the meaning of Section 7:290 of the Dutch Civil Code, mostly stores and catering establishments. The ROZ models are drawn up by specialists with extensive knowledge and experience and are widely used in leasing practice. This model has been drawn up from the landlord’s point of view. The previous model dates from 2012 and was due for renewal. This new model takes into account social developments, amended legislation and case law. Think of corona, amendments to the Winkeltijdenwet (Shopping Hours Act) and court decisions on the validity of a signature or on the interpretation of the penalty clause.
This article first discusses the use of the ROZ model Huurvereenkomst Winkelruimte. Then some changes and additions compared to the ROZ model retail space from 2012 are mentioned and then explained. Finally, a number of points of interest follow.
How do I use the new ROZ model Huurvereenkomst Winkelruimte en andere bedrijfsruimte in de zin van Artikel 7:290 BW, version 2022?
The model Shopping Space Lease Agreement can be used by landlord and tenant for the lease of business space that – in short – is intended as retail space or catering, such as pubs or restaurants. Landlord and tenant should fill in the model with the details of the parties and of the leased property. The lease also sets out agreements on the rental period and the rent. It is possible to make additional agreements or deviate from the model provisions. Deviations must be included in the preamble and in Article 17 of the lease.
In addition to a new model lease agreement, the ROZ has also renewed the General Provisions accompanying the lease agreement. The General Provisions are declared applicable to the lease agreement. It is important that a landlord provides the tenant with the General Provisions before signing the lease. The tenant will have to sign for receipt. The ROZ has also published a manual. This provides a brief explanation of the provisions in the model lease to be completed by the landlord and tenant.
What are the changes in the ROZ Model Retail Lease Agreement 2022 compared to the 2012 version?
Provisions have been added to the 2022 model on new topics such as electronic signing, privacy, government measures and opening hours. The sustainability article has been expanded and the ROZ provides an appendix to that article in which landlord and tenant can record what measures they have agreed upon in the context of sustainability. The ROZ also provides a turnover rent provision that can be included in the lease when parties agree on a turnover-related rent. The website of the ROZ also provides for the downloading of an official report of completion that the landlord and tenant can use at the start of the lease. The General Provisions include an article on undermining.
I discuss some of the changes and their background below.
The changes to the ROZ model Huurvereenkomst Winkelruimte
Additional barrier for tenant who wants to sue landlord
The ROZ model raises an additional barrier for a tenant who wants to sue a landlord for breach. The ROZ model uses the term “culpable serious shortcoming. In principle, this means that the tenant cannot sue the landlord in the event of an attributable shortcoming (as required by law), but that this shortcoming must also be ‘serious’. When this is the case will have to be assessed on a situation-by-situation basis.
Opening hours
Article 13 of the lease of retail space allows the landlord and tenant to establish in advance what opening hours apply to the tenant. These appear to be minimum opening hours. There seems to be no objection to a tenant wishing to be open to the public beyond the agreed opening hours, albeit at its own expense (Article 11.1 General Provisions). The background lies in a provision added to the Shopping Hours Act as of January 1, 2022. This states that a shopkeeper cannot be obliged to keep his business open longer or at different times if he has not expressly agreed to this. This prevents anyone other than the tenant, such as the landlord or shopkeepers’ association, from deciding on his opening hours. By including the opening hours in the lease, the tenant of 7:290 business premises has agreed to those opening hours.
Corona determination
Article 14 of the lease of retail space contains a provision on government measures, the so-called “corona provision. That article states that the lessor and the lessee of 7:290 business premises must consult with each other if there is a loss of rental enjoyment as a result of generally applicable government measures. These are government measures that mean that the lease cannot be maintained unchanged due to a conflict with reasonableness and fairness. This provision was included as a result of the measures taken by the government in connection with corona, such as the mandatory closure of the catering industry, lockdowns and regulations regarding 1.5 meters distance. The article is broader than corona. Even when another situation arises as a result of which the government takes measures that impede the tenant in the use of the leased property, the landlord and tenant must consult with each other. The article does provide that until other arrangements are made, the tenant will simply have to pay the full rent.
Sustainability
Article 15 of the retail lease provides for a regulation regarding the legal obligations regarding sustainability that follow from the Activities Decree Environmental Management. Energy-saving measures that can be objectively recovered within five years must be taken. In principle, these costs are borne by the tenant (Article 15.3). On the other hand, energy-saving measures taken by the tenant do not in principle have to be undone at the end of the lease. If the energy-saving measures were installed less than five years prior to the end of the lease, the tenant should in principle receive compensation for them. However, the landlord has the option of attaching conditions to his permission to install energy-saving measures.
Electronic signature
In practice, it often happens that the landlord and tenant sign the lease separately from each other. The signed lease is then scanned and sent by e-mail. To prevent one of the parties from later taking the position that the scanned signature is not legally valid, there is the option of including in the lease agreement that a scanned signature (or other type of electronic signature) is also legally valid.
Clarification of penalty clause
Regarding the penalty clause from the previous model agreement, there was a lot of ambiguity in practice and a lot of case law. The ROZ has sought to eliminate this lack of clarity. The current penalty clause in Article 28.3 of the General Provisions reads as follows: “Each time an amount due by the tenant under the lease is not paid promptly on the due date, the tenant shall forfeit to the lessor by operation of law an immediately payable penalty of 1% per month on the amount then due, with a minimum of €300 per month, with each month commenced counting as a full month.”
In the manual to the lease of retail space, the ROZ provides a calculation example for clarification. It is as follows: if a lessee fails to pay the monthly rent of € 14,000 for the months of January, February and March, the lessee owes the minimum penalty of € 300 for both January and February under Article 28.3. In March, the arrears total €42,600, i.e. three months’ rent and two penalties. In March, the tenant then owes a penalty of € 462, being 1% of the arrears.
With this, the ROZ makes it clear that there cannot be a cumulative penalty. Thus, a tenant does not owe a penalty of €300 for every month that he has not paid (in full). As an example, if the aforementioned tenant does not pay the rent for January, he owes €300 in penalties. If he still hasn’t paid the January rent in February (and the February rent has), he won’t suddenly owe a €300 penalty.
Points of attention to the new ROZ model Retail lease agreement 2022
Finally, a few points to consider when using the new ROZ model Retail Lease Agreement 2022.
- Prior to or at the start of the lease, make sure you have a good record of completion. This prevents discussions at the end of the lease. If no official report of acceptance has been drawn up at the start of the lease, the tenant must hand over the leased property in a well-maintained condition, without defects and free of damage at the end of the lease. This is subject to wear and tear and normal aging or if the tenant can prove that the leased property was not in good condition at the start.
- The starting point is that the business premises are leased as shells. Only the structural parts, such as walls and roofs, are part of the leased space. In principle, the front of the premises is not part of it. It is recommended that the parties clearly specify in the lease what, in addition to the shell, is also part of the leased space, such as floors or installations. Then it is a matter of shell plus. If this has not been laid down, maintenance, repair and renewal will be at the tenant’s expense.
- Article 5.5 of the General Provisions allows a landlord to refuse the tenant access to the leased premises if the tenant has not yet fulfilled all his obligations at the desired moment of occupation. This is understandable with respect to, for example, rent payments, but can be more difficult if a tenant of catering space first wants to renovate and during the renovation does not yet have an operating license. It is wise to establish in advance that in such a case the tenant may already use the leased space while waiting for the permit.
- If a tenant wants to change its legal form, prior written consent is required from the landlord. Consider a tenant who wants to convert his sole proprietorship into a limited liability company. Landlord and tenant should also inform each other in writing in a timely manner about other proposed changes in the organization or corporate structure.
- The premise is that tenant is obliged to join the shopkeepers’ association or similar business association. If he does not, tenant must still contribute to it.
- If the lessee and the lessor of the premises make additional arrangements during the term of the lease, the lessor may charge administrative costs of at least €300 for recording those arrangements, for example in an allonge.
Supreme Court rules again on calculation method for rent reduction due to coronavirus for commercial leases
Supreme Court rules again on calculation method for rent reduction due to coronavirus for commercial leases
On 4 July 2025, the Supreme Court issued another ruling on the calculation method for rent reductions for commercial premises due to COVID-19. The Supreme Court ruled that, depending on the circumstances of the case, the court may choose which method to use to calculate the rent reduction in a specific case.
Rent reduction due to coronavirus: what was the situation again?
Earlier, on 24 December 2021, the Supreme Court ruled on preliminary questions about rent reduction during the coronavirus pandemic. The Supreme Court ruled that the circumstance that a tenant is unable to use the rented property, or can only use it to a limited extent, as a result of the coronavirus measures is an “unforeseen circumstance” that the parties did not take into account when concluding rental agreements before 15 March 2020. In such cases, the court may adjust the lease agreement by reducing the rent for the period of the loss of turnover. The reduction in rent had to be calculated in accordance with the fixed costs method. With the latter, the Supreme Court intended to provide a tool with which tenants and landlords of commercial premises could mutually agree to adjust the rent to the changed circumstances.
Deviating from the fixed costs method is permitted in the case of, for example, turnover-related rent.
In the case that led to the judgment of 4 July 2025, the dispute concerned the lease of a hotel. The rent consisted of a percentage of the turnover or a minimum rent (if the turnover was insufficient).
The tenant of the hotel claimed a reduction in the rent payment obligation for a period starting on 15 March 2020 (first lockdown) due to the coronavirus pandemic and the related government measures.
The court ruled that the hotel tenant’s turnover was so low that no turnover-related rent was due and that the fixed costs method and the 50/50 distribution should be applied to the minimum rent.
However, when the case was referred to the court of appeal, the court saw grounds to deviate from the calculation of the rent reduction according to the fixed costs method. After all, no fixed rent had been agreed, but a turnover-related rent.
Rent reduction must be based on change in value
The court explained that, under normal circumstances, the hotel would have had to pay a higher (because turnover-related) rent if its turnover had been higher. Due to the coronavirus measures, the hotel achieved a lower turnover, but this was offset by a lower rent.The disruption of the value ratio is therefore considerably less serious than in cases where a fixed rent has been agreed. The court therefore takes the lower rent into account when calculating the rent reduction.
The court explained that the landlord does not have to compensate the tenant for the fact that the latter is facing significant losses as a result of the coronavirus measures. A landlord of commercial premises must compensate the tenant for the fact that the coronavirus measures have reduced the “value” of the rented property for the tenant and the “value” of the rent has not decreased to the same extent.
Formula for rent reduction due to coronavirus in the case of turnover-related rent
The court ruled that when entering into the lease agreement, the landlord and tenant had assumed that the minimum rent would apply if the turnover did not exceed €13 million. The minimum rent and the percentage of the turnover were subsequently indexed.
To calculate the rent reduction, the turnover during the coronavirus period is compared with the turnover that would apply if the minimum rent were due. Before indexation, the turnover during the coronavirus period would therefore have to be compared with £13 million. This results in a percentage of turnover loss. This percentage is then divided by two and deducted from the minimum rent.
The Supreme Court upheld the court’s decision. This means that the court has the discretion to choose its own method for calculating rent reductions due to the coronavirus, if circumstances so require.
When can a buyer of a property address the seller for a hidden defect?
When you buy an (old) house, you buy it in the condition it is then in. This means including all visible and invisible defects. If it turns out that there is a defect after the purchase, this is in principle at the buyer’s risk. This sounds logical. Nevertheless, there are conceivable situations in which the buyer can hold the seller liable for the costs of repairing the defect. In this article I explain when this can be the case.
When can the seller be held liable for a defect?
A seller can still be liable for a defect after the transfer of a property, if:
- the seller has wrongfully failed to report the defect to the buyer; or
- there is a serious deficiency.
In both cases, the defect must have been present at the time of the transfer of the property.
Has the seller not reported the defect?
The seller may be liable if he knew of the defect in the property but did not say anything. In that case, the seller is liable because he has violated his duty of notification. The obligation to notify means that he must notify the (potential) buyer of all defects in the house prior to the purchase.
On the other hand, the buyer has an obligation to investigate. This means that the buyer must investigate the (architectural) condition of the house (or have it investigated). When buying an older house, the buyer has a heavier duty to investigate, because the risk of defects is greater.
Is there a serious defect?
A serious defect exists when the property does not have the properties necessary for normal use. Normal use means that someone can use the property safely. This means, for example, that you must be able to stand safely on the balcony or that the house has a safe and watertight roof construction. If the house is not suitable for normal use, while this is included in the sales contract, then there is a serious defect. The buyer can then hold the seller liable for the costs of repair. In principle, it does not matter that the seller did not know of the hidden defect at the time of the sale.
What possibilities does the seller have to limit his liability?
Sales contracts regularly include clauses limiting the seller’s liability for defects. For example, in an age clause, the seller reminds the buyer that the property is older. In that case, the buyer may not have the same expectations of the house as with a newer house.
Another example is the non-self-residence clause. This states that the seller has not lived in the house himself, so he is not familiar with the condition of the house. This is often the case with a former rented house or house acquired through an inheritance.
If such a clause is included in the purchase agreement, the seller may not be liable for the defect. The costs of repair will then remain for the buyer.
What to do when there is a defect?
The buyer has a duty to complain. This means that he must report the discovery of a hidden defect as soon as possible to the seller of the house of purchase. If the report is not made immediately after the discovery, the defect must in any case be reported within a reasonable period of time. Usually a period of two months is reasonable.
Whether the seller is also liable usually depends mainly on the contents of the sales contract and the circumstances of the case. It is therefore always wise to seek legal advice in good time.
Gentia Niesert
A proactive absenteeism policy; a precondition for sustainable employability
When an employee reports sickness, an employer must be alert. Does the employee need support? Is it short-term or long-term absenteeism? And how is reintegration handled? Perhaps outside their own company? These kinds of questions and more can be laid down in a sick leave policy. An adequate policy in this area has only advantages, including clarity among staff, low absenteeism and sustainable employability that contributes to business continuity.
In this article we discuss the most important parts of a sick leave policy and how you can implement this policy in your organization.
Mandatory absenteeism policy
Every organisation must draw up a policy on absenteeism due to illness. This obligation is implicitly included in Article 2.9 of the Working Conditions Decree. You must tailor the policy to your organisation.
The sick leave policy describes how an employer should deal with a sick employee. In addition, the policy describes procedures that the sick employee and (possibly) officials must follow. The policy can also define tasks, responsibilities and powers. A good sick leave policy is aimed at preventing (long-term) illness, promoting a rapid recovery and the sustainable employability of employees, usually within the company, but sometimes also outside.
Components absenteeism policy
First of all, you include in the policy a protocol concerning sick reports, control, guidance and rules on reintegration. This gives the employee immediate clarity about the course of his absenteeism on the work floor. The procedure starts with a sick leave report by the employee, generally to his manager. Here, the sick employee provides information about the expected duration of his absenteeism and his whereabouts. Agreements can then be made about a visit to the company doctor and also about activities that an employee can perform despite his illness.
Reintegration, in particular, must be clearly defined in the policy. Think about outlining the process with the company doctor or other third parties, drawing up a plan of approach and recording evaluation moments. It is very important that you maintain good contact with an employee. In that context, take a look at the UWV’s step-by-step plan.
Secondly, you can include a section on prevention in your policy. Here you describe the risks that the work can entail and what employer and employee should do to prevent absenteeism in the context of these risks. You can combine this with the risk inventory and evaluation (RI&E).
Third, you can include in the sick leave policy a section on absenteeism registration. This makes it clear whether your sick leave policy is effective.
Finally, you can include a section on guidance of sick employees. Think of the use of a case manager.
Implementing policies
The sick leave policy is part of your business organization and should therefore be implemented. It would be wise to make this policy part of your personnel handbook or other policy. You then make this policy part of employment contracts and/or assignment agreements. If necessary, you will need to amend or supplement the relevant agreement.
Do you need support in drawing up or implementing a sick leave policy? Please contact Lisa Kloot.
Changes Dutch labour law
The main implemented changes concern a dismissal law reform, an intended improvement of the legal status of flex workers and an adjustment of the Unemployment Insurance Act. Below, we will discuss the most important changes and suggest a number of recommendations.
The following points are raised:
- Trial period
- Noncompetition clause
- Notice requirement
- Temporary employment clause
- Provisions on succession of fixed-term employment contracts
- Dismissal law, – Grouds for dismissal – Dismissal procedure
- Transition compensation
- Reflection time
- Training and reassignment duty
- Unemployment benefit
As per 1 January 2015:
Trial period:
It is no longer possible to agree a trial period with the employee in case of an employment contract for a definite period of 6 months or less.
There are two alternative options: The first option is to enter into an employment contract for a short period of 2 to 3 months for example.
After this, it may be decided whether an employment contract for a longer period of time is entered into. In that case, this agreement is included in the provisions on succession of fixed-term employment contracts (see below).
The second option is an employment contract to be agreed of more than 6 months, and therefore at least 6 months plus 1 day. In that case, a trial period may be included.
Noncompetition clause:
A noncompetition clause may only be included in an employment contract for an indefinite period. There is one exception to this general rule: in fixed-term employment contracts a legally valid noncompetition clause may be included if the written substantiation shows that the clause is required for substantial business interests and interests of the service.
A judge may (entirely) annul a noncompetition clause if the interest is not required for business interests or interests of the service.
If a noncompetition clause is agreed before 1 January 2015, the ‘old’ legislation will still apply with respect to that clause.
Interim changes of the noncompetition clause are not allowed. Only when a new employment contract is entered into, a new noncompetition clause may be agreed. For that reason, the motivation and phrasing of the business interest or interest of the service in the noncompetition clause is essential. What will fall within the definition of business interest or interest of the service will be decided in jurisprudence. One may certainly think of specific knowledge or business information or disproportionate damage to the employer if the employee were to enter into the services of a competitor. It will be clear that this needs to be established per individual case. A standard provision will not be sufficient. It is considered to apply a provision per job category, with specific elements per employee.
A nonsolicitation clause is generally regarded as a form of a noncompetition clause. However, including a separate nonsolicitation clause and a separate noncompetition clause may be a smart thing to do. For it may well be that the motivation is accepted for one of the two clauses but not for the other one.
Notice requirement:
A so-called notice requirement has been introduced. This means that one month before the termination of the fixed-term employment contract at the latest date, the employer must inform the employee of:
- Whether or not the employment contract will be extended.
- On extension, the conditions thereof.
If the notice period is not observed at all, the employer will be due a compensation equal to the amount of wages for this month. If the employer does fulfil his obligation but does not do so timely, a pro rata compensation is due. The compensation is not only due when the employer has not indicated timely that the employment contract will not be continued, but also when he has not or not timely indicated that he wants to extend the employment contract. In the latter case, it is not likely that employees will claim any compensation but they do have the right to do so.
Should it be clear from the beginning that only a one-time employment contract for a definite period is entered into and that this contract will not be extended, it will probably be possible to already include the notice in the contract. A provision can be included in the employment contract to that end.
Temporary employment clause
The legal provisions state that a temporary employment clause may be agreed in a temporary employment contract for the maximum duration of 26 weeks. The possibility to deviate there from through collective agreement, has been restricted. The possibility to deviate there from through collective agreement, is limited to 78 worked weeks.
As per 1 July 2015:
Provisions on succession of fixed-term employment contracts
The provisions on succession of fixed-term employment contracts have changed. This means that an employment contract for an indefinite period arises if:
- Several employment contracts for a definite period were entered into whereas no more than six months passed between the employment contracts and the total duration of these employment contracts – including the interim periods – exceed a period of 24 months.
- More than 3 employment contracts succeeded each other with interim periods of no more than six months.
The provisions on succession of fixed-term employment contracts do not apply to employees under 18 years of age withan average working hours of 12 hours or less per week. As soon as the employee becomes 18 years, the provisions on succession of fixed-term employment contracts are immediately applicable.
Here as well, the ‘old’ law remains in force with respect to employment contracts entered into before 1 July 2015.
An agreement entered into or extended before 1 July 2015 that does not exceed 36 months, will legally be terminated. This, of course when the stipulations of the former legislation have been met (3 employment contracts with maximum interim periods of 3 months). In that case, however, a transition compensation will be due (see below) and the employer will also have to fulfil his notice requirement (see above).
If an interim period of more than 3 months was observed before 1 July 2015, this will also be honoured as a legal end to the succession of fixed-term employment contracts.
If a contract is entered into or extended after 1 July 2015, the new legislation will be applicable.
In case of collective agreement, the period of 24 months may be deviated from at the expense of the employee to a maximum of 48 months. The number of employment contracts and the interim period of 6 months can no longer be deviated from based on collective agreement. With respect to already concluded collective agreements, a transitional arrangement applies. The provisions of a collective agreement entered into before 1 July 2015, will remain in force for a maximum of 12 months. As soon as the collective agreement expires, the new legislation will become applicable.
It will remain possible to agree on a single fixed-term employment contract of more than 24 months. This may be desirable in the event of a project for a certain period of time. The employment contract may be extended once with a maximum of 3 months. If these requirements are met, the contract will end by operation of law. The notice requirement and the transition compensation will apply.
Dismissal law:
Grounds for dismissal:
As from 1 July 2015, there are only a limited number of grounds for dismissal. A termination may only be effected based on the grounds stipulated by law.
The law states the following grounds:
a) Business circumstances
b) Prolonged occupational disability
c) Frequent sickness absence
d) Unsatisfactory performance
e) Imputable acts or omissions on the side of the employee
f) Refusal to do work based on conscientious objection
g) Disrupted employment relationship
h) Other circumstances that are such that the employer cannot be required to continue the employment contract.
The latter category (h.) is intended as ‘remaining category’. Restrictive use of this remaining category is in order, however. This is also clear from the stated examples: detention, unlawful residence of the employee and no work permit for non-EU nationals.
By stating a limited number of grounds, it will therefore be possible that there are grounds for dismissal that fall outside the scope. In that case, a termination will be difficult or even impossible to effect.
In addition, documentation becomes an important factor. For the ‘unsatisfactory performance’ (d.) it is stipulated by law that the employee must have been informed timely and has been given the opportunity to improve his performance. The employer should also have offered sufficient training. If an employer cannot prove the stated aspects, no termination can be effected.
In the event of business circumstances (a.) the same rules apply as is presently the case. The principle of proportionality e.g., will also have to be applied as per 1 July 2015.
A Ministerial Regulation has been drawn up with the possibility to deviate from the principle of proportionality subject to certain conditions. It will be allowed to deviate from the principle of proportionality with a maximum of 10% in the age categories between 25 to 55 years with respect to employees that demonstrably perform above average or that are expected to possess an above-average potential for the future.
Dismissal procedure:
The procedure to be followed in the event of termination, is furthermore determined by the reason for dismissal. In the event of:
- Dismissal for business reasons or prolonged occupational disability (grounds a. + b.), the Employee Insurance Agency UWV WERKbedrijf must be asked permission to terminate the employment contract.
- Dismissal for personal reasons such as unsatisfactory performance, attributable acts or omissions by the employee or a disrupted employment relationship (grounds c. up to and including h.) a request for termination of the employment contract must be submitted to the district court.
Termination on the grounds of unsatisfactory performance is subject to more strict requirements. As said before, documentation will play an even more important role.
Both employer and employee may appeal and file an appeal in cassation against a decision of the district court in termination proceedings. This means that in some cases it may take some time before employer and employee will have clarity on this matter. The appeal and appeal in cassation proceedings take a relatively long time, so there may be uncertainty for quite some time on the question whether or not the employment contract is terminated.
Decisions by the Employee Insurance Agency UWV may be appealed. If the Employee Insurance Agency UWV WERKbedrijf grants permission to terminate the employment contract, the employee may request the district court to restore the employment contract or to award additional compensation.
If the Employee Insurance Agency UWV WERKbedrijf refused the employer to terminate the employment contract, the employer may request the district court to do so.
In both cases appeal and appeal in cassation proceedings are possible.
Transition compensation:
An employee who has been employed for at least 24 months, is in principle entitled to a so-called transition compensation on termination of the employment. The underlying idea was that the employee is assisted from one job to the next and, within that framework, receives compensation to be spent on training, counselling or outplacement. Hence the term ‘transition compensation’. This idea has now been abandoned and it concerns gross compensation paid directly to the employee.
The transition compensation is due irrespective of whether the employee is employed on the basis of an employment contract for a definite or indefinite period. Nor does it matter whether or not the employment contract was terminated by not extending the employment contract for a definite period, by giving notice or termination.
The height of the transition compensation depends on the duration of the employment:
- Over the first ten service years, the compensation amounts to 1/6 monthly salary per half service year.
- Over the period that the employee is longer than 10 years in service, the compensation amounts to 1/4 monthly salary per half service year.
- The compensation is capped at €75,000 gross or to the amount of the annual salary if this is higher than €75,000 gross.
- There is a transition period until 1 January 2020.
- An employee of 50 years or older, with an employment contract that spans at least 120 months, is entitled to 1/2 of the monthly salary for each half year of the employment contract after reaching the age of 50. This is not applicable to employers with less than 25 employees.
- In the event of business circumstances, employers with less than 25 employees may base the calculation of the amount of the transition compensation on the duration of the employment starting from 1 May 2013.
It is possible to deviate from the provisions concerning the transition compensation through collective agreement, provided that an equivalent arrangement is reached.
In principle, no transition compensation is due in the event that:
- The employment contract is terminated before the employee reaches the age of 18 and the average working hours did not exceed 12 hours per week.
- The employee has reached the pensionable age.
- The termination is the result of imputable acts or omissions on the side of the employee.
- The employment contract is terminated with mutual consent.
- The employer is declared bankrupt, is granted suspension of payment or when the statutory debt restructuring scheme is applicable.
Cost of measures may be deducted from the transition compensation that aim at preventing unemployment and stimulating a broader deployability in finding a new job. One may think of costs for training and outplacement. This is subject to very strict conditions by general administrative measure.
The provisions concerning the transition compensation are mandatory legal provisions. This means that these may not be deviated from. If an employment contract contains a provision that stipulates that, at the end of the employment, the employee is entitled to a certain amount of (severance) pay, as from 1 July 2015, the employee in principle is also entitled to the transition compensation. Therefore, it may be important to change the provisions on this subject in the employment contract, in the sense that the employee is not entitled to both compensations. For example by including that the transition compensation will be deducted from the severance pay.
Reflection time:
After the law amendment, the possibility remains to terminate the employment contract with mutual consent. Employees who have agreed to their dismissal or that have agreed to a termination with mutual consent, will have fourteen days reflection time. Within that term, the employee may reverse the dismissal.
The employer is under the obligation to point this reflection time out to the employee. If the employer fails to do so, the reflection time is extended by one week.
Training and reassignment duty:
A general reassignment duty was introduced. Before an employer may terminate the employment contract, it has to be assessed whether the employee, within a reasonable term and whether or not through training, may be placed in a fitting job.
It is included in the law as an element of good employer practices that an employee is entitled to training that is necessary for the performance of the job and for the continuation of the employment contract if the job becomes redundant or if he is no longer able to fulfil the job.
Change in the Unemployment Insurance Act
Adjustments of the unemployment schemes should result in unemployed employees accepting work sooner.
Main changes:
- All labour is considered suitable after 6 months instead of 12 months. This change has become effective as per 1 January 2015.
- Phasing out of unemployment benefit from 36 to 24 months. The phasing out will start as per 1 January 2016
In view of the above, it is of importance that the employment contracts are adapted to the new labour legislation. In addition, it is important that more attention is given to updating and maintaining personnel files and that a correct and adequate assessment system is applied.
Further information
You are welcome to consult us before taking a major decision with regard to summary dismissal of an employee for cause. For any further information regarding this subject, you can contact our office, 0031 – 10
Dismissal of statutory director: reasonable grounds for dismissal?
Dismissal of statutory director: reasonable grounds for dismissal?
The dismissal of a statutory director occupies a special position within labor law. For example, the protection against dismissal that a director under the articles of association has is designed differently from normal employees. It is no different in that there must be reasonable grounds for a legally valid dismissal. The absence of reasonable grounds can cost the employer dearly.
In this article, we discuss the special position of the statutory director, the requirements of dismissal of the statutory director and special attention is paid to the existence of reasonable grounds for dismissal.
Employment law and corporate law bond of statutory director
The special position of the statutory director is characterized by the existence of a corporate and an employment law bond, both of which must be severed in the event of dismissal. In order to sever both with one act, the dismissal decision, it is important that the relationship is intertwined and not split. A split bond exists if the director performs work exclusively for the company where he is a director and does not perform work for the company with which he has an employment contract. In that case, in addition to the dismissal decree, employment termination is required.
Note: Always check whether there is actually a corporate appointment as a statutory director. There is only a statutory director if there is an appointment and acceptance of that appointment.
No preventive dismissal test for statutory director
The director has less severance protection than the normal employee. There is no preventive test. This means that no permission from the UWV or dissolution by the court is required. The consent of the director is also not required. However, there must be a reasonable ground for the dismissal, the notice prohibitions (e.g. illness) apply, the reemployment obligation applies and a notice period must be observed.
Reasonable grounds for dismissal of statutory director
There must be reasonable grounds for a legally valid dismissal of the statutory director. In the absence of such grounds, the statutory director cannot apply to the subdistrict court for restoration of the employment contract. However, the director can claim fair compensation. The compensation can be high. Therefore, always seek advice regarding the dismissal of a statutory director.
The reasonable ground for dismissal of a statutory director can, for example, be a difference of opinion on the policy to be pursued, dysfunction, disagreement with other directors, or a loss of confidence from the shareholders. This reasonable ground must be included in the resolution to dismiss.
Please note that there are various company law requirements attached to the dismissal decision (AGM notice period, advisory and hearing rights). Our lawyers can advise you further on these, as well as on the existence of reasonable cause.
By way of illustration, reference is made to a judgment of the Overijssel District Court dated August 29, 2023. The employee in this case had joined the company in 2014 and was appointed CFO and statutory director in 2022. In 2023, he received an invitation to the general meeting of shareholders (AGM). On the agenda was his resignation. Employee did not attend the meeting, but filed a defense. The subdistrict court reviewed reasonable cause in the proceedings. The subdistrict court considered that after the share transfer, a “different wind started blowing.” The new shareholder expected a different approach. However, the CFO had not been sufficiently informed about the desired expectations from the shareholders. Nor had it been made known what changes were to be implemented in what time frame and whether these changes were of a permanent nature. Partly in view of a director’s autonomy, the Subdistrict Court found this to be incorrect. Only when it is clear that the director does not want to conform to the policy to be pursued, an unworkable situation arises and the employment contract can be terminated.
In short, termination of the employment of a statutory director is not simply possible. The reasonable ground must – as with an ordinary employee – be able to be properly substantiated. It must be clear that the employment contract cannot reasonably be continued.
Advice on dismissal of statutory director
The employment lawyers at LVH Advocaten in Rotterdam regularly advise on the dismissal of employees, statutory directors and other matters relating to personnel. If you have any questions or would like more information about the dismissal of employees, please contact LVH Advocaten.
Ship arrest in the Netherlands
The port of Rotterdam and the Rotterdam court are well-known amongst creditors who have a recoverable claim on seagoing vessels. Experience shows that ships usually can be seized easily and quickly. This is true compared to other jurisdictions. The court, lawyers and bailiffs are accustomed to acting quickly and enabling an arrest; it can happen that, at night, a ‘water’ lawyer asks a judge at his home for an arrest, after which the bailiff goes to the ship that same night. The vessel is then under arrest.
Abroad
This is completely different than in other European jurisdictions. In a number of jurisdictions, an arrest is only possible in exceptional cases or is impossible. Moreover, the arrest has to be prepared in advance for days, weeks even. The parties have to be heard and guarantees have to be made in advance. Then there are the preservation costs, often quite extensive.
Rotterdam; quick and effective
In the Netherlands, a lawyer can suffice with drawing up an application of one or two pages, in which he describes the claim and amount of that claim. Generally, the judge will hold the statements in the application to be true. The judge can give his permission with a simple signature after which the application is referred to the bailiff, who will board the vessel in order to seize it. The port authorities are briefed and, as of that moment, the vessel cannot go anywhere; at most, it may be moved within the port after approval.
Which claims may lead to an arrest?
Not all claims are automatically recoverable on a vessel. If the creditor, for instance, has a claim on the time charterer, arresting the vessel is often not beneficial to him. Usually, a claim is recoverable on the vessel only under special circumstances, or if the debtor is the actual owner of the vessel. Furthermore, in case of prejudgement seizure on seagoing vessels of states bound to the Brussels arrest convention, the claims should be maritime claims as described in said convention. The time charterer who does not pay, should, however, fear a bunker arrest. Most time charters ensure that the time charterer is the owner of the bunker oil on board. The bunker is an object subject to arrest. This means that the vessel command is punishable when the motor is kept turned on after the bunker arrest; with this act, the vessel command destroys a property for which recourse is available! Thus, the bunker arrest has a similar effect as a ship arrest: pending the arrest the vessel cannot go anywhere. Transferring the contents of the bunker to the shore is an expensive alternative and, therefore, it is hardly ever used.
Lifting the arrest
The debtor has a number of possibilities to have the arrest lifted. Simply by paying the claim for which the vessel has been seized. He can also opt for having a guarantee provided. Often, a standard form is used in order to obtain agreement on the text quickly, as developed by the Rotterdam lawyers, Rotterdams Garantieformulier 2008.
If the debtor has valid reasons, he may also bring the creditor to interlocutory proceedings in order to have the arrest lifted. If there is prima facie evidence for the implausibility of the claim, the judge will lift the arrest.
Wrongful seizure
During such a lifting procedure will come to light, that the current system is not entirely to the detriment of the maritime operator. Moreover, the creditor is liable for the damage suffered, when afterwards it is found that the vessel was seized without proper cause. Whoever is familiar with the costs involved with the exploitation of a seagoing vessel will understand that the damage may be enormous and that this should be carefully considered.
Conclusion
Vessels calling on the port of Rotterdam have been warned. The system developed here is quick and effective, and because of the bunker arrest developed in practice, a time charterer is not safe either from decisive creditors
Information
If you would like more information on this subject, please contact our office 0031 10 209 2777 or by e-mail info@lvh-advocaten.nl.
What are the rights, obligations and liabilities of clients and consultants in the commission agreement in a construction process?
At the start of a construction project, a client will often engage an architect, engineer or consultant to help him with the design (hereafter: ‘consultant’). The legal relationship between the client and his consultant is – if nothing else has been agreed – governed by the legal rules for the commission contract. These legal rules can be found in the first section of title 7.7 of the Dutch Civil Code (art. 7:400 ff. of the Civil Code). The summary statutory regulation has a general and open character and is largely of a regulatory nature. It is therefore common for parties to make further agreements. Usually this is done by means of general conditions modeled by professional organizations of architects in addition to and in order to elaborate the legal regulation of the commission contract. The most recent set of general conditions in consultancy law is De Nieuwe Regeling 2011 (hereafter: ‘DNR 2011’). The rights, obligations and liabilities of the parties to a commission contract are explained below, both on the basis of the legal regulations and on the basis of the DNR 2011.
Rights and obligations of a consultant during a construction project
Based on the legal regulations, a number of general duties of care apply to the consultant. In the first place, the consultant must observe the care of a good contractor when carrying out his activities. After all, the client may expect a certain level of competence and commitment. When evaluating whether there is a good contractor, one must look at the norm requirement. The consultant will have to meet the standard which applies to a ‘reasonably competent and reasonably acting professional’.
Secondly, the consultant has an information duty towards the client. The consultant must keep the client informed about his activities in the execution of the commission and inform him when the commission is ready. The consultant must also render an account with respect to the manner in which he has carried out the commission.
In the DNR 2011 the obligations of the consultant are further specified. In general there is for the consultant in the design stage a (i) consultation obligation with the client about those subjects which are important for the commission, (ii) an information obligation on the ground of which the consultant has to inform the client about the (progress of the) execution of the commission and has to provide information about alterations of legal regulations, financial aspects, financial consequences of alterations in the commission and agreements between the consultant and third parties in relation to the fulfilment of the commission and (iii) an obligation to execute the commission in a proper and careful manner, whereby the consultant stands by the client in a position of trust and will carry out his services to the best of his knowledge and ability. This position of trust between the client and the consultant applies during all stages of the building process (the design stage, the contracting stage and during the management).
More specifically, the DNR 2011 determines that the obligations of the consultant in the design stage also include the realization of (i) a technically sound design (state of the art), (ii) a financially feasible design, (iii) a legally executable design (the work must qualify for a permit) and (iv) an obligation to warn the client if his information, data or decisions obviously contain such errors or show such deficiencies that he has to point these out to the client.
In the tender phase the consultant will have a role in particular in advising the client about the tender method to be followed and possibly in advising and bringing about a contract with the contractor. However, the awarding of the contract to the contractor is reserved for the client himself.
During the execution stage the consultant has a role in the management. The consultant has to see to it that the contractor carries out the work according to the specifications and in time. If the consultant is granted powers of representation during the management, a written authorization will have to be issued by the client on the basis of the DNR 2011.
Rights and obligations of the client during the construction process
Opposite the obligations of the consultant are the obligations of the client during the construction process.
Based on the legal regulations, the client owes the consultant a wage and is obliged to reimburse the incurred expenses of the consultant insofar as these are not included in the wage. If the level of the wage is not determined, then the client owes the wage calculated in the usual way or a reasonable wage. The client has the right to cancel the commission contract at any time.
The DNR 2011 further elaborates that the client must behave as a good and careful client. This duty of care is further elaborated in an obligation of the client to provide the consultant with the information necessary for the execution of the consultancy work. Examples are the brief or information coming from other consultants involved in the building project. The client can rest on the obligation to evaluate in time the activities of the consultant. Possibly the consultant is dependent on this evaluation before he can proceed with the next design stage. A client is not obliged to check the activities of the consultant, but if he does, the client must warn about any shortcomings in his consultant’s activities. However, this warning obligation does not extend as far as the warning obligation which rests on the consultant. The client has no warning obligation with respect to shortcomings of which he could have been conscious.
Finally, the DNR 2011 (just like the legal regulation) also contains the obligation for the client to pay the consultancy fees in time. On the basis of the DNR 2011, a payment schedule will usually be agreed for this purpose. The DNR 2011 also contains further rules about what is to be understood by consultancy costs and how these costs are to be determined. One can think of a percentage of the contract sum, an amount based on time spent or a fixed fee.
If the consultant has been contracted under the DNR 2011, the client can cancel the commission contract with the consultant on the basis of the cancellation possibilities as formulated in the DNR 2011. Dissolution of the contract under the force of the DNR 2011 is excluded, unless the client is a natural person who is not acting in the exercise of a profession or business.
Liability of the parties in a commission contract in a building process
If a client or consultant does not comply with his obligations and damage occurs as a result, the client or consultant can be held liable. On the basis of legal regulations a party is liable if damage has been caused by his shortcoming. If the consultant can still fulfill his obligations, for example by making good his mistake, then for liability it is required that the consultant is in neglect.
The DNR 2011 contain a number of liability limiting provisions. The first limitation of liability is that the consultant or client is only liable if there is a culpable shortcoming. In other words: there must be a shortcoming for which the failing party is responsible. Furthermore the liability of the consultant is limited to a considerable extent. Under the DNR 2011:
- Is the liability of the consultant limited to direct damage (so no compensation for consequential damage, such as trading loss, loss of turnover or profit or higher costs);
- Is the compensation obligation of the consultant limited in scope
o The compensation is (at the choice of the parties) equal to the consultancy costs with a maximum of € 1 million or the compensation is equal to three times the consultancy costs with a maximum of € 2,5 million;
o If a third party is called in on the instructions of the client, the compensation is limited to the sum to which the consultant can appeal to this third party by virtue of the agreement between the client and the third party; and
o In the case of the realization of an object, the compensation is limited to that part which is not covered by the CAR insurance of the client.
- Is the liability period limited. There is an expiry period of five years after completion or two years after the shortcoming has been protested about.
Real estate lawyer in Rotterdam
The real estate lawyers at LVH regularly assist clients, consultants and contractors. They advise on the conclusion of the commission contract between the client and the consultant, on the execution of the consultancy work and on how to act when a shortcoming occurs. In view of the short expiry period under the DNR 2011 it is always useful to obtain legal advice in good time. If necessary, we conduct proceedings before the courts or the Arbitration Board in construction disputes.
Duty to report data leaks
On 1 January 2016, the Dutch Data Leaks (Duty to Report) Act and the extension of the administrative authority of the Dutch Data Protection Authority (Cbp) to impose fines came into effect. The law introduces a duty to report data leaks to the Dutch Personal Data Protection Act (Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens – Wbp). In addition, the authority of the Cbp (the name of which will be changed to ‘Autoriteit persoonsgegevens’ on 1 January 2016) to impose fines was extended.
Data leaks
The Dutch Data Leaks (Duty to Report) Act adds a new obligation to the Dutch Personal Data Protection Act. Every breach of the measures to protect against loss or unlawful processing of personal details must be reported to the Data Protection Authority. In addition, the person involved must be informed.
Possible breaches include a hack or a technical failure, but also the loss of a flash drive or theft of a laptop on which personal details are stored. Even the loss of a printed list with personal details may qualify as a data leak. It is every situation in which third parties that should not have access to personal details, acquire this information anyway. However, the duty to report only applies if the breach leads to (a considerable risk of) serious negative consequences for the protection of personal details.
Responsibility for the duty to report
All those who are responsible for processing personal details, both in companies and in the government, have this duty to report. If the processing of details has been contracted out to a third party, this party is merely the processor of the details and, as such, does not have the duty to report.
Report
A report to the supervisory authority must at least describe the nature of the breach, the consequences of the breach and the measures that have been/will be taken to limit the negative consequences of the breach.
The information provided to the person involved must be such that proper and careful information provision is ensured. In addition, the responsible party is obliged to keep a record of all breaches.
Authority to impose fines
As of 1 January 2016, the Data Protection Authority will be authorised to impose fines if the duty to report is not met. If the violation of the Dutch Personal Data Protection Act was not intentional or due to serious culpable negligence, the supervisory authority will initially issue a binding instruction. This will give the responsible party the opportunity to remedy the situation by taking appropriate security measures after all. A failure to comply with a binding instruction may be subject to a fine. If the Dutch Personal Data Protection Act is deliberately violated, a fine may be imposed immediately.
Objective
The objective of the duty to report is to limit the consequences a data leak has for the parties involved as much as possible, and to make a contribution to maintaining and restoring confidence in the processing of personal details.
Consequences for you as an entrepreneur
In order to realise the objective of the legislative change, it is important for entrepreneurs to ensure that their processing of personal details is in order. If there is a data leak after all, this must be reported immediately. In practice, this means “as soon as possible”, which often makes it impossible to draw up a contingency plan. Therefore, drawing up an internal protocol describing the course of action in the event of a data leak is advisable. In addition, it is wise to enter into a (new) agreement with the processors of personal details that, as of 1 January 2016, provides for a contractual duty to report to the responsible party.
Further information
For additional information please feel free to contact Leoni van Westen.
Received an enforcement decision: what now?
“The municipality has identified a violation and intends to take enforcement action. What are my options?”
Have you received a letter in which the municipality announces that it will take enforcement action against you? Or has the municipality already imposed an order subject to a penalty payment on you? If you do not file an objection in time or remedy the violation, there is a risk that you will have to pay a large sum of money. This article explains what you can do in such a situation.
In which cases can the municipality take enforcement action?
If the municipality has determined that you are violating a rule, it may decide to take enforcement action. The purpose of this is to ensure that the rules are followed and the violation is remedied.
There are two categories of activities for which the municipality may take enforcement action: the first category concerns activities carried out at a location where they are not permitted. For example, if you live in a place not designated for residential use, such as an industrial park or a recreational park. The second category includes activities carried out without applying for a permit, even though one was required. For example, if you construct or renovate a structure without a permit, or use a structure in a different way without a permit. Are you unsure whether you need a permit for a specific activity? Take the Permit Check or feel free to contact our office.
What can you do if the municipality takes enforcement action?
If the municipality has identified a violation and designated you as the violator, it will, in most cases, proceed with enforcement. For example, if you carry out an activity that is not permitted, or have not applied for a permit for it. Depending on the stage of the enforcement process, you can challenge municipal enforcement in the following ways:
- Has the municipality issued you a warning that you must cease the violation, or else it will take enforcement action against you? This is called a notice of intent to enforce. In that case, you can submit a statement of views, explaining why the municipality should not proceed with enforcement in your case. The deadline for submitting a statement of views is short: often two weeks.
- Has the municipality since decided to actually proceed with enforcement if you do not cease the violation in time? For example, by imposing an order subject to a penalty payment? That decision is called an enforcement decision. You can object to this by submitting a notice of objection. In it, you state the reasons why you disagree with the enforcement decision. The deadline for submitting a notice of objection is six weeks after receiving the enforcement decision.
- Did you submit a notice of objection on time, but do you disagree with the decision on your objection? Then you can file an appeal with the administrative court within six weeks.
! Please note that filing an objection or an appeal does not have a “suspensive effect”: this means that once the deadline has passed, the municipality can collect the penalty payment from you.
What arguments can you raise?
An enforcement decision by the municipality can have serious consequences. You must cease the violation by a certain date; otherwise, you risk owing a penalty (“forfeiting” it). Challenging municipal enforcement can be complicated. The general rule is that the municipality is required to take enforcement action in the event of a violation. This is known as the principle of mandatory enforcement. Only in exceptional cases may the municipality waive this obligation, for example, if there is a concrete prospect of legalization, or if the consequences of enforcement are disproportionate. It is therefore important that you submit your statement of views in a timely manner and subsequently provide the correct grounds in your objection if you wish to successfully challenge an enforcement decision.
Lawyer for company acquisitions in Rotterdam
Would you like to know more or do you have questions about this topic? Please contact Laura Kleijne at 010-209-2749 or 06-2932-7393.
Pitfalls for directors and supervisory directors in a leveraged buyout
Introduction and description of a leveraged buyout
In a leveraged buyout, the shares of a target company are acquired by a specially created acquisition vehicle (the acquisition holding company), with the purchase price being financed largely with debt and, to a lesser extent, with equity.
Advantages of a leveraged buyout
The advantage of this financing method is that a relatively small investment of equity capital can generate a relatively high return on the share capital, provided that the (indirect) buyer of the shares of the target company (usually a private equity fund, via the purchasing holding company) succeeds in selling the shares at a profit after a certain period of time.
Bank financing for a leveraged buyout
The portion of the purchase price that is financed with borrowed capital is usually provided by the bank in the form of a loan to the purchasing holding company. The purchasing holding company is usually an empty shell with no assets other than the shares in the target company.
Collateral provided by the target company in a leveraged buyout
In a leveraged buyout, the bank requires collateral when granting the loan to the purchasing holding company. This is done by the purchasing holding company granting the bank a pledge on the shares it holds in the target company. The bank often requires that the target company and its subsidiaries also guarantee the interest and repayment obligations of the purchasing holding company. In that case, the target company provides security on its assets for the benefit of the bank.
Rules for directors and supervisory directors when providing security
The target company’s guarantee for the purchase holding company’s obligations towards the bank and the provision of security on its assets to the bank are subject to rules laid down by the Enterprise Chamber.
Firstly, advice must be sought from the target company’s works council. Furthermore, rules apply to the directors and (if applicable) supervisory directors of the target company.
It is important for the director(s) of the target company to bear in mind that a leveraged buyout involves a considerable (potential) financial burden for the target company. In the interests of the target company, the directors must therefore consider it their duty to weigh up all the advantages of the leveraged buyout against the (potential financial) disadvantages. This weighing of interests is not only a question of whether the continuity of the target company is sufficiently assured by the provision of the securities, but above all whether the continued success of the company will benefit from the leveraged buyout and whether the leveraged buyout will enable the target company to implement its strategy.
What is expected of directors and supervisory directors in a leveraged buyout
Directors are expected to ask themselves repeatedly from the start of the takeover process whether the decision in favor of a leveraged buyout and the specific terms and conditions thereof are in line with the interests of the target company. The directors must take a proactive stance in this regard and, where necessary, counterbalance the parties involved in the leveraged buyout, including the private equity fund and the bank.
This is where the dynamics of the takeover process come into play, as directors are often required to make last-minute decisions with far-reaching consequences, even though they were not involved in the preparations for these decisions, or only to a limited extent.
In practice, the private equity fund usually negotiates with the bank on the terms of the loan to finance (a large part of) the purchase price of the shares of the target company. It is not uncommon for the directors of the target company to only be informed of the financing conditions shortly before the intended acquisition date and to be expected to take a decision “overnight” on the provision of security by the target company and its subsidiaries.
All this while the Enterprise Chamber expects the directors to take careful decisions, whereby the directors have obtained sufficient insight into the possible consequences of providing security prior to the decision-making.
Specifically, the directors are expected to:
- Make a careful and transparent inventory of the obligations arising from the provision of security;
- Have the advantages and disadvantages for the target company associated with the security (and the fact that it could consequently become liable for the obligations of the purchasing holding company under the acquisition financing) assessed objectively and externally;
- Make a specific assessment of the risks of the security for the interests of the target company and its business, weighed against the benefits to be gained.
In doing so, the directors are also expected to stand firm and be able to counterbalance the often emphatic wishes of other parties involved in the leveraged buyout to complete the acquisition without delay.
The supervisory board (if applicable) is generally expected to carefully weigh all interests involved and to perform its supervisory and advisory role in a meaningful manner. This means, for example, that the supervisory board is familiar with relevant documents and that it adequately assesses the management decision to provide security against the interests of the target company. The supervisory board must also carefully weigh the advantages and disadvantages of providing security.
Risks for directors and supervisory board members in leveraged buyouts
The consequences for directors and supervisory board members if they fail to meet these expectations and the transaction subsequently fails are serious: they may be accused of mismanagement, for which they may be held liable.
Following on from this article, see also Deficiencies in participation – LVH advocaten Rotterdam.
Information
If you have any questions about this article or this subject, please contact Peter Verheijden.
Bank has limited duty of care in respect of the franchisee
On 23 May 2017, the The Hague Court of Appeal gave a judgment in respect of a bank’s duty of care regarding an ex-franchisee. In short, the Court of Appeal is of the opinion that it was not established that the bank neglected its duty of care by not warning the franchisee about the poor financial position of the franchiser.
What was this issue about?
In September 2007, a prospective franchisee acquired a bakery shop in Amsterdam, and to this end the franchisee concluded a credit agreement with the bank in June 2008. Due to the fact that the franchisee did not meet his payment obligations in respect of the bank, the bank terminated the credit agreement by means of a letter of 25 January 2010 and ordered the franchisee to pay the arrears of more than
€ 100,000 under the credit agreement within 14 days.
Subsequently the franchiser, who banked with the same bank as the franchisee up to February 2009, went bankrupt on 4 February 2010.
As the franchisee failed to pay the arrears, the bank summonsed the franchisee and claimed payment of the outstanding amount. In first instance, the Rotterdam District Court was of the opinion that the bank had not breached its duty of care in respect of the franchisee, because the Court was of the opinion that there was a limited duty of care on the part of the bank. This concerned a regular credit agreement with risks that could be overseen by the franchisee. Furthermore, the Court was of the opinion that privacy did not allow the bank to report any issues regarding the franchiser to the franchisee.
The franchisee evidently disagreed with the judgment and appealed.
Appeal
In appeal, the franchisee took the view that the Court had unlawfully referred to a regular credit agreement and had failed to observe that this concerned a credit agreement for the purpose of a franchise and the franchisee believed to be tied to the franchise agreement. The franchisee was also of the opinion that the bank should exercise more prudence on entering into a credit agreement, as it was aware of the franchiser’s financial situation.
The Court of Appeal did not accept the franchisee’s position and pointed out to the franchisee that in this case that bank was only obliged to inform the franchisee of the consequences of entering into the credit agreement and the resulting risks, which the Court believed the bank to have made appropriately clear. Finally, the Court was of the opinion that it had not been demonstrated that the franchisee, which had been in business for some time, asked the bank questions about the franchiser’s financial situation at the time.
Conclusion
Given this issue, a franchisee would be wise to ask the bank the right questions about the franchiser’s financial situation in the event of a bank arrangement.
Information
If you would like any further information about this issue, please contact our office 0031 10 209 2777 or by e-mail info@lvh-advocaten.nl.
Indexation of rent by 14.5% in 2023 not unreasonable
Indexation of rent by 14.5% in 2023 not unreasonable
Many lessees of commercial space faced indexation of the rent according to the consumer price index (CPI) by a percentage of 14.5% in 2023. Several tenants of commercial space disagreed, and there have since been court cases about this. From the court rulings, the view emerges that indexation of the rent in 2023 by 14.5% is not unreasonable.
Rent indexation stipulated in lease agreement
Many leases for business premises stipulate that the rent is indexed annually based on the CPI. The ROZ model, for example, states that when the rent is indexed annually in January, the CPI of four months earlier is considered. For a rent increase as of Jan. 1, 2023, the CPI of September 2022 that came out to 14.5% is looked at.
Tenants disagree with 14.5% indexation
Tenants of commercial space believe they are being doubly burdened by the indexation. The tenants of commercial premises have to bear the high energy costs themselves and, in addition, get the increase in energy costs passed on in a higher rent. The Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) has now adjusted the calculation method. In other words, the percentage of 14.5% is too high. However, CBS has chosen not to apply the new calculation method retroactively. After all, a percentage of 0.21% applies to the rent price indexation as of January 1, 2024, because the previously used percentage of 14.5% was taken into account.
Court rulings on 14.5% rent indexation for business premises
There have now been rulings by the District Courts of The Hague, Gelderland, Rotterdam, Midden-Nederland and Oost-Brabant on the validity of the indexation of the rent by 14.5%. The broad outlines found in those rulings are described in this article and are as follows.
Tenants of commercial premises have raised two grounds in court to indicate their disagreement with the 14.5% indexation. First, an appeal is made for modification of the lease due to unforeseen circumstances. Second, an appeal is made to reasonableness and fairness.
The first ground fails in the various courts. There is no question of an unforeseen circumstance, because by including the indexation provision in the lease, the lessee and lessor of business premises have precisely taken into account the fact that energy prices (in this case partly as a result of the war in Ukraine) can rise sharply. The parties have explicitly agreed on the manner in which the rent change is calculated.
As a second basis, the tenants argue that the landlords’ reliance on the indexation provision is unacceptable by the standards of reasonableness and fairness. Nor do the courts go along with this. The courts rule in the various cases that there are no unacceptable consequences. Moreover, it is impossible to see why indexing the rent by 14.5% is not part of the tenant’s normal entrepreneurial risk. It is at the tenant’s risk that the parties opted for the CPI methodology without attaching a ceiling to it.
Conclusion
Courts in the Netherlands rule that indexation of the rent of business premises by 14.5% in accordance with the CPI is not unreasonable. There are no unforeseen circumstances and a reliance by the lessor on the indexation provision is not unacceptable by the standards of reasonableness and fairness. In other words, indexation of the rent by 14.5% is in principle allowed.
Advice for lessees and lessors of commercial premises regarding rent indexation
Lessees and lessors of business accommodations are free to make other arrangements in deviation from the indexation provision in the lease. It is not inconceivable that when indexation of the rent by 14.5% would lead to unacceptable consequences for the tenant of business premises, this percentage must be adjusted. In determining whether this is the case, all the circumstances of the case are taken into account. On the other hand, when adjusting the rent for 2023, the lessor in turn does not have to agree to indexation of the rent by 0.21% as of January 1, 2024. This, in turn, could lead to unacceptable consequences for the landlord. The parties should therefore consult with each other.
Compulsory education and study-cost clause: all points of attention for employers
Compulsory education and study-cost clause: all points of attention for employers
As an employer, you like to keep your employees’ knowledge up to date. This is important for the sustainable employability of your personnel and it can create more productivity within the organisation. Thus, a win-win situation.
But staff training requires investment. If the employer invests in an employee, the wish is of course that the employee will remain in service for a long time. But what if that employee leaves anyway? Who pays for the training if the employee leaves the company during or after the training?
Labour law has the necessary rules to deal with this. In this article we discuss all the points of interest for employers regarding the training of employees, namely the legal training obligation, training costs and the study costs clause.
Training obligation of employees
The law (Article 7:611a BW) stipulates that the employer must enable its employees to follow (1) the training necessary for the performance of their duties and (2) the training necessary for the continuation of the employment contract when the employee’s position is no longer held, if this can reasonably be expected of the employer (training in connection with redeployment). This implies an obligation for the employer to invest in employees by means of training. An employee is expected to make efforts as a good employee to accept the training and to complete it successfully.
Attention: see also heading “Change to training obligation and study costs clause as per 1 August 2022”.
Training necessary for the performance of a function
We will now zoom in on the first part, the necessary training for the execution of the position. It concerns necessary training. This includes training that is compulsory by law or by an external party (collective labour agreement or governing body). In addition to offering the training, the employer must also enable the employee to follow the training. The employer must make regular working hours available for the training activities.
Does the organisation have a CAO? Check it for the specific rights and obligations with regard to training.
Training in case of malfunctioning
The aforementioned training obligation is also important in a situation where the employee does not function. If there is dysfunction and this can be resolved through coaching or courses, it is up to the employer to offer support in the form of training. Are you, as an employer, not making enough effort? This can lead to serious culpability and the associated fair compensation.
Training costs to be borne by employer or employee?
In principle, the employer has to finance the necessary training mentioned above and training in the context of redeployment. Is the training not necessary? Then the employer does not have to finance it. If the employer does pay for the training, this can, under certain conditions, be deducted from the transitional allowance.
Study Costs Clause
As mentioned, a training course is an investment. An investment that the employer would like to recoup. This is not possible if the employee leaves shortly after completing the training. To prevent this becoming an empty investment, a study costs clause can be agreed. The education costs clause provides that an employee, if he or she resigns (or if the employer’s resignation is at the employee’s risk), must repay the training costs to the employee. Please note: in principle, an employer cannot invoke the training costs clause if the initiative for dismissal or non-renewal of the employment contract lies with the employer, unless other agreements have been made. For example, it may be agreed that the employee must repay the study costs if he is summarily dismissed or in the event of serious culpability on the part of the employee.
This study costs clause is not (yet) regulated by law, but case law has laid down a number of requirements:
1. The financial consequences (concrete amounts) of the clause and when it comes into effect must be properly explained, preferably in writing;
2. The period during which the employer will benefit from the study (and the resulting knowledge and skills) must be established;
3. The repayment obligation must decrease proportionally on the basis of the established period mentioned under 2 (sliding scale).
Even if the foregoing has been arranged well, it may be that the employer cannot invoke the study costs clause. This is the case if after the study costs have been deducted, the employee’s salary falls below the statutory minimum wage. Furthermore, invoking the study costs clause may be unacceptable according to the standards of reasonableness and fairness.
Change to training obligation study costs clause as of 1 August 2022
On 1 August 2022, new rules will be introduced in Dutch law regarding the training obligation and the study-costs clause. Based on the European Employment Conditions Directive (click here for more information about this directive), the employer is obliged to offer a study free of charge if (1) the study is compulsory on the grounds of the law, the CAO or regulation of a competent administrative body and (2) the study is necessary for the performance of the duties. If a study costs clause is nevertheless agreed for this compulsory or necessary training, the clause will be null and void. These are clauses whereby the costs of training are recovered or set off against monetary income arising from the employee’s employment.
Please note: training or education that employees are obliged to take in order to obtain, maintain or renew a professional qualification, does, in principle, not fall under mandatory training as referred to under 1. Therefore, a study-costs clause would be agreed upon with regard to such training. The question is how this will work out exactly in the Netherlands if a course of study is not compulsory, but necessary for the performance of the duties.
Do you need a lawyer in Rotterdam to advise you on the obligation to study and the study costs clause?
The above shows that agreeing and invoking a study costs clause is not self-evident. So think carefully about the exact wording of the education costs clause and consult an employment lawyer. If you want to invoke the clause, first get advice on your chances. If you would like to know more, please contact Richard Ouwerling of LVH Advocaten.
Temporary lease of business space: what is possible?
Temporary lease of business space: what is possible?
In real estate, there are two types of leases for business premises: lease of medium-sized business premises (think of a store or catering establishment) or the lease for other business premises (such as office space). This article explains the options for entering into a short-term lease for the different types of commercial space.
What lease terms apply to medium commercial space?
Leases for medium-sized business premises are characterized by a high degree of protection for the tenant. This protection is expressed, among other things, in fixed lease terms. In principle, the lease of medium-sized business premises is concluded for the period of 5 + 5 years. The rent may only be terminated at the end of a certain rental period and the landlord must take the legal grounds for termination into account. Termination is therefore often only possible after the first five years.
Would you like to know more about lease terms and the termination of rent for medium-sized business premises? Read our article about the termination of a lease for medium commercial premises.
What rental terms apply to other commercial property?
A large degree of contractual freedom applies between the parties for the lease of other business accommodation. The tenant and the landlord may determine themselves how long the rental agreement for the ‘other business space’ lasts and in which manner notice is given. In these leases, the parties are free to agree on any rental period they wish.
Temporary lease for medium-sized businesses possible
Despite the fixed rental periods that apply to the rental of medium-sized business premises, it is possible to agree on a rental period that is shorter than five years. This rental period is then two years or less. In practice, this is often chosen as a trial period. With a lease for two years or less, the tenant of the medium business accommodation has the option to terminate the lease if it appears that his business is not going well. With a lease of two years or less, the landlord is given the opportunity to rent out the business space for a short period of time, if it is not available for five years, or to terminate the lease for medium business space at the end of the temporary lease period if the tenant does not like it.
No rent protection for temporary leases of medium-sized business premises
It is important to note that when the tenant and landlord of medium-sized business premises enter into a lease for the duration of two years or less, there is no rent protection for the tenant. After all, the idea is that parties are free to agree on what they want for a certain duration. The tenant and the lessor of the medium business accommodation may, in the case of a lease for two years or less, choose how the contract will end. This may be by notice, by the occurrence of a resolutive condition or by operation of law at the end of the agreed contract period. It is also possible that only one of the parties can terminate the lease or that certain conditions apply. Consider the case where the tenant of medium-sized business premises can terminate the lease after the first two years if his turnover remains below a certain level. In the case of termination by the landlord, the landlord is not bound by the statutory grounds for termination and the lease does not end only after the courts have been involved if the tenant does not agree to the termination.
Conversion of temporary lease into a five-year lease for medium-sized business premises
If a temporary lease is extended for two years or less, the trial period lapses and the rent protection rules that apply to the lease of medium-sized business premises apply. The lease will then last for five years after all. Renewal of such a temporary lease may also be tacit. To prevent such a temporary lease from being qualified as a regular lease for the duration of five years (with rent protection) it is important that the intention of the parties is clearly recorded in the lease. It must also be clearly written down how the temporary rental agreement ends.
Lease period of two years or less must be expressly included in the lease agreement for medium-sized business premises
If, for instance, a lease for medium commercial premises is concluded for a period of five years, but with a possibility of premature termination after two years, it makes sense to explicitly state that the first two years are intended to be a two-year lease, pursuant to Section 7:301 of the Dutch Civil Code. In order not to run a risk, a lease for medium business accommodation can always be entered into for the duration of two years or less. After that temporary rental period, the tenant and the landlord can discuss entering into a new rental agreement with rent protection or for the additional duration of the temporary rental agreement.
Rental period for medium-sized businesses longer than two years but shorter than five years only possible with court approval
If the tenant and the landlord of a medium-sized business accommodation want to agree on a rental period that is longer than two years but shorter than five years (for example three years), permission must be sought from the court. After all, in the case of a three-year lease, the normal rent protection rules apply, which entitle the tenant to a minimum rental period of five years. Deviating clauses can be annulled by the tenant. Annulment is not possible if the court has approved the clause containing the deviating rental period. This request to the court can also be made after the tenant has annulled the clause. However, the court will only give its approval if the clause does not substantially affect the tenant’s rights or if the social position of the tenant compared to the landlord is such that he does not reasonably need the legal protection. The request to the court must be made by filing a petition by a lawyer.
Conflicts of interest within a foundation
Can a director of a foundation give an assignment to a private company with limited liability that he is a director of as well?
In such cases, there is a conflict of interest.
There are no legal rules on this if it concerns a foundation. At present, the rules applied are for foundations are the “rules on conflicts of interest” that apply for public limited companies and private companies with limited liability. These rules stipulate that a director may not participate in the deliberations and the decision-making process if he has a direct or indirect personal interest that conflicts with the interest of the company and its business.
With public limited companies and private companies with limited liability, these rules concern the decision-making process; they do not provide for the representation of the company. This means that a conflict of interest does not affect the representative authority of the relevant director.
The new Dutch Legal Entities (Management and Supervision) Act (Wet bestuur en toezicht rechtspersonen) (involving changes to Book 2 of the Dutch Civil Code) is expected to be implemented in 2016. This will cause the rules on decision-making to apply to all legal entities, including foundations. With regard to conflicts of interest, the law will be in line with the existing rules for public limited companies and private companies with limited liability.
In other words, be careful in the event of a conflict of interest. We advise not participating in the deliberations and the decision-making process. However, a conflict of interest does not affect the representative authority of the director.
The transfer of operations within a corporate group
In a previous article, I wrote about the risks associated with an inherently risky structure. By distributing a company’s assets and activities across various group companies, there is a risk that a creditor will have little or no recourse for debts.
Recently, the Court of Appeal in The Hague issued a ruling on the question of whether recourse may be frustrated by the transfer (“reallocation”) of activities by one group company to another group company.
Background
Customs broker Eurotransit is performing services on behalf of logistics company Ahlers. In doing so, Eurotransit handles the customs declaration for the import of certain goods for a client of Ahlers. By mistake, an incorrect commodity code is used, resulting in insufficient import duties being collected initially, and the tax authorities impose a back tax assessment of €1.3 million on Eurotransit. Based on the Fenex terms and conditions, Eurotransit claims the amount of the back tax assessment from its client, Ahlers. This takes place in 2005.
Following this incident, a restructuring takes place within Ahlers’ company. Ahlers’ activities and assets are transferred to LV Ahlers, a group company within the Ahlers group. LV Ahlers and Ahlers have the same directors. After this transfer in 2005, no further activities take place within Ahlers.
Lengthy legal proceedings follow, but in 2013, the Court of Appeal in The Hague orders Ahlers to pay Eurotransit €1.5 million in damages. Ahlers cannot pay this amount because all assets were transferred and operations ceased in 2005. A few months later, the company Ahlers is even completely dissolved. Eurotransit is left empty-handed. Eurotransit does not give up and sues (the board of) LV Ahlers for frustration of recovery; the transfer of operations within the group, leaving Ahlers empty and no longer offering any recourse for Eurotransit’s claim.
LV Ahlers’ Liability for Impeding the Ability to Seek Redress
Eurotransit held LV Ahlers (and its board) liable for wrongful acts, and the court granted Eurotransit’s claim for damages. An appeal was filed against this ruling. In the appeal proceedings, the focus was on the issue of “frustration of recourse”—the obstruction of recourse options after an obligation has arisen.
Administrative discretion
The court finds that, taken on its own, the group’s decision—following the separation from Ahlers—to transfer operations to a new company rather than continue them within the existing company cannot be regarded as a tortious act against Eurotransit. The court finds that a restructuring falls within the group’s freedom of organization. The board may exercise that freedom, even if there was the threat of a claim by Eurotransit. This is the starting point.
However, what may be required of the board in this context is that, when transferring significant assets, the value of those assets be determined correctly, for example through an appraisal by external experts. The value thus determined must, certainly if the activities are terminated, subsequently remain available to the creditors. The value could, for example, have been set aside. Ahlers did not do so.
The Ahlers board knew or should reasonably have known that the transfer of the activities would result in Ahlers being unable to fulfill its obligation at all and thus offering no recourse. Although the obligation toward Eurotwist was in dispute, the board had to take its existence seriously into account. By failing to take this into account, they are seriously at fault. The fact that the claim was disputed by Ahlers at the time of the transfer of activities and had not (yet) been established in court does not alter this. LV Ahlers must compensate Eurotwist for the damage suffered as a result of the unlawful conduct.
Damage
With liability having been established, things seemed to be turning out well for Eurotransit. But nothing could be further from the truth. The court had assessed Eurotransit’s damages at 1.3 million euros. However, due to “contributory negligence” on the part of Eurotransit, a 50% reduction was applied. This reduction for contributory negligence was imposed because the court held that Eurotransit was itself to blame for the lack of recourse. Eurotransit had the opportunity to secure recourse. Eurotransit failed to do so, thereby taking a risk itself, and that risk materialized. Thus, instead of full compensation, Eurotransit is only entitled to 50% of the damages. Things get even worse for Eurotransit at the court of appeals. The court questioned the value of the assets and operations transferred by Ahlers to LV Ahlers in 2005. The court had the damages assessed by experts. With the help of experts, the court determines that the damages resulting from the frustration of recovery amount to only €132,147. That was the value of the transferred assets in 2005, and that amount should have been set aside in 2005 so that Eurotransit could (still) recover its losses from it.
Looking for a corporate law attorney?
Would you like to know more about liability in bankruptcy? Feel free to contact Rob Steenhoek of LVH Advocaten. He specializes in insolvency and corporate law and will be happy to assist you.
Abolition of minimum youth wage for employees 21 years and older
Currently, a lower statutory minimum wage applies to young people under 23 years of age, the so-called minimum youth wage. Minister Asscher wishes to abolish the minimum youth wage for employees who are 21 and 22 years of age.
The reason for this is that the introduction of a statutory minimum wage for adults who are 21 and 22 years of age would better suit the age at which qualified young people enter the job market. Furthermore, this would be better in accordance with international use.
The aim is to raise the minimum youth wage gradually as of 1 July 2017. To avoid loss of jobs, the cabinet intends to take compensatory measures. However, it is questionable whether this will be sufficient to genuinely counteract the job loss amongst 21 and 22 year olds.
On 8 July 2016, the council of ministers has agreed to send Minister Asscher’s bill to the Raad van State (Council of State) for advice. After receiving the advice from the Raad van State, the bill will be put before the Lower House of the Dutch Parliament.
If you have any questions on this subject, please contact our office 0031 10 209 2777 or by e-mail info@lvh-advocaten.nl.
The penalty clause: where and when?
The penalty clause: where and when?
A penalty clause is a clause in a contract which states that a party must pay a penalty if it fails to fulfil a contractual obligation. Penalty clauses come in all shapes and sizes and can often be recognised simply by the word ‘penalty’. Penalty clauses can, for example, be found in lease agreements, purchase agreements, settlement agreements, money loan agreements, employment contracts and general terms and conditions.
In this article we will explain, based on three agreements, how to recognise a penalty clause and when it can be invoked:
1. Penalty clause in a contract of sale of a house
The following penalty clause is almost always included in NVM contracts for the sale of residential property:
“On dissolution of the contract of sale on the basis of attributable failure, the defaulting party shall forfeit for the benefit of the other party an immediately payable penalty of ten percent (10%) of the purchase price without judicial intervention.”
We regularly receive cases in which the seller claims the penalty because the buyer has failed to take possession of the property due to the fact that he/she is unable to arrange financing (and has not included a financing reservation). The starting point in that case is that the seller can dissolve the contract and claim 10% of the purchase price of the property.
2. Penalty clause in rental agreement
Penalty clauses are also regularly found in general terms and conditions of rental agreements (residential and business premises). Think of a provision with the following purport:
“The tenant shall owe an immediately due and payable penalty of €25 per calendar day for each obligation he fails to fulfil.”
If a tenant fails to pay his rental payments or uses the rented property contrary to its purpose, for example, the landlord can claim the penalty.
3. Penalty clause in money loan agreements
Penalty clauses also occur in money loan agreements. Consider the situation where party X borrows an amount from the bank to finance his/her home and owes penalty interest if payment is not made on time:
“In the absence of timely payment as referred to in Article (…), party X shall forfeit an immediately payable penalty interest of 6% of the overdue amount.”
For example, if X does not pay interest or repay on time, the bank can claim the penalty interest.
Mitigation of penalty
The starting point is that the full penalty must be paid. However, a court can decide to moderate the amount of the fine if granting the fine leads to an excessive and therefore unacceptable result. This depends on the circumstances of the case.
Do you need advice on penalty clauses?
Do you have a case in which you are claiming an amount of penalty or are actually owed the penalty? Or do you need help in drafting a penalty clause? Then you have come to the right place. As lawyers with experience in contract law, we regularly come across penalty clauses. Gentia Niesert, lawyer in contract law, will be pleased to help you.
Covenant on ancillary activities; greater clarity desired
Since August 1 of this year, the law (Section 7:653a of the Civil Code) has provided that the employment contract may no longer contain a prohibition on ancillary activities (“ancillary activities clause”) unless there is an “objective reason for doing so.
This means work in addition to the current position with the employer. This may also include work that the employee performs independently.
Ban on ancillary activities
The ban on ancillary activities is certainly not absolute. An additional work clause may be included in case of an objective reason, which does not necessarily have to be included in the employment contract in advance. The employer may also communicate the objective reasons at the time the employee requests permission for the ancillary activities.
Examples of “objective reasons,” according to the explanation of the law, include the health and safety of the employee, the protection of the confidentiality of company information, the integrity of a public service, the avoidance of a conflict of interest, or the violation of a legal requirement. For the last example, consider a violation of the Working Hours Act.
If the work is performed during the employer’s regular working hours, a ban on ancillary activities need not be accompanied by an objective reason. After all, Section 7:653a of the Civil Code deals with ancillary activities ‘outside the work schedule’ or ‘outside times when work is performed’. It may therefore be advisable to make a distinction in the ancillary activities clause between ancillary activities within and outside normal working hours.
The case law that has appeared to date on ancillary work is very limited. Below is an overview
Being transparent about ancillary activities
In a case before the Den Bosch Court of Appeal, there was no ban on ancillary activities, but the employee was expected to be transparent about the ancillary activities he performed. The employee was employed by an aircraft manufacturing company. He was required to make many business trips. His employer expected employees to complete an annual form to report any outside activities. The worker had filled out the form in 2015 and 2016 that he would perform translation work for his partner’s family business. His employer found out in 2021 that the employee had additionally been registered as a statutory director for that family business since 2015. The failure to report this was considered culpable by the Court, resulting in the termination of the employment contract. Not as seriously culpable, which did give the employee the right and entitlement to the transitional compensation.
Integrity of public services and an objective justification
In a case before the Zaanstand subdistrict court, an arborist employed by the Municipality of Zaanstad claimed that it should be ruled that his ancillary employment clause was void and invalid. The Subdistrict Court rejected the claim. In the opinion of the Subdistrict Court, the employer, a municipality, may in this case prohibit the employee from performing ancillary activities within the area of the municipality. In addition to his position with the Zaanstad municipality, the civil servant had consistently performed ancillary activities since 2014. Those ancillary activities amounted to him working on commission as an arborist for companies and individuals in and outside the municipality of Zaanstad, which included pruning work and caring for and maintaining greenery in gardens. Prior to 2017, he had verbal permission for these ancillary activities and from 2019, he received written permission for the two-year period.
Effective May 31, 2021, the official’s position was changed from Arborist to Supervisor Green. Given this promotion, higher demands were placed on the official’s integrity and he was no longer allowed to perform outside activities within the municipal boundaries of Zaandam. The employee challenged this new ban before the subdistrict court.
On June 8, the subdistrict court ruled that the ban on ancillary activities must be appropriate, suitable and necessary to protect the employer’s interest, also in light of the fact that this is a restriction of a fundamental right. The interests of the employee must also be taken into account.
The Subdistrict Court ruled that the integrity of government services could provide an objective ground of justification for the municipality as referred to in Section 7:653a (1) of the Civil Code and the Transparent Employment Conditions Directive. After all, that integrity of public services is specifically mentioned in Article 9 (1) of the Directive as objective reasons to restrict certain ancillary activities. Also in the legislative history of article 7:653a BW, integrity of public services is mentioned as an objective reason to prohibit ancillary activities. In short, the prohibition of ancillary activities is objectively justified and upheld.
Case law from before August 1, 2022
From case law before the new legal regulation on ancillary activities came into force, we also saw a certain line in the case law of circumstances that can be considered an objective reason to prohibit ancillary activities (even without an ancillary activities clause):
Normally, ancillary activities are prohibited if:
- The employee’s ancillary activities compete with the employer.
- The employee performs ancillary work for competitors.
- The employee’s ancillary activities result in damage to the employer’s image.
- The employee’s ancillary activities result in the employee not performing well at his full-time job.
Conclusion
Whether ancillary activities are permissible and what qualifies as an objective reason for a legally valid ancillary activities clause can be inferred primarily from existing and future case law. As a result, it is unclear to most employers and employees what the rules on ancillary activities are. To avoid an employment dispute over this with an unpredictable end, please contact Richard Ouwerling, lawyer specializing in employment law.
Sebastiaan Knook
Secretary
+31 (0)10 209 27 64
knook@lvh-advocaten.nl
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Asbestos issues when buying residential or business premises
Until the early 1990s, the mineral asbestos was used in the manufacturing of a lot of products. Old building materials for instance often contain asbestos.
A better insight into the harmful effects on our health when inhaling asbestos fibres ultimately resulted in a full ban on stocking and processing asbestos with effect from 1 July 1993. Naturally, a lot of structures were built long before that ban came into effect.
If after the purchase of residential or business premises asbestos is discovered in such buildings, the buyer and the vendor are faced with the necessary problems. They are confronted with the question if the presence of asbestos is a defect for which the vendor is liable. In that case, the buyer could in principle cancel the purchase or pass the cleaning-up costs on to the vendor.
A defect, or not?
A building should have the qualities the buyer may expect from a well-maintained building when he buys it. Also, the buyer may assume that the building is in a condition that makes it possible to use it in a normal manner. If the presence of asbestos obstructs the normal use of residential or business premises and if the buyer could have expected there not to be any asbestos, it constitutes a defect for which the vendor is liable.
Whether this is the case first depends on whether it concerns unbonded or bonded asbestos.
It is also important to know if the vendor was or should have been aware of the asbestos and if he should have informed the buyer of his own accord. Did the vendor have a duty of disclosure or should the buyer himself have conducted a survey?
Bonded or unbonded asbestos?
In the case of unbonded asbestos such as sprayed asbestos, the fibres do not strongly adhere to any other material and they are released much quicker.
If the asbestos fibres adhere to another material stronger, as is the case with asbestos cement, they release few fibres, presuming the material is undamaged.
Unbonded asbestos
If the buyer discovers unbonded asbestos after the sale, there is little room for discussion. This concerns such a big health risk that the normal use of the building is obstructed. Furthermore, the vendor is obliged to report the presence of unbonded asbestos or, if he was not aware of this, to conduct a survey to find out.
Bonded asbestos
The matter becomes more difficult when bonded asbestos is involved.
In that case, you have to look at how the buyer wants to use the building. If it is used as a residence or as a shop, and the buyer does not intend to undertake any activities that would constitute a risk of asbestos being released, there is in principle no problem.
If the buyer does intend to undertake activities that carry such a risk, such as certain refurbishments, the question is if the vendor should have been prepared for that. The nature of the refurbishments and the condition of the building play an important role in that respect. If the refurbishments are of a customary nature and they could have been expected given the condition of the building, the risk of any asbestos being released can be regarded as a quality that obstructs normal use.
If the building is used for commercial activities that involve drastic changes to the structure of the building, the risk of asbestos being released is even bigger and people will be quicker to presume obstruction of normal use.
As soon as it has been established that the discovered asbestos obstructs normal use, the question arises if the asbestos having remained hidden can be attributed to incomplete information from the vendor or a poor survey by the buyer.
If the vendor was aware of the asbestos, he should have reported it. If he fails to do so, he is in principle liable.
Things are different when the presence of asbestos was obvious or highly likely and the buyer should have been aware of it. The buyer’s expertise can play a big role in this, as does the age of the building and the impressions the buyer has created about his own knowledge. It is also possible that the vendor had good reason to assume that the presence of asbestos was of no importance to the buyer. It may have been explicitly announced beforehand that the building was only going to be used for activities that do not constitute a risk of asbestos being released, for instance.
If the vendor was not aware of the asbestos either, the buyer’s duty to have a survey conducted does in principle weigh greater, which means the presence of hidden bonded asbestos tends to be at his risk. However, if the buyer would not have to have been prepared for the presence of asbestos in the given situation, things may be entirely different again. The impressions created by the vendor during the sales negotiations, the age of the building and the expertise on both sides may entail that the liability is placed with the vendor.
In conclusion
Whether or not the buyer can cancel the purchase or can pass the costs for a clean-up on to the vendor depends on the strength of the asbestos, the use of the building, the vendor’s knowledge and the knowledge the buyer could have been assumed to have. That is why this is a difficult question to answer. Getting legal advice in such cases is, therefore, a wise decision.
Are you a buyer, a vendor or perhaps a tenant or landlord and are you confronted with an asbestos issue? Please contact us for a no-obligation meeting with mr. D.C. van Genderen, lawyer of the Property section of Leeman Verheijden Huntjens Advocaten.
Peter Verheijden
Bankruptcy Transfer of Undertaking Act (Wovof)
Start of consultation
On 27 May 2024, the Transfer of Undertaking in Bankruptcy Act (Wovof) was submitted for consultation. All stakeholders will have the opportunity to respond to the bill until 22 July 2024. Thisis a follow-up to the earlier consultation in 2019. What is the purpose of this new legal regulation?
Current law; distinction business transition outside or inside bankruptcy
Business transition outside bankruptcy
Employees are protected during a business transfer. Pursuant to Art 7:663 of the Civil Code, the employees of the transferred company enter the employment of the acquiring party by operation of law. The employees do not have to do anything for this; they keep the same terms of employment and the date of commencement of employment is the date of commencement of employment with the original employer.
Transfer of business within bankruptcy
The aforementioned statutory regulation does not apply during bankruptcy. The legislator chose to make an exception to the above rules because otherwise a successful relaunch would be less likely to take place and thus more jobs would ultimately be lost. If a receiver sells the company after bankruptcy (also known as a restart), the acquirer of the company may choose whether to employ employees of the bankrupt, which employees to employ and under what conditions to employ the employees. This difference in treatment leads to the fact that a takeover from bankruptcy can easily give the impression that bankruptcy is mainly used to easily and cheaply part with unwanted staff.
Selection of employees
If not all employees are taken over in a relaunch, the criteria for selecting which employees will be taken over by the acquirer in a relaunch and which employees will not be taken over are not transparent. Administrators often try to steer this process but are not always in a position to impose sufficient requirements and safeguards on the transferee so as not to jeopardise the restart itself. Because the relaunching company in bankruptcy is reorganised without the cost of redundant employees, this leads to a competitive advantage over companies that have to apply the rules and related costs of regular labour law (demarcation principle, transition compensation) when restructuring. Research shows that young people (up to 25 years old), older people (over 55 years old), pregnant women and low-skilled people in particular are less likely to be hired by the restarted company.
New law: WOVOF
Purpose
The difference in protection of employees in a transfer of a company outside bankruptcy and a transfer of a company within bankruptcy is deemed undesirable by the minister, and the minister has prepared the preliminary draft ‘WOVOF’ (‘Wet Overgang Van Onderneming in Faillissement’). By amending the law, this preliminary draft aims to strike a better balance between, on the one hand, the interest in an easy restart and, on the other hand, the interest of employees in protecting their legal position.
Proposal
The bill regulates that the exception that currently applies to all bankrupt companies will be limited to an exception for those companies where the bankruptcy is aimed at liquidation (and therefore not a relaunch) and for small companies (less than 20 employees). In other cases, the party buying a business from the bankruptcy administrator will be obliged to take over all employees with it, unless this is not possible on the grounds of business economics. For that case, the law requires an objective selection method to be used to determine which employees receive an offer of employment. Also, if a vacancy arises within six months of the relaunch, a former employee would first have to be offered an employment contract.
Approval and participation
The liquidator will need approval from the supervisory judge before selling the company as part of a relaunch. Under the bill, the supervisory judge must hear the receiver, the acquirer and the works council before granting approval. The position of the works council is strengthened here. The supervisory judge assesses whether there are business economic reasons not to transfer all employees to the transferee and what selection criteria will be used.
Sanction
If the relaunching company wrongfully fails to offer employees of the bankrupt company an employment contract, the employee can claim from the subdistrict court that he still receives an offer or that he is awarded fair compensation.
Consequences of introduction
If the law is introduced in this form, it will have an impact on the restart practice of bankruptcy trustees. More investigation around a relaunch will be required to assess whether there are business circumstances that force the relauncher to make a choice in employees for economic, technical or organisational reasons. There will often be a combination of circumstances. The transferee will have to demonstrate to the supervisory judge that measures have to be taken and why not all employees can be taken over. If the acquirer fails to do so, it will have to take over all employees. The works council is also given more say. The works council must be given the opportunity to give its advice.
Procedure
The receiver, as liquidator of the assets of the bankrupt, enters into negotiations with the prospective restarters. Consequently, the liquidator must first assess whether there is a transfer of undertaking in bankruptcy. If that is the case, the liquidator must allow the works council to advise. Next, the liquidator must request the supervisory judge’s approval. If, according to the proposal, not all employees transfer to the re-starter, the supervisory judge must examine whether it has been made sufficiently plausible that there are business economic circumstances to take measures resulting in job losses. If this has been made sufficiently plausible, the supervisory judge must assess whether the method of selecting the employees is in line with the indenture principle to be applied or according to a plan approved by the supervisory judge.
Will it work?
Compliance with the new rules will lead to more transparency and supervision of the selection of employees involved in a relaunch. In itself, there is no objection to this except that more time will be involved in investigating and preparing a proposal to the trustee. The trustee will have to provide more information so that the candidate can assess whether there are economic circumstances that make it impossible to take over all employees. This will be the case in almost all bankruptcies. Next, the consultation process with the works council and the approval process by the supervisory judge require more time. Compliance with these new rules therefore costs time and money. These are precisely the two things that are lacking in a bankruptcy situation. There is no money and there is no time. The longer a relaunch takes, the less likely it is to be successful.
An earlier consultation (2019) on the Wovof raised particular concerns about the impact of the scheme on restart practice. The scheme is considered too complex and time-consuming to apply under high time pressure. There are too many uncertainties for the acquirer. In response to these expressed concerns, the proposal has been amended. Although it is undeniable that the procedure has been improved, the scheme remains complex, time-consuming and represents an obstacle for the relaunch candidate. The risk that the new regulation will hamper the restart practice and thus reduce the number of restarts remains.
Competition clause
Somewhat related is the problemative of the employee with a non-compete clause. If an employee transfers by operation of law to a new employer on the transfer of a company outside bankruptcy, a stipulated non-competition clause simply remains in place. If the employee is offered an employment contract with the new employer in a relaunch in bankruptcy, employee and (new) employer can make their own arrangements. But what happens to the non-competition clause with the employee dismissed by the liquidator but not offered an employment contract with the restarting company? This has been the subject of many proceedings. Although the provision is rarely enforced in full, in principle, the non-competition clause simply remains valid and the liquidator (provided it has a sufficient interest) can claim compliance. The Wovof provides for the inclusion of a new legal provision stating that a non-competition clause ends when the employment contract is terminated by the liquidator and the relevant employee is not offered an employment contract by the re-starter. This improves the employee’s position and creates clarity for all parties.
Entry into force
Following a previous round of consultation in 2019, this is a new consultation. The formal legislative process including approval in the Lower and Upper Houses of Parliament has yet to be initiated. Entry into force of the bill in its current or amended form will be some time away. That does not alter the fact that, in anticipation of and taking into account this new regulation, receivers can ask for more transparency from the candidates for a relaunch so that it can be explained to interested parties why there is no room for all employees in a relaunch. According to the Insolad practice rules, even now a trustee must be guided by interests of the estate the trustee takes into account interests of a social nature. Transparency in the selection of employees can be part of this.
Looking for an insolvency law lawyer?
Would you like to know more about filing for bankruptcy or making an offer on a company in bankruptcy? Feel free to contact Rob Steenhoek of LVH Advocaten. He specialises in insolvency law and will be happy to help you.
International trade: the CMR Convention
International trade: the CMR Convention
In international trade, it is very important that transport is also well regulated. After all, at least as important as the quality or “conformity” of the goods is that these goods arrive at their destination correctly and on time.
When transport crosses borders, the question may arise as to which law applies to the transport contract. To avoid ambiguity in this regard, several international conventions have been created over the years in the field of transport. One such convention is the CMR Convention: “Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road” (“the Convention”).
What does the CMR Convention regulate?
The Convention aims to protect the best interests of all parties involved in the carriage. The Convention provides that the contract of carriage is recorded in a consignment bill and also regulates the requirements that the contract of carriage (i.e., the consignment bill) must meet. Furthermore, the Convention regulates the rights and obligations of the carrier, but also of the other parties involved, such as the sender and the consignee.
When does the CMR Convention apply?
The Convention automatically applies to agreements for the cross-border carriage of goods by road. Cross-border in this case has nothing to do with the identity of the contracting parties, but with the transport itself. If the place of taking delivery of the goods and the place of delivery of the goods are in different countries, there is cross-border transport. If at least one of those countries is a member of the Convention, it applies to the contract of carriage. Therefore, the applicability of the CMR Convention cannot be excluded.
The CMR Convention applies to transport by road. Other regulations exist for transport by sea or air. The CMR Convention does make an exception for the so-called “stack transport”: part of the journey is not by road, but the goods remain in the vehicle during that part. In that case, the CMR Convention also continues to apply to the transport.
Obligations and liability under the CMR Convention
The Convention regulates the obligations and therefore the liability of the parties involved in the transport. Among other things, the Convention states that the sender of the goods is responsible for the correct preparation of the consignment bill, the correct designation of the goods (and quantity thereof), as well as proper packaging. Should the consignor of the goods not have done this correctly, he is liable for any damage suffered by the carrier as a result.
On the other hand, the carrier has a duty to examine the goods upon taking delivery and must also include the findings of the examination in the consignment bill. In addition, the carrier – of course – has an obligation to perform the carriage properly. Therefore, with some exceptions, the carrier is liable for damage to the goods to the extent that such damage occurred during carriage.
Finally, the consignee must, in the presence of the carrier, ascertain the condition of the goods. If he fails to do so, or without timely reporting any loss or damage to the carrier, he is deemed to have received the goods in the condition as shipped. This makes it difficult for the consignee to complain afterwards about the condition of the goods or to bring an action against the carrier on that account.
Advice?
Would you like to receive advice on a (international) contract of carriage, the applicability or interpretation of the CMR Convention? Then please contact us. Jacolien Leuvenink will be happy to assist you.
Irene Nuijen
Administrative Assistant
+31 (0)10 209 27 50
nuijen@lvh-advocaten.nl
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Terminating a commercial contract
This article will explain in which way commercial agreements can be terminated under the Dutch Civil Code (DCC).
The general rule in the Netherlands is that there is substantial freedom of parties to enter into an agreement. There are however specific agreements such as rental agreements, employment agreements, agency agreements and franchise agreements, referred to as specific agreements in the DCC where additional rules are set out. In the event that you are contemplating the cancellation of specific commercial contracts, as referred to above, then there are specific provisions regarding termination that need to be adhered to. Furthermore, the DCC makes a distinction between compulsory law and regulatory law, meaning that if a provision in the DCC states this is compulsory law, the article in the DCC is overriding to anything agreed to between the parties by way of a contract.
In this article I will deal with the non-specific agreements as regulated within the DCC, and how these type of agreements may be ended under the DCC.
Parties may agree to terminate the legally binding commercial agreement by:
- Cancelling the agreement in accordance with the terms as set out in the agreement entered into between the parties. For example, this could be by way of an agreed notice period set out in the agreement. Termination is also possible, where both parties agree to terminate the agreement based on mutual consent.
- Contracts for a fixed term – with or without an early termination clause – are generally regulatory law, meaning there is substantial freedom to contract. Agreements such as these can be terminated in accordance with the terms of the agreement, provided they are sufficiently clear and also provided the terms are complied with.
- Terminating a commercial contract with an indefinite term which does not contain a provision regulating the termination of the agreement is also possible, but only in accordance with the rules set out by the Supreme Court. However, such termination may require a certain notice period based whereby there are sufficient grounds based on reasonableness and fairness that a notice period for termination is required or where damages need to be paid to compensate the non-terminating party for their loss. This can be quite tricky especially as parties need to agree on a reasonable notice period, and each party has a different interest. For example a distributor will have greater interest in a longer termination notice to compensate for the loss than the principal.
- Rescission, which is regulated in 6:265 DCC is also a ground for termination. Recission is where the contract is cancelled and parties are placed in the situation where the performance of the commercial contract is reversed. For example where goods have been delivered, and they are returned. However, there are situations where this is not possible and then the other party is awarded damages. The above-mentioned article dictates that there must be a breach of the agreement, and this breach is such that it justifies recission of the agreement, so it needs to be a material breach. The breach is such that it cannot be remedied, either temporarily or permanently or where the party is in formal breach as set out in article 6:82 and 6:83 DCC. For example when a fatal deadline has been exceeded or where the party has been notified to be in breach and has not remedied the breach within a certain time-limit. An agreement can be rescinded by obtaining judgment of the court or by way of an extra-judicial declaration of rescission. Rescission is not compulsory law and is therefore often excluded in commercial contracts, so please check the commercial contract.
- Revocation, which is where parties are put in the situation as if the commercial contract had never existed. This is a strict legal principle, where the intent to enter into the agreement was not correct. Under the DCC there are four grounds for revocation of the agreement. These grounds are mistake, threat, deception and abuse of circumstances.
Damages are due and payable in the event that one of the parties is in formal breach. The DCC sets out what is considered to be damages, and this includes material loss and other loss. Contractual damages is regulated in article 6:95 to 6:106 DCC and is not compulsory law, which means that parties can deviate from this by agreement. Material breach under the DCC includes loss and loss of profits. Reasonable costs for mitigating the damages as well as reasonable costs to determine or limit damage and liability and extra-judicial legal costs to determine the damage and extra-judicial costs to exercise your rights. Furthermore, article 6:101 DCC states that in the event that the person suffering damage has contributed to the damages due to his or her own fault, then the damages awarded may be reduced by this amount.
Legal advice on terminating international commercial agreements
Again, if your business enterprise is contemplating cancelling an existing commercial contract, the above shows you how important it is to do this correctly from a legal point of view.
If you have any questions, please feel free to contact Madelon van Breemen.
Checklist Dismissal during an employee’s illness
In the first two years of illness, the prohibition on termination applies. In principle, the employment agreement cannot be terminated during that period, not even with a dismissal permit from UWV. However, in some cases, dismissal during an employee’s illness is possible. There are several situations in which the employment can be terminated despite the fact that the employee is ill. A checklist.
Checklist
- Is there an urgent cause for dismissal with immediate effect?
If there is a valid reason for dismissal with immediate effect, dismissal is always possible, including during the employee’s illness.
- Was the dismissal permit applied for and did UWV WERKbedrijf receive the relevant application before the employee reported ill?
If that is the case, the illness does not stand in the way of the dismissal. Therefore, it is advisable to apply for the dismissal permit before discussing the matter with the employee.
- Is the dismissal part of a reorganisation?
Since 1 July 2015, the law on dismissal has changed and the prohibition on dismissal also applies to a dismissal due to reorganisation. This means that, in such case, the employer cannot apply to the subdistrict court to have the employment agreement set aside. As long as the employee is ill, the employment agreement cannot be terminated in connection with a reorganisation.
- Are there other valid reasons for dismissal?
If there are other grounds for the dismissal, such as unsatisfactory performance, a damaged working relationship or an imputable act on the part of the employee, the employer can apply to the subdistrict court to have the employment agreement set aside. However, if the employer wishes to do that, it must be able to substantiate the grounds for dismissal, or the subdistrict court will be unlikely to order the termination. In addition, the grounds for dismissal may not be related to the employee’s illness in any way.
- Is the company discontinuing its business?
In such case, the employment agreement with an ill employee can be terminated after obtaining a dismissal permit from UWV WERKbedrijf.
- Is the ill employee not cooperating in his reintegration?
If the employee refuses suitable alternative work, does not follow reasonable instructions from the employer or the company physician within the framework of his reintegration or does not cooperate in the drawing up, evaluation or amendment of the plan of approach, this can be considered to constitute an imputable act on the part of the employee, which is a ground for dismissal. If a salary-related penalty has already been imposed and the employee continues to refuse to cooperate, the employer can apply to the subdistrict court to have the employment agreement set aside.
Termination
An employment agreement can end in a variety of ways. There must always be a ground for dismissal.
a) dismissal on commercial grounds
b) dismissal of an employee who has been ill for longer than two years
c) regular absenteeism with unacceptable consequences for the business operations
d) unsatisfactory performance
e) imputable acts or omissions on the part of the employee
f) refusal to do a particular job due to conscientious objections
g) damaged working relationship
h) other circumstances due to which the employment agreement cannot be maintained.
If an employee does not agree to a dismissal, the employer can, in the case of ground a) and b), terminate the employment agreement with the permission of UWV WERKbedrijf. If one of the other grounds applies, the subdistrict court can set aside the employment agreement at the request of either party. In this case, it is not considered a termination.
In proceedings to set aside an employment agreement, the subdistrict court will look into whether the employee is ill and if so, whether the request to set aside the employment agreement is related to the illness. Sometimes, the reason behind the request is grossly unsatisfactory performance, or the fact that the working relationship is damaged to such an extent that it may be better for the parties to go their separate ways. If reporting ill was predominantly a strategic move on the part of the employee, the subdistrict court will usually disregard it.
Dismissal with immediate effect
Dismissal with immediate effect is the ultimate sanction, which can only be applied if the employer has urgent cause for that. If there is such an urgent cause, the employee can be dismissed with immediate effect even if he is ill. Examples of this include serious misconduct on the part of the employee, such as a theft that only comes to light after the employee reports ill.
Mutual agreement
Even if the employer and the employee agree that the employment should be terminated, they cannot simply enter into a termination agreement. By agreeing to a termination “without proper grounds” before two years of illness have passed, the employee commits an act prejudicial to a national insurance fund within the meaning of the Dutch Sickness Benefits Act (Ziektewet). As a result, the employee may not receive Sickness Benefit after the dismissal. In such a situation, another form of termination of the employment is possible in some cases. If the employee does not plan to claim Sickness Benefit, termination by mutual agreement is possible as well. This is possible because – provided that other requirements are met – the employee is eligible for Unemployment Benefit.
Conclusion
Dismissal during an employee’s illness is often complicated. In practice, situations are never as black and white as they are in a checklist. It may be useful to see whether a situation can be changed and whether termination is possible.
Further information
For additional information please feel free to contact Mieke Bestebreurtje.
Employee termination: ‘We are going to quit’, clear and unambiguous?
Employee termination: ‘We are going to quit’, clear and unambiguous?
It is more common than thought: an employee terminating their job in an emotional state. This termination may obviously be due to a conflict or discussion at work (e.g. about reintegration). It may also be that the employee feels pressured by his employer to quit.
Often, the employee only realises afterwards that he is then not entitled to WW benefits. The employee changes his mind and wants to go back on the termination.
Employee termination: clear and unambiguous
Any employee can terminate his employment contract. This can be done verbally or in writing. In a conversation, an employee makes a remark like “I’m not coming back here” or “I’m quitting”. This can therefore also be seen as a formal termination of the employment contract under circumstances.
However, there must be a clear and unambiguous statement by the employee, aimed at termination. This requirement does not apply to the employer in case it has given notice.
The employee is bound by the notice unless there is a lack of will, such as threat, fraud or abuse of circumstances. The employee must invoke this within two months. If he fails to do so, the termination is fixed.
The employer certainly has a duty to investigate in case of verbal or emotional termination. The extent of this duty to investigate depends on various circumstances.
We are going to quit is not a direct termination of employment contract
A good example of a termination that was not seen as clear and unambiguous is that of a head coach of FC Volendam. Here, the arbitration tribunal ruled that the media statement “We are quitting” did not constitute a clear and unambiguous termination will.
The Arbitration Committee (and also the North Holland District Court) considered – with reference to Supreme Court case law – that an employer may not quickly assume that an employee has given notice of termination given the far-reaching consequences of voluntary termination (no entitlement to benefits and transition compensation). Furthermore, the key issue is whether, given the circumstances, the other party was reasonably entitled to construe the statement as a termination. In the present situation, there was reason for the employer – if it believed there was a termination – to investigate whether the employee had intended a termination. After all, the statement was addressed to the media. The employer’s press secretary was only in the cc. Also, the content of the statement “We are going to quit” is not a direct termination. After all, this could also mean that the employee would quit at FC Volendam in the future.
Notice period and interim termination?
The employee must observe a notice period, except when terminating during the probationary period or for an urgent reason.
A fixed-term employment contract can only be terminated prematurely if this has been agreed in writing. The employee who terminates without a notice period is liable for damages over the non-observed notice period.
Termination during illness?
If an employee terminates while sick, this may constitute an act of prejudice towards the UWV. The employee is then not entitled to ZW.
Conclusion
- The employer should ensure that an employee understands that he may lose his right to ZW benefit, WW benefit and the transition allowance.
- Give a reflection period to the employee who terminates in an emotional state.
- Confirm the termination in writing. Address the circumstances of the case and state that you have made the employee aware of the consequences.
- If in doubt, seek legal advice immediately.
Want more information on employee termination? Contact Richard Ouwerling. He is an employment law lawyer at LVH Advocaten in Rotterdam and deals with the termination of employment contracts.
Reorganisation and dismissal in NOW scheme: what is allowed and what is not?
In a recent article we discussed the Temporary Emergency Measure Bridging Employment (NOW). The subsidy from this scheme comes with obligations for employers. If these obligations are not (fully) met, a sanction may be imposed. This article looks at the question whether you can still lay off employees during the granting of the NOW subsidy and whether you can reorganise.
Employers’ obligations during provision of NOW subsidy
The obligations which apply during the granting of the subsidy:
- Keeping the wage bill equal to January 2020;
- Not dismissing an employee via the UWV on the a-ground;
- Only using the subsidy for wage costs;
- Consultation with the employee participation body;
- Other administrative obligations.
Can I still dismiss employees if I have applied for the NOW subsidy?
Yes, you can still dismiss employees. However, this does have consequences for the NOW subsidy if you dismiss employees via the UWV on the a-ground (business economic reasons). An obligation for the use of the NOW scheme is, among other things, that the employer, when applying, doesn’t apply for dismissal for business economic reasons for its employees during the period in which the subsidy is granted.
If you do dismiss employees for business economic reasons during the grant period, a financial sanction may be imposed. In the event of a violation, your wage bill will be reduced and a fine will be imposed, as a result of which the subsidy will be much lower. This is because the wage and salary bill is reduced by the wage and salary received by an employee in the declaration period used, multiplied by 1.5.
In short, it is possible to apply for a NOW subsidy and submit a resignation application on the a-ground. You will have to make a financial assessment. After all, when an employee is dismissed, the employer receives less wage compensation.
For other grounds for dismissal, the regular rules apply. For an employee who, for example, is dysfunctional, a request for dissolution can still be submitted to the court.
Furthermore, a settlement agreement (termination by mutual consent) can still be concluded with an employee, even if the dismissal is based on business economic reasons. The NOW scheme is only linked to dismissal via the UWV on the a-ground.
Can I reorganise if I receive a NOW subsidy?
In principle, you can continue your reorganisation. If you apply for a NOW subsidy, this will of course have consequences for the amount of that subsidy. This is regardless of whether your reorganisation is related to the corona crisis. Here too, therefore, you will have to make a financial assessment.
You can, however, prepare for your reorganisation if you have applied for a NOW subsidy. The reorganisation plan can be drawn up and you can already enter into consultation with your participation body. However, you cannot yet turn to the UWV if you want to prevent your NOW subsidy from being reduced. However, you can – as already appointed – conclude a settlement agreement. This will, of course, reduce the subsidy if the wage bill is lower than the stated wage bill.
More information from our employment lawyers?
For more information about employment law and the corona crisis, please contact the employment lawyers of LVH Advocaten in Rotterdam.
Sick employees; Reintegration second track in SMEs
Suppose your employee has been sick for almost a year. He holds a defining position within your company. You therefore want to appoint a replacement, because it looks like the sick employee will not be able to return to his original position. Is this allowed?
If it were up to the legislature, yes, but not at this time.
Bill on reintegration obligation second year of illness
A bill is pending, which offers small and medium-sized employers the possibility to fully focus on reintegration in the second track, i.e. reintegration with another employer, from the start of the second year of illness (no earlier and no later). Under conditions, second-track reintegration may be closed.
Completion of the reintegration first track
Closing the first track with the current employer is possible if the employee agrees. The consent by the employee is entirely voluntary, must be in writing, the employee must be demonstrably informed (in writing) of the two-week reflection period, and the employee is free to attach any additional conditions to the consent.
UWV permission?
If the employer and the employee have not reached a joint agreement on the closure of the first track and the employer still wants to close the first track, he must ask the UWV for permission.
After the conclusion of the first track and after the end of the notice period, the employer can ask the UWV for permission to terminate the employment contract, regardless of whether the employee is sick or better.
Advisory Council for the Judiciary
Earlier this year, the Council for the Judiciary advised on this bill, stating that it does not provide relief from the (long) obligation to continue paying wages, which is perceived as burdensome by SMEs. Furthermore, the necessity of the proposal is questioned. In the current situation, the employer can have the job temporarily filled by a temporary worker or a seconded employee. A fixed-term employment contract, for the duration of the employee’s illness, can also be entered into.
Moreover, the Council does not expect this bill to lead to more indefinite contracts. Caution remains necessary in this regard, given the duration of two years of wage payment.
Finally, according to the Council, the new ground for termination adds little to the current system of dismissal, where after two years of illness, parting can be done anyway through a vso or through the UWV.
Therefore, it remains to be seen whether the new administration will pass this bill and send it to the EK. If so, you as a small employer will have faster clarity in the reintegration process.
Questions about reintegration sick employee?
Do you have questions about the reintegration of a sick employee? Or are you curious about the status of this bill. Please contact Richard Ouwerling.
Employee leaving sick: what about premium differentiation?
Employee leaving sick: what about premium differentiation?
Are you familiar with the financial consequences of an employee leaving your company sick? The Sickness Benefits Act and WGA premiums are differentiated. This means that the premiums depend on the inflow of employees who became ill on the last day of their employment or within 4 weeks after the dismissal date. In this article we discuss the premium differentiation and the calculation of this premium.
Premium Differentiation
Since the introduction of the Sickness Absence and Disability of Employees Act, the ZW benefit and WGA benefit are attributed to the last employer. This is done via a differentiated premium. If an employee leaves sick or becomes sick within 4 weeks after the end date and can claim a ZW or WGA benefit, this may have consequences for the premiums to be paid by the employer.
Note: An employee who leaves employment, receives unemployment benefits and then becomes ill, is not attributed to the employer. The UWV is then regarded as the “last employer”.
Calculation of premiums Sickness Benefits Act and WGA
Each year the UWV calculates the premiums based on the data from two years earlier. As an employer, you are informed by the tax authorities of the level of these premiums in the autumn of each calendar year in the so-called ‘Besluit gedifferentieerde premie Whk’ (Differentiated Contribution Decision).
Distinction between small, medium-sized and large employers
When calculating the differentiated ZW and WGA premiums, a distinction is made between small, medium-sized and large employers. For small employers, a sector-based premium applies. For medium-sized employers, the weighted average of the sectoral premium and individual premium applies. For large employers, the premium is based on an average premium level with a surcharge or discount depending on the individual and average employer risk.
From a financial point of view, it is therefore in the interest of medium-sized and large employers that an employee does not leave sick or falls ill within four weeks of the date of dismissal.
Average wage due for contributions
To determine the contribution rate in a particular year, the average compulsory wage in the preceding two years is always taken into account. For 2022 the year 2020 has been taken into account.
Report employee’s recovery to UWV?
For an employer it may therefore be advantageous that the employee does not leave sick. However, a sick employee cannot simply be reported back to work. After all, the employee is not available for the labor market and there is a chance that the ex-employee will still report sick after leaving employment, with all its consequences.
If recovery is expected in the short term, it may be advantageous to retain the employee in service until recovery has taken place. This prevents the employee from leaving the company sick. In the latter case, a termination agreement may already be agreed upon. After recovery and leaving the company, the employee can apply for unemployment benefits and the employer will not be affected by the premium differentiation.
Become self-insurer for the ZW or WGA?
For some employers, it may be attractive to become self-insurer for the ZW or WGA. In the case of the ZW, an own-risk carrier pays a lower differentiated premium, because no premium needs to be paid for the ZW flex. In the case of the WGA, the excess carrier only pays the basic premium.
Note: as an excess carrier you do have other costs. You pay the benefits and in addition, as an excess carrier, you are responsible for the reintegration of the (ex-)worker. As an own-risk carrier, you must therefore have sufficient knowledge of the ZW and/or WIA.
Employment Lawyers Rotterdam
Do you have any questions about the sick leave of employees, premium differentiation or self-risk bearing? Please feel free to contact our employment lawyers Peter Verheijden and Richard Ouwerling of LVH Advocaten.
What are the options and points of attention when subletting business space?
For tenants of business premises, it may make sense to (partially) sublet the leased business premises. The tenant then also becomes a sublessee. Is this allowed?
Subletting is legal
In principle, subletting is permitted by law. The law states that a lessee of business premises may sublet all or part of the leased property to another party, unless the lessee should have understood that the lessor would object.
Sublease often requires the landlord’s prior consent
If the tenant of business premises must assume that the landlord has reasonable objections to the subletting, subletting without the landlord’s consent is not allowed. The objections then relate to either the identity of the subtenant or the intended use of the leased business premises. For example, a subtenant cannot provide sufficient financial security or the intended subtenant wants to carry out activities in the leased property that may cause damage or nuisance.
Subleasing of business premises is usually contractually excluded
Most (model) leases state that subletting is only allowed if the landlord has given prior written consent. If such a provision is included in the lease, a tenant of business premises should understand that subletting is not allowed just like that. Therefore, a tenant cannot enforce sublease with the landlord. If the lease stipulates that the lessor of business accommodation may not refuse his permission for subletting on unreasonable grounds, the lessee may be able to enforce subletting.
Points of attention in case of subletting of business accommodation
If subletting of business premises is allowed, it is wise to align the provisions in the subletting agreement with the provisions in the main lease as much as possible. After all, if one of the leases in the chain ends, it should also be possible to terminate the other lease. In addition, it is often convenient that the annual rent adjustment for both the main lease and the sublease is implemented on the same date.
In the case of leases for medium-sized business premises (7:290 business premises), such as shops and catering establishments, legal rules also apply to the duration of a lease (5+5 years). If, during the term of a lease for 7:290 business premises, a sublease agreement is concluded with the same rental regime, it is wise to seek prior permission from the subdistrict court for a different lease term (shorter than 5 years). It is true that there is a legal provision stating that if the main landlord has terminated the lease and the court has set the eviction date, the sublease agreement ends on the eviction date. However, this provision does not apply when the sublessor himself wants to terminate the lease by the end of the current tenancy.
A main landlord and sublandlord are obliged to consider the interests of a subtenant. When the main lease ends, the sublandlord must also consider the interests of the subtenant before agreeing to the termination. This may also mean that the subtenant may not agree to termination by the landlord or must invoke eviction protection (if 7:230a business premises are involved).
Unauthorised subletting of business premises is valid though
If a tenant of business premises (partially) subleases the leased property without the landlord’s consent, it is an unauthorised sublease. However, this does not mean that the sublease agreement is not valid. The subtenant may simply use the rented property.
Damage compensation for unauthorised subletting of business premises
Unauthorised subletting does entail risks for the sublessor. The sublessor fails to fulfil his obligations. The landlord can then dissolve or terminate the main lease. If the main lease ends, this often also means that the sublessor must vacate the leased property. He can then also no longer fulfil his obligations towards the subtenant. The sublessor will then be liable to pay damages to the subtenant because of this failure. In all cases, it makes sense for a subtenant to know whether the landlord has given permission for the sublease or has no objection to it.
Most model leases, such as the ROZ model, include a penalty provision if subletting is done without the landlord’s consent. The ROZ model does not contain a provision stating that the landlord may not refuse permission on unreasonable grounds. Therefore, the basic principle is that subletting is not allowed. Besides a fine, the landlord can also claim damages from the sublessor.
Main landlord can take over contract with subtenant
Under circumstances, it may make sense for the main landlord to rent directly to the subtenant. The sublandlord will then ‘step out’, so to speak. This is useful if the sublandlord goes bankrupt, for example. The main landlord then takes over the rental agreement. It is also possible to arrange such a contract takeover in advance. A three-party agreement must then be concluded between the main landlord, sublessor and subtenant, stating when or under what circumstances the subtenant will rent directly from the main landlord.
Anna-Rhodé van den Dool
The shareholders’ agreement: what if agreements are not kept?
In my previous contributions “A shareholder agreement to make your startup investor-proof” and “The shareholder agreement: some practical tips” I already wrote about the usefulness and necessity of the shareholder agreement. In order to avoid conflicts with, for example, future investors, it is wise to make good agreements about the cooperation. Not only agreements about the positive aspects of the cooperation, but above all agreements about what should happen if the cooperation does not go as expected.
The inclusion of such agreements in a shareholder agreement is important. But what if one of the parties refuses to comply with the agreements in the shareholder agreement? This scenario must also be taken into account when drawing up a shareholder agreement.
Penalty clause in the shareholder agreement
A self-evident way of enforcing compliance with agreements from the shareholders’ agreement is the inclusion of a penalty clause. A penalty clause is a clause stipulating that the party who fails to fulfil his or her obligation is obliged to pay a sum of money (or another performance). A penalty clause can serve as compensation for any damage or only as an incentive to perform. If a shareholder, who is a party to the shareholders’ agreement, violates an agreement in the shareholders’ agreement, it is possible for the other shareholder(s) to enforce a fine. Very high fines are often agreed upon, which in principle also have to be paid. However, at the request of the shareholder who has to pay the fine, the court can, if fairness so requires, mitigate the stipulated fine. This follows from Article 6:94 of the Dutch Civil Code. However, this power of moderation is applied with restraint. It is not possible to contractually exclude the reliance on moderation.
Agreements from shareholders’ agreement also valid after transfer of shares?
Shares can be transferred to other parties in different ways. This can be via general title or via special title.
Transfer of shares under general title
One obtains goods under ‘general title’ among other things by partition, merger or division of the estate. If shares are transferred by universal title, the obligations arising from the shareholders’ agreement follow the shares in question. In this way, the penalty clause, with a few exceptions, will also apply to new shareholders.
Transition of shares under special title
Shares may also be transferred by ‘special title’. A transfer by special title includes the sale or purchase of shares. In the case of the sale of shares by special title, the obligations arising from the shareholders’ agreement may not, as in the case of general title, be enforced against the new shareholder. This therefore also means that the penalty clause cannot be invoked against the new shareholder. This is an unfavourable situation for the incumbent shareholders.
Chain clause in the shareholders’ agreement
The situation that a new shareholder cannot be held to the agreements in the shareholder agreement can be prevented by including a chain clause. By including a chain clause in the shareholders’ agreement, it is hoped that the current shareholder will also impose the obligations from the shareholders’ agreement on the shareholder who has purchased the shares (and then the new shareholder will also impose them on his legal successor, if any). The shareholders are thus obliged to ‘pass on’ the shareholders’ agreement and the obligations arising from it. Incidentally, when including a chain clause, it is advisable to agree on a penalty in the event that the shareholder who sells his shares does not comply with the chain clause.
Enforcing compliance with shareholder agreement obligations
This article provides various practical recommendations for enforcing the obligations arising from a shareholder agreement. However, many issues have not yet been discussed, such as the effect of the shareholder agreement and the non-competition clause. It is advisable to seek expert advice when assessing a shareholder agreement. Do you have questions about the shareholders’ agreement or other company law issues? If so, please contact us.
Non-competition clause for commissioned workers and the prohibition on obstructing competition
In the assignment contract between the client and the contractor, a non-competition clause can be agreed – just as with employers and employees – so that the client can protect its business interests when the relationship with the contractor ends.
In this article we will discuss the possibilities of agreeing a non-competition clause between the client and the contractor. In addition, we will discuss the possibility of enforcing the non-competition clause. Finally, the prohibition of obstructions in the Waadi (Workforce Allocation Act) is discussed.
Non-competition clause in assignment agreement
A client may agree a non-competition clause with its contractors in order to protect its business interests. This non-competition clause ensures that a contractor cannot enter the service of a competitor without permission. Different rules apply to this non-competition clause than to the employment contract. After all, a contractor is not an employee.
Requirements for a non-competition clause in an assignment contract
Case law provides a similar test for assessing the legal validity of a non-competition clause. A non-competition clause is not automatically valid. It must be in writing and may not violate the fundamental right of free choice of employment (Article 19 of the Constitution). This may be the case if the duration of the clause is unnecessarily long or otherwise too broadly formulated. The clause can be restricted by invoking reasonableness and fairness.
Enforcing non-competition clause after termination of assignment contract?
After the termination of the assignment contract, the former contractor, if a non-competition clause has been validly agreed, is obliged for a certain period of time to refrain from certain activities for competitors of the client. If the contractor fails to comply with this, the client may enforce the non-competition clause.
Compliance can first be sought amicably by sending a summons. If a penalty clause is linked to a breach of the non-competition clause, a claim can also be made for the penalties. Furthermore, the employer can claim compliance and demand the fines in legal proceedings.
Does the ban on obstructions apply to a non-competition clause in an assignment contract?
Article 9 of the Waadi contains a ban on obstructions. The ban on obstructions means that a temporary employment agency or secondment agency may not impose restrictions on a worker to avoid entering into an employment contract with the hirer after the end of the posting. The contract for professional services under Article 7:400 of the Dutch Civil Code is not covered by the Waadi. However, Article 9 of the Waadi, which contains the prohibition on obstructions, may under circumstances be applicable. This was the case in proceedings before the District Court of Noord-Nederland (ECLI:NL:RBNNE:2021:3274).
The Court ruled in the aforementioned case that it follows from the case law of the European Court of Justice and the Supreme Court that the Temporary Agency Work Directive and the Waadi also apply to workers who have an employment relationship with a temporary agency, not being an employment contract. In short, an independent worker who works under a contract for services and is posted to a user company to work under the management and supervision of that user company is also covered by the Temporary Agency Work Directive and the Waadi. In this case this meant for the client that the agreed non-competition clause could not be invoked. The non-competition clause in fact blocked the contractor’s ability to work for the hirer after the end of the assignment and was therefore null and void.
Want to know more about the non-competition clause in a commission contract?
A non-competition clause can therefore be validly agreed with a contractor. However, in some situations it cannot be invoked. This is the case if the clause does not meet the requirement of being in writing or in accordance with the principles of reasonableness and fairness, but also if the prohibition on obstructing business is applicable to the contractor.
Want to know more about the non-competition clause and how it can be enforced by clients and employers. Feel free to contact the employment lawyers of LVH lawyers in Rotterdam.
Dismissal due to violation of a smoking ban
Companies that work with dangerous substances often have a total smoking ban in place, which includes the yard. An employee of Elementis Specialties in Delden was recently dismissed with immediate effect for violating the smoking ban that applies at that company. The employee subsequently applied to the subdistrict court of Almelo to claim continued payment of wages and reinstatement.
On 13 August 2010, the subdistrict court dismissed the claim. The court found – among other things – the following:
The employee had joined the company in May 2001. Since November 2008, smoking has been prohibited on the entire company premises, except within a certain area indicated with a yellow line. At certain times, employees are allowed to smoke behind this yellow line. The relevant employee was caught smoking outside the designated area and designated times, and was dismissed with immediate effect.
The district court found that the employer is free to decide to impose a smoking ban, as it concerns a company that works with dangerous and flammable substances. It is not up to the employee to judge whether an exact location is safe to smoke in or not. According to the applicable collective labour agreement and the associated regulations, violation of the smoking ban was considered a “serious violation”, subject to dismissal with immediate effect. Several newsletters were distributed amongst the employees, which made mention of this. In addition, on 21 January 2009, the employer sent the employees an email with the following text: “as of today, anyone caught smoking behind the yellow line or in between the laboratories will be dismissed with immediate effect. Safety is our highest priority, which means that we cannot afford such risks.”
All things considered, the subdistrict court came to the conclusion that the employee’s dismissal with immediate effect was justified.
The employee appealed this decision of the subdistrict court. On 14 August 2012, the Court of Appeal of Arnhem ruled that violation of the smoking ban must be considered a deliberate failure to comply with orders/instructions (a serious violation). The Court of Appeals considered it important that all the employees had been expressly warned of the consequences of violating the smoking ban, i.e. that this would lead to dismissal with immediate effect. The Court of Appeals also ruled that the dismissal with immediate effect was justified.
Information
If you require further information in connection with this article, you can contact Mieke Bestebreurtje.
The future labour market
The future labour market
Minister Van Gennip (Social Affairs and Employment) sent a package of labour market measures to the Lower House on 3 April (Kamerbrief over voortgang uitwerking arbeidsmarktpakket | Kamerstuk | Rijksoverheid.nl). The Minister largely follows the so-called ‘Borstlap Committee’ and the SER Advice and gives an advance insight into what the labour market should look like (at the latest) in 2025, according to the Cabinet.
The future of the labour market: level playing field between permanent contract and self-employed/flex worker
The playing field between the self-employed and the employee must be levelled so that employees are not (forced to) wrongly choose one form of contract or the other. The tax benefits of self-employment are being phased out. Moreover, a compulsory disability insurance for the self-employed is being worked on.
The differences between permanent and flexible contracts will also be reduced. As a result, employers will – the minister expects – more often opt for a permanent contract. That remains to be seen, as the dismissal law will not be further relaxed and the legal obligation to continue paying wages in case of illness will remain at two years. In addition, many employers need certain flexible shells to cope with the ups and downs in the workload.
1. Flexible workers get more security
On-call contracts, such as zero-hours and/or min-max contracts, will be abolished from 1 January 2025. These will be replaced by a ‘basic contract’, which has yet to be fleshed out. Scholars and students can still continue to work on the basis of current on-call contracts. The employer’s flexible shell will thus be further curtailed. This is again expected to lead to an increase in self-employed workers.
2. Smaller firms’ obligations for long-term incapacitated workers are reduced.
From 1 January 2025, small and medium-sized employers (up to 100 employees) may determine by mutual agreement that reintegration with their own employer (‘first track’) is no longer reasonable and focus entirely on reintegration with another employer (‘second track’). Employers, on the other hand, remain obliged to continue paying wages during illness for two years. They are also co-responsible for the reintegration process. The incapacitated employee retains the right to return to his own job, should he recover in the second year of illness and if the employer has not yet permanently filled his original position.
3. In a crisis or calamity, a company can retain employees
There will be a Crisis Staff Retention Scheme (‘CP’), formerly part-time unemployment. Employers can claim this if there is at least 20% less work across the company. The scheme will be aimed at coping with crisis and calamities, which fall outside the regular business risk (e.g. in case of another lockdown due to a pandemic). The CP implies that only 80% wages need to be paid on the number of hours not worked in a crisis situation. Of this, the employer can then claim back 60% under the scheme.
4. So-called false self-employment among self-employed workers will be reduced
There are almost 1.2 million self-employed in the Netherlands. Among them are also a large number of “false self-employed”. In fact, Deliveroo’s meal deliverers, Uber’s drivers were also pseudo self-employed.
The lack of protection in case of illness and dismissal and the fact that these self-employed workers (wrongly) only contribute to social security to a limited extent is seen as problematic.
There will therefore be legislation, which will define the ‘organisational embeddedness of the work and the worker’. This is the decisive criterion on the basis of which a commission contract may turn out to be an employment contract after all. In addition, this should combat false self-employment. Moreover, it will become easier for self-employed persons to claim an employment contract. Indeed, there will be a civil-law legal presumption of an employment contract linked to an hourly rate (a possible rate below €35 per hour). If the zzp’er’s hourly rate is higher, this will be a contraindication for a contract for services.
Finally, the enforcement moratorium by the tax authorities will finally be lifted in 2025 and the (to be adapted) DBA Act will be enforced again. The question is, however, whether the tax authorities will then have sufficient capacity to actually enforce it.
Questions about the future of the labour market and implications for your organisation?
In short; another set of far-reaching labour market changes are on the agenda. Do you have questions about how these labour market changes will affect your organisation? Then contact Richard Ouwerling, employment law lawyer at LVH Advocaten in Rotterdam for more information.
The Environment Act & Disadvantage Compensation (part 2) The reference date and (planning) comparison
Introduction
As of Jan. 1, 2024, the Environment Act will be in effect. With its entry into force, it has been said that the largest legislative operation has been completed since the introduction of the Dutch Constitution law in 1848. Several previously existing separate laws and regulations have been combined into one law and four Orders in Council with the Environment Act. With a legislative operation of such magnitude, of course (principle) choices are made that bring about a change from the previously applicable law. So too in the context of the Environment Act.
One area of the Environment Act where (principled) differences between the old and new law clearly emerge on is the law of plan damage / loss compensation. In a number of separate contributions some of these changes will be discussed in more detail and the (mo equal) consequences for practice will be considered. In each of these subjects, the judiciary will probably still have an important task in settling fundamental (points of dispute). This aspect, in combination with the fact that the old law will remain in force for quite some time under the transitional law, will undoubtedly create a lot of dynamics in case law in the coming years.
In the previous contribution, some terminological differences between the old law and the Om gevingswet were discussed, and attention was also paid to Section 4.5 of the General Administrative Law Act (“Awb”), which also came into force on January 1, 2024. This contribution will discuss the reference date and the (planning) comparison to be made.
The reference date
The reference date is an important benchmark for answering the question of whether damage is suffered as a result of a planning/spatial development. Under the old law (the Wro), the reference date was the da tum on which the alleged damage-causing decision (e.g., a zoning plan) entered into force, regardless of whether the planning development that was permitted was actually realized. This interpretation of the reference date was abandoned when the Environment Act entered into force. Under the Environment Act, the reference date for loss compensation (after all, the term “planning damage” has been abandoned) is the moment that the damage actually occurs. That moment can be the moment the permit is granted, the start of the activities or the moment the competent authority is informed about the start of the activities.
The amended reference date under the Environment Act stems in part from the global scope of the environmental plan. After all, the environmental plan does not have to describe in detail what is or is not permitted at a location. The amendment of the reference date is particularly intended to tie in with the moment when something actually changes in the physical environment. Under the old law, planning damage could occur as a result of ‘merely’ changing the planning regime (e.g. the amendment of a zoning plan) without the permitted development being realized. Under the old law, this could therefore result in compensation of theoretical damage. After all, what was permitted from a planning perspective could – although not (yet) realized – already result in planning damage as a result of the modified planological working conditions. With the introduction of the Environment Act, the possibility of theoretical damage has been abandoned with regard to the changed reference date.
The (planning) comparison
Besides a different reference date, the changed comparison under the new loss compensation scheme in the Environment Act also stands out. Illustrative of the comparison under the old law (Wro) is the ruling of the Administrative Law Division of the Council of State (“the Division”) in the Hardenberg case (ABRvS January 24, 2024, ECLI:NL:RVS:2024:225) in which it is considered: “For the assessment of an application for compensation for planning damage, it is examined whether the applicant has been placed at a disadvantage as a result of the relevant change in the planning regime and suffers or will suffer damage. To this end, a comparison is made between the post-impact modification of the planning regime, which is claimed to have caused damage, and the immediately preceding planolo _COPY0 gical regime. In that far ge comparison, in principle the most unfavorable in filling of the possibilities of the old and new planning regime is assumed. Only if the most un favorable fulfilment of these possibilities can be excluded with a probability bordering on certainty, there is reason to deviate from this starting point.”
The old planning damage regulation under the Wro thus had a highly theoretical assessment with a high level of abstraction whereby damages were, in principle, assessed in one go. An exception to the principle of plan maximization concerned the case where realization of the maximum construction or use possibilities could be excluded ‘with a probability bordering on certainty’ (e.g. as a result of private law obstacles). Under the Environment Act, at least in the case of indirect damage in the form of decrease in the value of an immovable property, a different course will be taken. Instead of the planological comparison (the maximum planological infill), under the Environment Act, Articles 15.3 and 15.4 are about comparing actual situations (in short, what has been and is being realized?). In this context, a parallel can be drawn with the other reference date discussed above, which after all corresponds to the moment when something actually changes in the physical living environment. Whether this method of comparison also applies to direct damage in the form of decrease in the value of an immovable property or in the case of loss of income has not been determined by the legislator and will therefore probably have to be determined by the administrative courts in the coming years.
Illustrative of the manner in which the (planning) comparison takes place under the Environment Act is the comment in the Explanatory Memorandum (Parliamentary Papers II 2018/19, 34986, no. 3, pp. 229 / 236) which notes: “………. in cases as referred to in Articles 15.1, second paragraph, ge read in conjunction with Articles 15.3 and 15.4, (damage) will not (…) be determined on the basis of a far equation between the maximum possibilities of the old and new regime, as is the case under the Wro. Instead, the determination of damages in those cases will focus, much more than is currently the case , on the actual situation. Determining the extent of the damage here ties in with the changes actually made to the physical environment. (…) Article 15.3 leads to the fact that in the case of indirect damage, the decrease in the value of an immovable property is determined on the basis of the actual situation before and after the granting of the environmental permit.”
In practice, the comparison that will have to be made under the Environmental Law still raises the necessary questions. After all, if the actual situation must be taken into account, should the (previous) local planning regime be completely ignored (by a surveyor)? Even if that could have major consequences and to that extent already cast its shadow far ahead? Consider, for example, the pla no logical possibility of establishing a business at a short distance across from a detached house that would then have to be disregarded. Disregarding such effects of planning pressure on value ken can lead to a higher house value in an appraisal than if these effects had been taken into account (overestimation). Whereas the changed reference date prevents compensation of the o re ti sche damage (see above), the regulation of the Environmental Law with respect to the pla no lo gical comparison may result in compensation of theoretical damage because, in the example given above, the house value is overestimated / appraised (after all, abstracted from the disadvantageous planning possibility of establishing a business in the vicinity of the house). Among other things, the administrative law speech will have to provide clarity on this and related questions.
Closing Remarks
This contribution discussed the reference date, theoretical damage and the modified equation for assessing a request for loss compensation. The next contribution will discuss the changes brought about by the Environment Act with regard to the concept of damage.
Learn more
This contribution was written by Ben van Nieuwaal of LVH Advocaten. If you have any questions about this contribution, please contact us at the general number 010 – 209 27 77.
Annique Wennekes
Introduction of the Franchise Act does not produce a rosy future for franchise formulas
I have written about the Netherlands Franchise Code (NFC) before and explained its contents. In that context, I noted briefly that Minister Kamp sent a white paper for the Franchise Act to the Dutch House of Representatives. The white paper concerns special regulations for a franchise agreement and is open for consultation up to 25 May 2017, inviting stakeholders and interested parties to express their opinion.
A few of the questions that could arise in the context of the white paper include: What is the purpose of the white paper? What does it include exactly? What are the objections to introducing the white paper?
Purpose
The purpose of the white paper is to strengthen the position of the franchisee to ensure that prior and after concluding a franchise agreement there is a greater balance between the interests of the franchiser and those of the franchisee/prospective franchisee. There is a group of people who believe that the franchisee generally has a weaker position than the franchiser. This legislation is set to change this.
Content
By adding two Sections, Sections 7:399f and 7:399g, to the Netherlands Civil Code, “a code of conduct or part thereof”, in other words the NFC, is declared applicable to franchisers and franchisees.
With Section 7:399F of the Netherlands Civil Code, the white paper includes a definition of the franchise formula, the franchiser, the franchisee, the franchise agreement and the preliminary agreement.
The second Section 7:399g of the Netherlands Civil Code refers to a general order in council that can adopt a code of conduct. Despite the fact that the NFC is not mentioned explicitly in the aforementioned Section, the comprehensive explanatory notes make it abundantly clear that this order in council will come and that it will include the NFC.
It is striking that the explanatory notes observe that most chains are characterised by good cooperation between franchisers and franchisees and that both parties benefit. On the other hand, it notes that there are persistent problems in the sector that must be solved or prevented by means of legislation.
The starting point of the code of conduct is that it must be applied in principle. In the event the franchiser and the franchisee decide together to exclude the code of conduct or to deviate from it, they must agree this explicitly and substantiate this thoroughly. This is known as the so-called ‘comply or explain’ principle. The explanatory notes say that it should be explained why a certain requirement or element from the code of conduct is not workable in a specific situation or sector. In order to leave as much room as possible for business, the rules of the code of conduct are not enshrined in law, but a code of conduct is designated that should be applied in principle. That should give the parties the opportunity to record their rules along the lines of the code of conduct.
In the event the franchiser does not comply with the code of conduct and the franchise agreement does not contain a clause stating that the code of conduct is not adopted in full, the franchiser is in breach of the new regulation. This also applies if the corresponding motivation does not comply with Section 7:399g(2) of the Netherlands Civil Code. This could concern breach of contract on the part of the franchiser, following which the franchisee may force the application of the code of conduct by going to court. Any damage due to not applying the code of conduct can be recovered from the franchiser in this way.
Objections
In my view, the actual implementation of the white paper would prejudice contractual freedom between two professional parties. Furthermore, the NFC does not fit well within the existing regulations in Dutch law and case law for distributors and agents.
The white paper provides too much protection for franchisees, which begs the question as to what happened to business practice. In practice, the ‘comply or explain’ principle will cause legal uncertainty. The NFC also includes restrictions in respect of termination options by the franchiser that go beyond those developed in case law. It is equally unclear how the white paper relates to choice of jurisdiction or choice for foreign law in a franchise agreement.
Conclusion
In view of the aforementioned, the introduction of the white paper does not offer a rosy prospect for franchise formulas. I hope that interested parties will express their opinion before 25 May 2017 to ensure that self-regulation is given a chance.
Information
For more information about the white paper and its possible consequences, please contact Sabriye Ort.
Effective employee participation through clear ground rules
Effective employee participation through clear ground rules
Effective cooperation with the works council benefits your operations. This requires clear ground rules. How are these established, what do they achieve and what are the pitfalls?
Lack of clarity on employee participation; duty to advise or not to consent
Sometimes it is not clear whether a proposed decision of the company requires advice or consent. Not infrequently, director and works council have discussions about this, which degenerate into disputes. This leads to delays in decision-making (and in business operations) and usually does not benefit smooth cooperation and mutual trust. A company agreement can offer a solution.
What does the Works Councils Act (WOR) say about a company agreement?
Section 32 WOR contains provisions on the works council agreement. By written agreement, the entrepreneur and the works council can mutually agree on powers of the works council. The condition is that the works council can only be granted additional powers.
Possibilities in the works agreement
In the works agreement, the entrepreneur and works council can arrange that certain intended decisions require the advice or consent of the works council. Or that consultations will be held on certain subjects. While this is not required under the WOR.
At first sight, it seems that by entering into such an agreement, the entrepreneur restricts himself unnecessarily in his decision-making. But there are also advantages for the entrepreneur by entering into a company agreement.
Possible agreements between entrepreneur and works council
An example. The employer can agree with the works council that consultations will be held on changes to employment conditions and that the parties aim to reach agreement on all proposed changes. Additional agreements can then also be made, for example:
- that consultations will be held on certain topics (such as the level of remuneration), but no agreement needs to be reached;
- that if no agreement is reached during the consultations, the works council will not invoke the right of consent regarding individual parts of the employment conditions (so that Section 27 of the WOR does not apply);
- That the works council will observe confidentiality on certain matters;
- that parties will seek advice or mediation if they cannot reach agreement.
Such agreements ensure that discussions are less likely to degenerate into protracted disputes and also that decision-making can be accelerated.
Pitfalls and points of attention when concluding company agreements for effective employee participation
It is very important that the company agreement specifies precisely which decisions require advice or consent. If not, discussions may arise as to whether a proposed decision requires advice or consent. Or discussions may arise about the scope of the obligation to advise or consent.
Furthermore, it is not wise to give the works council additional advisory or consent rights incidentally, outside a company agreement, because this could set an (undesirable) precedent.
Need advice on effective employee participation?
Do you need advice on the corporate agreement or effective cooperation with the works council? If so, please contact corporate law lawyer Peter Verheijden
Summons Dismissal: Requirements and Recent Rulings
Many employers are occasionally confronted with an employee whom – in view of the seriousness of the conduct – they wish to part with immediately, i.e. dismiss summarily. But is this really possible? In this article, we will discuss the requirements for summary dismissal and three recent decisions by subdistrict courts that have ruled on summary dismissal.
Requirements of summary dismissal
Prior to discussing the rulings, we briefly name the requirements that a summary dismissal must meet. (1) An urgent reason must be present, (2) the employment contract must be terminated without delay, and (3) the urgent reason must be communicated without delay.
- Urgent reason is conduct that, according to the law, is such that the employer cannot be required to allow the employment contract to continue. The law mentions examples, such as theft, violence, deceit, neglect of duties and violation of reintegration obligations. Previous conduct of the employee may also contribute to the urgent reason.
- Immediate termination means that the employee’s employment contract must be terminated as soon as possible after the employer knows that he is authorized to dismiss. An employer has time to investigate and obtain legal advice.
- The urgent reason must be communicated to the employee as soon as possible so that the employee determine his or her status. We recommend always doing this (also) in writing. The burden of proof lies with the employer.
Verification of circumstances in the event of summary dismissal
In addition to these three requirements, the court also tests all the circumstances of the case, including: (a) the impact on the employee (age), (2) length of employment, (3) seriousness of the conduct, (4) frequency and knowability of the conduct, (5) job level, and (6) justifications.
Claims against employee for summary dismissal
A summary dismissal does not require that the employee be at fault. However, if the employee has given the employer an urgent reason for terminating the employment through intent or fault, the employee owes compensation. This compensation is equal to the salary for the notice period which the employee should have observed. In the case of a fixed-term employment contract without an interim notice clause, the compensation is, in principle, the salary for the remaining term of the employment contract. The subdistrict court may reduce the amount, but it may also increase it.
In addition to this fixed compensation, employers may also recover damages from the employee as a result of, for example, theft or embezzlement.
Case Law on summary dismissal
North Holland District Court 7 January 2021
In this case, an employee was summarily dismissed for work ethic, financial mismanagement and work refusal. The employer tried afterwards to withdraw the dismissal, but the employee did not agree. The employee claimed liquidated damages and equitable remuneration, as well as a declaration that the employer could not derive any rights from the non-competition clause.
According to the subdistrict court, the employer had not proven that there was a case of malfunctioning. There was no evidence of a serious discussion with the employee about his performance, nor was an improvement plan offered. Furthermore, not every refusal to work constitutes grounds for immediate dismissal. The employee refused to attend a performance appraisal interview after it was indicated that other people would be present than previously agreed. The summary dismissal was therefore not legally valid. The subdistrict court granted the employee’s requests and awarded €30,000 in fair compensation.
North Holland District Court 24 February 2021
Employee who worked for a transport company was summarily dismissed for allegedly assigning loads in exchange for personal benefits. Employee claimed liquidated damages, transitional compensation and equitable relief.
The subdistrict court ruled that the immediate dismissal was unjustified, since it was based in particular on an undated written statement in a foreign language which was so colored that it could not be regarded as credible. On this basis, the Subdistrict Court awarded fixed damages and transitional compensation. The sub-district court did not award equitable remuneration. It had been established that for years the employee had received payments from a third party (Spanish transport company), the employee had advanced money for fines to drivers and had granted a loan to the third party without informing the employer. This created the suspicion of fraudulent conduct. A request for dissolution would probably have been granted in view of these acts without the award of an equitable remuneration, according to the subdistrict court.
North Holland District Court 18 March 2021
In the latest case, an employee was summarily dismissed after taking and not returning a socket wrench set. During an interview in which the employer asked whether the employee had taken the set, the employee denied twice. When the employer showed a photo showing the employee with the set, the employee confirmed that he had taken the set. During that same conversation, the employee was summarily fired. Approximately one week after this dismissal, the employee indicated that he had no intention of taking the set. Approximately one month later, the employee indicated that he had not taken the set away, but had merely kept it.
The employee requested payment of the transitional allowance, fixed damages and equitable remuneration. It has been established that the dismissal was given without delay. It has also been established that the employee took the set with him and did not report this, nor was the set returned of its own accord. In view of the circumstances, the Subdistrict Court considered that there had been a serious breach of duty that justified immediate dismissal. The Subdistrict Court therefore did not award fixed damages and equitable relief. However, the Subdistrict Court did see reason to award partial transitional compensation of € 10,000, since the loss of the entire transitional compensation would be unacceptable according to the standards of reasonableness and fairness. The reason given was the 19-year employment relationship, the age of 55, the fact that the employee had not been at fault before and he had not yet found another job.
Probability of success for summary dismissal
The preceding judgments show that the success rate of a summary dismissal is small, but certainly not impossible. Always seek immediate advice regarding summary dismissal. We can review with you all the circumstances of the case and determine whether it is possible to give a summary dismissal or whether it would be better to opt for the dissolution procedure or an alternative solution.
Lawyers specialized in summary dismissal
Do you have any questions about this article? Please contact Peter Verheijden or Richard Ouwerling of LVH Advocaten. As employment lawyers, they regularly deal with instant dismissals and will be happy to advise you on your options.
Flight delay due to a screw in the tyre or oil on the track
Many factors influence whether or not a flight departs on time, with an airline having an influence on far from all matters. The delay of a flight can often not be prevented by the airline, but it is confronted with passenger claims under EC Regulation 261/2004 in case of a delay.
An update on 2 recent judgments of the Court of Justice of the EU
When can an airline appeal to the disculpation of an extraordinary circumstance (in fact a kind of force majeure) in case of flight delay? The Court of Justice of the EU (ECJ EU) handed down two new judgments on this matter in the first half of 2019. What were the Court’s considerations?
Recent judgments on flight delay ECJ EU
The Court has recently clarified in two judgments when an air carrier can invoke an extraordinary circumstance in the event of a flight delay. These are the judgments in Germanwings GmbH vs. Wolfgang Pauels (C-501/17) on 4 April 2019 and André Moens v. Ryanair Ltd. (C-159/18) on 26 June 2019.
Air carrier not liable for financial compensation
In both cases, the ECJ ruled that the air carrier concerned was not required to pay financial compensation under Article 7 of EC Regulation 261/2004 for the flight delay. In both proceedings it was held that the flights had been delayed as a result of an exceptional circumstance under Article 5(3) of the aforementioned Regulation.
Definition of exceptional circumstance in the event of flight delay
In the Germanwings vs. Pauels judgment, the Court considered that an air carrier is not obliged to pay compensation if it can prove that the cancellation or delay is caused by an extraordinary circumstance which could not have been avoided even if all reasonable means had been employed. According to the Court, the air carrier must prove that it has taken measures appropriate to the situation using all the material, financial and human resources at its disposal. It is not necessary to make sacrifices which are unacceptable from the point of view of the capabilities of the air carrier’s undertaking at the relevant time.
Flight delay due to a screw on the runway
In this judgment, airline Germanwings invoked the disculpation of the extraordinary circumstance, since the flight had been delayed as a result of a tyre being damaged by a propeller on the runway.
The Court considered that airlines regularly have to deal with damaged tyres. However, damage to a tyre caused by a collision with a foreign object on the runway of an airport is by its nature not inherent in the normal exercise of the airline’s activities. This is because the tyre defect caused by a collision with a foreign object is not a defect originating in the aircraft itself. Moreover, the responsibility for the maintenance of the runways lies with the airport. This therefore falls outside the competence and sphere of influence of the airline.
The collision with a foreign, external object that is not used for the operation of the flight therefore generates an extraordinary circumstance as a result of which the airline does not have to pay compensation if a flight delay occurs in these cases.
Flight delay due to petrol on the runway
The Moens vs. Ryanair judgment concerned the delay of a flight due to petrol on the runway of Treviso airport. The runway was temporarily closed by the airport authorities to clean the runway. Passenger Moens claimed compensation for the flight delay.
The ECJ EU considered that petrol on a runway – which does not originate from the aircraft that carried out the flight – is not inherent in the nature or origin of the normal operation of the airline concerned (Germanwings judgment). Nor is it related to the operation of the aircraft on which the flight was operated. In addition, the air carrier cannot exercise any real influence in this respect either, since the maintenance of the runways falls outside its competence. In this case, the airline could do nothing other than await the decision of the airport authority to reopen the runway or to take an alternative measure. In short, petrol on the runway, which does not originate from the aircraft which carried out the flight and as a result of which the runway is closed, is also qualified as an extraordinary circumstance on which an air carrier can rely in the event of a flight delay.
Information
This article was written by LVH advocaten who regularly assists various airlines in the handling of compensation claims.
When does a commercial agreement become a legally binding agreement?
It may be that your commercial enterprise was still negotiating the terms of a commercial contract and the negotiations did not result in an agreed written contract. At least that is what you thought until you received an invoice. When does a commercial agreement become legally binding according to the Dutch Civil Code (DCC)?
An agreement is constituted by offer and acceptance, after an offer has been made which has been accepted (article 6:217 – 6:225 DCC).
This seems to be quite straightforward, but a lot of discrepancies can arise between an offer and acceptance, in addition to confusion as to whether the offer was a legally binding offer, or whether the acceptance was a legally binding acceptance. Under the DCC there are 3 requirements that need to be met before an offer or acceptance is legally binding and after which they constitute a legally binding agreement. These relate to the intention of the party making the offer, the manner in which it is declared and the alignment between the offer and the acceptance. Intention, declaration and alignment of the offer/acceptance all need to be in accordance with the legal requirements in the DCC and subsequent case law.
In order to establish whether the offer and the acceptance are aligned, the offer needs to be directed to the party for which it is intended. The offer and acceptance both consist of an intent and of a declaration which has been disclosed and has been understood by the receiving party in the same way as how it was intended by the disclosing party, based on the circumstances that the receiving party could reasonably have understood (3:33 and 3:35 DCC). The declaration is form free (3:37 DCC), so this can be verbally or in writing.
The alignment of the offer and acceptance is often the reason for a dispute between the parties, because of the parties have understood the offer or acceptance to have been something different. For example, you are contemplating selling your company and a buyer has appeared wanting to buy your company subject to certain terms and conditions to be agreed upon during the discussions. It may be that an agreement is in place already, and negotiations have not started yet or have not started at all. A consequence for the seller may be that he may no longer be permitted to sell the company to another party. A consequence for the buyer may be that he is under a duty to pay the purchase price plus delivery of what is being sold.
In some situations it may happen that the negotiations break down, and then the question is what are the consequences of stopping the negotiations?
There is set case law on this originating from Plas/Valburg where the Supreme court defined three defined pre-contractual stages, being the following:
- The negotiations have broken down without any obligation to compensate the costs of the other side.
- The negotiations have progressed to such a stage that stopping the negotiations would lead to substantial costs being incurred. In this stage, damages are due and payable by the withdrawing party.
- The negotiations are in such an advanced phase that stopping the negotiations would be in breach of good faith. The parties may each rely on the fact that the negotiations would have resulted in an agreement. The withdrawing party is then under an obligation to pay the costs incurred by the other party and in some cases even loss of profit.
This judgment had an enormous impact in the legal world and resulted in a draft amendment in the DCC which was never implemented, but was applied by the Supreme court in VSH/Shell. So, based on case law, it became more and more accepted to apply the above stages.
In the Supreme Court judgment CBB/JPO however, these phases were amended in such a way that the rights to compensation of the non-withdrawing party were reduced. So the protection for the non-withdrawing party became less. Thereafter the Supreme Court ruled in Greenib/Van Dam that damages were payable for broken down negotiations. So, therefore re-instating the Plas/Valburg stages, whereby compensation for the costs incurred by the non-withdrawing are to be compensated by the withdrawing party.
The facts in this case were that the negotiations regarding a Hyundai dealership were in such a phase that the other party could reasonably have relied on the fact that a legal agreement would have been entered into. The court decided that negotiations could not just stop without any consequences, and therefore order the payment of damages to compensate the other party.
So, as you might understand, the formation of a legally binding agreement is quite complex and there are a lot of issues to take into consideration starting from the point where parties are commencing the negotiations to the point where both parties believe that a legally binding agreement has been entered into.
Are you negotiating the terms of an agreement, and are you concerned about any of the above, then please contact Madelon van Breemen.
Is interest on a rental debt also a debt of the estate?
On 24 December 2021, the Supreme Court ruled on the question of whether statutory or contractual default interest on rent owed as an estate debt is an estate debt. The judgment is of great importance for practice, because in most corporate insolvencies there is a lease running on the business premises on the date of the bankruptcy. This results in estate debts concerning the rent owed for the period after the bankruptcy date. First, we will explain the concept of estate debts and then discuss the judgment.
What is meant by estate debts in bankruptcy?
Estate debts can be regarded as the costs of the bankruptcy. Only when the debts of the estate can be paid in full can payments be made to creditors with preferential rights. Only when the preferential creditors can be paid in full can distribution be made to creditors without preferential rights, i.e. the unsecured creditors. Incidentally, pledgees and mortgagees have a special position, but this will not be discussed further in this article.
When must an estate debt be paid?
Estate debts give rise to an immediate claim on the bankruptcy estate. However, settlement of an estate debt cannot always be enforced, because the trustee in bankruptcy may postpone payment if it is uncertain whether the estate debt can be fully settled. This depends on the available and expected financial resources, but also on any other existing and future estate debts and the applicable order of priority among the estate debts.
What are the grounds for the creation of estate debts?
In the important 2013 judgment Koot Beheer / Tideman q.q., the Supreme Court clarified when there are estate debts. These are only the debts that give rise to an immediate claim on the bankruptcy estate, either
– (i) pursuant to the law,
– (ii) because they have been contracted by the trustee in his capacity (in the sense that his will has been directed towards them),
– (iii) because they are the result of an action by the liquidator in contravention of an obligation or duty to be performed by him in his capacity.
Regulation on termination of lease in case of bankruptcy
Section 39 of the Bankruptcy Act provides that if the bankrupt is a tenant, both the trustee in bankruptcy and the lessor may terminate the lease prematurely. In short, a notice period of three months has to be observed. From the date of the bankruptcy, the rent will be a debt of the estate. This is therefore an example of the first category of estate debts referred to in the Koot Beheer / Tideman q.q. judgment: an immediate claim on the bankruptcy estate by virtue of the law.
Opinions of Subdistrict Court and Court of Appeal on interest as estate debt
A landlord claimed before the Subdistrict Court that the trustee should be ordered to pay the rent owed to the estate, plus interest. In addition, in appeal it was claimed that the Court of Appeal should rule that the interest on the rented estate debt should also be qualified as a claim against the estate (by way of a declaration for rights).
The Subdistrict Court and the Court of Appeal rejected the claims. The Court of Appeal assessed whether the interest on the leasehold estate debt fell under one of the categories mentioned in the Koot Beheer / Tideman q.q. judgment. In other words, according to the Court of Appeal, the law does not recognise the interest on the rental estate debt as a claim against the estate. Evidently, according to the Court of Appeal, the interest payment obligation, as such, does not qualify as an estate debt in the second category either.
Is the interest on the rent a debt of the estate as a result of an act of the trustee in breach of an obligation or duty to be fulfilled by him?
The Court of Appeal considered that for the question whether the interest on the estate rent should at any time be qualified as an estate debt of the third category, the situation of the estate should also be taken into account. The Court of Appeal reasoned as follows. In principle, it is not the fault of the trustee if the assets of the bankrupt turn out to be insufficient to (fully) pay estate debts such as the ones in question. The trustee in bankruptcy has to make do with the assets as he finds them. Insofar as the trustee in bankruptcy is unable to pay the debt in question, excluding interest, out of the estate with due observance of the legal precedence, he shall not be in default in his capacity as trustee. Therefore, to that extent, no interest shall be owed by him as a debt of the estate. The same applies in principle as long as it is uncertain whether he will be able to pay the debt in this way. The Court of Appeal is of the opinion that in the case at hand the trustees have not been in default.
Judgment of the Supreme Court: interest on estate rent debt is an estate debt
The landlord appealed to the Supreme Court and argued that the Court of Appeal had wrongly ruled that the landlord was not entitled to a claim against the estate in respect of interest on the leasehold debt.
The Supreme Court put first and foremost that the bankruptcy does not change existing reciprocal agreements. The rent has been owed to the estate since the date of the declaration of bankruptcy. The claim to payment of the rent, even where it has been treated as a debt of the estate, remains a claim by the landlord against the insolvent tenant under the tenancy agreement concluded between them. The question of whether default exists with regard to the claim to pay rent must be answered on the basis of the lease and the statutory provisions applicable to default, according to the Supreme Court.
Then comes the key consideration:
“If default exists with regard to the payment of a claim on the estate, and the creditor is entitled to compensation in the form of statutory (commercial) interest (Article 6:74 DCC in conjunction with Article 6:119 et seq. DCC), the nature of a claim on the estate as an immediate claim on the estate implies that the obligation to pay this interest associated with the estate claim must also be regarded as a debt of the estate.”
Even if the trustee is allowed to postpone payment, interest on estate debt is an estate debt
The Supreme Court considered that the purpose of the rules which may result in the trustee in bankruptcy sometimes being able to defer payment of an estate debt is to guarantee the equality of estate creditors, and any different ranking of their claims. According to the Supreme Court, these rules do not justify that the claim for compensation in the form of interest lapses if the claim is not paid or not paid on time.
Can contractual default interest on the estate rent also be regarded as a claim of the estate?
It is possible that parties to a lease agreement have agreed that instead of the statutory commercial interest a contractual default interest applies. The Supreme Court considered that the default interest on the rental estate debt should also be regarded as an estate debt. There is no reason to approach this differently than the statutory interest.
Looking for a lawyer in insolvency law in Rotterdam?
Should you wish to seek advice on insolvency law, such as on the rights of a landlord in the event of a tenant’s bankruptcy, estate debts and the ranking of creditors, please contact Peter de Graaf of LVH Advocaten.
Dutch employment law: dismissal procedure and severance pay
Almost every company employs personnel and therefore has to deal with the relatively complex system of Dutch employment law. Hiring and hiring personnel is relatively simple. Dismissal, on the other hand, can be complex and in certain cases impossible or expensive. In many cases, it can therefore be advantageous to agree on termination of employment by mutual consent.
Preventive dismissal test
In the Netherlands there is a preventive dismissal test. This means that the employer – with a few exceptions – requires prior permission to terminate an employee’s employment contract. Depending on the reason for the dismissal, the subdistrict court assesses whether the UWV or the employer has reasonable grounds for dismissal and whether the employer has made it plausible that reinstatement (possibly by means of training) is not possible or not reasonable.
Limitative grounds for dismissal
The law contains nine limitative grounds on the basis of which an employer can dismiss an employee. These are:
- Business economic circumstances;
- Long-term incapacity for work (after 104 weeks);
- Regular absenteeism due to illness;
- Dysfunction;
- Culpable act or omission;
- Refusal of employment due to serious conscientious objections;
- Disrupted employment relationship;
- Other circumstances;
- Cumulation of grounds.
It is up to the employer to make this ground sufficiently plausible. It is therefore very important that you build up a file which shows that you cannot be expected to maintain the employment contract.
UWV dismissal procedure
Of the nine limitative grounds for dismissal, two are assessed by the UWV. These are: a) business economic circumstances and b) long-term incapacity for work. An application for dismissal can be submitted to the UWV for these grounds for dismissal. If the employer obtains permission from the UWV, the employment contract can be validly terminated. If permission is refused, it is possible to initiate proceedings before the subdistrict court.
Termination via subdistrict court
The other grounds for dismissal are assessed by the Subdistrict Court. This dissolution procedure is started with a request for termination, after which a hearing is scheduled. The employee can then put forward a defence. If the Subdistrict Court determines that the employment contract is to be dissolved, it also determines the time at which the employment contract would have ended in the event of termination. If the request for dissolution is rejected, an appeal may still be possible.
Termination of employment contract
The employer cannot terminate the employment contract in the event of a ban on termination. For example, there is a termination ban during illness (104 weeks), pregnancy, military service and membership of the Works Council or PVT. In that case, termination is only possible if the request does not relate to the ban on termination. An example is a sick employee who is guilty of theft during reintegration. In that case, the reason for dismissal is not the illness, but (serious) culpability.
Transition compensation
As of 1 January 2020, an employee is entitled to transition compensation as of the first day of the employment contract, if the employment contract ends on the initiative of the employer by notice, dissolution or if the employment contract is not continued after an end by operation of law. An employee may also claim this compensation if it is established that the employer has acted in a seriously culpable manner. A transition allowance is not payable to employees who (i) have reached the AOW or pensionable age, (ii) are younger than eighteen years of age and have worked a maximum of 12 hours per week, (iii) have acted or failed to act in a seriously culpable manner and finally (iv) if the employer is in a state of bankruptcy or has been granted a suspension of payments or the WSNP applies.
Fair compensation in the event of dismissal
Fair compensation is severance pay which may be awarded to an employee by a court. Fair compensation may be awarded to an employee, inter alia, in the event of serious culpable behaviour on the part of the employer, as an alternative to reparation, or if the employer has given notice, for example, in breach of a prohibition on giving notice. The court determines the amount of fair compensation on the basis of the exceptional circumstances of the case, such as the consequences of the dismissal, the duration of the employment contract and the employee’s chances on the labour market.
Cumulation allowance
If dissolution is granted on the ground for cumulation, the judge can grant a so-called cumulation compensation. The cumulation allowance (on top of the transition allowance) amounts to a maximum of half of the transition allowance to which the employee is entitled. This compensation serves as compensation for the employee who is confronted with dissolution without the existence of a full ground for dismissal.
Questions for our Dutch employment lawyers?
Do you have any questions regarding the above information, or do you need legal assistance from a lawyer in dismissal proceedings? Feel free to contact Richard Ouwerling.
Dutch Divorce Lawyer
When a personal matter such as divorce, questions about custody, or any other matter surrounding marriage dissolution is in question, and proceedings are likely to take place in the Dutch jurisdiction, it is vital that you have experienced legal representation by a Dutch divorce lawyer who deals with International Divorce Cases on a daily basis and who is familiar with the challenges the expatriate faces under such conditions.
Netherlands Divorce Attorneys
The divorce laywers of the LVH Advocaten Family Law Practice Group are there to protect the interests of our clients and pursue the outcome they want. As every individual is unique, so is every family law matter. On top of that every international divorce case has its own challenges, with issues like jurisdiction, service of process, conflict of laws, international conventions and foreign law, foreign pre-nuptial contracts. Our divorce laywers use their experience in the Courtroom and understanding of the system to deal with those aspects.
It is a fact that divorces with international components do present divorce lawyers with uniqe challenges and opportunities. But apart from these challenges, the assistance of our divorce lawyers is not all that different from the assistance you would expect in your own jurisdiction.
Some divorces are amicable, and the two parties are able to determine how they want to divide assets, support matters and how custody will be managed. Others involve matters that are contentious and no resolution is possible through negotiations and the court must decide. Our team of Dutch divorce lawyers is prepared to evaluate your personal situation and provide the skilled legal support that is required to bring the matter to a resolution.
Information
For additional information you can contact our office 0031 10 209 2777, or by e-mail info@lvh-advocaten.nl
Change to box 3 levy on income from savings and investments
Change to box 3 levy on income from savings and investments
Change to box 3 levy as of 2022
On December 24, 2021, the Dutch Supreme Court issued a ruling that may have consequences for you as a taxpayer. In this ruling, the Supreme Court decided that the box 3 levy on income from savings and investments is in conflict with the European Convention on Human Rights. This article discusses the judgment and the consequences it may have for you.
How does the box 3 levy work?
Since 2017, box 3 has a flat-rate system. With this system, the legislator aims to match the returns achieved on average by taxpayers in previous years. With the flat rate, an average is taken that applies to all taxpayers. It is assumed that part of the assets consists of investments and part of the assets consists of savings. The part that is assumed to consist of investments is assumed to yield a higher return than the part that consists of savings. Because the balance between savings and investments can differ in reality from the average taken, the calculated in reality can differ from the actual return achieved.
Lump-sum system in violation of European property law and the prohibition on discrimination
In this judgment the Supreme Court ruled that the fixed sum system of box 3 is in conflict with the European law on property and the prohibition on discrimination. According to the Supreme Court, there is no reasonable relationship between the interests that the legislator wanted to serve with the system and the inequality caused by the system.
Difference between actual return and taxed return lump sum system
This case involved the interested party and his wife with assets of approximately EUR 1 million. Eighty percent of these assets consisted of savings. The flat-rate system ensures that interested parties are taxed on a higher return than was actually achieved. The Supreme Court ruled here that this is not allowed. For this reason, the actual return is included in the tax for interested parties.
What does the change in the box 3 levy mean for you as a taxpayer?
If your actual return is lower than the fixed return, the judgment may have consequences for you as a taxpayer. You can object to the income tax assessment. You can do so once you have received the final assessment. Please note: you have 6 weeks from the date of the final assessment to file an objection. Your objection may be designated as a mass objection. If this is the case for 2017 and 2018, you can invoke the Supreme Court ruling. The tax in box 3 can then be recalculated based on the actual return. This can ensure that you pay less tax.
Until when is an action against the income tax assessment possible?
If the period for objection has expired, you could request an ex officio reduction of the assessment. However, the Minister has imposed conditions on the possibility of granting an automatic reduction. For example, an automatic reduction is no longer possible if 5 years have passed since the end of the calendar year to which the relevant assessment relates.
Objection box 3 levy for 2020 and 2021
For the 2020 and 2021 tax returns, it is also important to register for the mass objection (if the actual return is lower than the fixed return). The tax authorities have yet to decide what they will do with the ruling. In principle, the ruling only affects taxpayers who participate in the mass objection, which is why it is necessary to register for the mass objection.
Looking for a tax lawyer in Rotterdam?
Would you like to know more about the steps you can take against the assessment in box 3 and what the Supreme Court ruling will mean for the fixed box 3 levy? Please contact our tax lawyer David Harreman.
Penalty in penalty clause payable?
Violation of conditions in the employment agreement is often made subject to a penalty. The most well-known example is the penalty attached to a non-competition clause. Violation of a confidentiality clause, a prohibition on ancillary activities or a non-solicitation clause may be made subject to penalties as well. Are penalty clauses in employment agreements valid? Could an employer actually claim payment of such penalties, or are these often mitigated by the court?
validity requirements
First and foremost, a penalty clause must have been agreed upon in writing. It may – for example – be part of the employment agreement, but may also be included in the company regulations or the personnel handbook. It must in any case be clear which violations are subject to the penalty clause. The amount of the penalty must be stated in the penalty clause as well.
In addition, for penalty clauses pertaining to matters other than non-competition clauses, the law stipulates that the penalty “may not benefit the employer personally”. Furthermore, the law stipulates that the penalty amount per week may not exceed half a day’s pay. The latter two restrictions only apply if the employee receives the statutory minimum wage. For all other employees, the penalty clause may be different in the following respects: the penalty may benefit the employer directly and may be considerably more than the daily maximum. In such case, such derogations from the standard statutory regulations do have to be laid down in writing in the penalty clause.
payable?
It turns out that in practice, many employees do not take penalty clauses seriously (enough). They assume the penalties will only be payable if the court gets involved. While the mere violation of a prohibition in the employment agreement that is subject to a penalty does not provide the employee with an enforceable judgement, the penalty is incurred straight away. Its payability is not subject to an advance warning.
If the underlying condition is valid and the violation of the condition is proven, the penalty is – in principle – incurred. In such case, the only question that remains is whether the penalty is subject to mitigation.
mitigation?
Penalties contained in employment agreements can be extremely high. An employee may – for example – be liable to pay EUR 5,000.00 for violating a non-competition clause, and EUR 1,000.00 for every day the violation continues. For most employees, such penalties quickly become too high. However, in proceedings, the penalties demanded by employers often amount to tens of thousands of euros. If the court finds that the prohibitory provision has been violated, it will in principle impose the agreed penalty, unless, in the relevant circumstances, this would result in a manifestly unreasonable outcome. According to the Supreme Court, courts must be careful in mitigating penalties, and these may only be mitigated if “the rules of fairness manifestly require this”. In practice, many penalties are eventually mitigated, but the remaining amounts can nevertheless be considerable. In addition, in some cases, the court does not mitigate the penalty at all. This may be the case if the employee knew that he had violated the provision and, despite receiving a warning from the former employer, did not discontinue the competing activities. In such cases, the penalties can be very high.
tips for employers and employees
for employers:
- make prohibitory provisions in the employment agreement subject to a penalty
- do not state in the penalty clause that the penalty is “not subject to mitigation”; this is unlawful and, in some cases, it caused the court to find the entire penalty clause to be invalid.
- warn the employee in advance, or in the event of a violation. While this may not be a requirement for the payability of a fine, in court decisions, the fact that the employee had been warned has been successfully used as an argument for not mitigating the penalty.
for employees:
- take penalty clauses seriously.
- discontinue the forbidden activities after receiving a warning, unless you have very well-founded reasons for expecting the clause to be found invalid. In the event of doubt, consult an expert first.
Information
If you require further information in connection with this article, you can contact Mieke Bestebreurtje.
The shareholders’ agreement: some practical tips
Whether it is a startup or a company that has been around for a long time, it is important that shareholders make good agreements. By recording the agreements, shareholders gain certainty about where they stand with regard to their fellow shareholders.
Agreements that shareholders make among themselves are often included in a shareholder agreement. In the article “A shareholder agreement to make your startup investor-proof” I will discuss the legal difference between the articles of association and the shareholder agreement and give examples of subjects that can be regulated in the shareholder agreement. In this article I give some practical recommendations for some of these topics.
Financing of the company by the shareholders
A subject that must be included in the shareholder agreement is financing. The parties will have drawn up a budget from which the necessary financing results. It is wise to make agreements on how this financing requirement will be met.
From a legal point of view, financing can take place via the issue of shares, share premium payments on existing shares or the granting of loans, whether subordinated or convertible (see also my article “The convertible loan: in whose interest?” for more information about the convertible loan as a financing method).
We advise you to make agreements about the way in which the various forms of financing are applied. For example, the shareholders’ agreement may stipulate that financing takes place in order of priority by first having to use the available reserves, then shareholder loans, obtaining bank financing, issuing new shares to existing shareholders and finally issuing new shares to new shareholders. With the inclusion of this clause, there is clarity about the way in which financing takes place without the shareholders having any further obligations to provide further financing. It also prevents the risk of dilution of shares.
Shareholders’ right to information
An individual shareholder does not have an independent right to information (see, among other things, the Supreme Court’s ruling). However, agreements can be made about this in the shareholders’ agreement. The shareholders’ agreement may include a specific obligation for the management board to provide information to the shareholders. A common agreement is that the management board will provide the shareholders with a monthly report on the progress of the company, including the company’s results, personnel policy, investments, and so on.
Blocking the transfer of shares
It may happen that just after a shareholder joins a company other shareholders wish to retire. Pursuant to Article 2:195(3) of the Dutch Civil Code, it is possible to exclude the transfer of shares for a certain period of time by means of the articles of association. This is also referred to as the ‘lock-up’. A transfer of shares contrary to this lock-up is invalid. A more extensive arrangement about the lock-up can be included in the shareholders’ agreement. The opposite of the lock-up can also be agreed, for example that shareholders will promote the sale of their shares. Many variants are conceivable.
Conclusion
This article contains various practical recommendations for subjects that can be regulated in the shareholders’ agreement. However, many subjects have not yet been discussed, such as the filling of management board positions, dividend policy, dispute resolution, non-competition and so on. It is advisable to seek expert advice on this subject. Do you have questions about the shareholders’ agreement or other corporate law issues? If so, please contact us.
A tenant’s obligation to operate business premises: legal obligation or bargaining point?
When renting business premises, not only the amount of the rent and the duration of the contract play an important role, but also whether the lessee is obliged to actually operate the leased business premises. This so-called obligation to operate can have far-reaching consequences for both the landlord and the tenant of the business space. What exactly does this obligation entail, and under what circumstances can it be enforced or called into question?
What is the duty to operate?
The obligation to operate means that the lessee of business premises is obliged to actively and actually use the leased business premises and continue to conduct a business therein during the term of the lease. This prevents a landlord from being faced with a vacant property, which can be detrimental to a shopping center in which the leased property is located, for example.
Legal basis
The obligation to operate has no legal basis and thus must be explicitly included in the lease. Many standard lease agreements, such as the ROZ model, include an obligation to operate. As a tenant, you can make different arrangements with the landlord of the premises or negotiate the terms of such an obligation to operate.
Importance of landlord’s obligation to operate
For landlords, especially of retail and hospitality properties, an operating obligation is essential. An active business attracts customers and contributes to the success of other nearby businesses. If a tenant closes its doors without going out of business, it can reduce the overall attractiveness of a location.
Tenant and flexibility
For tenants, the obligation to operate can sometimes be a hindrance. Entrepreneurs want the freedom to terminate or temporarily pause operations when economically necessary. Therefore, possible exceptions, such as a right to temporarily pause operations for compelling business reasons, are often negotiated during contract formation.
What if a tenant does not comply with the duty to operate?
When a tenant fails to comply with the duty to operate, it can lead to legal disputes. Landlords may in some cases claim damages or even dissolution of the lease. The outcome of such disputes depends on the specific terms of the lease and the circumstances of the case.
Does the WHOA apply to claims by industry pension funds for pension premium arrears?
The Supreme Court recently issued a ruling on the question of whether the Homologation Underhand Agreement Act (WHOA) applies to claims by industry pension funds for pension premium arrears. The question was answered in the negative. This article discusses the judgment.
What is the Homologation Underhand Agreement Act (WHOA)?
On January 1, 2021, the Homologation Underhand Arrangement Act (WHOA) entered into force. With this regulation included in the Bankruptcy Act, a new restructuring instrument has been introduced. Its purpose is to prevent companies from being declared bankrupt while they are still (partly) viable. Under the scheme, the court can impose a compulsory agreement on creditors and shareholders. This is called homologation. An arrangement may change the rights of those involved. For example, a creditor may have to settle for partial payment of his claim against the debtor.
The WHOA and the position of workers
Section 369(4) of the Bankruptcy Act provides that the scheme of the WHOA does not apply to rights of employees employed by the debtor arising from employment contracts. Thus, the WHOA can be used to settle various debts, but not debts to employees.
Under the WHOA, contracts can also be amended or terminated (Article 373 Bankruptcy Act). However, due to article 369 paragraph 4 Bankruptcy Act, this does not apply to employment contracts.
Are pension contributions covered by the WHOA?
The judgment of the Supreme Court was rendered in response to a preliminary question from a district court. The proceedings involved the following. A hotel company offered a WHOA settlement. In the settlement offer, the Stichting Pensioenfonds Horeca en Catering was put in a class of unsecured creditors. This class was offered payment of 20% of the claim. All classes voted in favour of the settlement with a sufficient majority. The Pension Fund voted against the settlement and filed a defense against the homologation request. The Pension Fund argued that the WHOA does not extend to claims for pension contributions, because of what is stipulated in Section 369(4) of the Bankruptcy Act.
Thus, the legal question arose whether the WHOA applies to pension contributions. Are there here rights of employees employed by the debtor arising from employment contracts? The court referred this question to the Supreme Court.
Rights of employees arising from employment contracts?
The Supreme Court briefly discusses the establishment history of the statutory provision. Based on this, the Supreme Court concludes that with rights of the employees in the sense of article 369 paragraph 4 Bankruptcy Law nothing else is meant than with obligations of the debtor towards its employees.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court pointed out that a pension agreement, pursuant to Section 1 of the Pensions Act, is that which has been agreed between an employer and employee regarding pensions. The Explanatory Memorandum to that Act states that it makes no difference to the reciprocal rights and obligations between employer and employee whether they actually agree the pension themselves or whether the organizations representing them do so. Therefore, the Supreme Court takes as a starting point that, also in the case of participation in an industry-wide pension fund on the basis of an obligation, a pension agreement applies between an employee and an employer.
Pension is a condition of employment and is part of the employment relationship
The Supreme Court continued:
“Pension is an employment condition and as such the pension agreement forms part of the employment relationship between the employee and the employer. It follows from the foregoing that the rights and obligations of the employee and the employer arising mutually from compulsory participation in an industry pension fund under the Wet Bpf 2000 must be regarded as rights and obligations arising from an employment contract.”
Furthermore, the Supreme Court points to the triangular relationship that exists between the employee, the employer and the pension provider (such as an industry pension fund). In this relationship, the employer is also obliged to the employee to pay to the pension provider.
Claims for pension fund contributions in arrears fall outside the scope of WHOA
The Supreme Court considered that involving claims by a pension fund for premium arrears in a WHOA agreement would impair the employee’s corresponding right against the employer. It could also jeopardize the pension accrual of employees. This would not be in line with the intention of the legislator, according to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court therefore concludes that the WHOA regulations do not apply to a claim for premium arrears from an industry pension fund, and that such a claim cannot be included in a private settlement as referred to in Article 370 (1) of the Bankruptcy Act.
WHOA cooling-off period cannot extend to workers’ rights
A cooling-off period is – in short – a period during which creditors cannot take recourse against assets of the debtor (unless an authorization has been issued by the court). Also, during the cooling-off period, a petition for bankruptcy filed by a creditor against the debtor is suspended. The debtor who has started a WHOA process (or the restructuring expert) can request the court to declare a cooling-off period (section 376 Bankruptcy Act). In practice, the proclamation of a cooling-off period is requested relatively often.
Can the cooling-off period extend to pension contributions?
In the judgment discussed, the Supreme Court also noted that a cooling-off period declared by the court cannot extend to the rights of employees under section 369(4) of the Bankruptcy Act. Therefore, the cooling-off period cannot extend to claims of an industry pension fund for pension contributions either, according to the Supreme Court.
Thus, it appears that even if a cooling-off period has been declared under the WHOA, pension funds may continue to take collection action against the debtor, including taking recourse and filing for bankruptcy.
Remediation of debts to pension funds for pension premium arrears not possible
The judgment of the Supreme Court seems to me to be correct. It was the intention of the legislator that the position of employees cannot be affected by the WHOA and it is therefore appropriate that pension entitlements remain unaffected.
Of course, the fact that the debts to the pension fund cannot be restructured by means of a WHOA agreement may be a reason for a debtor to choose to file for bankruptcy on its own anyway.
Looking for a lawyer about WHOA agreement in Rotterdam?
Thus, the Supreme Court has made it clear that claims relating to overdue pension contributions of industry-wide pension funds fall outside the scope of the WHOA. If you need legal assistance in offering a settlement under the WHOA or if you wish to object to the settlement as a creditor, please contact Peter de Graaf or one of our other insolvency law specialists.
How do I transfer a lease agreement through the right of substitution?
An entrepreneur who wants to sell his business will generally want to transfer the lease of his business premises to the buyer. This is possible by means of substitution. For mid-market business premises, such as shops, catering, collection or delivery services and craft businesses, this is regulated by law. It is a special form of a transfer of the lease agreement.
What is a substitution?
In the event of substitution, the rights and obligations from the original tenancy agreement are transferred to the successive tenant. The ‘new’ tenant takes the place of the original tenant in the lease. The agreed lease terms, lease price and other conditions therefore simply remain in force.
Parties will often first try to have the substitution take place in consultation. However, if the landlord does not want to cooperate, for example because he is afraid that the new tenant will not pay the rent (on time), the tenant can go to court. The tenant then asks the court for permission (a replacement authorisation) for the substitution.
How does the court assess a claim for substitution?
The court assesses a claim for substitution on the basis of the following criteria:
- it must be a transfer by the lessee of the business established in the leased property;
- the incumbent tenant must have a substantial interest in that transfer; and
- the succeeding tenant must provide sufficient guarantees for the correct performance of the lease and proper business operations.
If requested, the court must also weigh the interests of the tenant and the landlord against each other. In addition, the court may attach a condition or charge to the authorisation for substitution. For example, the judge may make it a condition that the new tenant must provide a bank guarantee or other security.
When must substitution take place?
In principle, an action for substitution must be brought before the business is transferred. If substitution is not realised before the transfer of the business, permission must be sought from the court as soon as possible after the transfer. Another important point of attention is that the tenant may not give the leased property to the new owner without the landlord’s permission. If this is not permitted under the tenancy agreement, this may be a reason for the lessor to dissolve the tenancy agreement. If the tenant still wishes to give the property in use to the new owner, permission to do so can be requested from the court in preliminary relief proceedings. However, in order not to run any risks, it is always wise to seek advice from a rent lawyer.
Do you have any questions about subletting when renting mid-terrace business premises?
LVH Lawyers commercial property tenancy law attorneys will be happy to answer any questions you may have about the renting and letting of business premises. We assist both tenants and landlords and, where necessary, draw up a substitution agreement. If necessary, we will start summary proceedings or ask the court for a replacement authorization for the substitution.
Bill on Homologation Private Placement Significant change in insolvency law is imminent
A very important change in insolvency law is imminent. This change concerns the possibility of a debtor’s offering a composition to creditors. In the current situation, there is only an arrangement for the compulsory imposition by the court of an arrangement with creditors in suspension of payments or bankruptcy. In the Bill on the Homologation of Private Agreements (WHOA), the possibility has been included that a compulsory composition without a moratorium or bankruptcy can be concluded. This will drastically change the possibilities for resolving problematic debts. This change is important for debtors, but also for their providers of capital, such as creditors and shareholders.
Changes to insolvency law in the area of composition with creditors
In Dutch insolvency law, the main focus is still on bankruptcy. Most suspensions of payment end in bankruptcy. Bankruptcy is aimed at liquidating the debtor’s assets. In only a few cases is an arrangement offered and approved (homologated) by the court.
Scientists and the government have been thinking for some time about ways of enabling debtors to restructure problematic debts so that there can be continuity instead of liquidation. In this respect, inspiration has been drawn from foreign regulations, such as the chapter 11 procedure of the United States Bankruptcy Code. In 2014, there was the preliminary draft of the Continuity of Enterprises Act II in the Netherlands, which also provided for a compulsory arrangement other than suspension of payments and bankruptcy. In July of this year, the European Directive ‘Preventive Restructuring Schemes’ came into force. This Directive obliges member states to introduce pre-insolvency proceedings within two years. As a result of the Directive, amendments have been made to the Dutch bill. The bill was submitted to the House of Representatives on 5 July 2019.
Homologation agreement outside suspension of payments and bankruptcy
The WHOA provides that a debtor may offer a settlement if he ‘is in a condition where it is reasonably likely that he will not be able to continue to pay his debts’. In this situation, any creditor and shareholder, as well as the debtor himself, can apply to the court for the appointment of a restructuring expert, who can then offer a settlement. As long as the expert is appointed, the debtor himself cannot offer a settlement.
The proposed arrangement will entail a change in the rights of the parties concerned (creditors and shareholders). For example, a creditor will have to accept only partial payment of his claim. The parties concerned are divided into classes and are entitled to vote on the arrangement. It would be going too far to go into the details of this now, but it is important to note that under circumstances a minority in a class that votes against can still be imposed on the arrangement for the reason that the majority has agreed to it. It is also possible under certain circumstances that a class that votes against can still be imposed the agreement by the court. This is called cram down.
Introduction of legislative changes to debt restructuring
As already mentioned, the WHOA is under discussion in the House of Representatives. Whether the law will be introduced in the form of the current proposal cannot be predicted, but due to the fact that the European Directive must be implemented by July 2021 at the latest, it is clear that drastic changes to insolvency law are imminent.
If you have any questions about restructuring and creditor agreements, please contact one of our insolvency lawyers.
Commercial contracts: ‘the assignment contract’ (series 5/5)
In this final article of the ‘Commercial Contracts‘ series, Gentia Niesert, attorney at contract law, discusses the ins and out of ‘the assignment agreement’. How does it differ from the building contract and the employment contract, and what provisions do you find in an assignment agreement?
The assignment agreement
A assignment agreement is an agreement between a client and a contractor in which the parties agree that the contractor will perform work commissioned by the client. Assignment agreements are found, for example, in the following industries: consulting, coaching, IT, marketing, events industry, healthcare, creative, legal and financial services.
The difference with the building contract
In a previous article, we discussed what the difference is between the building contract and the assignment agreement. The difference is primarily in the “material”. In a building contract a work of a material nature is created, whereas in a assignment agreement, work of a non-material nature is performed.
The difference with the employment contract
An assignment agreement also involves a different type of agreement than the employment contract. The most distinctive difference is that an employment relationship involves a relationship of authority between employer and employee, while in a assignment agreement this relationship does not exist.
Provisions in contracts of assignment
What provisions one includes in the assignment contract depends, of course, on the intentions of the parties. Listed below are a number of topics that one may encounter in assignment agreements:
- Description of the assignment
It is important that the engagement agreement provide a clear description of the work/services to be performed and what the objective is. - Obligations of the contractor and the client
It is also advisable to state in the assignment agreement the obligations of the contractor, such as what the client may expect with regard to the quality of the work, within what time period the work must be performed, in what manner the contractor must report to the client and whether the contractor must observe confidentiality.
Employer obligations may include providing certain information and all necessary cooperation. Payment terms may also be agreed upon.
- Duration and termination
It is wise to include in the agreement the duration for which the agreement is entered into, whether and how the parties can terminate the agreement (prematurely) and in which cases the agreement can be dissolved. - Liability
It may also be advisable to include in the assignment contract something about which party is liable if damage occurs during the performance of the assignment, whether certain items of damage are excluded, and whether or not the amount of compensation is capped (e.g., up to the amount paid out by the insurance company). - Intellectual property rights
Finally, the assignment agreement may include a provision on intellectual property rights. It can be agreed which party is the owner of the intellectual property rights and whether or not the intellectual property rights are transferable.
Advice on an assignment agreement
Would you like to have a contract of assignment drafted or reviewed? Then Gentia Niesert, attorney at contract law, will be happy to help you.
Anouk van Houdt
An escape in contractual compensation for temporary workers?
Is there an escape route for companies that want to avoid the contractual fee when taking on temporary workers? Often temporary workers must work a minimum number of hours before they can be taken over by the hirer free of charge. Taking over earlier usually results in a contractual fee. One painting company thought it had found a way to get out from under this fee.
The ruling of the Gelderland District Court of December 18, 2024 focuses on the aforementioned situation. What exactly preceded it?
Agency agreements
Temporary employment agency BaanMeesters (also trading under the name SchilderMeesters) concludes a temporary employment contract with painting company A on December 10, 2021. On this contract, a minimum hiring period of 1750 hours is agreed upon. The general terms and conditions of SchilderMeesters are also declared applicable.
The temporary worker resigns in July 2022, having worked 908 hours under the aforementioned contract. On August 1, 2022, the temporary worker enters the employment of painting company B.
Painting company A and B have no legal relationship with each other, but the directors are the same. Moreover, both companies are located at the same address.
On July 21, 2023, the foregoing construction is repeated: Painter Masters enters into a hiring confirmation with painting company B, subject to a minimum hiring period of 2080 hours. The general conditions are also declared applicable to this agreement.
The temporary worker enters the employment of painting company A in January 2024, having worked 725.25 hours under the temporary contract.
Judgment of Subdistrict Court
JobMeesters went to court and claimed compensation for the hours not worked, plus 25% over the hourly rate. Painting company A argues that no group or subsidiary relationship exists between it and painting company B, which allowed the temporary worker to be employed by painting company B.
However, the district judge dismissed painting company A’s reasoning. Although formally there is no group or subsidiary relationship between the companies, both companies have the same directors/shareholders and are located at the same address. This makes the companies so affiliated that they can mutually agree on “shifting” personnel to avoid contractual fees.
All this leads to the conclusion that the claims of BaanMeesters can largely be awarded. The Subdistrict Court orders painting company A to pay €20,961.58, plus the legal costs of €2,745.22.
It can be concluded that this so-called “mouse hole” did not have the desired effect for the painting company.
Information
Are you looking to hire temporary workers or seconded employees and are you subject to contractual restrictions? Jamie Jansen and Richard Ouwerling, employment law specialists at LVH Advocaten, advise you on the options available to you.
Richard Ouwerling
Wills and Estates
The lawyers of the Family Law & Divorce practice group have years of experience acting in all facets of Wills and Estates, including:
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Executors Responsibilities and Commissions;
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Challenging a Will and Estate Litigation;
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Family Provision;
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Guardianship and Administration;
If you have questions with regard to Wills and estates in the Dutch jurisdiction, it is crucial to obtain expert legal advice. Our lawyers can provide you with advice at a crucial time and liaise with the executing notary.
Information
For additional information please feel free to contact our office 0031 10 209 2777, or by e-mail info@lvh-advocaten.nl
Support agreement for and by the Dutch retail sector on rental obligations during the corona crisis
On Friday 10 April, an agreement was reached between the property and retail sectors on rent suspension for retailers due to the consequences of the corona crisis. Parties involved are IVBN, INretail, Vastgoed Belang, Detailhandel Nederland, EZK, NVB and VGO. The starting point is that the financial pain resulting from the corona crisis must be shared between retailers (and their shareholders), landlords, banks and the government. The support agreement provides guidelines for the short and long term.
Support agreement offers short-term rent reduction for tenants of retail premises
Dutch retailers who suffer at least 25% loss of turnover in the period April-May-June 2020 as a result of the corona crisis are eligible for a rental discount. The rent suspension is valid for a period of three months from April 2020. The support agreement is based on a rent suspension of at least 50% and, where necessary, 75 to 100% if possible for the lessor, taking into account proportionality in size and bearing capacity. On the other hand, the tenant can only claim the rent reduction if he provides full and verifiable insight into his (offline) loss of turnover.
Support agreement concluded for Dutch retailers
For tenants with an international character, e.g. because of an establishment abroad or an international shareholder, tailor-made arrangements must be made. Tailor-made agreements are only entered into if the retailer adopts a constructive attitude.
Eviction of the retail premises and invocation of bank guarantees not possible
If landlords and financiers commit themselves to the aid agreement, they cannot, in principle, make use of rent evictions or claim bank and/or group guarantees.
Obligations of retailers regarding rent suspensions
Retailers are expected to make every effort to reopen the store (safely) when this is possible within government guidelines. In this way they will be able to generate turnover again. Retailers must pay rent to the extent possible and in good consultation with the lessor. They may not unilaterally suspend payment of the rent.
Remission of the rent obligation for retailers in the long term possible
If after three months the impact of the corona crisis is clear, the tenant may be eligible for a waiver of the rent payments. This will differ per retailer, landlord and location. The parties to this support agreement will determine in May 2020, after consultation, which method will be applied to the possibility of remission. This does not, however, alter the fact that landlords are free to voluntarily relieve tenants of the burden. Reasonableness and fairness will also apply in the long term and the parties will have to move forward (together) in the future.
Landlords shop premises are supported by financiers and the government during the corona crisis
Banks support the support agreement and will be as flexible as possible. In consultation with the government, they have been given room to help retailers and landlords with their liquidity. Landlords and retailers with financing of up to € 2.5 million can be granted a six-month grace period. For larger financings tailor-made solutions are required. The government is calling on property financiers to follow the banks with the redemption exemption.
Retail sector support agreement and rent suspension agreements during the corona crisis non-binding
The aid agreement is not binding. This means that landlords are not obliged to comply with the agreements in the aid agreement. Therefore, agreements cannot be enforced. However, the support agreement does provide guidelines on how parties in the retail sector must deal with the consequences of the corona crisis. It also provides points of contact for tenants and landlords who are negotiating rent payments or reductions in charges.
Dismissal due to offences committed privately?
A relatively common question in employment law is: can an employee be dismissed in connection with offences committed outside working hours?
First of all, an employer does not have to continue paying the employee’s salary while the employee is in pre-trial detention or in prison. However, the below decisions show that it is not easy to dismiss a convicted, imprisoned employee if there are no clear work-related connections.
First, a decision of the subdistrict court of Deventer in 2006.
This involved an employee who, after a chase, was arrested on the company premises of the employer (a printer) in connection with assault and attempted rape. The subdistrict court found that it concerned offences committed in the private sphere, which the employee had been punished for, and that the mere fact that the chase ended on the company premises was insufficient to rule that the workplace had been involved in the offence in a manner that was relevant for employment law purposes. In addition, it concerned offences committed within the employee’s relationship, which meant that there was no risk of these being repeated on the work floor.
Therefore, this employee could not be dismissed, and the employment was upheld.
In a Supreme Court judgement in 2010, it concerned a bank employee, who was sentenced to prison in connection with indecent acts with his minor stepson. He continuously kept his employer informed of what was going on, including when the appeal that was initially lodged was withdrawn. Shortly thereafter, the bank dismissed the employee with immediate effect since, as the bank argued, its confidence in the employee had been irreparably damaged.
The employee subsequently requested a declaratory decision from the court that the dismissal with immediate effect was null and void. The court and the court of appeal allowed the claim. The bank subsequently brought the appeal to the court in cassation. The Supreme Court found that the mere fact that, as a result of being imprisoned, the employee had been absent from work was not sufficient to justify dismissal with immediate effect. The fact that, due to the imprisonment, the employee had been absent from work for some time, did not automatically mean that there was an urgent cause to justify the dismissal with immediate effect. In addition, this employee had been in the bank’s employment for a long time and had an excellent work record, the sentence was related to facts that only took place in the employee’s private sphere, and the bank did not suffer a loss as a result of the long-term absence. All things considered, the dismissal with immediate effect was found to be unjustified.
If the offence committed by the employee is related to the employment, dismissal will in many cases be possible. In some cases, it may even constitute an urgent cause for dismissal with immediate effect.
Further information
For additional information please feel free to contact Mieke Bestebreurtje.
Termination of banking relationship by bank
It is increasingly common for banks to terminate a relationship with a customer – sometimes dating back many years. Such termination of a banking relationship can have serious consequences for a business owner. Can a bank terminate a credit relationship? When is it allowed and when is it not? Below is a brief explanation of the background to such termination and the rights and obligations of banks and account holders.
WWFT and customer due diligence
In the WWFT (Law for the prevention of money laundering and financing of terrorism) the government has made banks responsible for detecting so-called financial-economic crime and other integrity risks. In recent years, the Public Prosecutor’s Office has conducted investigations at several banks because the banks did not properly carry out the obligations imposed on them. The client files at the banks were not in order. Several banks have paid fines (transactions to prevent further prosecution) of even hundreds of millions of euros. It is therefore not surprising that banks take their obligations to conduct customer due diligence seriously. Many an entrepreneur has by now familiarized himself with questions from banks and is becoming familiar with abbreviations such as KYC (Know Your Customer), CDD (customer due diligence) or AML (anti-money laundering). This customer research does not only affect entrepreneurs who are applying for a bank account, but also entrepreneurs who have been banking with the same bank for years.
General banking conditions
The agreement between the bank and the customer is governed by the General Banking Conditions. On the basis of these General Banking Conditions, the Customer is obliged to inform the Bank and to keep the Bank informed of his activities and the origin of the financial resources that the Customer places with the Bank. If the bank is unable to complete a customer due diligence, the bank must terminate the relationship with that customer. The bank is then unable to oversee the risk of abuse of the services offered by the bank. It is not necessary for a bank to have concrete indications that the customer is involved in criminal activities.
Obligation to cooperate in customer due diligence
Banks depend on the cooperation of customers to obtain information. Customers are obliged to inform the banks on the basis of the general banking conditions. The bank’s questions are many:
- who are the shareholders;
- who are the UBOs;
- who are the suppliers;
- who are the customers;
- how is the turnover structured;
- how to reduce the share of cash payments in turnover;
- what is the background of payments to foreign bank accounts;
- what is the customer’s screening policy;
- etc. etc.
There are customers who cannot or will not fully answer the very extensive questions posed by banks, or at least are passive and do not actively cooperate in providing the requested information. A bank can then make use of the contractual right included in the general banking conditions to terminate the customer relationship.
Can the bank terminate the customer relationship?
A bank’s right to terminate the customer relationship is not unlimited. Banks have a social function and, by virtue of this, a special duty of care to customers. Banks must take the interests of those customers into account. By terminating a relationship, the client loses access to the banking system and the consequences are serious for the client. After all, it is impossible to operate a business if you do not have a checking account with a bank. There may be circumstances that mean that it is unacceptable according to the standards of reasonableness and fairness for a bank to use its contractual power of termination. This involves a balancing of interests. There is the bank’s interest (for example, to meet the legal requirements of customer due diligence) and there is the customer’s interest (for example, to have access to the banking system).
Weighing up interests when terminating a customer relationship
What circumstances may play a role in this balancing of interests?
- Is there sufficient insight into the origin of the client’s financial resources?
- Is there sufficient insight into the client’s activities?
- To what extent is there insight into the customer’s payment flows?
- Is the customer meeting its obligations to the bank?
- Are there many receipts from or payments to foreign parties?
- Are the payments traceable to invoices?
- Can any cash flows be sufficiently substantiated?
- Does the customer have a screening policy for suppliers and customers?
- Does the customer have access to the banking system through accounts at another bank?
- Is there an explanation for rapid changes in turnover?
These are just a few of the circumstances that are cited in procedures. In addition, the specific circumstances of the customer itself are important.
What to do in the event of a customer inquiry by the bank?
It is important to take the investigation seriously. Banks are obliged by law to carry out the investigations and the customer is obliged by the general banking conditions to cooperate and provide the requested information. This can be a laborious process for both parties. An intention of the bank to terminate a customer relationship is usually announced well in advance. If further consultation does not lead to a solution, the customer can demand the continuation of the relationship in a preliminary injunction. The judge in preliminary relief proceedings may decide to do so if it is sufficiently plausible that in proceedings on the merits the client’s claim to restoring the customer relationship will be granted and that the client cannot be expected to have no bank account at his disposal until that time.
Looking for a corporate law lawyer in Rotterdam?
If, after reading this article, you have a question concerning the termination of a customer relationship by your bank or if you have another question in the field of corporate law, please contact Rob Steenhoek.
Justified employee job reassignment after serious incident?
A question that we as employment lawyers receive with some regularity is whether an employee can be placed in a lower position with a lower salary after one or more incidents. In many cases an employee will not voluntarily agree to this and the question arises whether a unilateral change of position is possible. This question was addressed by the subdistrict court in its judgment of December 31, 2020.
Rotterdam District Court ruling on employee reassignment after incident
In brief, the facts were as follows. The employee caused serious damage during his work. While loading and unloading trucks, a container fell on other containers. In view of that incident and in view of previous incidents, the employer wanted to adjust the employee’s position with a corresponding lower salary.
The employee protested against this unilateral job change and claimed before the subdistrict court that he should be allowed to return to his former position with corresponding pay.
The subdistrict court ruled that the employer could not reinstate the employee on the basis of the unilateral change clause laid down in the collective agreement and the rules book. On that basis, the employee could only be reinstated one level lower and not two levels. The subdistrict court therefore tested the unilateral change against Article 7:611 of the Dutch Civil Code, which stipulates ‘good employment’.
What does a unilateral (job) change under Art. 7:611 of the Dutch Civil Code mean?
‘Good employment practices’ as set out in Article 7:611 of the Dutch Civil Code mean, in brief, that an employee should generally respond positively to reasonable proposals from the employer related to changed circumstances at work and that these proposals may only be rejected if acceptance cannot reasonably be required of him or her.
The test contains a so-called ‘triple reasonableness test’ and looks at all circumstances of the case. There must be (1) a reasonable proposal from the employer, (2) this proposal must be related to changed circumstances at work and (3) acceptance of the proposal must be reasonable for the employee.
Supreme Court ruling on unilateral change under Art. 7:611 of the Dutch Civil Code
The Supreme Court elaborated on this test in its Stoof/Mammoet judgment. Relevant is the reason for the change, whether a phasing-out scheme is used, whether there are less far-reaching alternatives and what type of employment conditions are involved. The judgment also shows that the employer must actually make a proposal in order to enter into consultation about the change. If there is no communication on the change, it will soon be unreasonable.
Ultimately, it is a matter of weighing up interests. The judge weighs the changed circumstances at the workplace and the personal circumstances of the employee.
Judgment of Subdistrict Court on Unilateral Job Change after Incident
In the previously mentioned judgment of the Rotterdam sub-district court, it was ruled that the reassignment with wage adjustment was justified on the grounds of Article 7:611 of the Dutch Civil Code. The employee had already inflicted substantial material damage on several occasions in the past. Given the new serious incident in which, in addition to material damage, a dangerous situation had arisen for persons, it was reasonable for the employer to reassign the employee. The subdistrict court further appointed that the change in salary is drastic, but not unreasonable because that change mainly relates to the elimination of the shift work bonus and the employee no longer has to work shift work. The subdistrict court thus rejected the employee’s claim.
Lawyer specialized in (amendment of) terms of employment
Questions about amending terms of employment? The employment lawyers at LVH regularly advise employers on employment conditions and changes thereto. They can assist you in making these important decisions so that legal proceedings can be avoided. Please feel free to contact Peter Verheijden and Richard Ouwerling for the possibilities.
Peter de Graaf
International trade: the Vienna Sales Convention
International trade: the Vienna Sales Convention
There is constant trading between business parties. Products are bought and delivered to be used, processed or, for example, resold. More than once these trading relationships cross the border of the Netherlands or even Europe. To prevent all kinds of different legal rules from applying in these trading relationships, there is the UN Convention on the International Sales of Goods (CISG), or the Vienna Sales Convention (“the Convention”). This Convention provides rules for international sale of goods.
What does the Vienna Sales Convention regulate?
The Convention defines how a sales contract is formed and the rights and obligations of buyer and seller. According to the Convention, a commercial sales contract does not necessarily have to be concluded in writing. In addition, the Convention provides rules on what should be expected of the various parties in certain situations, such as when delivered products are defective or unsuitable.
When does the Vienna Sales Convention apply?
The Convention automatically applies to the purchase of movable property between two professional parties established in different member states. Since 85 countries, including the member states of the European Union, are parties to the Convention, there is a significant chance that the Convention will apply to a contract between a Dutch and foreign trader.
The applicability of the Vienna Sales Convention can be excluded. Parties must then explicitly exclude the applicability of the Convention (or part of its provisions) in their contract or general terms and conditions.
Differences Treaty and domestic law
Treaty rules differ from Dutch law in several respects. For example, under the Convention, the buyer can choose to claim damages immediately if the seller fails to fulfill his obligations. For a seller this can be disadvantageous compared to Dutch law, which states that in such a case the seller must first be given the opportunity to fulfill his obligations. Only then may alternative damages be claimed.
By contrast, the buyer has a so-called duty of inspection under the Treaty: the buyer must check the product after delivery within the shortest possible time. Should anything then be wrong, he must inform the seller of this within a reasonable period of time. Under our national law, the buyer does not have such an obligation to inspect, but must in principle only complain to the seller within a reasonable time after discovering a defect. The Convention thus requires a more active and investigative attitude on the part of the buyer and gives the seller more certainty that he will not be confronted with a complaint after a long time.
Finally, under the Convention, it is more difficult to dissolve a sales contract. Whereas in our national law this is in principle possible in case of a shortcoming in performance, under the Convention what matters is, among other things, whether the other party has actually suffered damage due to the shortcoming and whether this damage was foreseeable. Once the products have been delivered or the price has already been paid, dissolution is even possible only in some very specific cases.
Advice?
Would you like to receive advice on an (international) sales contract, the applicability or interpretation of the Vienna Sales Convention? Then please contact us. Jacolien Leuvenink will be happy to assist you.
Annulment of guarantee legally valid?
For some legal acts, one spouse needs the consent of the other spouse. In the absence of consent, the other spouse may annul the legal act. Under certain circumstances, this also applies to the provision of security deposits.
On 20 March 2020, the Supreme Court rendered an interesting judgment on the validity of an appeal for the annulment of a guarantee, in which the central question was whether the guarantee was commercial or private. It concerned a situation in which a (de facto) director, under pressure from a creditor threatening to file for bankruptcy, provided a guarantee.
I will first discuss the legal arrangement. Next, I will discuss the ruling of the Supreme Court.
Difference between a corporate and a private guarantee
A private guarantee is said to have been entered into if the guarantee contract is entered into by a natural person who was not acting in the course of his profession or business, or for the normal exercise of the business of which he is a director, or who alone or with his fellow directors holds the majority of the shares (Article 7:857 of the Dutch Civil Code). In all other cases there is a business guarantee.
Spouse’s consent required when providing private guarantee
Due to the fact that a guarantee can have far-reaching financial consequences, the legislator considered it necessary to protect the spouse of the private guarantor. Article 1:88 paragraph 1 opening words and under c of the Dutch Civil Code stipulates that the consent of the other spouse is required in the event of a guarantee:
“agreements that, other than in the normal course of his profession or business, bind him as guarantor or joint and several co-debtor, or as security for a debt of the third party”.
According to paragraph 5 of the article, the authorisation for the legal act is not required if it is carried out by a director of a public limited liability company or of a private limited liability company, who alone or with his fellow directors holds the majority of the shares in that company and provided that it is carried out for the purpose of the normal conduct of that company’s business.
Case nullification of guarantee by spouse
The following facts led to the recent judgment of the Supreme Court.
A B.V. (Ltd.) specialising in asbestos abatement (hereinafter ‘the B.V.’) hires staff from a temporary employment agency. The B.V. has a parent company that holds all the shares and is the sole director. There is also a married couple. The wife holds 89.9% of the shares in the parent company and is sole director. The spouse (hereinafter referred to as ‘the spouse’) holds 10.1% of the shares in the parent company. He acts as a de facto manager.
The temporary employment agency had to establish that the B.V. was in arrears with payments and threatened to file for the bankruptcy of the B.V. The temporary employment agency was prepared to defer payment.
of payment of two weeks, but demanded that the B.V.’s parent company and the spouse stand surety. The husband finally let us know:
‘You informed me that (…) I will only waive my right to file a petition for bankruptcy if I personally stand surety for the claim of €38,062.35.
I therefore have no choice but to confirm that I (…) personally stand surety for the aforementioned claim (…)’.
Two months later the B.V. went into liquidation. At that time the B.V. still owed € 33,498.35 to the temporary employment agency. The spouse called for the destruction of the deposit issued by her husband. She claimed not to have given permission for this.
Judgment of court: private surety, but no setting aside
The temporary employment agency goes to court and demands payment of the spouse on the basis of the security deposit. The spouse defends himself by claiming that the bail has been destroyed.
The court grants the temporary employment agency’s claim. It is true that the spouse should have given permission because it concerns a private bail, but it is unacceptable by standards of reasonableness and fairness to invoke the annulment, because it is implausible that she would not have known about the bail, nor is it plausible that the spouse acted entirely on her own.
Judgment of the Court: guarantee in rem
The spouse appeals. The Court also finds that the spouse must pay under the guarantee, but assesses the guarantee in a different way. The Court of Appeal was of the opinion that the guarantee was businesslike. According to the Court of Appeal, the guarantee relates to payment obligations concerning the hiring of personnel and that activity falls under the normal exercise of the B.V.’s business.
Judgment of the Supreme Court on the annulment of a guarantee
The husband institutes cassation before the Supreme Court. He argues that the guarantee did not relate to the normal operation of the company and points out that the aim was to prevent a petition for bankruptcy and to create liability for an existing claim against the B.V. for which there was previously no liability, without this being offset by a performance by the creditor that would give the B.V. or the person providing security a (financial) advantage.
The Supreme Court agrees with the spouse’s argumentation. The Court has misunderstood that the guarantee was not entered into in order to be able to continue the hiring of personnel. Rather, the aim was to provide security for an already existing payment obligation and to avert a bankruptcy petition. The Court should have examined whether this falls within the normal course of business, but did not do so. Therefore, the Supreme Court referred the case to another Court of Appeal to decide on the matter.
Deposit sometimes annullable
The difference between business and private suretyships plays a role in more ways than one. For example, a bank has a special duty of care in relation to private suretyships. Furthermore, in the case of private suretyships, certain protection provisions must be observed, of which the spouse’s consent, as discussed above, is just one example.
Attorney at law on surety
If you have any questions about guarantees or other securities, please contact the specialists of Leeman Verheijden Huntjens Advocaten.
A receiver can object to a liquidation based on a winding-up petition filed by the legal person itself
On 18 December 2015, the Supreme Court passed an important judgement on the possibility for a receiver to object to a liquidation based on a winding-up petition filed by the legal person itself.
When a company is put into liquidation, a receiver is appointed. According to the Dutch Bankruptcy Act (Faillissementswet), any interested party can object to a company being put into liquidation. In the relevant case, a private company with limited liability had been put into liquidation after the company had filed a winding-up petition itself. However, the receiver quickly discovered that there was no income at all, and that none was to be expected either. Therefore, the receiver argued that his activities would only increase the debts, while paying the creditors would not be possible. This was due to the fact that the receiver’s salary is charged to the estate as estate debt. The receiver argued that, in the relevant case, the company should have been dissolved. Therefore, he objected to the company being put into liquidation, taking the position that, in petitioning for liquidation, the company had abused its authority to do so.
As the law is unclear on this, the court requested a preliminary ruling from the Supreme Court on whether the receiver is an interested party within the meaning of the Dutch Bankruptcy Act and whether he can object to the liquidation.
The Supreme Court answered both these questions in the affirmative. The receiver is an interested party as, pursuant to his appointment, he has various statutory obligations to discharge of his duties. Within that framework, he incurs expenses, as a result of which he becomes a creditor to the estate. The Supreme Court ruled that this creates a legal relationship with the debtor.
According to the Supreme Court, the objection is only allowable if it concerns an estate that has (practically) no assets and there are no claims in connection with fraudulent preference and improper administration. A receiver who considers objecting will therefore have to determine this quickly.
It is important to note that this judgement does not mean that the receiver can also object to a natural person being declared bankrupt. The Supreme Court has explicitly indicated that, in answering the questions it was asked, it would limit itself to situations in which a legal entity has been put into liquidation at its own request. An important difference is that a natural person cannot be dissolved pursuant to Section 2:19 of the Dutch Civil Code.
Based on this judgement, receivers may be expected to make use of the possibility to object more often in the future. This makes it important for directors who are unsure as to whether the company should be dissolved or should file a winding-up petition to ensure that they take the correct course.
Further information
For additional information please feel free to contact Peter de Graaf.
Compensation transition payment in case of dismissal after long-term occupational disability?
Minister Asscher of Social Affairs and Employment announces an adjustment to the Wet werk en zekerheid (Wwz – employment and security act).
On 21 April 2016, Minister Asscher sent a letter to the Lower House of the Dutch Parliament, in which he stated that the cabinet, in consultation with the social partners, intends to make a number of adjustments to the Wwz; these adjustments include, among others, the transition payment in relation to dismissal due to long-term occupational disability.
In case an employee has been occupationally disabled for a long period of time, the employer is, in principle, obliged to continue paying the employee’s wages for the first two years. During this period, there is also a prohibition of termination. After two years of occupational disability, the prohibition of termination no longer applies and the employer may terminate the employee’s employment contract. Since the introduction of the Wwz, termination of the employment contract with an ill employee after two years has had negative consequences for employers. The reason for that the employer is obliged to pay the transition payment. This circumstance makes employers decide to continue an employment contract after two years of occupational disability, which causes the employment contract to be dormant. A number of subdistrict court judges has already ruled that an employer is not obliged to terminate the employment contract after the obligation to continue to pay wages has ended. Moreover, this fact is not to be considered seriously culpable, which means that the employee cannot ensure that a transition payment and/or fair compensation will be payable.
The cabinet intends to come to a regulation on the grounds of which employers are compensated for the costs for a transition payment because of dismissal due to long-term occupational disability. The compensation could be financed from the Algemeen Werkloosheidsfonds (Awf – General Unemployment Fund), which will cause the (uniform) contribution to increase. Furthermore, a possible retrospective effect when introducing the proposed adjustment will be looked into.
The legislative proposal is expected to be submitted to the Lower House at the beginning of 2017 and could be put into effect on 1 January 2018.
If you have any questions on this subject, please contact Madeleine Boone.
Defense Against Passenger Claims
Regulation 261/2004 and Montreal Convention?
Is a flight delayed or canceled or does a passenger face a denied boarding? Then Regulation 261/2004 and the Montreal Convention (Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air) govern the rights of passengers vis-à-vis tour operators and airlines. Passengers can claim compensation (lump sum) and care or assistance (e.g. accommodation, meals and refund of ticket price or a replacement flight). Furthermore, the Regulation and the Convention sometimes also offer the possibility of compensation for other individual damages.
They may file these claims with the airline or a tour operator. In short, airlines and tour operators regularly face claims, which are not always (fully) assignable. After all, there are numerous factors at play in aviation that airlines can face that disrupt flight operations.
The attorneys at LVH Lawyers have long handled these passenger claims for airlines. We take over the entire handling from the subpoena. This allows the airline to focus on its core business. To give you an idea of what our lawyers have to deal with, a number of topics are discussed below. These come into play in passenger claims arising from Regulation 261/2004 and the Montreal Convention.
Extraordinary circumstances?
At LVH Lawyers, we have now seen all types of extraordinary circumstances pass by. Therefore, we can advise and litigate on the existence of extraordinary circumstances. Strikes, bad weather, power outages, acute medical situations or problems with passengers. Nothing is too crazy. We test the existence of extraordinary circumstances on the basis of the case law of the Court of Justice, as well as lower case law.
It is becoming increasingly clear when an extraordinary circumstance exists. It is therefore easier to assess whether an extraordinary circumstance exists. Nevertheless, there is still some regular discussion about this. Think of the effect of bad weather, the impact of changing an EOBT or a change of aircraft.
What is more difficult, on the other hand, is whether all reasonable measures were taken to mitigate the delay. This varies widely in case law. What about using substitute aircraft, when is there a reasonable alternative? When should a flight be offered from a third airline? Our aviation specialists will be happy to answer these questions and more for you.
Schedule change?
Another topic that comes up with some regularity is schedule amendments. LVH Advocaten is of the opinion that a schedule change is not automatically covered by the Regulation. Therefore, passengers are not always entitled to compensation. A schedule change can in some situations be equated with a cancellation or delay. However, this is not necessarily so.
Additional benefits beyond compensation?
The compensation that follows from Article 7 of Regulation 261/2004 is a lump sum. Discussion of the amount is therefore not an issue. In contrast, this does come into play with the compensation for care costs and the compensation that passengers can claim under the Montreal Convention. Passengers cannot claim all costs. After all, the costs must have been reasonable and necessary. For example, a passenger cannot book a hotel at Transavia’s expense after reaching the final destination because the passenger finds it too late in the evening to go home. It is notable that claim agencies often file all costs, but judges, when sufficiently reasoned defenses are presented, do not award all costs.
Consider, for example, the cost of a replacement ticket. Each airline charges different prices for its tickets. Has a passenger purchased a relatively cheap ticket from an airline? Then the airline cannot be required to bear the cost of a ticket in a completely different price range. After all, the Regulation speaks of a replacement flight with comparable transportation conditions.
Claim bureaus
Several claims agencies operate within the world of passenger claims. These agencies bring many claims to the competent court. LVH Advocaten is familiar with these agencies and can advise you on how to deal with these claims. The agencies all have different working methods, so it is important to be aware of this.
It also remains important to adequately contest the claims. Otherwise, the frameworks of Regulation 261/2004 and the Montreal Convention will be stretched too far. It is good that passengers’ interests are protected, but within the confines of the law.
Conclusion
In short, it is a dynamic area of law when knowledge within aviation is very important. LVH Advocaten has this knowledge. The lawyers do not shy away from METAR messages, IATA delay codes, closing messages and other documents from Eurocontrol. Our lawyers use these documents to tell a clear story in court about the rejection of the claim towards the passengers. Besides knowledge of aviation, LVH Advocaten in Rotterdam is a full service office for entrepreneurs. We have all specialties in-house. This allows us to properly handle all facets of a procedure.
Want to learn more about what our aviation specialists can do for your airline? Feel free to contact Gentia Niesert of LVH Advocaten in Rotterdam for more information about passenger claims handling.
Liability for damage to an aircraft
When transporting cargo or passengers, airlines are faced with several conditions that can cause damage to their aircraft. This damage occurs in most cases when the aircraft is still on the ground. When parked, leaving the gate or taxiing to the runway. But who is liable for this damage and what does an airline have to pay for itself?
LVH advocaten regularly helps airlines to recover the damages they have suffered from the right party. This was also the case in a matter where an aircraft was pushed back from a gate (the push-back service) by the ground handler and the North Holland District Court ruled on the issue of liability for the damage.
Damage to aircraft wing after collision at Schiphol Airport
In 2016, an aircraft of El Al Israel Airlines (hereafter: El Al) at Schiphol Airport was pushed backwards from the gate by the ground handler (the push-back driver). In doing so the aeroplane hits the blastfence of the airport with one of its wings (the wingtip), causing a big crack in the wing. As a result, the aircraft could not take off anymore and first had to be repaired at Schiphol Airport. Passengers and crew had to disembark and were accommodated in a hotel until a replacement flight could be arranged.
Liability for aircraft damage by ground handler
The ground handler was of the opinion that it was not (fully) liable for the damage suffered by the airline as a result of the collision. The airline was therefore forced to start legal proceedings in order to obtain compensation for the damages. The basis of this claim for damages was the ground handler’s culpable breach of its obligations under the IATA Standard Ground Handling Agreement (SGHA). On the basis of the SGHA, the ground handler is liable for the loss and damage to the aircraft if caused by negligent acts or omissions of the ground handler.
Negligence ground handler
In this case, the court has established that the driver who performed the push-back was negligent in his actions, because he deviated from the applicable guidance (and limit) lines prescribed by Schiphol on the platform of the gate during the push-back. The ground handler argued that the collision was caused by local weather circumstances (slipperiness), but failed to prove this. The (negligent) actions of the driver were therefore at the risk of the ground handler and the court upheld the claim for damages.
Compensation for the airline
However, the amount of the compensation was under discussion. The SGHA contains an exoneration with regard to consequential damage in case of damage to the aircraft. Therefore, according to the court, certain costs were not eligible for compensation. The costs for the new final wing tip of € 321,574.00 were awarded, as well as the legal interest thereon from the date of default.
This is an interesting case that illustrates how damage can occur to an aircraft and the associated liability. The basis for the liability in this case was the agreement concluded between the parties (SGHA) and the applicable guidelines for the performance of the services. Due to the specific circumstances in this case the ground handler was held liable for damage to the aircraft due to negligent acts.
Questions about damage in the aviation industry?
LVH Advocaten regularly assists airlines and other companies in the aviation industry in disputes concerning damage. Do you have questions about the possibility of recovering damages in the aviation industry or are you looking for advice on recovering damages or assistance in legal proceedings? Feel free to contact us for the possibilities. We will be happy to assist you in all your aviation related legal disputes.
Testing an employee for alcohol or drugs: allowed or not?
The AVG states that testing employees for substance use is not allowed. According to the Personal Data Authority, it is only permissible to have employees undergo alcohol and/or drug testing if there is a legal basis for doing so.
Consent for alcohol or drug test
For now, the permission is there only for certain professions in the Shipping Act, the Railways Act, the Local Railways Act, and the Aviation Act. Consider, for example, checks on pilots and train drivers. They may be required to take a breathalyzer test because they are responsible for a large group of passengers during their work.
On May 10, 2022, the Minister of SZW announced in a letter that the Working Conditions Act will be amended to allow testing. The amendment to the law will first give companies covered by the Major Accident Hazards Decree (Brzo companies) these testing options. This involves about 400 companies where testing for specific functions will soon be required. To be allowed to test, an employer must have a proper alcohol, drug and medication (ADM) policy (tool). This bill is still in the pipeline and it is unclear, given the outgoing administration, whether this will become new legislation.
Alcohol or drug test to prevent workplace accidents
Many companies, where the risk of workplace accidents is high, do test their employees for alcohol or drugs according to their regulations. So that is formally against the law, but according to these companies (mostly rightly) privacy is secondary to safety. These employers invoke their right of instruction (art. 7: 660 BW). This is limited by good employment practice. If the employer’s regulations interfere too far with the right to privacy, the result may be that these regulations do not stand.
There is not much case law on this point. Based on a Supreme Court ruling, among other things, it seems that taking alcohol and drug tests at work is permitted, provided strict conditions are met (necessity, proportionality, subsidiarity).
Employer’s duty of care
An employer may argue that, given the nature of the business activity, it has a far-reaching duty of care (necessity), so the right to privacy must give way somewhat (proportionality). Furthermore, the employer could argue that a breathalyzer test in the case of suspected alcohol is much less invasive than a blood test, thus meeting the requirement of subsidiarity. Employers can lay down these rules in a so-called ADM policy. The Works Council has a right of consent. Should an employee argue in any case that the ADM policy and/or the test were not permissible, even then, in labor cases, the evidence can almost always be used. Excluding illegally obtained evidence is not common.
Conclusion
If you have any questions on this topic, please contact Richard Ouwerling, an attorney specializing in employment law.
Deficiencies in participation
Careless consultation with the Works Council may constitute mismanagement of the company’s management
Careless conduct and mismanagement
The Enterprise Chamber ruled in a case of a company takeover via a leveraged buyout that the management of the company had acted negligently (partly) due to defects in the co-determination process. The careless conduct was classified as mismanagement, because it violated the elementary principles of proper entrepreneurship.
Request for advice from Works Council in case of company takeover (financing and provision of security)
Pursuant to Section 25 (1), opening words and under a, i and j WOR, an employee participation body must be given the opportunity to advise on any decision to transfer control of the company, to attract significant credit for the benefit of the company and to provide security for significant debts of another entrepreneur, unless this is done in the normal course of business.
Duty to correct inaccurate, incomplete or misleading information
A request for an opinion should include the essence of the proposed resolution, the board’s rationale for it and an accurate description of its likely consequences. It is the responsibility of the board that the employee participation body is correctly and fully informed in the advisory process, according to the Enterprise Chamber. According to the Enterprise Chamber, this responsibility implies that incorrect, incomplete or otherwise misleading information must be corrected as soon as possible.
Subsequent relevant information must still be provided to the works council
In this case, the management board had become aware of further relevant information after it had asked the relevant employee participation body for (an initial) advice on a proposed sale of the company under Section 25 of the WOR. This further information related to the structure of the financing of the transaction, its significance, and the associated risks for the company. These risks were significant, in part because after the acquisition, the company became liable (due to merger with the buyer) for high loans (at very high interest rates) taken out by the buyer to finance the acquisition.
The Enterprise Chamber found that the board should have informed the employee participation body about this after submitting the request for advice. However, the board failed to do so. Even when a second request for advice was submitted (about the merger after the takeover), the board failed to inform the employee participation body carefully, correctly and completely. According to the Enterprise Chamber, the board should have done so.
Failure to inform the works council correctly and/or fully qualifies as mismanagement
The ruling shows that the Enterprise Chamber regards it as a serious matter if the management board of the company does not give the Works Council, by not correctly and/or fully informing it, insufficient opportunity to do its job and therefore does not sufficiently respect the participation rights. According to the Enterprise Chamber, this qualifies as mismanagement.
An important point for attention is that relevant information must also be shared with the Works Council afterwards, as soon as the management has become aware of it, at such a time that the requested advice can still have a substantial influence on the decision to be taken. And that the Works Council must subsequently be given sufficient time to provide further advice, if necessary, on the basis of the further information obtained.
Discharge granted may be annulled
It is worth mentioning that the Enterprise Chamber has annulled the resolutions of the shareholders’ meeting granting discharge to the management board (and the supervisory board), insofar as this discharge relates to the mismanagement established by the Enterprise Chamber.
Information
If you have any questions about this article or this topic, please contact Peter Verheijden, an employment law attorney at LVH Advocaten.
Burden of proof for advertising fraud changed since 1 July 2016
Entrepreneurs regularly fall victim to advertising fraud. This involves misleading commercial practices. Certain (telephone) sales techniques are used to gain the entrepreneur’s confidence and raise expectations. The objective is to have the entrepreneur enter into an agreement, after which the agreed performance is not or not properly delivered.
In practice, this is often an offer to place an advertisement or reference in a business directory or on the internet. The advertisement or reference is subsequently placed on an unprofessional website. Another common form of advertising fraud is the sending of invoices with no (legal) basis (so-called phantom invoices). The fact that this is a serious problem is evidenced by the estimated economic loss of € 400 million euros involved.
Until 1 July of this year, an entrepreneur who had fallen victim to advertising fraud had three legal remedies: a claim for fraud, a claim for error and/or a claim for breach of contract. One major disadvantage in such proceedings was the division of the burden of proof. The entrepreneur had to prove that he had been misled, had not agreed to the agreement or had received incorrect or incomplete information. As this was difficult to prove, entrepreneurs would either decide against taking (legal) action or lose the proceedings. The entrepreneur would be left with the loss.
All this changed on 1 July of this year. As a result of a legislative change, the burden of proof is now on the selling party, rather than on the aggrieved entrepreneur. It is now up to the selling party to prove that it provided the entrepreneur with correct and complete information. If it fails to provide the required evidence, it is easier for the entrepreneur to have the agreement declared invalid. The law has not just changed from a civil-law point of view, but from a criminal-law point of view as well: violations can lead to a prison sentence of up to two years.
For questions about this subject, contact our office 0031 10 209 2777 or by e-mail info@lvh-advocaten.nl.
Prevent an earn-out from becoming a burn-out
Various (also not directly financial) reasons to enter into an earn-out arrangement
When selling a company, a difference of opinion about the results to be realized by the company in the future (and thus the value of the company) can be bridged by an earn-out arrangement, whereby part of the purchase price is only due if pre-agreed financial results are (timely) realized after the acquisition. But also other (not -directly- financial) uncertain circumstances that may influence the value of the company, may be reason to agree that part of the purchase price only has to be paid if an event occurs after the acquisition of the company. Consider, for example, the retention of key employees for a minimum period after the acquisition, the acquisition of an important license, or the winning of a strategically important order.
Advantages of an earn-out arrangement
The advantage of an earn-out arrangement for the buyer is the certainty that part of the purchase price only has to be paid after the agreed earn-out results have actually been realized. Conversely, an earn-out arrangement offers the seller certainty that if an earn-out result is realized, a higher purchase price will be received. So far only positive.
Problems in implementing an earn-out arrangement
But practice, as always, is recalcitrant. For example, there may be a difference of opinion between the seller and buyer as to whether or not an earn-out result has been realized (on time). It may also be, that the seller is of the opinion that the buyer did not make sufficient efforts after the acquisition to realize an earn-out result (or even frustrated the realization of an earn-out result). What is the seller’s position in such situations?
Risk for the seller in an earn-out arrangement
First of all, by entering into an earn-out arrangement, the seller accepts the risk, that part of the purchase price will turn out not to be due. Having said that, the seller can ensure that the risk of an earn-out dispute with the buyer is considerably reduced. It is very important that the earn-out arrangement(s) is/are properly worked out in the purchase agreement.
Uncertainty for the seller
Without specific agreements on this in the purchase agreement, the buyer may and must run the company in a way that puts the interest of the company first, but he must also take into account the interest of the seller in maximizing an earn-out arrangement in the considerations and policy decisions he makes. A role in this is that (market) circumstances may change and that the seller must take into account that this may lead to new insights. Expectations and predictions that existed when the purchase agreement was entered into can therefore be overtaken by new developments, as a result of which the buyer must adjust policy and respond to these in the interest of the company.
Also in such a situation, the buyer may be expected to reasonably accommodate the seller’s interests in the (maximization of the) earn-out. Despite this (general) obligation of the buyer, the situation of the seller remains uncertain and this can easily lead to disputes with the seller and ultimately to the (full or partial) loss of the earn-out.
Importance of a well-developed earn-out arrangement
The seller can avoid such a situation by including a well-developed earn-out arrangement in the purchase agreement, which clearly sets out the (concrete) efforts and actions required from the buyer to maximize the earn-out. Furthermore, in the earn-out arrangement it can be agreed which (policy) developments are and which are not taken into account when determining the earn-out result.
Liability of Directors
This article briefly discusses a number of regularly occurring grounds for the liability of directors of legal entities.
Liability outside of bankruptcy
Entrepreneurship involves risks. Therefore, a director has a large degree of policy making freedom in running the company. The fact that a certain decision in hindsight has not been a beneficial or onerous one will not lead necessarily to director’s liability. When a director crosses reasonable boundaries, however, he may be held personally liable.
Section 2:9 Burgerlijk Wetboek (BW – Dutch Civil Code) states that the director is obliged to fulfil his duties on behalf of the company in a proper way. The act, however, does not give a further meaning to this criterion. The Hoge Raad (Dutch Supreme Council) has determined that it is considered mismanagement when a director can be ‘seriously blamed’. It is called ‘serious blame’ if a reasonable and experienced director would not have made the contested decision. If mismanagement is the case, the director is held personally liable for the damage towards the company.
Examples of mismanagement are:
- Withdrawing funds from the company for personal purposes
- Committing acts of fraud or criminal offences
- Taking irresponsible and excessive financial risks
- Failing to take out the insurances necessary for operational management
- Only the legal entity itself may hold the director liable on the grounds of section 2:9 BW. Third parties disadvantaged by the director’s acts will have to try to obtain compensation for their damages by asserting a claim in tort. Previous decisions have shown that when a director, on behalf of the company, has made payment commitments (has created an appearance of creditworthiness) while he knew the company would fail to fulfil its obligations, he acted wrongfully. Then, the director is obliged to compensate for the damage incurred by the duped creditor.
Liability after bankruptcy
In case a legal entity is declared bankrupt, a curator is appointed to administer the insolvent estate. Sections 2:138 and 2:248 BW give the curator exclusive powers to hold the directors and policy makers of a bankrupt company personally liable. The following is based on the provisions of section 2:248 applicable to directors of a limited liability company. Section 2:138, applicable to the public limited company, however, has equivalent meaning.
Section 2:248 states:
“In case of bankruptcy of the company, each director in respect of the estate shall be jointly and severally liable for the amount of the debts, in so far as these cannot be paid by balancing the other benefits, if the board has manifestly not properly fulfilled their duties and it is reasonable to assume that this is a major cause of the bankruptcy.“
This is tested in two issues. Firstly, it has to be certain that there is manifestly mismanagement. Subsequently, it has to be plausibly shown, that mismanagement is a major cause of the bankruptcy. The burden of proof lies with the curator and he is faced with the difficult task to prove mismanagement. The legislator has met the curator half way by determining two cases in which it is certain that the board has not fulfilled their tasks properly. This is the case when:
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The board has failed to keep proper accounts which show the rights and obligations of the company
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The board fails to publish the annual accounts within 13 months after the end of the financial year at the Chamber of Commerce
In these cases, it is an irrefutable fact that this is mismanagement and that this mismanagement is suspected to be a major cause of the bankruptcy. The burden of proof is hereby reversed. It is now up to the director to prove that not keeping the accounts, or the failure to publish the annual accounts, is not a major cause of the bankruptcy. In many cases, the board will not succeed. In cases in which a single annual account has been published too late, it may be argued successfully that this has not been a major cause of the bankruptcy, when another external cause of the bankruptcy can be designated (think for instance of the economic crisis). If, however, the accounts are not up to par, the board will in most cases be unsuccessful in proving that, as keeping proper accounts can be viewed as a core task of the board.
Liability on the grounds of section 2:248 BW implies that the board is jointly and severally liable for the deficit in the bankruptcy. The deficit consists of the joint amount of debts plus the costs of bankruptcy minus the realised proceeds from liquidation by the curator. The deficit may, therefore, be substantial when there are insufficient proceeds in the insolvent assets.
Section 2:248 BW states that actual policy makers are in certain cases equal to directors. This means that the curator may hold the actual policy maker in the company liable on the same grounds as the board. The actual policy maker may be a natural person who uses a frontman as a director, but it may also be the parent company of a bankrupt subsidiary. If a parent company intensively interferes with the policy of the subsidiary, it may be held liable for the deficit in the bankruptcy.
Even during the bankruptcy, it is possible for individual creditors to hold directors accountable under tort, even though the curator has held the board accountable on behalf of the joint creditors. However, under certain circumstances, this joint claim of the curator may precede the individual claim of the creditor (group interest before individual interest).
Liability for debts arisen at incorporation
Pursuant section 2:203 BW, the founders of the legal entity are jointly and severally liable for individual creditors for debts arisen during the period of incorporation if they knew or could have been expected to know that the company would not fulfil its obligations. If the company goes bankrupt within one year after incorporation, then it is assumed that the founder knew the company would not fulfil its obligations and the founder must show this was not the case. A founder need not necessarily be a director of the company, but frequently the founders, shareholders and directors are the same persons. A director-founder may, therefore, be faced with this form of liability, if the company goes bankrupt soon after incorporation.
Fiscal liability
Section 36 Invorderingswet (Collection of State Taxes Act) states that a director may be held liable in person for certain taxes payable by the company. Liability of directors enters into force when the fact that the company will not be able to pay its tax debts has not been reported in time. In order to avoid liability, the inability to pay the tax must be reported in writing within 14 days after the tax is payable.
This form of liability frequently occurs after the bankruptcy of the company. The company will not be able to pay its tax debts and the debts will subsequently be claimed from the director unless he can show that he is not to blame for the unpaid taxes.
Additional information
Especially with a bankruptcy in sight, it is very important to identify possible liability at an early stage so that future problems may be prevented as much as possible. Actions that belong to the normal powers of the board may be perceived as ‘suspicious’ when a bankruptcy is in sight. Therefore, seeking advice at an early stage is not just recommended, but also necessary. We also have extensive experience as curators in bankruptcies, so we know both sides and we are in a unique position to anticipate the possible actions of the curator or individual creditors.
Leeman Verheijden Huntjens Advocaten knows the practice from both sides and often acts in the following cases:
- Guiding companies in trouble with restructuring and relaunch
- Advice for directors on possible liabilities in and outside of bankruptcy
- Act on behalf of directors after liability
- Litigation in legal actions concerning liability of directors
- Negotiate with the curator in bankruptcy cases
- Advice and litigation in legal actions for individual creditors
If you would like more information or if you have any questions, please contact our office 0031 10 209 2777 or by e-mail info@lvh-advocaten.nl.
A declaration of intent; rights and obligations
How binding is a clause in a letter of intent stating that rights and obligations only arise once a signed agreement has been concluded? Not always binding, as it turns out.
A practical example
Two companies enter into a partnership. They want to jointly market a new product. They lay down a number of principles for this partnership in a letter of intent. To avoid any misunderstanding about the status of their (legal) relationship, the parties agree in the letter of intent in so many words that they cannot derive any rights from the letter of intent. Furthermore, the letter of intent states that it does not constitute an agreement. And finally, the parties stipulate in the letter of intent that rights will only arise after an agreement has been signed between the parties in which agreement has been reached on essential elements. It seems that all of this leaves nothing to be desired in terms of clarity.
Start of implementation
The parties then begin to implement the proposed collaboration even though no agreement has been signed. One party (the supplier) also invoices the other party (the customer) for work already carried out and services provided. These invoices remain unpaid. After a while, problems arise, after which the buyer extrajudicially dissolves the agreement, if such an agreement exists.
Claim
The supplier does not accept this dissolution and files a lawsuit to claim payment of the unpaid invoices, as well as compensation for damages suffered due to lost profit as a result of the premature termination of the collaboration.
The buyer’s defense is that the parties did not conclude a (written) agreement. According to the buyer, the parties got stuck in the negotiations and the buyer broke off those negotiations. The work carried out was supposedly only a pilot. The product had yet to be “proven”. If an agreement was ever reached, it was terminated by dissolution, according to the buyer.
Ignoring the requirement for a written letter of intent
The court ruled that the parties had reached agreement on the content of the documents to be signed (including a quotation and general terms and conditions issued by the supplier). The court then established that the parties had implemented the agreements made, while these were still being further developed and formalized. The parties also agreed on these agreements. In doing so, the parties tacitly ignored the requirement for a written agreement as stated in the letter of intent. The court ruled that the buyer can therefore no longer invoke this.
Work not performed without obligation
The court attaches importance to the fact that the requirement for a written quote in the letter of intent is very generally worded. For example, the letter of intent does not stipulate that if the supplier performs work prior to signing the agreement, he does so entirely at his own expense and cannot derive any right (to payment) from this. Furthermore, the court attaches value to the fact that the offer is formulated unconditionally. For example, it does not state that payment for the work only needs to be made (and exclusively) after the parties have determined that the pilot is successful.
Conclusion
The conclusion is that when parties implement agreements in the context of a cooperation that has not yet been formalized, this implementation cannot be regarded as non-committal by the buyer, (solely) by invoking a (generally formulated) requirement for a written declaration in a letter of intent. In other words, a buyer who wants to “keep his hands free” will have to explicitly stipulate this prior to the execution of agreements by a supplier.
Information
If you have any questions about this article or this topic, please contact Peter Verheijden, attorney at LVH Advocaten.
Reopening liquidation after turboliquidation
If the business activities of a legal entity are discontinued, it must be considered how the legal entity will be wound up. If there are no more assets at all, a turboliquidation can take place. This is dissolution without the appointment of a liquidator. The legal entity then ceases to exist immediately. A resolution for dissolution is passed and the board notifies the Commercial Register of the end of the legal entity’s existence (Article 2:19 paragraph 4 BW).
Turboliquidation can also take place if the legal entity is still indebted to creditors. However, unpaid creditors can revive the legal entity by filing for bankruptcy or by reopening the liquidation (Art. 2:23c BW). This will require proof that the legal entity still has a possible benefit. Without a possible benefit, there is no interest in reviving the legal entity. After all, it is then clear that there is nothing to distribute among the creditors.
The ‘s-Hertogenbosch Court of Appeal recently issued a judgment on the request to reopen a liquidation. This is interesting because it shows the options available to a creditor facing a debtor who has been dissolved. The following was the case.
Turboliquidation of the debtor
A construction company built and delivered a home to a client under a construction contract. Defects were found upon delivery. The construction company was held liable. The client had an expert report dated July 13, 2021, which showed that repair costs were estimated at €87,653. The client had a draft subpoena prepared to claim damages. Before this summons could be issued, the construction company was dissolved by turboliquidation on Aug. 12, 2021. The principal was thus faced with a no longer existing debtor.
Procedure for reopening liquidation in court
The principal (hereinafter “creditor”) applied to the court for the reopening of the liquidation. The court held that although it was plausible that the creditor had a claim, due to the lack of benefit, the application should be rejected, due to lack of interest.
Appeal proceedings on reopening liquidation
The creditor has appealed. The creditor points out that the 2018 and 2019 annual figures show that the construction company still had significant cash and cash equivalents and positive equity. It further points to the circumstances that (i) the construction company’s shortcomings were serious (ii) the extent of damages was substantial and (iii) the turboliquidation was carried out with the knowledge that the creditor wished to initiate proceedings.
The construction company raises a defense, claiming that there were no more assets at the time of dissolution. In doing so, no financial data are shown at all.
The Court met the creditor and held:
“Unlike the court has considered in paragraph 3.3. of the contested decision, the court of appeal is of the opinion that it follows from the text of article 2:23c paragraph 1 BW that (in this case) it is sufficient that [appellant] et al. make it plausible that they have a claim on [respondent]. They do not also have to make it plausible that there is a possible benefit. Paragraph 1 of article 2:23c DCC states that the court may reopen the liquidation “if (…) another creditor or person entitled to the balance arises or (emphasis added by the court) the existence of a profit appears.”
And further:
“Although the court of appeal is of the opinion that [appellant] et al. do not also have to prove that there is a benefit, reopening the liquidation is of course of little use if ultimately there can be no payment of (part of the) damages to [appellant] et al. because [respondent] has no benefits. This could mean that [appellant] et al. have no interest in reopening the liquidation. However, this consideration does not prevent reopening in this case either. To this end the court of appeal considers as follows.”
Has the presence of assets been demonstrated?
The Court then considered that the creditor had made it plausible that assets were still present at the construction company at the end of 2019. It is impossible to ascertain what happened to the assets thereafter. However, the Court believes that the creditor cannot be required to further substantiate a claim to the extent that data necessary for such substantiation is in the domain of its counterparty. It would have been more up to the construction company to provide further data to support its position (that there were no more assets) as part of the dispute.
Thus, the Court considers it sufficiently plausible that at the time the construction company was dissolved, there was still some income and reopens the liquidation.
Temporary law on transparency turboliquidation
On Nov. 15, 2023, the Temporary Tuboliquidation Transparency Act will enter into force. This law aims to improve the legal protection of creditors.
Under the new law, in the event of a dissolution without assets, the board must file a balance sheet and a statement of assets and liabilities for the fiscal year in which the company was dissolved with the trade register within 14 days. This must include a description of (i) the reason for the lack of assets at the time of dissolution, (ii) (if applicable) the manner in which the company’s assets were disposed of and how the proceeds were distributed, and (iii) (if applicable) the reasons why a creditor or creditors remained wholly or partially unpaid. Also, all financial statements must be filed with the Chamber of Commerce.
Immediately after these documents are filed, the board of the company must notify the unpaid creditors in writing.
Conclusion
In the ruling under discussion, the Court helped the creditor somewhat by considering that it would have been up to the debtor to show that there were no more assets.
If the Temporary Law on Transparency Turboliquidation is enacted, creditors should be able to find more information about what happened at a dissolution (or, in other words, how the condition, in which there are no more assets, arose). This could work, but there is still a risk that a malicious debtor could file inaccurate information. The Chamber of Commerce is not going to check the filed information for accuracy. So a creditor who believes that the dissolution is unjustified will have to initiate a request for reopening the liquidation or a bankruptcy petition himself.
Looking for a business law attorney?
If you would like to learn more about corporate dissolution, turboliquidation, petition for reopening of liquidation or bankruptcy filing, please contact Peter de Graaf.
Do airlines have to compensate passengers financially in case of a strike?
The rights of air passengers in case of delay, cancellation or denied boarding are regulated by EU Regulation 261/2004. The Regulation entitles passengers in certain cases to standardized financial compensation of €250, €400 or €600 depending on the flight distance.
Passengers cannot claim such financial compensation if the cancellation or delay is caused by an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ which could not have been avoided even by taking all reasonable measures. As an example of an extraordinary circumstance, recital 15 of the preamble of the Regulation, explicitly mentions the case of strikes. But as it turns out, a strike is not always an extraordinary circumstance. As a result, in some cases passengers are still entitled to financial compensation in the event of a strike.
Judgment on strike in aviation: Airhelp Ltd vs. Scandinavian Airline System SAS
On March 23, 2021, the Court of Justice of the EU issued a judgment on this subject in the case of Airhelp Ltd vs. Scandinavian Airline System SAS (C-28/20). The case involved the following. The passenger’s flight had been cancelled by the airline SAS due to a strike by its pilots. Airhelp, a claimagency that had taken over this passenger’s rights, claimed compensation in proceedings before the Swedish court, arguing that the strike would not be an extraordinary circumstance. The strike of its own pilots would be inherent in the normal exercise of activity of an airline. The Swedish court referred the matter to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling.
The court considered therein that a strike organized by a trade union of airline employees, which is aimed in particular at increasing wages, does not fall within the concept of an “extraordinary circumstance” that can relieve the airline of its obligation to pay compensation for cancellation or long delay of the flights concerned. This is also the case where the strike is organized in compliance with the conditions set out in the national regulation.
Strike of own staff airline
The court views a strike with these characteristics as an event inherent in the normal exercise of the airline’s activity as an employer. Measures relating to working conditions are part of the normal management of the airline. A strike is seen as a consequence thereof. The Court points out that the right to strike is a right guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and that it is foreseeable for any employer that employees may exercise this right. The Court also notes that, in principle, the employer has the means to prepare himself – upon announcement of the strike.
In short, according to the Court, a strike of the staff of an airline, which is related to the employment relationship between the airline and its staff that can be discussed in a dialogue between the social partners within the company, including wage negotiations, does not fall under the concept of “extraordinary circumstance” within the meaning of the Air Passenger Rights Regulation. In other words, a strike arising from a conflict over working conditions is not an extraordinary circumstance and passengers must be compensated in the event of such a strike of airline staff.
Strike by external parties or with an external solution
It is important to note that the court also emphasizes that events with an external origin that cannot be controlled by the airline can constitute an extraordinary circumstance, because it arises, for example, from a natural event or an act of a third party. This includes strikes by other airlines, airport staff or air traffic controllers. Furthermore, the court mentions that there can be an extraordinary circumstance if the strike stems from requirements that can only be met by the government. In that case, control over the resolution of the strike is beyond the airline’s control and passengers are not entitled to compensation.
Passengers not always entitled to compensation under Reg. 261/2004 in case of strike
Whether the strike constitutes an extraordinary circumstance therefore depends on the circumstances and in particular the influence of the airline (internal or external cause / solution). A strike with an external cause is in principle an extraordinary circumstance as a result of which passengers are not entitled to compensation under Regulation 261/2004.
Lawyers specialized in aviation
LVH Advocaten assists airlines on a daily basis with advice and litigation on Regulation 261/2004 and other aviation related issues. If you have any questions regarding this article, please feel free to contact Gentia Niesert for more information.
Terminating an Agency agreement by the Principal
An agency agreement (“Agency Agreement”) may be terminated with or without cause and below you will find a practicable explanation on which steps need to be considered. Please note that terminating an Agency Agreement may be done through the Cantonal Courts or by taking extra-judicial steps as set out in article 6:265 of the DCC.
The EC directive (86/653/EEG) is implemented in the Netherlands in articles 7:428 to 7:455 of the Dutch Civil Code (“DCC”), which is mostly compulsory law, which means that deviation by agreement is generally not possible and that these provisions are overriding.
This article will only address the situation where the Principal terminates or rescinds the Agency Agreement. My next article will address the situation of the Agent.
Definition Agency agreement
First of all, you need to check whether the Agency Agreement falls within the definition of article 7:442 DCC which is applicable to agency agreements. An agency agreement is an agreement whereby one party (the Principal) and the other party (the Agent) agree that the Agent will negotiate contracts for the sale of goods/services of the Principal. The Agent negotiates the contracts between the Principal and the Customer and receives a certain amount of commission for each contract concluded. The commission is generally a percentage of the value of the contract that is entered into between the Principal and the Customer.
If the agreement you are confronted with falls within the definition referred to above, then please continue carry reading. If you are not sure, then please contact Madelon van Breemen on the details set out below.
Termination
Termination can be done in several ways with several effects:
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Is the Principal terminating because of an urgent reason under article 7:439 DCC, then termination can be done through the courts or by way of an extra-judicial notice. Examples of an urgent reason are the insolvency of the agent, breach of the non-compete or fraud. Either way the party that is terminating the agreement is not liable for damages;
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Is the Principal terminating because of a breach of contract, then the breach needs to be material. This can be done by the courts or by extra-judicial notice;
Is the Principal terminating the agreement because of unforeseen circumstances. Unforeseen circumstances could for example be if the circumstances of either party has changed to the extent that it is no longer reasonable for the agreement to continue. This can only be done by the Cantonal Courts under article 7:440 DCC etc. or the Civil Court under article 6:258 DCC.
Notice period
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Article 7:437 DCC states the notice period that needs to be complied with. If an incorrect notice period is given, the Principal may be subject to pay damages. The notice period depends on whether there is a contractual provision for termination in the contract or not. In the event that the Cantonal Court is involved, the court will rescind the contract without a notice period, but when the contract is terminated extra-judicially in accordance with article 6:265 DCC then a set procedure needs to be followed very carefully for the termination to be effective.
The legal compulsory notice period for termination is one month for the first year, two for the second and thereafter three months when parties have agreed upon a notice period. If the agency agreement is for indefinite term and there are no provisions regarding termination notice, the minimum notice period is 4 months.
Damages
In some instances of termination the other party, in this case the agent, may be liable to pay damages. Damages are payable when the agent can be blamed for the reason for termination. This is further set out in article 7:445 DCC etc.).
Goodwill compensation
An agent is afforded special protection under the DCC and it is quite likely that upon termination the Principal may have to pay goodwill compensation for the loss of commission of the agent. In most cases the Principal has to pay goodwill compensation upon termination and the amount of the goodwill compensation to be paid is dependent on a number of factors as set out in article 7:442 (1) (a) DCC, being:
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The amount of the goodwill compensation is generally maximized to one year’s commission based on the average of the last 5 years. This amount is generally the gross amount;
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The commission relates to new customers that the agent has introduced or to considerable expansion of the current customer orders;
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The amount under 1. can be adjusted so that is reasonable based on the facts. This adjustment can mean an increase or a decrease of the amount referred under 1.
To conclude, there are many different options available for the Principal to terminate the Agency Agreement. As you can see from the above, the laws relating to agency need to be followed correctly in order to avoid the situation where the agency agreement is not terminated properly or where damages are payable for incorrect termination.
Please contact Madelon van Breemen on (+31) (0) 10 2092756 or at vanbreemen@lvh-advocaten.nl for further information
Carrier liable for damage after delivery
On 21 June 2016, the Arnhem-Leeuwarden Court of Appeal has rendered an interesting decision on the period of liability of the carrier. The main rule is that the carrier has done his duties, when he delivers the received goods without damage or delay. Therefore, the moment of delivery is an important moment for the transport contract. Parties may disagree on whether or not there has been a delivery and, therefore, whether or not it is the end of the liability period of the carrier.
CMR convention
The international transport of goods by road is governed by the Geneva Convention of 1956, the CMR convention. The CMR has also served as a model for the national rules on transport by road in section 8 of the Netherlands Civil Code. The CMR does not provide a concrete description of what is to be understood by the delivery of goods and when this is applicable. That is by no means strange. A package is delivered in a different manner than, for instance, a yacht. The delivery to a liquor store at the corner is done by roll container. At a distribution centre, parking is needed only at the dock. Whether there are explicit agreements on delivery or not differs from case to case, and sometimes, no one knows exactly what has been agreed.
For that reason, several variations on the delivery have been considered by the court. For each situation, the question as to whether it actually is a ‘delivery of goods’ has to be answered and, with that, whether the liability period of the carrier has ended.
Delivery of goods
In the Netherlands, it is assumed that the delivery of goods is equal to the moment on which the carrier gives up the power of the goods after consensus with the consignee. When the consignee sees to the unloading, the carrier must enable the consignee to execute his actual power over the transported goods. When the consignee sees to the unloading of the goods, the moment of delivery lies before the actual unloading, because the actual power of the goods has already been transferred to the consignee before the unloading is started. The moment of delivery can also take place at a later time, for instance, when the carrier has also committed to seeing to the unloading, in addition to the transport.
Decision Arnhem/Leeuwarden Court of Appeal 21 June 2016
This case involved damage to a prototype of an automated packing and cutting table. The damage occurred during unloading the cargo. As indicated, parties have to agree themselves on who sees to the unloading of the cargo. In this instance, the sender had explicitly instructed the carrier, and had mentioned this on the consignment bill, that a representative of the sender had to be present at the unloading, due to the value and fragility of the shipment.
Without this person, unloading was not to take place. Because the person was not present and, according to the driver, could not be reached, the consignee started to unload the cargo, during which the goods were damaged. The sender held the carrier liable for this. This was awarded by the district court. The carrier filed an appeal to this decision at the Court of Appeal.
Position of carrier
The carrier stated he was not liable. Because the carrier was not designated to unload the cargo, the goods had been delivered at the arrival at the destination. According to the carrier, the liability period had, therefore, ended. Furthermore, the damage was caused by an employee of the consignee and not by the carrier himself. Consequently, the carrier stated there was no liability on his part.
Decision Court of Appeal
The Court of Appeal did not agree. The Court of Appeal found that, in general, a carrier is not obligated to unload the cargo under the CMR. Also, parties have not made agreements on this. At the handing over of the cargo by the carrier to the consignee, the transport contract ended. Because the damage occurred after this, the carrier is not to be held liable for this on the grounds of the CMR. To that extent, the Court of Appeal goes along with the carrier’s defence.
According to the Court of Appeal, this does not affect the fact that the carrier may be liable for this damage in reference to the applicable national law, if he has fallen short in another commitment than that of the transport of the goods. In the Court of Appeal’s opinion, this is the case here. By not respecting the explicit instruction not to unload the cargo in the absence of a representative, the carrier has fallen short and is, therefore, liable for the damage. The fact that the damage was not actually caused by the carrier, but by an employee of the consignee, is deemed not to be important by the Court of Appeal.
Conclusion
The transport company is not held liable as a carrier (under the CMR), but because it did not fulfil its (additional) accepted commitment. Because this liability has not been regulated by the CMR, the carrier cannot claim any exclusions and limitations as governed by this convention.
Systematically, the agreement does not seem to be quite correct. Parties have not reached any other agreement than the transport contract. Moreover, a note on the consignment bill is a part of the agreements between the carrier and the carrier’s client. It seems artificial to see this agreement as an agreement that is separate from the transport contract. It seems fairer to judge that the liability period had not yet fully ended or that delivery was carried out in conflict with the instruction of the sender. The case was about a damage of approximately € 2,000.00, so it is not likely that an appeal in cassation will be filed.
Information
If you have any questions on this subject, please contact Hein Kernkamp.
The statutory regulation of conflicting interests in a B.V. (and the foundation and association)
Since 2013, the private limited liability company has a statutory regulation with Article 2:239 (6) of the Dutch Civil Code for the situation where one or more directors have a direct or indirect personal interest that conflicts with the interest of the company and its affiliated business.
The regulation concerns an internal decision-making scheme. If a board member has a direct or indirect personal interest, he is required under Article 2:239(6) BW to abstain from the deliberations and decision-making.
When is there a conflict of interest?
To determine whether there is a conflict of interest, the standard set out in the Bruil judgment must be applied. There is a conflict of interest – within the meaning of Article 2:239(6) of the Dutch Civil Code – if a management board member is unable to protect the interests of the company with integrity and impartiality because of a direct or indirect personal conflict of interest.
How should the Bruil criterion be interpreted?
In the literature it is sometimes thought that the Bruil criterion should be understood more broadly than the legislator does and that a conflict of duties, a qualitative conflict of interest, should also be included in the Bruil criterion. A conflict of duties may exist if a managing director enters into an agreement on behalf of a company with another company, of which he is also a managing director, and, given the factual circumstances, he must be considered unable to safeguard the company’s interests with integrity and without prejudice. There may also be parallel interests. The mere fact that a director enters into an agreement on behalf of a company with another company, of which he is also a director, does not mean that there is a conflict of interest. It must be a conflict of duties.
The conflict of duties is not part of the statutory regulations (Article 2:239(6) of the Dutch Civil Code). This means that a board member does not have to abstain from the deliberations and decision-making in the event of a conflict of duties.
The Linders-Hofstee rules and other case law of the Enterprise Chamber
However, in addition to the statutory rules of Section 2:239(6) of the Dutch Civil Code, there is also case law of the Enterprise Chamber. In the Linders Hofstee judgment, the Supreme Court formulated a number of rules that a management board member must observe in the event of a conflict of interest. For example, if a management board member believes that there is a conflict of interest or potential conflict of interest, he must disclose this to the other management board members (and/or to the Supervisory Board, and if there is no Supervisory Board, to the General Meeting) and he must ensure that the agreement that is intended to be entered into is at arm’s length and that an expert is engaged if necessary. By applying these rules, the conflict of interest could be ‘resolved’.
The Linders-hofstee rules must always be followed, so not only in case of a personal conflict of interest, but also in case of a conflict of duties. Think of the situation in which there is a qualitative conflict of interest (a conflict of duties), but the board member concerned does not disclose the conflict to his fellow board members and still participates in deliberations and decision-making. If there is a conflict of duties, the director need not abstain. However, in view of the reasonableness and fairness of Article 2:8 BW in conjunction with Article 2:15 BW, the resolution would be subject to annulment.
It has also been assumed in several decisions of the Supreme Court in Enterprise Chamber cases that a director (or supervisory director) must refrain from decision-making in the event of a conflict of duties. In addition, there may be mismanagement if there is a conflict of interest – not only in the context of decision-making rule (in the past there was also a representation rule). An example is the Zwagerman II judgment, in which mismanagement was assumed when there was a conflict of interest (this judgment was rendered before Bruil) among the directors and the minority shareholders were insufficiently informed about transactions entered into by the director. In the Verstatel judgment it was assumed that the members of the Supervisory Board of Versatel, who were also directors of Tele2, had a conflict of interest and had to refrain from making decisions.
Advice to directors
The advice to directors is therefore to always apply the Linders-Hofstee rules and in addition, even in the event of a conflict of duties, to refrain from decision-making. Whether it is reasonable that a director can be blamed for not abstaining from the deliberation and decision-making process in the event of a conflict of duties is of course questionable. After all, the law does not prescribe it. However, the Enterprise Chamber considers the statutory decision-making scheme too brief. Incidentally, the articles of association can also provide for a regulation in the event of a conflicting interest. Acting contrary to the statutory regulation of Art. 2:236 (6) DCC also provides a rebuttable presumption of improper management within the meaning of Art. 2:9 DCC (Berghuizer-Papierfabriek HR). Acting contrary to a provision in the articles of association that aims to protect the interests of the legal entity can have the same effect.
The statutory decision-making scheme has internal effect
For the record, the decision-making rule of Art. 2:239(6) DCC only has internal effect. A decision taken contrary to Article 2:239(6) of the DCC therefore cannot be invoked against a third party (unless there is a so-called ‘Bibolini exception’).
Conflict of interest for foundations and associations
With the entry into force of the Management and Supervision Act on 1 July 2021, the same decision-making rules of Art. 2:239 (6) of the Dutch Civil Code will also apply to all other legal entities. In the case of the association, therefore, the representation rules of Section 2:47 of the DCC will be changed to decision-making rules. In the case of foundations – partly in view of the one-tier structure of this legal entity – no conflict-of-interest rules existed yet. However, this is often already provided for in the articles of association, if there is a supervisory body.
Dissolution of contract: What is a reasonable period for performance?
Suppose your contracting party does not deliver the quality you had agreed, how much time should you give them to improve their performance? In other words, when can you say: “I have lost my patience and I want to dissolve the contract”? These questions were addressed in the judgment Fraanje vs. Alukon (ECLI:NL:HR:2019:1581) of the Supreme Court on 11 October 2019. An important judgment in the field of contract law, in particular for parties who are dealing with an opposing party who does not fulfil his obligations under the contract.
When can a contract be dissolved?
Dutch law includes article 6:265 of the Dutch Civil Code as a starting point for the dissolution of a contract. By virtue of this article any failure of a party to fulfil one of its obligations gives the other party the power to dissolve the contract in whole or in part. This unless the failure, in view of its special nature or minor importance, does not justify this dissolution and its consequences. Paragraph 2 of this Article adds that where performance of the contract is not permanently or temporarily impossible, the power to terminate the contract only arises when the debtor is in default. If no time limit has been set for the performance of the contract, according to Section 6:82(1) of the Dutch Civil Code, default only commences after the debtor has been put in default by means of a written reminder – whereby a reasonable time limit for performance has been given – and performance is not effected within this time limit.
Fraanje vs. Alukon: legally valid dissolution of contract?
In the case of Fraanje vs. Alukon, Fraanje has, as general contractor, among other things ordered frames and glazing from subcontractor Alukon for a new sports park to be built by Fraanje in Goes. Initially Alukon delivered too late and subsequently not the quality agreed upon by the parties. Correspondence between Fraanje and Alukon takes several months and discussions take place about the, according to Fraanje, non-timely and qualitatively unsatisfactory performance of Alukon. Subsequently, Fraanje dissolves the agreement. According to both the District Court and the Court of Appeal, this dissolution is not legally valid because Alukon is not in default. Fraanje allegedly set unreasonably short deadlines for performance, which meant that there was no default and the agreement could not be dissolved. Fraanje did not leave it at that and appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Appeal had not done its work properly, annulled the judgment of the Court of Appeal and went into the doctrine of default in detail.
Notice of default in the event of failure to comply with contract agreements
What’s a notice of default? According to Section 6:82 of the Dutch Civil Code, a written statement containing a reminder (summons, notice) to perform in accordance with the agreements in the contract within a reasonable period indicated in the statement.
The purpose of the notice of default is to give the debtor a final term for performance of the contract. If the debtor does not comply with the notice of default, the default shall take effect at the time indicated. The length of the term for performance of the contract to be given to the debtor depends on the circumstances of the case.
The Supreme Court notes that the relevant circumstance to be taken into account is how much time the debtor has had to prepare himself prior to the reminder. Deadlines set earlier and any earlier summonses may therefore, in the opinion of the Supreme Court, be important in assessing the reasonableness of the period referred to in the reminder. If earlier periods have been set or a summons has been sent, the period given in the final notice of default may be shortened, after which the debtor will be in default.
Default without notice of default
Default may also occur without notice of default. Article 6:83 of the Dutch Civil Code lists three cases in which default occurs without notice of default, but this is not an exhaustive list. It is therefore good to know that invoking the absence of a notice of default can be unacceptable according to standards of reasonableness and fairness. In a number of judgments it was even concluded that a notice of default could be omitted altogether and that the debtor was in default due to the circumstances without a notice of default.
Absence of debtor in case of inadequate response
The Supreme Court considers that the debtor’s default may also occur if the debtor does not respond or does not respond adequately to a request by the creditor to undertake to perform within a set, also reasonable, term. Default may also arise where the debtor fails to make a statement within a reasonable time as to how and when he will remedy defects in the performance of the contract as described by the creditor. What constitutes a reasonable period of time for the debtor to make a statement in that regard depends on the circumstances. Whether or not the set period is customary in the industry in which the parties are active may also play a role in this respect.
The requirements that may be attached to the creditor’s response also depend on the circumstances. According to the Supreme Court, one of the important factors in this respect is how concretely the creditor has indicated the defects to be remedied and how specifically he has insisted on notification from the debtor. Subsequent facts and circumstances (such as communications) may also be relevant when assessing whether the creditor has been able to deduce from the debtor’s reaction or attitude that the debtor would not perform or would not perform on time.
Legal rules on notice of default and default
However, perhaps the most important consideration of the Supreme Court is that set out in paragraph 3.2.2 above. which states that the statutory provisions on notice of default and default in Sections 6:82 and 6:83 of the Civil Code are not so much strict rules that must be applied by the creditor according to the letter of the law, but should rather be seen as a guide; ‘The purpose of these provisions is rather to enable the court to reach a reasonable solution in cases where the parties – as is usually the case – have acted without detailed knowledge of the law, in accordance with what could reasonably be expected of them in the given circumstances’. In fact, this is a solid deformalization of the legal rules regarding notice of default and negligence and gives the jurisprudence ample opportunity to colour a case with “the circumstances of the case”, which is a very open standard. The Supreme Court has referred the case of Fraanje vs. Alukon to the Court of Appeal of Arnhem-Leeuwarden for further consideration and has given it the clean task of taking all circumstances of the case into consideration and weighing them against the interests of both parties. To be continued.
Do you have questions about an opposing party who does not fulfil his contract or delivers too late and do you want to get rid of the contract? Please feel free to contact us for further questions.
Earlier publication of the annual accounts
On 1 January 2016, the term within which the annual accounts must be published was reduced again. This time, the amendment applies as of the 2016 financial year, for all companies. So what were the rules again, and what has changed on 1 January 2016?
On 5 April 2013, we reported that, with the implementation of the Dutch Private Company Law (Simplification and Flexibilization) Act (Wet vereenvoudiging en flexibilisering BV-recht) on 1 October 2012, the term within which private companies with limited liability have to publish their annual accounts if all the shareholders are also directors or supervisory directors has been reduced.
On 1 January 2016, the term within which the annual accounts must be published was reduced again. This time, the amendment applies as of the 2016 financial year, for all companies. So what were the rules again, and what has changed on 1 January 2016?
Annual accounts must be drawn up, adopted and published.
For all financial years before 2016, the rules that applied before 1 January 2016 will continue to apply. These rules are as follows: The annual accounts of a private company with limited liability or public limited company must be drawn up within five months of the end of a financial year. In the event of extraordinary circumstances, the general meeting of shareholders may grant the board an extension of up to 6 months. From the time the annual accounts are drawn up, the general meeting of shareholders has 2 months to adopt the annual accounts. The annual accounts must be published within 8 days of being adopted (note: if the general meeting of shareholders has granted the board the maximum extension of 6 months, the annual accounts must be published within 13 months of the end of a financial year). This means that, for all the financial years after 2016, the annual accounts must be published within 13 months of the end of the relevant financial year.
As we reported on 5 April 2013, as of 1 October 2012, the directors’ signature of the drawn-up annual accounts of private companies with limited liability also serves to adopt the annual accounts if all the shareholders are also directors or supervisory directors. This means that, as of 10 October 2012, the 2-month term within which the annual accounts must be adopted no longer applies. As a result, the maximum term within which the annual accounts must be published became 11 months + 8 days.
As of 1 January 2016, the extension term for drawing up the annual accounts of a private company with limited liability or public limited company was reduced by one month. Where the general meeting used to be authorised to grant the board a 6-month extension, this term is now 5 months. This means that annual accounts published after the 2016 financial year must be published within 12 months of the end of the relevant financial year.
For private companies with limited liability of which all the shareholders are also directors or supervisory directors, this reduction of the extension term means that, as of the 2016 financial year, the maximum term for publishing the annual accounts has changed to 10 months + 8 days.
Make sure to publish your annual accounts in time, as exceeding the term is an economic offence and may result in directors’ and officers’ liability.
If you have a question about this subject, you can contact our office, +31 10.
Judicial sale of vessels
The Netherlands is a suitable jurisdiction to enforce claims against ships. The arrest of vessels is a broadly used manner to obtain payment or security for a long outstanding claim. It is not always that vessels are subsequently released. Especially where various parties arrest a vessel there is always a risk that the vessel will not leave port in the same ownership. With a certain frequency seagoing vessels are sold before the Dutch Courts through a judicial sale by public auction.
Most of the times, the auctions take place at the request of the bank, but in theory any creditor may decide to auction a vessel. It is rare that creditors with a claim that is ranked below a privileged claim of the bank takes these steps, especially if he fears that the proceeds will not be sufficient to recover a fair amount of the claim. In general the vessels sold have in common that they have too many debts. The public auction is meant to divide the nett proceeds of the ship under those entitled thereto. Who comes later, that is after the auction, comes too late.
One creditor must take the initiative to auction the vessel. At the request of a creditor that is in possession enforceable legal title against the ship owner the Court will fix a date for the public auction, at which a ‘Dutch Auction’ will take place. The Conditions of Sale will be made available upon request.
Inspection of the vessel
Vessels at auction are sold on an “as is where is” basis. Subject to the Conditions of Sale, the vessel may be inspected on application to the attorney of the enforcing creditor.
Dutch Auction
The judicial sale by public auction is conducted in the Dutch language. The auction takes place in one brief session, consisting of two parts. The session begins with a customary manner of bidding. Parties interested in the vessel may bid. The highest bid wins, that is to say, initially wins only a bidding premium as fixed in the conditions of sale (normally half a per cent of the highest bid). After the first part the real Dutch Auction will start. During the second part a sum will be fixed that will have to be paid on top of the earlier mentioned highest bid. In order to come to this sum, the bailiff will call out diminishing amounts to be paid in excess of the price as already fixed. The person who first accepts the vessel, by calling out “mine”, acquires the vessel. If nobody calls mine, the vessel goes to the person who was the highest bidder during the first part of the session. The bidding therefore goes up and then down again.
Purchase price
The purchase price consists of the total of:
- the highest bid made during the first bidding part, plus
- the sum at which ‘mine’ has been called during the second part, plus
- the bidding premium (if one is not the highest bidder in the first part), plus
- the Costs of the auction, as fixed by the Court before the auction.
The purchase price of the vessel is normally payable within eight days of the auction. Only upon payment will the purchaser receive the protocol of adjudication, which is a necessary document to take possession of the vessel and to register the vessel in a ship register of choice.
Formalities
The specific formalities of a public auction are described in the terms and conditions of the judicial sale. One of the formalities will almost always be the deposit of a certain amount of money before the auction actually takes place. Our attorneys know the formalities and are in a position to advise you on short notice. Over the last few decades potential buyers of seagoing vessels have instructed the lawyers of LVH Advocaten with regard to the auction of vessels and to do the bidding on their behalf. Having local knowledge at your disposal can make all the difference for a successful purchase.
Information
If you have any questions on this subject, please contact our office 0031 10 209 2777 or by e-mail info@lvh-advocaten.nl.
How do I substantiate the need for reorganisation?
How do I substantiate the need for reorganisation?
Support measures have stopped and energy crisis and high inflation are putting many entrepreneurs in financial trouble (again). Starting to reorganise on time can then be a ‘must’. But how do you substantiate the need for reorganisation?
Do you need to reorganise due to business economic circumstances? If so, one of the options is to terminate the employment relationship with some of your employees by applying for individual dismissal permits from the UWV.
Substantiation for dismissal in the event of reorganisation
A request for dismissal for economic reasons must be substantiated with annual accounts and a profit and loss account for the past three years. You should also explain the number of jobs to be cut in relation to the minimum amount to be cut. In addition, you must provide insight into your company’s organisation and staff composition, indicating the different positions, their possible interchangeability, age and years of service.
Assessing dismissal in the event of reorganisation
Dismissal for economic reasons usually involves a poor financial situation or reorganisation. The business decision to reorganise is not always easy to assess. Therefore, there is a certain degree of policy freedom for an entrepreneur. In any case, the UWV may not sit in the employer’s chair and can therefore only marginally assess the reorganisation decision.
This policy freedom comes into play with an entrepreneur’s motive for dismissal, the size of the proposed staff reduction and the selection of the categories of jobs in which redundancies will take place. The UWV respects in principle that an entrepreneur must be able to take the appropriate decisions, which are necessary for healthy and efficient business operations, also in the longer term. Not only the corporate interest, but also the labour market interest and the employment interest may come into play here.
Which employee will be dismissed?
You cannot choose the employees for whom you apply for a dismissal permit. The UWV’s policy rules state that when determining which employees are to be nominated for dismissal, the employees must be classified by business location into so-called ‘interchangeable job categories and age groups’ based on the principle of mirroring. The age groups are classified as:
- 15-25 years;
- 26-35 years;
- 36-45 years;
- 46-55 years;
- older than 55 years.
Within each age group, the employee with the shortest tenure is put forward for dismissal first.
Reassignment in the event of reorganisation
Finally, in the UWV procedure, you as an employer must make it plausible that there are no possibilities for redeployment of the employees proposed for dismissal. This involves redeployment both within and outside the employer’s company. This assessment will also address whether other measures have been taken to maintain employment.
Notice period for dismissal due to reorganisation
The UWV dismissal procedure generally takes six to eight weeks. Does the UWV grant a dismissal permit for the employees? Then you still need to take into account the notice period of the employees concerned when terminating their employment. If a dismissal permit is granted by the UWV, the employer may reduce the notice period by one month, as long as at least one month remains.
More information or advice on reorganisations?
A letter of dismissal must be adequately substantiated and you must nominate the right employees for dismissal. The employment law specialists at LVH Advocaten can take this off your hands and, of course, advise you accordingly. Contact Richard Ouwerling, employment law lawyer at LVH Advocaten in Rotterdam for more information.
Ground rent due during bankruptcy is not an estate debt
Recently, the Supreme Court issued a ruling on the question of whether a ground lease rent that became due after the date of bankruptcy is an estate debt. In this article, I first explain what estate debts are and the relevance of the question answered by the Supreme Court for practice. I then discuss the judgment.
What are estate debts?
Estate debts can be considered the cost of bankruptcy. Only when the estate debts can be paid in full can it be acceded to distribution to creditors with priority rights (or preferential creditors). Only when the preferential creditors can be fully satisfied can it be acceded to payout to creditors without rights of priority, or unsecured creditors. In the vast majority of bankruptcies, there are insufficient financial resources to make a payment to unsecured creditors. The chance that an estate claim will be satisfied is therefore much higher than the chance that an ordinary unsecured claim can be satisfied. Moreover, in principle, estate claims must be paid immediately. This is in contrast to ordinary preferential and unsecured claims, which have to be submitted for verification.
By the way, pledge and mortgage holders have a special position, called the separatist position, by which they basically do not have to worry about other creditors.
What are the grounds for creating estate debts?
The law provides in some cases that a debt of a bankrupt is an estate debt. This is the case, for example, insofar as amounts become due after the date of bankruptcy, for rent and leases (Article 39 Bankruptcy Code), as well as an employee’s salary (Article 40 Bankruptcy Code).
In the important 2013 Koot Beheer v. Tideman q.q. ruling, the Supreme Court clarified when estate debts exist. These are only those debts that give an immediate claim to the bankruptcy estate, either
- (i) pursuant to law,
- (ii) because they were entered into by the trustee in his capacity (in the sense that his will was directed thereto),
- (iii) because they result from an act of the trustee in violation of an obligation or duty to be observed by him in his capacity.
The right of leasehold and ground rent
The right of leasehold is the right that gives the leaseholder the authority to hold and use another person’s immovable property. In the case of ground lease, it can be agreed in the deed of establishment that the ground leaseholder must pay a ground lease rent. This is a sum of money that must be paid all at once or at regular or non-regular intervals. The law does not stipulate that ground rent from after the date of bankruptcy is an estate debt (unlike rent and lease).
Does ground rent from after date of bankruptcy create an estate debt?
The situation on which the Supreme Court recently handed down a judgment involved a leaseholder who had gone bankrupt. The leaseholder’s receiver refused to consider the ground lease rent that had become due during bankruptcy as an estate debt. The leaseholder initiated proceedings and claimed payment. The trustee mounted a defense and was vindicated in the District Court and the Court of Appeal.
In cassation it was argued by the ground lease lessee that ground lease is similar to lease and rent and would therefore similarly give rise to an estate debt. It was also argued that a canon payment obligation is property law in nature and therefore can be enforced outside the concurrence of unsecured creditors.
The Supreme Court does not agree and dismisses the appeal. It notes that in the set of the Civil Code, the obligation to pay ground lease rent is not an obligation under property law, but a qualitative obligation resting on the ground leaseholder. Furthermore, the Supreme Court points to the special regulation on payment and termination in the case of ground lease. According to the Supreme Court, the payment of ground rent insofar as it becomes due after the date of bankruptcy is therefore not an estate debt pursuant to or by virtue of the Civil Code or the Bankruptcy Act.
Payment and termination for ground leases
As noted above, the Supreme Court referred to the special regulation governing payment and termination of the ground lease. Briefly, this regulation means that the ground lease can be terminated by the owner if the ground leaseholder defaults in paying the ground rent for the two consecutive years or seriously fails to fulfill his other obligations. Furthermore, the law provides that after transfer of the leasehold, both the transferee and the predecessor in title are jointly and severally liable for the canon owed by the predecessor in title that became due and payable during the previous five years. This rule also simply applies in the event of a leaseholder’s bankruptcy.
Increasing clarity on estate debts
With the Koot Beheer v. Tideman q.q. ruling in 2013 and subsequently, the Supreme Court has created more and more clarity about estate debts. For example, in 2015 the Supreme Court ruled that rent of movable property after the date of bankruptcy also constitutes an estate debt. And in 2021, the Supreme Court held that interest on an estate debt is also an estate debt. And now there can also be no doubt that – in a situation where there is already an emphyteusis on date of bankruptcy – emphyteusis rent that becomes due after date of bankruptcy is not an estate debt.
Looking for a lawyer insolvency law in Rotterdam?
If you wish to seek advice in the area of insolvency law, such as on the rights of the landlord in the event of a tenant’s bankruptcy, estate debts, security interests and the ranking of creditors, please contact Peter de Graaf of LVH Advocaten.
The importance of a scope review: avoid a financial noose
Recently, the Hague Court of Appeal ruled that Booking.com must join the industry pension fund for the travel industry.
The company opposed this because it sees itself as an Internet company. The financial consequences for Booking.com are huge: The parent company estimates that the ruling will lead to an additional cost of 405 million euros. None of that can be charged retroactively to (former) employees. Booking.com must join pension fund PGB with retroactive effect (up to and including January 1, 1999).
Scope investigation CLA and pension
Many such claims can be prevented by a scope investigation for generally binding pension fund or collective bargaining agreement.
It is very important to investigate in case of a takeover, a transition to a new pension scheme or in case of various business activities within the same (group of) company(ies) whether a compulsory collective bargaining agreement or pension fund applies or will apply to your company.
It regularly happens that companies are obliged to follow a collective bargaining agreement and an industry pension fund, without knowing it. Some companies adamantly deny this without having this investigated. This poses a substantial financial risk to you and can mean a financial noose. So when in doubt, do not cross over and have your company find out whether you fall under the scope of a collective bargaining agreement or industry pension fund that has been declared generally binding.
Information?
If you would like more information about the possibilities of a scope of application investigation, please contact our employment lawyers Richard Ouwerling or Lisa Kloot.
Directors’ liability after turboliquidation
If there are no longer any assets at all at a legal entity, a turboliquidation may take place. This is when a dissolution takes place without a liquidator being appointed. Recently, the North Holland District Court ruled on an issue in which a turboliquidation had taken place and a creditor (landlord) subsequently held that the directors were liable. We will first briefly explain what turboliquidation is and then discuss the judgment.
When turboliquidation?
As mentioned, a turboliquidation can take place when a legal entity no longer has any assets. Turboliquidation can also take place if the legal entity is still indebted to creditors. The legal regulation on turboliquidations was amended (temporarily) on 15 November 2023. Turboliquidations are still possible, but some additional formalities need to be observed.
If the legal entity still has assets and needs to be wound up then a liquidator needs to be appointed. If the liquidator finds that the debts are likely to exceed the assets, he must (in principle) file a bankruptcy petition. It is then up to a bankruptcy trustee to wind up the bankruptcy, including an investigation into legality issues.
If a legal entity has been terminated, it can be revived if the legal entity still has a potential benefit. You can read another article on our website about reopening the liquidation.
Turbo liquidation of catering business
The case that led to the court’s ruling involved the following. A catering business had started operations in early 2021, entering into a lease agreement with a landlord for the rental of the premises. Just under two years later, the management of the catering business decided to cease operations. The directors tried to sell the business, but were unsuccessful. As of 30 October 2023, the lease was terminated by 15 November 2023. However, this termination was not possible according to the lease.
The board led it to sell the available inventory. These proceeds have been divided among the creditors in proportion to their claims. The landlord was paid 4.76% of the assets present, amounting to €642.15. Subsequently, there were no more assets.
The landlord believes that wrongful acts were committed, holds the management of the catering business liable and starts proceedings to claim damages.
Directors’ liability in turboliquidation?
The landlord argues that the turboliquidation was unlawful and that an obligation to file for bankruptcy would not have been complied with. He points to the legal obligation incumbent on a liquidator to file for bankruptcy if debts exceed income. He further points out that he would have had an estate claim and a preferential position in bankruptcy.
The directors argue that there is no rule of law under which they were obliged to file for bankruptcy. The benefits were divided fairly among the creditors. The rule requiring a liquidator to file for bankruptcy did not apply because the company had ceased to exist by operation of law and no liquidation took place.
The court rejected the landlord’s claims and found in favour of the directors.
In doing so, it points out that directors’ liability in respect of detriment requires that a serious personal fault can be attributed to the director. The court points out that turboliquidation is possible and does not in itself lead to personal liability of the board. This was also the appropriate course of action, as there were no more assets. The provision on the obligation on the liquidator to file its own declaration of bankruptcy does not apply, as there was no liquidation (nor a liquidator).
Nor was there any unlawful selective payments. The small benefits were divided proportionally among the creditors. There was no question of the directors having favoured themselves or parties in which they have a personal interest. This conduct is still within the board’s policy freedom (even if that policy freedom is limited in insolvency). Thus, the directors cannot be seriously blamed for the landlord remaining unpaid.
Corporate and insolvency law lawyer
If you would like to know more about directors’ liability, winding up companies or reopening a liquidation, please contact Peter de Graaf of LVH Advocaten. The ruling discussed can be found here.
New rules on wage transparency
New rules on wage transparency on the way
EU directive on pay transparency and the pay gap remain a persistent phenomenon. Despite existing legislation stipulating equal pay, figures from Statistics Netherlands show that women still earn on average 10.3% less than men for equivalent work. That is why European legislators have not been idle: on March 26, 2025, the Dutch government published a draft bill to implement the European Pay Transparency Directive (EU) 2023/970. These new rules will bring about radical changes for employers.
The EU Pay Transparency Directive and the pay gap in the Netherlands create new obligations for employers. The core of the directive is that employers must be more transparent about their remuneration structures and must be able to justify pay differences. This means (among other things) that employees are entitled to information about remuneration criteria and that employers are obliged to report periodically on pay differences between men and women. The most important change is that the burden of proof is shifting. From now on, employers must demonstrate that they pay equally. If they cannot do so, they must explain the difference.
The Netherlands should have implemented the directive by June 7, 2026 at the latest. However, implementation has been postponed. On September 15, 2025, the Informal Council on Employment and Social Policy announced that the Netherlands needs more time to implement the EU Pay Transparency Directive. Therefore, the target date for entry into force is now no later than January 1, 2027. However, the European Directive will already apply on June 7, 2026, and employees will be able to invoke this directive directly from that date. So now is the time to take a close look at your remuneration policy, also in the context of attractive employment practices.
Which (large) employers will be subject to the new rules?
The directive and the reporting obligation it contains initially apply to employers with 100 or more employees. However, the directive also contains an information obligation for employers with more than 50 employees (see point 3 below).
When are there 100 or more employees?
For the purposes of the Directive and the upcoming Dutch implementation legislation, the decisive factor is whether a company “as a rule” has at least 100 employees in the Netherlands. This criterion is in line with existing legal provisions, such as Article 2:153(2)(c) of the Dutch Civil Code and Article 2:263(2)(c) of the Dutch Civil Code (structural arrangement). This refers to the average number of employees over a financial year. Both full-time and part-time employees are included, as are temporary workers who are actually working within the company. Employees working abroad are not included in this threshold.
EU directive on pay transparency and the pay gap in the Netherlands: what will change?
Our government has opted for a ‘pure implementation’ of the European directive. This means that national rules will not be stricter than strictly necessary. Nevertheless, the consequences are significant. The most important changes are listed below:
- Objective and gender-neutral pay structures
- Employers will be required to use pay structures based on objective, gender-neutral criteria such as skills, efforts, responsibilities, and working conditions. These criteria must be clearly defined, for example in a collective labor agreement or job evaluation system.
- Transparency before employment
- Applicants must be given clarity in advance about the starting salary or salary range, based on objective criteria. Employers are no longer allowed to ask about an applicant’s current or previous salary, precisely to prevent a repeat of wage differences. Of course, applicants are still allowed to share their salary history of their own accord.
- Wage transparency within the organization
- Organizations with at least 50 employees must give employees the right to request written information about their own wages and the average wages of colleagues in similar positions. If the employer does not comply with these transparency obligations, the burden of proof in a claim for unequal pay is reversed: the employer must then demonstrate that no prohibited discrimination has taken place.
- Reporting obligations for larger employers
- Employers with 100 or more employees must report periodically on pay differences between men and women, including bonuses. These reports are partly made public via a national website. The frequency of reporting varies depending on the size of the organization. See below:
Number of employees Reporting period First report no later than
100 – 149 Every 3 years June 7, 2031
150 – 249 Every 3 years June 7, 2027
250 or more Every year June 7, 2027
- Mandatory wage evaluation in case of differences
- If the report shows that there are unjustified wage differences, the employer must take measures within a reasonable period of time, in consultation with the works council. In case of differences of 5% or more that still exist after six months, a mandatory wage evaluation will follow, including an analysis, an action plan, and an evaluation of previous measures. The works council must agree to this plan.
- Role of the works council
- The works council will play a central role in ensuring equal pay and monitoring compliance with the new obligations. This includes the right of consent to the remuneration policy, helping to resolve unjustified differences, and assessing the pay reports. In collective bargaining situations, trade unions can take over these tasks, provided that the collective bargaining agreement provides for this.
Practical tips and preparation
It is wise to take action now:
- Identify the number of employees: Calculate the average number of employees over the financial year, including part-timers and temporary workers.
- Document job classification system: Clearly define job descriptions and equivalent positions.
- Analyze remuneration structures: Investigate whether there are any unexplained wage differences and establish objective remuneration criteria.
- Implement reporting systems: Ensure that systems are in place that make it easy to report on remuneration differences on a regular basis.
- Involve the works council in good time: Discuss the current wage structures and the objective criteria.
- Evaluate regularly: Conduct internal audits and draw up improvement plans where necessary.
- Inform and train the HR department and management: Ensure that those responsible are aware of their obligations and know how to answer questions from employees.
- Communicate with employees: Inform employees in good time about their rights and how equal pay is guaranteed.
Conclusion
For companies with 100 or more employees in the Netherlands, it is essential to anticipate the Pay Transparency Directive in a timely manner. By anticipating the EU Pay Transparency Directive and the pay gap in the Netherlands in a timely manner, large employers can limit risks (such as claims for back pay) and comply with future legislation. Do you have questions about adjusting your remuneration policy in response to the Pay Transparency Directive? Please feel free to contact LVH Advocaten. We are happy to assist you.
Bram van Ruijven
Legal assistant aviation
+31 (0)10 209 27 64
vanruijven@lvh-advocaten.nl
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Uncertainty about shareholder vote: is AGM resolution voidable?
Which bodies can make decisions?
This article is about the legal validity of decision-making in the private limited liability company. A private limited liability company has several bodies. A Management Board, a General Meeting (GM) and possibly also a Supervisory Board (SB), a Joint Meeting of Management Board and SB and, since the introduction of the Flex-BV, in appropriate cases, a BGA (a “Special” Group of Shareholders). These bodies are authorized to make decisions. The division of powers is determined by law, articles of association, regulations and resolutions. Within the bodies, agreements can be made on how decisions should be made. For example, in a shareholder agreement or voting agreement. For more information on the shareholder agreement I refer to previous articles on this website.
When is decision-making invalid?
It is important that valid decision-making is achieved. This is not always the case. Mistakes can be made in decision-making. For example, that those entitled to vote within the body, such as shareholders during an AGM, are not properly invited to the meeting at which the decision is taken. Or that the chairman of the body puts a proposal to a vote when the required quorum is not present. In such cases, the status of the resolution must be questioned. Is the decision valid, void or voidable? And if there is a defect in the decision-making process, can the defect be repaired? And what are the consequences if it turns out that a decision cannot be repaired and is therefore voidable or voidable?
Nullity and voidability of decisions
Nullity of decisions
There is an important difference between nullity and voidability of decisions. When a decision is void, it applies by operation of law. Nullity is a sanction that relates to the violation of fundamental requirements of a decision. Consider, for example, the aforementioned case of a quorum requirement not being met. Also consider the situation where the chairman of the GM fails to take into account an enhanced majority of votes, for example 75%. In these cases, the consequence is that the resolutions are null and void, meaning that the resolution never actually existed.
Destroyability of a decision
A voidable decision is valid until it is set aside by the court. The annulment has retroactive effect. It is not possible to nullify resolutions out of court. Examples of voidable resolutions are failure to observe the correct notice period of the AGM or incorrect inclusion of items on the agenda for the meeting. In principle, the sanction of such cases is nullification. Unlike nullity, these are non-fundamental creation provisions. Sometimes there are repair options by which the voidability of a resolution can be removed.
Case law: two directors vote on behalf of one shareholder
In the ruling of the Gelderland District Court dated May 18, 2022, there was a special situation. During the general meeting of Chainpoint B.V., two persons claimed to be able to validly cast a vote on behalf of one of the (legal entity) shareholders, JZ Investments B.V.. The two persons cast conflicting votes. The chairman of the general meeting then declared JZ Investments B.V.’s vote invalid in its entirety and marked it as ‘not cast’. The resolution to be voted on was eventually passed, but only the votes of the other shareholder were counted, and therefore not JZ Investments B.V.’s vote.
What is the role of the chairman of the AGM?
In the court’s opinion, the chairman mishandled this situation. It is not up to the chairman to give a legal interpretation to the situation that has arisen. This follows from the law, namely Article 2:13 paragraph 3 of the Civil Code. The chairman has a limited role. Although the opinion of the chairman of the general meeting is decisive when it comes to counting the votes cast, it is not decisive when it comes to assessing the validity of the votes cast. However, a chairman could be expected to signal if there are conflicting explanations of votes and to raise this, for example with reference to the law, articles of association, regulations, resolutions or other contractual agreements.
Is the decision of the AGM voidable?
In the proceedings before the court, the chairman did give a decisive legal opinion on the outcome of the vote. The chairman declared the votes cast on behalf of JZ Investments B.V. invalid in their entirety. This while one vote of the two votes cast may have been legally valid. It would have been in the chairman’s power to adjourn the meeting so that clarity could have been obtained about the casting of the vote. The parties would then have had the opportunity to present the issue to a judge. Unlike the chairman of the AGM, the Enterprise Chamber or the Court of Preliminary Relief does have jurisdiction to decide on the validity of the decision-making. The conclusion of the court is that the resolution passed during the AGM, whereby the vote of shareholder JZ Investments B.V. was declared invalid, is in violation of Article 2:15 paragraph 1 of the Dutch Civil Code under a. The resolution has been nullified and the nullification has retroactive effect.
Advice on decision-making within corporate bodies
The situation described above could have been avoided. For example, if the articles of association or shareholders’ agreement of JZ Investments B.V. had included a provision on representation in the general meeting of Chainpoint B.V. Perils regarding decision-making can lead to a period of uncertainty within a company and also result in a waste of time and money. It is therefore important that you seek proper advice on how decision-making can take place within a corporate body.
Surveillance in the (home) workplace: what is an employer allowed?
Surveillance in the (home) workplace: what is an employer allowed?
Previously we wrote an article about the rules for camera surveillance in the workplace. The need for employer monitoring exceeds – partly in view of the corona pandemic – the mere checking of the workplace with cameras. Employers also have a need to monitor employees’ browsing habits, as well as the emails they send. And, of course, they want to prevent employees from spending hours Internet shopping and watching TV at the home workplace during working hours. But isn’t monitoring this a violation of the employee’s privacy, especially at the home workplace?
In this article, we address that question. Is an employer allowed to use monitoring tools and what rules must the employer abide by during a monitoring. To form a clear picture, we will also discuss case law.
When may an employer conduct structural workplace monitoring?
The employer must comply with privacy legislation, including the General Data Protection Regulation (AVG). Does the employer want to monitor the (home) workplace? If so, this must be announced in company regulations or the personnel handbook. In addition, the Works Council (if any) must grant permission for this monitoring. Finally, a legitimate interest is always required. And that legitimate interest is not always present, as case law shows.
Is an employer allowed to check an employee’s e-mails?
The District Court of Amsterdam awarded an employee compensation of € 10,000.00 after the employer had violated the privacy of the employee. The court ruled that the employer searched the employee’s mailbox without concrete suspicion, prior notice or consent. This was allegedly done to gather information about ongoing projects. However, the years 2016, 2017 and 2018 were also searched. According to the court, this violated Article 8 ECHR, especially since nothing shocking came to light. Also, the employer should have hired an external agency for the investigation, according to the court.
Is camera surveillance in the workplace permitted?
In determining the amount of the fair compensation, the North Netherlands District Court took into account the events surrounding the placement of cameras on the work floor. The employer had placed hidden cameras without notice to the employees and without the consent of the Works Council without having a legitimate interest in doing so. The hidden camera surveillance should also have been reported to the Personal Data Authority. Partly because of this, the court ruled that the employer was seriously culpable. Learn more about camera surveillance, read: rules for camera surveillance in the workplace.
Is an employer allowed to monitor the home workplace?
When deploying surveillance equipment, it does not matter whether the employee works in the office or at home. Working from home is not a reason for the employer to monitor more strictly. An employee is not obliged to agree to a home visit. An employer cannot impose sanctions for refusal. The same applies if the employer asks for a photo or video of the home office. Checking e-mails, telephone traffic, surfing behavior and behavior on social media is in principle not possible since this is private. However, when the employer complies with the requirements, control is possible.
Looking for an employment lawyer in Rotterdam?
In short, as an employer you cannot simply monitor your employees. The privacy of your employees must always be taken into account. Therefore, always contact an employment law specialist. They can check whether you meet the requirements.
Would you like to know more about the means of control you can use as an employer and how you can do this correctly? Please contact Richard Ouwerling of LVH Advocaten in Rotterdam. She will be happy to help you implement these means of control, including drafting an internet and e-mail policy and/or a personnel handbook.
Bonus employees: how to create a good bonus scheme as an employer?
How to create a good bonus scheme?
The bonus is a nice incentive for employees that you can use as an employer. But you have to be careful. The bonus scheme can be risky if it is not put down on paper correctly. As an employer, you then face the question: is the employee entitled to the bonus and how high is it? Obviously, you do not want to have that discussion with your employees.
In this article, we discuss how you, as an employer, can draw up a good bonus scheme. We also discuss a number of important pitfalls that often occur in bonus schemes.
Determine the performance of the bonus scheme
A bonus is a variable reward linked to certain performances. This can be the performance of the organisation, the performance of an individual employee or a combination of both. So don’t use a standard bonus scheme, but attune the bonus scheme to the organisation and the function of the employees. Describe as clearly as possible the performances that must be achieved, leave no room for other interpretations and ensure that afterwards it can be verified whether those performances have been achieved.
Bonus scheme and subjective criteria
When determining performance, beware of subjective criteria, such as linking a positive assessment to the award of a bonus. If you do opt for this, make sure that you have a fixed assessment moment every year. Not giving an assessment and then not awarding a bonus is contrary to good employment practice as set out in Section 7:611 of the Dutch Civil Code judgment of the District Court of Amsterdam 6 September 2016.
Discretionary power in bonus schemes
In many bonus schemes we also see a discretionary power (freedom to make a decision at one’s own discretion) on the basis of which the employer may decide not to award a bonus or to award a lower bonus to the employee. It is good to include this, but the employer must take into account that this discretionary power to mitigate the bonus cannot be used just like that. It is established case law that this power to determine the bonus is subject to good employment practice. It follows from case law, Amsterdam Court of Appeal 18 January 2022, that good employment practices require the employer to make clear how the discretionary power is exercised. If this is not clear, the employer may not mitigate. Therefore, explain under what circumstances moderation is possible.
Termination of employment and bonus scheme
Another important point of attention with regard to the bonus scheme is that the employer can stipulate that the employee must be employed in order to be entitled to the bonus. If an employee leaves employment halfway through the year, he is not entitled to a bonus. It is also possible to opt for a pro rata claim to the bonus if the employee leaves employment halfway through the year. It is sensible to agree this in writing, all the more so if the bonus depends on a turnover which is only determined at the end of the year.
Beware of acquired rights in bonus schemes
Has an employee received a bonus year after year and does the employer at any time decide not to award a bonus? The employee may argue that this is an acquired right. Namely, that the bonus was granted every year and therefore became part of the fixed salary. This risk arises particularly if there are no clear agreements on the granting of the bonus. The advice for employers is therefore to clearly indicate with every bonus payment that it concerns a variable reward and not an acquired right.
Bonus scheme for sick employees
During illness, an employee is entitled to at least 70% of his or her salary for 104 weeks. But what about the bonus? After all, this is a variable bonus which (sometimes) depends on the performance of the employee. An employee may also be entitled to the bonus during illness if it depends on performance, as long as it is plausible that the employee would have achieved the performance if he had not been ill. An agreement in the bonus scheme that the employee will not receive a bonus if he is sick, is not possible. The obligation to continue to pay wages during illness is compulsory law (it cannot be contractually deviated from).
Need a lawyer in Rotterdam for drawing up a bonus scheme?
In short, do not use a standard bonus scheme. Tailor the bonus scheme for your employees to the organisation and the position of the employee. Choose for clear achievements and give yourself, as an employer, a clearly defined discretionary power.
Do you need help with drawing up a bonus scheme or do you have a conflict about the granting of a bonus? Please contact Richard Ouwerling of LVH Advocaten. He is an employment lawyer and will be pleased to help you with all matters relating to employment law.
The position of the SME entrepreneur as a creditor in a WHOA arrangement
The position of the SME entrepreneur as a creditor in a WHOA arrangement
On 1 January 2021, the Homologation Underhand Arrangement Act (WHOA) entered into force. This law introduced a new restructuring instrument. Its purpose is to prevent companies from being declared bankrupt while they are still (partially) viable. The statutory scheme includes a minimum protection for (smaller) SMEs. This is also referred to as the 20% rule. In this article I will explain the position of the SME as a creditor in a WHOA settlement.
Classification of creditors in the event of a WHOA agreement
Creditors and shareholders must be divided into different classes when a WHOA agreement is offered, if their rights in a liquidation of the assets in bankruptcy or offered on the basis of the agreement are so different that there is no comparable position. In any case, creditors who have a different rank in recovering the debtor’s assets will be assigned to different classes. A difference in rights exists, for example, between preferential creditors (creditors with rights of priority) and unsecured creditors (creditors without rights of priority).
Minimum payment to small SME creditors under WHOA agreement
Small SME creditors must, in principle, be paid at least 20% of their claim under the WHOA agreement if they:
- have an unsecured claim for goods or services supplied;
- or have an unsecured claim from an unlawful act (Art. 374 paragraph 2 Bankruptcy Act).
This may be deviated from if there are compelling reasons to offer less than 20%.
What is a small SME creditor under the WHOA?
These small SME creditors are defined as creditors where fifty or fewer persons are employed or who meet the criteria of Art. 2:395a of the Civil Code or Art. 2:396 of the Civil Code. These articles of law determine which companies qualify as micro or small businesses. This is the case when, on two consecutive balance sheet dates, at least two of the three requirements below are met:
- the annual net turnover is less than € 12 million;
- the balance sheet value is less than € 6 million;
- the average number of employees during the financial year is less than 50.
Classification of SME creditor in separate class in WHOA agreement
If the requirement to offer at least 20% satisfaction of the claim to the small SME creditors is not met, these creditors should be classified in a separate class.
If this class does not agree to the arrangement, a creditor from that class can ask the court to reject the homologation of the arrangement. The court will then have to do so, unless a compelling reason has been shown for offering less than 20% satisfaction of the claim.
WHOA agreement must meet information requirements
Article 384, paragraph 2 sub c Bankruptcy Act stipulates that a request for approval of the composition will be rejected if the composition itself and the documents submitted with it do not contain all the information referred to in Article 375 Bankruptcy Act. This section of the law enumerates the information that a settlement agreement must contain. One of these information obligations concerns a statement showing on what serious grounds the class of small and medium-sized creditors is offered less than 20% of their claim.
Both to comply with this information requirement and to convince the creditors in question and the court that there are weighty grounds for offering less than 20%, it is important to pay sufficient attention to the statement.
Judgment regarding rejection of WHOA request
In a judgment of 10 November 2021 by the District Court of Midden-Nederland, a request for homologation of a WHOA agreement was rejected for various reasons. One of these reasons was that the small SME creditors had been offered less than 20% of the claim and that the creditors in question had not been placed in a separate class. According to the court, there was therefore a violation of section 374 of the Bankruptcy Act. In another article on our website you can read more about this judgment and find more information about the WHOA.
More information about the WHOA
You can read the following articles on our website about the WHOA:
- the WHOA in outline (discussion of bill);
- the role of the restructuring expert under the WHOA; and
- rejection of homologation request WHOA agreement
Looking for a lawyer about the WHOA agreement in Rotterdam?
If you need legal assistance in offering a settlement under the WHOA or if you wish to object to the settlement as a creditor, please contact Peter de Graaf.
Widening of the term building site for VAT purposes, with effect from 1 January 2017
New legislation traditionally comes into effect at the start of the year. With effect from 1 January 2017, this is the case in the property world in respect of, among other things, the term ‘building site’ pursuant to the Turnover Tax Act 1968 [Wet op de omzetbelasting 1968].
Building site
Until 1 January 2017, a building site, pursuant to Section 11, subsection 4 of the Turnover Tax Act 1968, was regarded as
undeveloped land:
- which has or will be cultivated;
- for which measures have or will be taken that are exclusively conducive to the land;
- in the vicinity of which measures have or will be taken; or
- for which an integrated environmental permit for building activities has been granted;
all of this with a view to developing the land.
In practice, the Tax and Customs Administration strictly enforced these requirements.
Ruling
The ‘Woningstichting Maasdriel’ ruling of the European Court of Justice (ECJ EU 17 January 2013, C-543/11, ECLI:EU:C:2013:20) however, made it clear that the definition of the term building site in the Turnover Tax Act 1968 is ‘strict’ and that it is not compatible with the interpretation of the same term on the basis of the European VAT Directive (Directive 2006/112/EC, OJEU 20016, L 347).
Pursuant to this ruling, it was the national legislator’s move. The national legislator did so by amending Section 11, subsection 4 of the Turnover Tax Act 1968. With effect from 1 January 2017, pursuant to Section 11, subsection 4 of the Turnover Tax Act 1968, a building site constitutes “undeveloped land that is manifestly intended for development with one or more buildings”. From a textual point of view, that is a considerable simplification compared to the requirements that used to apply (see a to d above). From 1 January 2017, when assessing if land constitutes a building site, the circumstances of the case, including the parties’ intentions, will have to be taken into account to a greater extent than before. This is the result of the “manifest requirement” which must be complied with pursuant to Section 11, subsection 4 of the Turnover Tax Act 1968. In practice, people will undoubtedly ask how ‘broad’ the term building site can be interpreted pursuant to the new regulation. A question that will then have to be answered in case law.
Consequences of legislative change
The practical consequences of this legislative change will be that more land will be classified as building site than before. As the transfer of a building site is taxed under VAT law, VAT may be deducted as input tax in certain circumstances, and an exemption for transfer tax (concurrence exemption) may be invoked. This may be (very) attractive financially, especially now that the national property market is recovering and the transformation and demolition of buildings are in the spotlights.
Information
If you have any questions or comments about this contribution, please contact the Property team of LVH Advocaten.
This contribution was made by Ben van Nieuwaal on behalf of the Property team.
Critical building supervision or hasty enforcement?
Critical building supervision or hasty enforcement?
There are times when the public authority suspects that the quality of a building is not up to scratch. This is not always easy to prove. Especially when it comes to technical regulations, the compliance of which can only be determined through extensive testing. That was the subject of a recent case at the Administrative Law Division of the Council of State. The central issue was the Building Decree.
Buildings Decree standards
According to the Buildings Decree, a building must comply with various standards. Those standards concern, among other things, the architectural quality of the construction, the health of persons and safety. Among the safety standards are, for example, regulations aimed at preventing the risk of fire starting and spreading.
The fire brigade, which oversees safety in buildings on behalf of the public authority, distinguishes various fire compartments in a building. The boundaries of those compartments determine the maximum range within which fire is allowed to spread. To prevent fires from spreading to another compartment, fire barriers must be in place. These must be suitable for preventing the spread or spread of a fire for at least 20 minutes.
The fire resistance of the facilities is assessed according to the methodology described in NEN standard 6068. All calculations of fire spread required for applying for a building permit must be carried out according to this standard.
Uncertainty about fire resistance of floor system
During a fire safety check of a property in Nijverdal, doubts recently arose about a rather old storey floor. The floor in question was a so-called Perfora floor, a lightweight floor system of ceramic hollow brick, which was used until the 1970s. There was no known test data on this relatively dated floor system. It was therefore unknown how long the shape of the floor would be maintained during a fire. Probably the stability of the floor would be weakened, was the assessment of an engineering firm called in. What the further impact would be on the extent of an outbreak of fire was not entirely clear. However, it was expected, the expert said, that the fire resistance would not last 20 minutes.
Procedure up to the highest instance
The municipal council decided to intervene. For it, the risk of fire was too high and the suitability of the fireproofing too unclear. The college omitted further investigation because a test of the fire resistance of the structure was not properly possible. This would in fact require testing a substantial area of the material in question, but this was not available. The college therefore left the uncertainty to the owner.
An order under penalty was therefore imposed on the owner. The owner had to ensure that the floor would meet the requirement of a fire resistance between fire compartments of 20 minutes, according to the standard of NEN 6068. For every week the owner did not comply, it had to pay a sum of twenty-five hundred euros. A hefty financial burden, on top of the costs the owner would already have to incur for investigating, adjusting and possibly replacing the floor.
The owner opposed this in administrative proceedings, which went all the way to the highest court.
The court eventually ruled in favour of the college. According to the court, the college was entitled to rely on the expert report. This would have shown sufficiently that the floor did not meet the applicable standard.
Council of State whistles back
Although the expert had reported on his expectation that the floor construction would last less than 20 minutes, it had not actually been confirmed whether this expectation was correct. An enforcement decision should not be based on an expectation that the construction is inadequate. The fact that conducting further research was very difficult does not constitute a reason to think otherwise, according to the Council of State. That was the college’s problem. The enforcement order went down and the owner was spared a heavy financial noose.
An emotionally rather unsatisfactory decision perhaps, but the formal line taken by the Council of State fits in with the norms in the Building Decree. It does not stipulate that the owner is in breach if he fails to demonstrate that the floor meets the standards of NEN 6068. It is up to the public authority to prove that the floor does not comply. The difficult task for the college in this case, therefore, is to get this old floor system, of which not much material is available, reliably tested for fire resistance one way or the other. So far, then, the owner has the benefit of the doubt. And that saves quite a bit of money.
Administrative enforcement and LVH Lawyers
LVH Advocaten handles many administrative enforcement cases.
Conference on 60 years CMR reveals differences in application treaty
On 6 and 7 October, the International Conference 60 years CMR took place. I was pleased to attend the conference. The following is a brief report of several interesting issues that were discussed.
Explanation CMR convention
The CMR convention is an international treaty containing rules regarding transport of goods by road. 55 countries have affiliated themselves with the treaty. Most European countries have joined the treaty, but also countries such as Russia, Morocco and Tunisia.
There is not an international court that interprets the treaty. Therefore, the courts in the member states have to do that themselves. At the conference, various speakers from several countries have explained how the treaty is interpreted by the courts in their countries.
The treaty aimed at creating uniformity as far as road transport law is concerned. In general, the treaty is considered to be a success, but the various presentations showed that the desired unity of law has only been partially achieved.
Characteristics CMR convention
The CMR convention is characterised by the fact that a road carrier may be held liable for cargo and delay damage, but that it can invoke the liability limitation of 8.33 SDR (a mix of several currencies) per kilo of transported cargo. Differences exist in the jurisprudence of the various countries as to under which circumstances a carrier escapes liability, but also under which circumstances the liability limitation can be broken in favour of the cargo stakeholder. The differences are the largest in case of breaking the liability limitation. This is partly due to the fact that the relevant article 29 paragraph 1 refers to domestic law. In addition, there are two official language versions of the treaty, English and French. According to the unofficial Dutch translation, breaking the limitation is the case when damage arises from the carrier’s intent or the carrier’s guilt, which, according to the law of the court the claim was brought before, is equivalent to intent. As far as the degree of guilt is concerned, the French version uses the term intent (‘dol’), but the English version calls that ‘default equivalent to wilful misconduct’.
Default equivalent to wilful misconduct
It is remarkable, that the concept of default equivalent to wilful misconduct was unknown to the British domestic law. In the UK, a highly subjective test was developed in the case law. What did the carrier think? In a case in which a driver fell asleep behind the wheel – resulting in an accident and cargo damage -, the question arose if he should have been aware of his drowsiness and, therefore, should not have continued driving. The court assumed the driver must have thought he would get more alert again. Wilful misconduct was, therefore, not the case and breaking the liability limitation was not adopted.
Breaking liability
In the Netherlands, it is very difficult to break the liability limitation. According to the Netherlands Supreme Court, for breaking the limitation to be applicable, it must be proven that the carrier was aware of the risks of his behaviour and that he was aware of the fact that the possibility that the risk would occur was significantly larger than that it would not happen and that he was not held back by that. There should have been awareness that the risk of damage as a result of the behaviour was indeed significantly larger than 50%.
In Germany, it is easier to break the limitation. The criterion is, that there must be a severe disregard of the obligations of the carrier regarding the interest of the sender, knowing that the damage was likely to have been caused by that.
The presentation of a Polish scientist showed, that breaking the limitation in Poland is assumed when there is an intentional breach of contract or deliberate failure to comply with certain agreements. Thus, in Poland, breaking the limitation is easier adopted than in the Netherlands.
In conclusion
It was interesting to hear the case law of the various countries. For now, it looks like the treaty will apply for a long time. It is intriguing to see how the courts of the treaty states will deal with new developments. For instance, nowadays, it is more common for refugees to hide in trucks, which result in cargo damage. This raises the question whether a carrier is liable for the damage and, if so, whether he will be able to invoke the limitation.
Information
If you would like more information on this subject, please contact Peter de Graaf.
Dutch bankruptcy law
Bankruptcy in The Netherlands is governed by the Dutch Bankruptcy Act. Intra-EU cross-border insolvency proceedings are governed by Council regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings. Cross-border insolvency proceedings that do not fall within the scope of the EU Insolvency Regulation will be governed by the general rules of Dutch Private International Law.
The Dutch Bankruptcy Act provides for the following insolvency procedures:
- bankruptcy;
- suspension of payments;
- debt restructuring for private individuals.
Bankruptcy
Any debtor (being a natural person or a private legal entity) can be declared bankrupt by the District Court, as long as the debtor has the center of its (his/her) interests in the Netherlands (for natural persons, this means that they should live in The Netherlands). Applications for bankruptcy can be filed by:
- the natural person or private legal entity itself;
- a creditor, or
- the public prosecutor.
Bankruptcy proceedings
If the petition is granted, the district court will declare the debtor bankrupt and appoint one or more trustees (in Dutch: curator). The trustee is charged with the administration and liquidation of the bankruptcy estate.
As a general rule, the District Court will only declare a debtor in state of bankruptcy if the debtor has ceased to pay. This is generally considered to be the case if various creditors have difficulty in collecting outstandings.
If the debtor is properly summoned, bankruptcy may be declared in a default judgment. In that case the debtor has a right to ask for a review within 14 days after the judgment of bankruptcy. Appeals must be lodged ultimately within eight days. Both review and subsequent appeals have no suspensory effect.
Suspension of payments
With the suspension of payments procedure the Dutch Bankruptcy Act intends to provide for a legal instruments in order to restructure and continue an enterprise in financial distress, which in whole or in part is viable. The suspension of payments procedure, however, rarely ever fulfilled its goal and companies that do ask for suspension of payment generally are declared bankrupt within a few weeks after the initial decision on the suspension of payments request.
Debt restructuring for private individuals
This relatively new arrangement under the Dutch Bankruptcy Act provides a possibility for private individuals in a debt position without any prospects to make a fresh start without being chased for life by his creditors. Residency in The Netherlands is a pre-requisite in order to be able to apply for this arrangement.
Information
We are frequently consulted by clients from abroad with regard to issues related to Dutch Bankruptcy Law. Our firm’s lawyers represent both applicants and defendants in bankruptcy proceedings before all Dutch Courts.
Obviously, this is a very brief introduction that will not answer your specific questions. For additional information please feel free to contact our office 0031 10 209 2777 or by e-mail info@lvh-advocaten.nl.
Can a cash payment made after the bankruptcy date be reclaimed?
Can a cash payment made after the bankruptcy date be reclaimed?
Recently, the Supreme Court issued an interesting judgment involving two important principles of bankruptcy law, namely the principle of fixation and the principle of paritas creditorum. The case concerned a situation in which, after the bankruptcy date, a cash payment was made from the bankrupt’s bank account to a creditor. The central question was whether the trustee could recover the payment from the creditor. This article discusses the case, the relevant principles and the Supreme Court’s opinion.
Giro payment by bankrupt to creditor after date of bankruptcy
The case that gave rise to the judgment is straightforward. Bleiswijk Boeketservice B.V. (hereinafter ‘BB’) has been declared bankrupt. A day later, on the basis of a direct debit, a debit is made from BB’s bank account in favor of a creditor, Flora Holland. At the time of the bankruptcy declaration, the balance on BB’s bank account was already negative. There was no possibility of a reversal.
The bankruptcy trustee claimed the payment back from the creditor on the grounds of undue payment. The creditor takes the position that it is not obliged to repay.
The fixation principle in bankruptcy law
Article 23 Bankruptcy Act provides that the debtor loses by operation of law the disposal and management of his assets belonging to the bankruptcy as of the day (counting from 00:00 hours) on which the bankruptcy is declared. This is an elaboration of the fixation principle. In addition to the loss of the debtor’s power of management and disposal, the principle entails that the legal position of all those involved in the estate becomes unchangeable as a result of the bankruptcy. Article 20 of the Bankruptcy Act provides that the bankruptcy includes the debtor’s entire assets at the time of the bankruptcy declaration, as well as what he acquires during the bankruptcy. This article of law also expresses the fixation principle.
When can a cash payment made after the bankruptcy date be reclaimed?
In the 2015 JPR/Gunning q.q. judgment, the Supreme Court ruled with respect to non-cash payments that the trustee can always recover the payment that was credited to the creditor’s account only after the bankruptcy situation occurred.
In the case discussed, the trustee argued on the basis of Article 23 Bankruptcy Act that BB could no longer perform legal acts affecting its assets as of the declaration of bankruptcy. Therefore, according to the trustee, the payment to the creditor was unjustified and the creditor must repay.
Proceedings concerning recovery by trustee of non-cash payments
The Subdistrict Court rejected the claim of the trustee. On appeal, however, the trustee was proven right. The Court of Appeal referred to the JPR/Gunning q.q. judgment of the Supreme Court and observed that this judgment does not state that the trustee’s authority to recover amounts is limited to non-cash payments to the credit balance of a bank account. According to the Court, such a limitation would also be in conflict with the fixation principle, the purpose of which is that the legal position of a creditor may no longer be changed in its favor (as regards amount and priority of the claim) after the bankruptcy has occurred. At the Supreme Court, the creditor is proven right again: the judgment of the Court of Appeal is set aside and the ruling of the subdistrict court is upheld.
Why can’t payments made after the bankruptcy date be reclaimed?
The Supreme Court’s opinion seems surprising: if a payment is received from a bankrupt, why does it not have to be repaid to the trustee? This has to do with Article 24 Bankruptcy Law, which states:
“For the obligations of the debtor, arising after the declaration of bankruptcy, the estate is not liable except to the extent that it has benefited as a result thereof.”
When executing a giro payment through a bank account, this leads to a lower balance on the same bank account. If there was already a negative balance, the negative balance becomes even lower.
No obligation to repay if the payment does not lead to a reduction of estate assets or an increase of estate liabilities
The Supreme Court considered that the payment in the case at hand did not lead to a reduction of the estate assets, because the bank account already had a debit balance when the bankruptcy commenced. Nor did that payment result in an increase of the estate’s liabilities, according to the Supreme Court. Although the debt to the bank has increased as a result of the payment to the creditor, the estate is not liable for that pursuant to article 24 Bankruptcy Act. After all, the estate has not benefited from the payment. The fact that the estate is not liable means that the bank will not be able to submit a claim in the bankruptcy for compensation of the amount transferred to the creditor.
The fixation principle and Article 23 of the Bankruptcy Act therefore provide no basis for granting the trustee’s claim.
The principle of paritas creditorum in bankruptcy law
The principle of paritas creditorum entails that debtors of equal rank should be treated equally in the satisfaction of their claims from the proceeds of property of the debtor. According to BB’s trustee, this principle is breached because one creditor gets paid and the other creditors do not.
A reliance on this principle cannot help the trustee either. The Supreme Court considered that the payment did not take place from an asset of the estate and that therefore no claim against the estate arose. According to the Supreme Court, there is therefore no question of an impermissible breach of the paritas creditorum.
Would the outcome have been different if the balance of the bank account was positive?
The outcome would have been different for the trustee if the payment had been charged to a positive balance on the bank account. After all, in that case an asset of the estate would have been reduced.
Looking for a lawyer in bankruptcy law in Rotterdam?
If you need legal assistance in disputes with a bankruptcy trustee or would like to obtain advice in the field of bankruptcy law, please contact Peter de Graaf. We will be happy to tell you more about the principle of fixation, the principle of paritas creditorum and the regulations concerning the recovery of giro payments by a bankruptcy trustee.
The judgment discussed can be found here.
Prejudgment attachment: what is it and how does it work?
You may have seen the term “prejudgment attachment” pass by. In this article we will explain what prejudgment attachment is and how the process of prejudgment attachment works.
What is precautionary attachment?
The word “conservatory” is derived from the verb “conserve,” or preserve. When an attachment is made, goods or property are preserved until the court has made a final decision. A prejudgment attachment is usually used to prevent the other party from disposing of or mortgaging goods or property. There are various types of prejudgment attachment possible. Consider, for example, prejudgment attachment:
- under third parties (such as bank seizures and wage garnishment);
- under the debtor himself;
- on an immovable property (such as seizure of a home);
- on movable property (such as seizure of cars, boats, or trading stock);
- on registered shares, and registered securities that are not shares;
- On ships;
- on aircraft.
To illustrate an example. Car company X has sold a car to Y. Subsequently, Y fails to pay the invoice of the car to X. Y can pay the invoice, but has no desire to pay the invoice. In that case, X could, for example, consider making a prejudgment attachment on the car or on Y’s bank account.
When may you have a prejudgment attachment imposed?
The process of garnishment works as follows. A lawyer files a petition with the preliminary relief judge of a district court. This petition is also called an ‘attachment petition’. The application for attachment indicates, among other things, what type of precautionary attachment is desired and what the underlying claim is.
The application for attachment is then summarily reviewed by the interim relief judge of a court. The judge in preliminary relief proceedings informs the lawyer whether or not to grant ‘leave’ (permission) for the attachment to be made.
If the judge grants leave, the lawyer receives a so-called ‘leave order’. As soon as the order for leave has been received, the bailiff can go ahead and impose a prejudgment attachment.
What happens after a prejudgment attachment has been levied?
After the precautionary seizure has been made by the bailiff, a ‘claim in the main action’ will often still have to be filed. This is a procedure before the court concerning the dispute on which the attachment is based. In most cases, the claim in the main action is instituted by issuing a writ of summons. It is also possible that the precautionary seizure is made during ongoing proceedings. In that case, it is not necessary to institute a new ‘claim in the main action’.
Would you like to know more about prejudgment attachment?
Would you like to assess whether a prejudgment attachment can be levied on the assets of your counterparty, or has a prejudgment been levied on you yourself, and would you like advice on this? Then you have come to the right place. Please feel free to contact us. Gentia Niesert, procedural law attorney at LVH Advocaten in Rotterdam, will be happy to help you.
Garnishment of the purchase price with the buyer
On 31 October 2013, in the article “Beslag op de koopsom van een woning” (“Garnishment of the purchase price of a dwelling”), we already discussed a judgement of the Supreme Court of 12 July 2013, in which the Court ruled that garnishment levied on the purchase price against the buyer is not subject to the protection of the priority notice (“Vormerkung“).
The Vormerkung means that, in the six months after a purchase agreement regarding the purchase of immovable property is recorded in the land register, any mortgages or attachments registered in respect of the relevant immovable property cannot be enforced against the buyer. This means that, in such case, the registered property can be transferred to the buyer free from the relevant mortgages and/or attachments. In practice, creditors tried to circumvent the Vormerkung by having garnishment levied on the purchase price against the buyer, as a result of which the immovable property could not be transferred to the buyer. After all, it meant that the buyer was unable to pay the purchase price, as garnishment had been levied on that. Without payment, there can be no transfer. According to the judgement of the Supreme Court, garnishment levied on the purchase price against the seller was not subject to the protection of the Vormerkung. This meant that the garnishment against the buyer had the desired effect, and the creditors achieved what they wanted to achieve.
However, this changed on 1 January of this year, when a legislative change came into effect that means that, if garnishment is levied on the purchase price against the buyer after the purchase is recorded in the land register, the buyer can pay the purchase price to the civil-law notary, despite the garnishment levied on it, so that the transfer can go through.
In addition, from that moment onwards, attachments levied on the immovable property after the purchase is recorded in the land register will only be levied on the portion of the purchase price the civil-law notary holds for the benefit of the seller. It means creditors will be more likely to opt for levying garnishment on the immovable property again.
However, the legislative change means the buyer is much better protected.
If you have a question about this subject, you can contact our office, +31 10 209 2777 or by e-mail info@lvh-advocaten.nl
Divorce and children
Parental responsibility
In the Netherlands both parents have joint parental responsibility (“gezag“) both during marriage or civil partnership and after a divorce or legal separation. Both parents have an equal say in matters regarding the upbringing and education of the children. Only in cases where a parent is deemed wholly unfit to fulfil their parental responsibilities, the court can grant the parental responsibility to one parent.
Access to the children
In March 2009 the Netherlands has introduced a new statute establishing that both parents have equal rights to access and the law now obliges the parent that the children reside with to promote contact between the children and the other parent after the divorce. The child also now has its own right to access to their parents.
Access between a parent and a child can only be denied when that parent is deemed unfit to have access. Cases where access is totally denied by the courts are much rarer since the introduction of this legislation, which has been hailed as an improvement of (mainly) fathers rights.
When getting divorced, it is inevitable that parties consider the future of any children. But what are your legal rights and obligations as parents after a divorce?
Information disclosure
Parents are legally obliged to disclose relevant information and consult each other regarding the upbringing and education of the children. Even if the courts have temporarily denied access, the legal obligation to inform the other parent on the well being of the children remains in force, unless leave has been given by court order to withhold information.
Child maintenance
Child maintenance provides a financial contribution towards the upbringing and education of the children and is owed to the parent predominately taking care of the children. Child maintenance is mandatory until the child turns 18 years of age. After the child has reached their majority a further contribution may be owed if the child is still studying or cannot financially provide for itself. In such cases maintenance is owed until the child turns 21 years of age. What amount of child maintenance a parent is actually able to pay, is determined on the basis of their income.
If the parents have a joint custody agreement whereby the children spend roughly half their time with both parents, separate financial arrangements can be made to split the costs of living between both parents rather than setting a fixed amount of child maintenance.
Parenting plan
If minor children are involved when getting a divorce, Dutch law now requires that parties agree on a parenting plan, setting out the future roles of the parents after the divorce. The plan must at least include arrangements regarding parental access and financial provisions for the children. This plan must be filed at the same time as the divorce petition, so parents are now forced to consult with each other on future arrangements for the children at an early stage. If no parenting plan is filed, then the courts may refuse to hear the divorce petition. In some cases a court may also prescribe mediation to see if parties can come to an agreed solution under the guidance of an impartial professional.
Our lawyers can help you to draft a parenting plan and can advise you with regards to your legal rights as a parent. We always bear in mind what is in the best interest of the children and will not litigate needlessly, but we will take all necessary legal measures if the other party will not see reason. We can also start injunction proceedings to obtain immediate access to the children, should access be denied in the course of the divorce proceedings.
Information
For additional information please feel free to contact our office 0031 10 209 2777, or by e-mail info@lvh-advocaten.nl
No enforcement by the ILT with regard to delayed flights
Under EC Regulation 261/2004, passengers can claim financial compensation when a flight is severely delayed or cancelled. Pursuant to Section 16 of this Regulation, the Netherlands is obliged to appoint a national institution that is responsible for the enforcement of this regulation. In the Netherlands, this is the State Secretary for Infrastructure and the Environment, while the Human Environment and Transport Inspectorate (Inspectie Leefomgeving en Transport – ILT) has been charged with the execution.
If a passenger feels that he is entitled to compensation, he or she must submit a request to that end to the airline. However, the airline will pay no such compensation if the delay or cancellation was due to extraordinary circumstances. In such case, the passenger can request that the ILT assess whether the airline is right, or the compensation should be paid after all.
So far, the ILT has refused to take enforcement action against airlines in cases in which compensation had to be paid but the relevant airlines refused to do so. This caused a lot of dissatisfaction with a number of passengers, who brought this lack of enforcement before the Council of State.
During these proceedings, the Council of State subsequently asked the Court of Justice in Luxembourg whether – in individual cases – the ILT is obliged to take measures against an airline if it refuses to pay compensation. On this subject, the text of the regulation is general and, according to the Council, does not provide a definitive answer to this. In addition, passengers who want to enforce payment of compensation already have the option of going to civil court.
On 17 March 2016, the Court of Justice found that the duty of the ILT is to carry out general supervision in order to safeguard the rights of airline passengers. This means that the ILT is not obliged to act if an individual complaint against an airline is submitted to it. According to the Court of Luxembourg, national law can grant this authority.
Please find enclosed the judgement of the European Court of Justice of 17 March 2016 (in the consolidated cases C‑145/15 and C‑146/15). The Council of State will handle any cases deferred by it with due observance of this judgement.
Further information
For additional information please feel free to contact our office.
No-risk policy: points of attention for employers
In this article we discuss the so-called ‘no-risk policy’ and points of attention for employers who employ personnel with a no-risk policy. We discuss what the policy entails and what this means for the reintegration obligations when the employee becomes disabled.
What is a no-risk policy?
The no-risk policy is an arrangement that applies to employees with an illness or disability. In short, it means that when an employer hires an employee with a sickness or disability, this employer receives a benefit under the Sickness Benefits Act for the employee when he or she becomes ill. The UWV thus takes over the obligation to continue to pay wages from Art. 7:629 (1) of the Dutch Civil Code. In addition, the employer does not have to pay a higher premium for the Sickness Benefits Act and WGA.
When will the employer receive sickness benefits for his employee?
The employer does not have to apply for this benefit in advance. As soon as the employee becomes ill, the employer informs the UWV that the no-risk policy applies. The UWV will then determine whether the employer will receive the benefit under the Sickness Benefits Act.
If the employer only finds out later that a no-risk policy applies to the employee (an employee only has to report this on request), the employer may report this within four days of the date on which it could reasonably have known this. The UWV will then grant the ZW benefits with retroactive effect (of up to one year).
When is an employee covered by the no-risk policy?
The no-risk policy applies, for example, to employees who once received a Wajong benefit or employees who are entitled to a WIA or WAO benefit. Under certain conditions, it also covers employees who have been hired on the basis of unemployment benefit.
Reintegration and no-risk policy
During occupational disability, employer and employee have reintegration obligations. The no-risk policy does not change this. Even with a no-risk policy a reintegration process must be started. In addition, the UWV can impose a wage penalty for insufficient reintegration efforts. So start timely with the reintegration.
Imposing a wage freeze on an employee with a no-risk policy?
A wage freeze can also be imposed on an employee who falls under the no-risk policy. This is necessary if the employee does not comply with his reintegration obligations. The employer must inform the UWV of the implementation of this wage freeze within five days using a UWV form. If this is not done or not done in time, the UWV may impose a fine.
Would you like to know more about the no-risk policy?
Feel free to contact the employment lawyers of LVH Advocaten in Rotterdam. Our employment lawyers, Peter Verheijden and Richard Ouwerling, are specialized in disability and reintegration processes. They will be happy to discuss the no-risk policy and sickness benefit with you.
Lifting of pledge ban
Trade receivables as collateral for corporate financing
A very large percentage of SMEs (figures 2022; 82%) have financing from a bank. Naturally, a financing bank wants security that the credit provided will be repaid. An important form of security is the provision of a pledge on trade receivables. By law, pledging of receivables is possible if a receivable is transferable.
Transferability of receivables
The premise of the law is that all receivables can be transferred – and therefore pledgeable – unless the nature of the receivable or the law prohibits it. An example of an untransferable receivable is the NOW subsidy. This subsidy was intended to enable employers to keep employees in permanent employment. It was, as it were, a concession on the employee’s salary. The subsidy is thus intended for the employee, and then by its nature this subsidy claim is non-transferable, and the employer cannot transfer the NOW claim to a third party. With this, the NOW claim is also not subject to pledge.
Exclude transferability
There is another important category of nontransferable receivables; these are those where the parties themselves have agreed that a receivable is nontransferable. Many parties are often unaware that a receivable is nontransferable. The non-transferability then appears to be included in the general terms and conditions declared applicable to the contract.
Why exclude transferability and pledge
When a receivable is transferred or pledged, there can be ambiguity about to whom payment should be made. It is also possible that a payment has just crossed a notice to pay to another or even that the notice to pay to another is missed altogether. As a result, payment may be made to a creditor while the receivable has been transferred to a third party. Payment is then made to the wrong address and the debtor runs the risk of having to pay again. Whether these are good reasons to exclude the transferability of a receivable is questionable, but often parties have no choice, especially if the non-transferability is included in general terms and conditions.
Consequences of non-transferability of claims
If a receivable cannot be transferred, the receivable cannot be pledged either. This affects a company’s ability to obtain financing from a bank. The introduction states that a large majority of SMEs have financing from a bank. It makes a difference to the size of the financing and the price of the financing (risk premium) whether a company can pledge receivables (as security for repaying the bank) or not. A simple calculation example: if a bank is willing to finance up to 50% of the debtor balance, a company with a debtor balance of 500 has a borrowing capacity of 250. If at the same company 20% of the trade receivables are not susceptible to pledge, the bank will not count those receivables as collateral. The receivable balance to be pledged is then only 400 and the borrowing capacity drops to 200. Another form of business financing is factoring. Then the receivable is transferred directly to a factoring company. This form of financing is not possible if the parties have agreed that a receivable is non-transferable.
Thus, companies have an interest in minimizing restrictions on the transferability (and pledgeability) of receivables.
Law on lifting pledge bans
The disadvantages of a pledge ban have long been known and the government has set itself the goal of improving financing based on trade receivables. The idea is that lifting pledge bans will provide SMEs with up to €1 billion in additional financing space. This could lead to an investment boost. Already in 2018, the internet consultation on the preliminary draft of the Act on lifting pledge bans was launched. Several market participants responded to preliminary draft of the law. In June 2020, a bill was submitted to the 2e chamber and on June 11, 2024, the 2e chamber passed the bill. On March 4, the bill was passed by the 1e chamber of parliament.
New arrangement
Two new paragraphs are added to art. 3:83 Dutch Civil Code which stipulate that exclusion of transferability and pledgeability of money receivables in name arising from the exercise of a profession or business is not possible. Some receivables are legally excluded from the law and for those receivables it remains possible to exclude transferability or pledgeability. Consider, for example, the balance of a g-account. Contractual clauses to that effect are null and void. The expected effective date is July 1, 2025. As of this date, nullity applies to new clauses. For existing agreements, there is a short transition period. Old stipulations will be void as of 3 months after the law enters into force.
Negative estate issue
The removal of pledge bans has an important effect on the resolution of bankruptcies. It is a problem that in many bankruptcies there are no or insufficient assets available to meet the trustee’s costs for performing legal duties (legality investigation). Currently, in many bankruptcies, the proceeds of unpledged claims are an important source of income. From these proceeds the costs of the bankruptcy can (partly) be paid. This act removes the restriction on pledges, and this results in fewer assets flowing into a bankruptcy estate. As a result, the negative estate issue increases. While recognizing the urgency of the negative estate problem and that this act bill will affect the negative estate problem lemma, no solution is offered. The solution would have to come from other ongoing studies and subsequent measures. The estimated benefit of broadening financing in SMEs is considered to outweigh this disadvantage. For the trustees who now must perform work in a negative estate for which no remuneration is paid, this is unpleasant.
Important date for approval amendment of Articles subsidiaries housing corporations
Following the mandatory amendment of the Articles of housing corporations, subsidiaries must also bring their Articles in line with the Housing Act (Woningwet). This has to be done before 1 January 2018.
In connection with the assessment period of the Netherlands Authority for Housing Corporations, it is recommended to file the application for approval of the amendment of the Articles with the Authority before 1 September 2017.
In the Housing Act, a number of stipulations have been declared applicable to subsidiaries as well. Several of these stipulations are outlined below.
Object under the Articles
If a housing corporation has a 100 % owned subsidiary, the object of the subsidiary under the Articles must determine that it exclusively performs activities on the field of public housing. If the company is just partly associated with the housing corporation, it should at least in proportion to that part pursuant to its Articles be active in the field of public housing.
Shares
Equal rights and obligations should be attached to the shares of a subsidiary in proportion to their amounts. Furthermore, it must be possible to establish a right of pledge to the shares and it must not be allowed to attach obligations to a certain type of shares. Stipulations under the Articles that conflict herein shall be no longer permitted pursuant to the Housing Act.
General Meeting
In most cases, the General Meetings of subsidiaries will be formed by the housing corporations. The Articles of the subsidiary must stipulate that the prior approval of the General Meeting is required for a number of decisions, such as making investment of over 3 million euros, selling property or establishing a restricted right thereon if this involves an amount of at least 10 million euros.
Transfer restrictions
In contrast with the Simplification and flexibilisation of private limited liability companies Act (Wet vereenvoudiging en flexibilisering BV-recht), the Articles of subsidiaries must contain mandatory transfer restrictions. These limit the options to freely transfer the shares to third parties.
Battle of forms: the applicability of General Terms and Conditions
The battle of forms is where a business enterprise has contracted with another business and both parties claim that their General Terms and Conditions are applicable to the contract that has been entered into. The question is which General Terms and Conditions apply in this instance?
When do General Terms and Conditions apply?
Article 6:217 of the DCC states that agreements are into by offer and acceptance, which also applies to General Terms and Conditions. In order for the General Terms and Conditions to be valid and applicable to the contract, the contract needs to clearly state that the General Terms and Conditions apply. Acceptance of the applicability of the General Terms can also be implied in the event that the other contracting party does not know the content.
Legal obligation to present the General Terms and Conditions to the other party
Article 6:233 and 6:234 of the DCC does provide for a duty on the party relying on the General Terms and Conditions to inform the other party by presenting the General Terms and Conditions to the other party. If these requirements are met the General Terms and Conditions are applicable to the contract, so the applicability requirement for General Terms and Conditions is less stringent that in relation to the contract itself.
Which General Terms and Conditions apply to the agreement?
In the event that both parties declared their General Terms and Conditions to be applicable, Article 6:225(3) DCC provides for a solution to determine which set of General Terms and Conditions apply. This article is what is referred to as the “first shot” principle. The “first shot” principle is where one party applies the General Terms and Conditions to be applicable and the other party in turn does the same. In this case the first party declaring their General Terms and Conditions to be applicable goes first provided that the applicability if the other General Terms and Conditions are expressly rejected. Often this wording is included in the General Terms and Conditions themselves, which may not be sufficient.
When are General Terms and Conditions considered to be rejected?
Case law has shown that by merely adding wording to your company’s General Terms and Conditions is not sufficient for the “first shot” principle to apply under Dutch law. This means specific wording needs to be included in the contract or offer. It needs to be very clear to the other side that your company will and is rejecting their General Terms and Conditions.
Battle of forms: UN Convention on International Sale of Goods
In the event that the parties to the agreement are selling commercial goods internationally ,then the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (Vienna, 1980) (CISG). United Nations Commission On International Trade Law is applicable to the contract when both parties have their place of business in a nation that have signed CISG: List of Contracting States | Institute of International Commercial Law (pace.edu) the CISG. It is important to note that the CISG is a lex specialis, meaning that this Convention is applicable to the contract in priority of the Netherlands Dutch Civil Code. For example, when one party has their place of business in the Netherlands, and the other party in Germany, then the CISG is applicable to the agreement in priority to the national jurisdiction. The CISG applies to the international sale of goods only to services and does not apply to consumer goods.
The CISG can also be specified by the contracting parties as the choice of law. This means that the contract for the international sale of goods is governed by the CISG even if one of the parties is from a nation that has not signed the CISG. Similarly, parties can also opt out of the CISG in the contract.
Which General Terms and Conditions apply to the international agreement?
Article 19 of the CISG states that the General Terms and Conditions are applicable in accordance with the “last shot” rule. This means the last party declaring their General Terms and Conditions to be applicable is successful, which is different to the relevant provision in the Dutch Civil Code (DCC). The CISG is generally very pro seller, which is something worth taking into consideration when you are the seller of the goods. Especially bearing in mind that you can opt into the CISG even if one of the parties is from a non-signatory nation.
If the CISG is expressly excluded by parties in the contract, and parties have agreed for the contract to be governed by Dutch law, then the provisions of the Dutch Civil Code apply to the applicability of the General Terms and Conditions.
Are you looking for an attorney at law who specialises in the use and applicability of General Terms and Conditions for an international agreement?. Please feel free to contact Madelon van Breemen.
The wage guarantee scheme: continued payment of wages in the event of the employer’s bankruptcy
The wage guarantee scheme: continued payment of wages in the event of the employer’s bankruptcy
The Unemployment Insurance Act includes a scheme that entitles employees to payment in the event of payment problems on the part of the employer. The regulation is also called the wage guarantee regulation. It also regulates which benefits an employee can claim in case of bankruptcy of the employer. In this article I will discuss the main provisions of the wage guarantee scheme that apply in the event of bankruptcy and I will go into a recent judgment of the Supreme Court on this subject.
Bankruptcy of the employer
If an employer has gone bankrupt, the bankruptcy trustee will, in principle, proceed as soon as possible to terminate the employment contracts on the basis of Section 40 of the Bankruptcy Act. In any case, the trustee does not have to apply a longer term than six weeks. The law stipulates that the salary and premium debts related to the employment contract are estate debts. Estate debts refer to the costs of the bankruptcy. Estate debts have a very high rank and the trustee can be expected not to allow them to arise and accrue unnecessarily.
The wage guarantee scheme in the event of an employer’s bankruptcy
Pursuant to sections 61 and 64 of the Unemployment Act, the UWV takes over the wage payment obligation of the bankrupt employer. The period for which the wages are covered by the wage guarantee scheme is limited. Wages do fall under the wage guarantee scheme:
- wages for a period of 13 weeks prior to the liquidator’s termination of the employment contract;
- the wages for the notice period, up to a maximum of six weeks;
- the vacation pay, the vacation allowance and the amounts, which the employer owes to third parties in connection with the employment relationship with the employee, for the year preceding the end of the six-week notice period (this is somewhat simplified).
The amounts are also capped by law. However, most people’s wages are less than the maximum amounts.
Wage claims that fall outside the wage guarantee scheme
It is clear from the above that not all conceivable claims arising from the employment contract are covered by the wage guarantee scheme. Depending on the situation, the employee then has an estate claim, a preferential claim on the basis of Section 3:288 opening words and under c to e of the BW (claim with privilege) or an unsecured claim (claim without privilege) or a combination of these.
UWV’s position in the wage guarantee scheme
The claims of the employee and third parties against the employer are transferred to the UWV, in so far as these claims are settled by the UWV. This means that the UWV acquires direct claims against the insolvent employer.
It may be beneficial to the estate if a restart takes place, whereby the employees are employed by the re-launched company. The relauncher becomes the new employer and therefore the bankrupt employer saves on wage costs. The Supreme Court recently issued a judgment on such a situation. This judgment is briefly discussed below.
Supreme Court ruling on wage guarantee scheme
The following facts emerge from the judgment. An employer, employing 84 people, goes bankrupt. A few days later, the trustee terminates the employment contracts with due observance of a six-week notice period. A few days after the declaration of bankruptcy, the company is restarted as a going concern. This means that the re-starter takes over the ongoing business activities of the bankrupt. The re-starter takes over the assets and employs the employees under the same conditions as they were previously employed by the bankrupt employer. The UWV will soon be informed about this by the insolvency administrator. The UWV will make payments to the employees on the basis of the wage guarantee scheme. These payments relate to the six-week notice period. This involves an amount of € 353,067. Subsequently the UWV submits a claim against the estate for this amount to the trustee. The trustee disputes this claim. The trustee believes that the employees were no longer entitled to wages from the bankrupt employer from the moment they started working for the re-starter.
No work, no pay?
The statutory regulation concerning the right to wages in the event of failure to perform work was amended on January 1, 2020. The Supreme Court notes that in this case, where the facts played out in 2016, the old regulation still applies. However, the Supreme Court notes that the new Article 7:628 (1) of the Dutch Civil Code does not intend to change the allocation of risks between the employer and employee. The new regulation implies that the employer is obliged to pay the salary determined according to the time frame if the employee has not performed the agreed work wholly or partially. This does not apply if the total or partial non-performance of the agreed work should reasonably be at the expense of the employee. Since the amendment of the law, it is therefore formulated as: no work, pay, unless…
Employee no longer willing to perform work?
The Supreme Court considered that if an employee, after his employer has been declared bankrupt, is reinstated in the employ of the acquirer on equal terms of employment for all or part of his business, the trustee in bankruptcy may deduce that the employee is no longer willing to perform work for the bankrupt employer. In such a case, the cause of the ceasing to perform the work should not lie with the bankrupt. From the moment of entering into service with the transferee, the employee is therefore no longer entitled to salary. The UWV was therefore not obliged to pay on the basis of the wage guarantee scheme. The trustee was therefore found to be in the right.
Strategy of employee in case of payment problems with employer
The wage guarantee scheme has only been discussed to a limited extent in this article. For employees who are employed by an employer who is unable to pay salaries, it is important to take action quickly, otherwise there is a chance that claims for benefits under the wage guarantee scheme will be lost. One strategy may be to file a report with the UWV and, in addition, to file for the employer’s bankruptcy.
Lawyers insolvency law and labour law Rotterdam
At LVH Advocaten we have specialists in the field of labour law and insolvency law. Please contact Peter de Graaf if you have any questions about the wage guarantee scheme, a bankruptcy petition and/or a restart. The judgment discussed can be found here.
TRADE SECRETS ACT: Good news for enterprises!
As you all know the introduction of the Data Protection Regulation (2016/679 with effect on 25th May 2018 had a substantial impact on enterprises on all levels, and received a lot of attention. Shortly after, another act was implemented in the Netherlands which also puts the trade secrets of organization on the map and gives enterprises a competitive advantage.
This new act is called the Trade Secrets Act (Trade Secrets Act) and was implemented in October 2018. The Trade Secrets Acts is the implementation act of the Directive on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure (2016/943) (the Directive). The aim of the Directive was to harmonise the definition of trade secrets and also give enterprises the possibility to initiate interlocutory measures to protect their trade secrets. These rights are similar to the rights available for the protection of intellectual property.
The legislation on trade secrets was spread around different parts of the Dutch Civil Code and case law. With the introduction of the Trade Secrets Act, this has been solved by just one act covering this subject.
Which information is protected under the Trade Secrets Act? Below you will find 3 cumulative requirements that need to be met.
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The information needs to be confidential. This means that the information should not be easily accessible and should not be general knowledge. The Explanatory Note of the Trade Secrets Act states that information should be widely interpreted. So think of recipes, drawings, marketing plans, customer lists etc.
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The information, because is it confidential under sub 1, has a commercial value to the enterprise.
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Reasonable measures need to have been taken to keep the information confidential by those who legally hold the information. What can be considered as reasonable measures?
a. Examples of these are confidentiality agreements or confidentiality clauses in the contracts (including contracts of employment), international commercial agreements, general terms and conditions, agency agreements, distribution agreements, framework agreements etc.
b. Other measures could include classifying the information as confidential with a text or watermark.
c. Technical measures also need to be taken such as the use of passwords, encryption etc.
If these three requirements are met, then the Trade Secrets Act is applicable and the enterprise can take steps to protect its trade secrets.
Which legal steps can be taken by enterprises under the Trade Secrets Act in order to protect their rights?
The owner of the enterprise can take all sorts of legal steps to preserve its rights under the Trade Secret Act. For example a prohibition to use, produce etc. the information, seizure of the information, destruction of the documents, electronic files etc, damages, etc. Furthermore, the courts can award full legal costs to the winner of the proceedings. As the information is confidential and has value to the enterprise, the Trade Secrets Act has also covered this issue. In order to prevent that the information is made public during the proceedings, the court hearing is a closed hearing and the decision is not fully disclosed.
Conclusion
The implementation of the Trade Secrets Act is good news for enterprises, especially when information has commercial value. It is advisable to scan your exciting commercial contracts and amend up the existing confidentiality clauses in agreements to make sure that the information is protected. Please contact Madelon van Breemen on +31 (10) 2092756 or on vanbreemen@lvh-advocaten.nl, who specializes in commercial international agreements and she can advise you.
Claudia Rondberg
Receptionist
+31 (0)10 209 27 77
rondberg@lvh-advocaten.nl
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Passenger claims 261/2004: Effect of extraordinary circumstances
Passenger Claims under Regulation 261/2004: The impact of extraordinary circumstances
Regulation 261/2004 entitles passengers, in the event of cancellation or long delay, to claim fixed compensation, unless the cancellation or delay of the flight is due to extraordinary circumstances and the airline has taken all reasonable measures. But what if the extraordinary circumstance occurred on a previous flight?
In this article, we examine extraordinary circumstances and reasonable measures, as well as the impact of extraordinary circumstances on subsequent flights in an airline’s flight operations.
Extraordinary circumstances in the event of long delays and cancellations
If a long delay or cancellation is due to extraordinary circumstances, the airline is not obliged to pay compensation to passengers. According to Regulation 261/2004, this applies, for example, in the case of:
“(…) political instability, weather conditions preventing the operation of the flight in question, security issues, unexpected flight safety issues and strikes affecting the flight operations of the airline operating the flight.”
An extraordinary circumstance also exists when:
“(…) a decision by air traffic control for a specific aircraft on a specific day causes a long delay, an overnight delay or the cancellation of one or more flights operated by that aircraft, (…)”
This is why no compensation is payable in such cases, as these are generally events over which the airline has little or no control. Examples include thunderstorms preventing a flight from departing or a bird strike. These are external circumstances over which airlines have no control.
Reasonable measures in the event of delay or cancellation
When an extraordinary circumstance is invoked, the court will also assess whether the airline has taken all reasonable measures to prevent or minimise the delay. Prevention will generally not be readily possible, as extraordinary circumstances must not be inherent to the conduct of an airline’s operations. Minimising the delay, on the other hand, offers more options. Examples include diverting a flight in the event of bad weather, or cancelling and rebooking onto the next available flight.
Repercussions of extraordinary circumstances
In LVH Advocaten’s aviation practice, we regularly see flights being disrupted by an extraordinary circumstance on a preceding flight that directly affects the subsequent flight.
Air traffic control decisions – impact of CTOT
This occurs, for example, in the case of decisions made by air traffic control. An airline is obliged to comply with such decisions under the Aviation Act. But when does an extraordinary circumstance have an impact?
An airline must submit a plan prior to the flight, specifying a departure time (EOBT, Estimated Off Blocks Time). However, even after such a plan has been approved, air traffic control may, by means of a so-called slot message (a decision by air traffic control), impose a later departure time (CTOT, Calculated Take-off Time). Air traffic control does this because it is required to regulate airspace. As a result of these slot messages, a flight may therefore only depart later than originally planned. There may be various reasons for this, such as a strike or a military exercise. However, the reason for imposing the slot is irrelevant, as the airline is obliged to comply with it. See the judgement of the District Court of North Holland of 30 November 2022.
Case law has now confirmed on several occasions that the issuance of such a CTOT constitutes an extraordinary circumstance. Furthermore, the question has regularly arisen as to whether that CTOT also affects a subsequent flight. Case law has held that where there is a causal link (direct effect) between the delay to the subsequent flight in question and the CTOT issued for the preceding flight, the extraordinary circumstance may also apply to the subsequent flight. See, for example, the judgement of the District Court of North Holland of 8 February 2023.
Do you have any questions about passenger claims and extraordinary circumstances?
LVH Advocaten regularly handles passenger claims on behalf of airlines and therefore has extensive knowledge of the aviation sector and the issues that arise within it. If you are an airline and would like more information about passenger claims or an insight into how we handle these claims, please feel free to contact Gentia Niesert without obligation.
Practical legal tips on the applicability of General Terms and Conditions of Trade
Are you sometimes confronted with the situation where your business enterprise has contracted with another business and your business enterprise has sent an offer to the other party you’re your General Terms and Conditions and the other party has accepted your order by return stating that that their General Terms and Conditions apply? The question is which General Terms and Conditions apply here. This is what is called a “battle of forms”.
Assuming Dutch law is applicable, then the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), will also be applicable in addition to Dutch law, unless it has been specifically excluded in the business contract. The CISG states that the General Terms and Conditions are applicable in accordance with the “last shot” rule. This means the last party declaring their General Terms and Conditions to be applicable is successful.
If the CISG is not applicable or has been expressly excluded by the parties, then Dutch law uses the “first shot” principle. This means that the first party declaring their General Terms and Conditions to be applicable goes first provided the provisions of article 6:265 (3) of the Dutch Civil Code have been met. This means that all other party’s General Terms and Conditions should be expressly rejected. Case law has shown that by merely adding wording to your company’s General Terms and Conditions is not sufficient and my advice is to include specific wording in your offer to the other party. It needs to be extremely clear to the other side that your company will and is rejecting their General Terms and Conditions.
As you can read, there are some challenges to be met in the event that your business enterprise uses General Terms and Conditions and regularly contracts with international parties. In addition to a very specific procedure that Dutch law requires for the applicability of the General Terms and Conditions, there is this requirement to meet too. In an earlier article, I set out which steps your company needs to take for the General Terms and Conditions to be applicable. The normal rules of offer and acceptance are applicable for the applicability but in addition the General Terms and Conditions need to be “handed over”. There are a number of ways of doing this. The safest way is is to include a PDF of your General Terms and Conditions and attach it to the offer that your company is sending. Furthermore a reference on your website together with a link to the General Terms and Conditions may also be an option as well as registration of the General Terms and Conditions with the Chamber of Commerce or the Civil Court.
If I can help you in relation to the above, please feel free to contact me.
Assessment of employment relationships and the DBA Act: Employee or self-employed person?
A widely used employment relationship is the ZZP construction. This employment relationship has a number of advantages for entrepreneurs and it is a good alternative to temporary work and (temporary) employment contracts. It is therefore a subject that has been the subject of much debate in recent years, more specifically, when is there an agreement for services or an employment contract? That qualification determines the applicable regime and whether payroll taxes must be paid to the Tax Office. This article looks at a number of important aspects, including: (1) the replacement of the DBA Act and (2) the fiscal and civil assessment of an employment relationship.
Replacement of the DBA Act
Since 1 May 2016, the Deregulation of Employment Relationships Act (Wet DBA) has been in force. This law has replaced the system with the VAR declarations. Based on the DBA Act, certainty is provided to clients through model and example agreements approved by the Tax and Customs Administration. Clients may also submit their own model agreement to the Tax and Customs Administration for approval. If an approved agreement is used, the client and contractor are indemnified against retrospective levies.
The DBA Act will be replaced in 2021. The reason for this is to combat false self-employment and competition on employment conditions. Clients do not pay employer’s premiums for the self-employed, which makes them attractive. Also, no salary is paid during illness and there is no protection against dismissal.
Enforcement of the DBA Act
From 1 May 2016 until at least 1 January 2021 no enforcement will take place. Since 1 July 2018 the Tax Authorities only enforce in cases of malicious intent. This means that the client knows or should have known that there is an employment relationship and he deliberately allows this false self-employment to arise or continue.
Web module: employee or self-employed
Since January 2021, a web module has been made available for six months. After the end of this web module pilot, enforcement will be started (October 2021 at the earliest). Until then, the current enforcement policy remains in place.
The web module must provide advance clarity to clients as to whether work is within the scope of employment (employee) or outside employment (self-employed) and whether income tax and social security contributions must be paid. The web module provides certainty (exemption from payroll taxes) as long as it is filled in truthfully. During the pilot project, filling in the web module has no legal status, so that those involved cannot derive any rights from the outcome of the web module.
Assessment of employment relationship
The DBA Act and the upcoming amendments do not change anything about the substantive assessment of an employment relationship. It only provides certainty as to whether there is an obligation to withhold payroll taxes. Below is discussed how relationships are qualified from a tax law and civil law perspective.
Tax qualification (employment) relationship
If a company wishes to engage a contractor, it must assess whether payroll taxes are due on payments made to the contractor. This is the case if the relationship qualifies as an “employment relationship” within the meaning of payroll taxes. Clients are responsible for this assessment. If this assessment is wrong, an additional assessment can be imposed retroactively (up to five years), with or without an increase in a fine and/or interest.
The Payroll Tax Act does not have its own definition, so the civil term employment contract has been used. The essential core characteristics of an employment contract are: (1) the presence of a relationship of authority, (2) obligation to pay wages, and (3) obligation to perform personal labor.
Relevant indicators of an employment contract
The Tax Administration has drawn up policy rules that describe relevant indicators. The relevant indicators that must be assessed – in conjunction with each other – are:
- Duration of the agreement: a long duration of a contract or a fixed contract is an indication of an employment relationship.
- Scope of the work: if the contractor only works a few hours per week for the principal, this is an indication that there is no employment relationship.
- Nature of the work: if the contractor’s work is part of the principal’s core activities, this is an indication of an employment relationship.
- Level of remuneration: a remuneration that is clearly higher than the market rate is an indication that there is no employment.
- Organizational integration: if the contractor is part of the organization of the employer, this is an indication of an employment relationship.
- Liability of contractor: if the contractor is liable for damages arising from the work, this is an indication that there is no employment relationship.
- Execution of work: if the contractor can determine how the assignment will be executed, this indicates that there is no employment relationship.
Civil qualification (employment) relationship
The DBA Act does not apply to the civil qualification. The use of a model agreement of the Tax Authorities (and web module) does not provide certainty as to whether or not an employment contract exists in the civil law sense.
Furthermore, the use of a model agreement does not remove the possibility that a contractor may take the position that he/she is an employee. Whether or not there is an employment contract is assessed on the basis of Article 7:610 of the Dutch Civil Code:
- Work: employee is obliged to perform work personally and may not be replaced without permission.
- Wages: the amount is not important and board and lodging and wages in kind can also be considered wages. Only an “expense allowance” is not pay.
- For a certain period of time: there is no legal minimum.
- Relationship of authority: employee follows instructions from employer. It is not required that employer actually gives instructions, but that he can give them. There is no authority if, for example, there is freedom in terms of working hours, work arrangement, method of execution and if the employee is allowed to perform other work in addition to the agreed work.
In assessing these elements, all the circumstances are important and they are weighed holistically, i.e. viewed in sense as a whole. In particular, the existence or absence of a relationship of authority is important.
It was recently held that the intentions of the parties are not relevant to the qualification question (HR 6 November 2020). It is not important whether it was actually the intention of the parties to conclude an employment contract. What matters is whether the rights and obligations agreed upon meet the legal description. That is the qualification. The question prior to that is, what rights and obligations have been agreed upon. That question is answered on the basis of the so-called Haviltex criterion. In short, this means that not only a purely linguistic interpretation of an agreement is considered, but that it comes down to the meaning that the parties in the given circumstances could reasonably attribute to the provisions of the agreement and what they could reasonably expect from each other.
Questions about the DBA Act or qualifying employment relationships?
Do you have questions about the Wet DBA, the changes to the Wet DBA or the qualification of employment relationships? Please feel free to contact our specialists: Richard Ouwerling (Attorney at Law Employment Law) and David Harreman (Attorney at Law Tax Law).
Qualifying employment contract: employee or not after all?
Qualifying employment contract: employee or not after all?
With the Deliveroo judgment of March 2023, the Supreme Court has once again given the practice more clarity on the qualification of the employment contract. Since that ruling, of course, various case law has again been rendered on whether there is an employment contract or yet another type of contract.
This article explains when there is an employment contract and, on the basis of two examples, further clarifies the qualification of employment relationships in order to get a better idea of when you are dealing with an employee or still with a ZZP or intern.
When is there an employment contract?
First of all, just the basics. We speak of an employment contract only when the following cumulative requirements of Article 7:610 of the Civil Code (BW) are met:
- labor;
- pay;
- authority (employed);
- for a certain amount of time.
These elements are left to be fleshed out by case law.
Viewpoints assessment employment relationship
In the Deliveroo ruling, the Supreme Court provided points of view that answer the question of whether an agreement should be classified as an employment contract. The points of view are as follows:
- The nature and duration of the work;
- The manner in which work and working hours are determined;
- the embedding of the work and the person performing the work in the organization and business operations of the person for whom the work is performed;
- The existence or absence of an obligation to perform the work personally;
- How the contractual arrangement of the parties’ relationship was established;
- The manner in which remuneration is determined and paid;
- the amount of these rewards;
- whether the person doing the work is at commercial risk in doing so;
- Also of importance may be whether the person performing the work behaves or can behave as an entrepreneur in economic life, for example, in acquiring a reputation, in acquisition, in terms of tax treatment, and considering the number of clients for whom he works or has worked and the length of time for which he usually behaves.
It also follows from the ruling that only provisions that actually have meaning for the parties are relevant in the assessment.
Then to the examples.
Security guard is self-employed and has no employment contract
The East Brabant District Court ruled that a security guard did not have an employment contract, but performed his work as a ZZP’er. Various elements in the employment relationship pointed to an assignment contract. The security guard had a lot of freedom. He had no obligation to work a minimum number of hours, he himself determined which days and times he worked, and he had no maximum number of vacations.
Furthermore, the court found it significant that although security work was the core business of the work provider, the security guard was not embedded in the organization. In addition, his fee was substantially higher than the salary of the employee with similar work and the security guard was at commercial risk because he had no claim to a fixed number of hours.
Finally, the court concluded that the security guard could conduct himself as an entrepreneur in the course of business by being allowed to work for other clients.
Internship agreement qualifies as employment contract
The Central Netherlands District Court ruled that, an employee whose last employment contract was not renewed was already in permanent employment. The first “internship agreement” qualified as an employment contract. In fact, after that first agreement, the employee had received three more temporary employment contracts and the last extension automatically resulted in an indefinite contract.
The agreement was qualified as an employment contract because the employee’s work during the internship agreement was not substantially relevant to the employee’s training. From the outset, the employee performed much of the work that was part of the position of entry-level production manager. Study was not a primary concern. There was no plan and the employer had no knowledge of the training requirements. Thus there was employment within the meaning of Section 7:610 of the Civil Code. Thus, the employer still had to pay the minimum wage over the internship agreement, because only an internship allowance had been paid.
Clarifying assessment of employment relationships and legal presumption
The legislature is also not sitting still in this area and aims to give more interpretation to the concept of “employed” (relationship of authority) in Article 7:610 of the Civil Code. The legislator proposes the following interpretation of the term:
- he who performs the work under work-related direction from the employer; or
- he or labor that is organizationally embedded in the employer’s organization; and
- he who does not perform the labor for his own account and risk.
The bill also introduces a new legal presumption. Anyone who performs work for remuneration not exceeding €32.24 per hour will be presumed to be working on the basis of an employment contract under a new Section 7:610aa of the Civil Code to be introduced.
Seek advice qualifying employment relationship?
In doubt about the qualification of an agreement? Contact Richard Ouwerling of LVH Advocaten in Rotterdam. Richard Ouwerling is an Employment Lawyer and advises entrepreneurs on labor relations and employment contracts.
Carola Plomp
Secretary
+31 (0)10 209 27 75
plomp@lvh-advocaten.nl (more…)
Right to prior consultation Works Council in the event of bankruptcy
In the case between the Works Council and the receiver of the chain of chemist’s shops DA, the Netherlands Supreme Court issued a judgement on 2 June 2017, in which in summary it ruled that the right to prior consultation of the Works Council, as incorporated in Article 25 of the Works Council Act (WOR) in principle also applies to the event in which a company has been declared bankrupt.
Herein, the Supreme Court has formulated three principles, namely:
- The right to prior consultation of the Works Council does not relate to the sale of goods and decisions concerning the dismissal of employees;
- If the sale of assets takes place in the context of a continuation or a relaunch of (a part of) the company by the same or a different entity, a decision thereto is indeed subject to the right to prior consultation;
- The receiver may, under circumstances, derogate from the formal requirements of Article 25 of the WOR if the circumstances so require. After all, the receiver has to make quick decisions.
What was the case?
On 29 December 2015, among others, DA Retailgroep (DA) was declared bankrupt. Subsequently, the receiver chose to accept a (slightly lower) bid from the Nederlandse Drogisterij Service (NDS), because it was prepared to take over most of the employees. Following a request thereto, the receiver informed the Works Council of the outlines of (the decision for) the transfer of the business activities to NDS. In its turn, the Works Council requested the receiver to confirm that he would consider the costs the Works Council was to make for legal assistance to be insolvency assets. The receiver rejected the Works Council’s request.
Enterprise Section
Next, the Works Council lodged an appeal on the basis of Article 26 of the WOR with the Enterprise Section against the decision to transfer assets by DA to NDS. In support of its appeal, the Works Council brought forward that:
- the contested decision is a decision as referred to in Article 25 paragraph 1 of the WOR;
- Article 25 of the WOR also applies in the event of a bankruptcy;
- the Works Council had not been notified of the contested decision; and
- there had been no consultation with the Works Council, let alone that its advice had been sought.
The Enterprise Section dismissed the appeal from the Works Council, as the right to prior consultation of the Works Council would in principle be incompatible with the role of the receiver aimed at the liquidation of the assets. Furthermore, in the opinion of the Enterprise Section, the right to prior consultation would be practically difficult to fit in a bankruptcy.
Appeal in cassation
Afterwards, the Works Council lodged an appeal in cassation. In part 1, the Works Council complains about the judgement that the right to prior consultation of the Works Council in principle does not apply in the situation in which the company is declared bankrupt. In part 2, the Works Council complains that the judgement of the Enterprise Section, that for the applicability of the right to prior consultation of the Works Council the receiver is at least required to continue the company, is also incorrect.
The WOR contains various obligations for entrepreneurs. In legal ground 3.3, the Supreme Court finds, in short, that the WOR in the event of a bankruptcy remains applicable. In addition, the Supreme Court finds that during the bankruptcy the receiver exercises the powers of the entrepreneur insofar this is entailed by the Faillissementswet (Bankruptcy Act). Here, there are two restrictions, as mentioned earlier under 1 and 3.
The complaints of the parts 1 and 2 therefore succeed. Therefore, the judgements of the Enterprise Section that the right to prior consultation of the Works Council does not apply in principle in the event of a bankruptcy as well as that for the applicability of the right to prior consultation of the Works Council the receiver is at least required to continue the company, are both incorrect.
Moreover, the Works Council complained in part 3 about the judgement of the Enterprise Section that the receiver was not required to pay the costs of these proceedings (based on Article 22 of the WOR) from DA’s insolvency assets. As parts 1 and 2 have succeeded, part 3 also succeeds. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has reversed the decision of the Enterprise Section.
Information
If you have any questions on the right to prior consultation or on works councils in general, please contact our office, 0031 10 209 2777 or by e-mail info@lvh-advocaten.nl.
Sick employee does not cooperate in reintegration: employer actions
Sick employee does not cooperate in reintegration: employer actions
A reintegration process starts when the employer reports sick. Previously, we wrote an article about the steps that should be taken in a reintegration process. But what if the sick employee does not cooperate? Which actions can you take as an employer to get the reintegration process back on track or can the employer fire the sick employee if he does not cooperate?
In this article we discuss the actions or measures an employer can or should take if a sick employee does not comply with the obligations arising from the reintegration process.
Actions of the employer in case of non-compliance with the reintegration obligations
First of all, the employer must determine what exactly the reintegration obligations are that are not fulfilled. This determines to a large extent the action to be taken.
Warning not to comply with reintegration obligations
Sending a warning letter is a good first step when the employee does not comply with the reintegration. The employer is well advised to make clear which obligations the employee has, such as appearing at the company doctor, cooperating in drawing up the plan of approach and performing suitable work. Subsequently, the employer can schedule a meeting to discuss the obligations during reintegration.
If the employee disagrees with the advice of the company doctor, it is good that the employer points out in the letter that the employee can request an expert opinion from the UWV on the disability and reintegration.
Announcement of wage suspension or wage cut
If there is already a reason for a wage freeze or wage suspension (see below), it can be announced immediately that a wage freeze or wage suspension will be implemented in the event of non-compliance within a certain period.
Suspension of wages after violation of control regulations
A company is obliged to draw up a sick leave policy. For more information see our article on this subject. This policy contains control regulations concerning work disability, such as the procedure for reporting sick, the obligation to pass on accommodation details and the obligation to attend the company doctor’s surgery. If these control regulations are violated without a valid reason, the employer is allowed to suspend the salary.
If the employee complies with the control regulations again, he is entitled to continued payment of wages with retroactive effect. The wages that were not paid during the suspension must still be paid. No statutory increase or interest is owed on those wages.
Note: the wage suspension must be announced. Therefore, if the employer intends to implement a wage suspension, the employee must first be warned that he has violated the control regulations and that the employer has reasons to suspend wages. This gives the employee the opportunity to comply with the regulations after all.
Wage freeze after breach of reintegration rules
In the context of reintegration, the employee must among other things cooperate in drawing up an action plan and must perform suitable work if the company doctor advises this. If the employee does not cooperate without a valid reason, a wage freeze can be imposed. It is important that the employer uses this measure in time. If the employee has not or not sufficiently fulfilled the reintegration obligations and the employer has been inactive, the UWV may extend the obligation to continue paying wages after the end of the waiting period (in principle 104 weeks after reporting sick).
Please note: here too, the wage freeze must be announced.
Dissolution of the employment agreement of a sick employee
Failure to comply with the reintegration obligations may ultimately also lead to dissolution of the employment contract. The subdistrict court may grant the dissolution in the event of (seriously) culpable act or omission. This is the case if the employee repeatedly violates the reintegration obligations despite the written reminders from the employer and the applied wage freeze. The prohibition on giving notice during illness does not apply. Note: employer must have a UWV expert statement.
Summarily dismissing a sick employee
In extreme cases, summary dismissal is sometimes even possible if the employee does not fulfil the reintegration obligations. In this case, there must be additional circumstances. These could include, for example, the employee going on holiday abroad for an extended period of time without the employer’s permission during the reintegration process (Court of Appeal ‘s-Hertogenbosch ruling).
Want to know more about actions of the employer in case of non-compliance with reintegration?
It follows from the above that the employer must timely intervene during the reintegration process, so a UWV wage penalty can be prevented. For this, sufficient means are available. Want to know more about the possible actions? Richard Ouwerling of LVH Advocaten in Rotterdam will be pleased to help you determine the right strategy. He can help you, for example, in drawing up a sick leave policy, drafting warning letters and conducting employment law proceedings.
IATA Travel Pass: ins and outs
International air traffic has been (partially) stopped for quite some time now. The corona crisis has had an enormous impact on the aviation industry. Restarting air traffic brings with it the necessary challenges in terms of information supply to passengers, the requirements of various governments, but also the requirements for airports and airlines.
Digital corona passport
IATA (International Air Transport Association) has come up with a global solution, the IATA Travel Pass, a digital corona passport. A global standardized way to validate and verify all national regulations regarding COVID-19 for passenger travel. With a mobile application, IATA aims to safely introduce the restart of air travel. The app allows governments to manage passengers’ health credentials, namely what tests passengers have undergone and whether they have been vaccinated. With this, IATA also hopes to counter fraud via forged papers.
The IATA Travel Pass contains four modules that can be combined:
- The passenger receives information on the testing and vaccination requirements for the notified trips;
- The passenger can find COVID-19 testing locations in the area of departure and arrival;
- It ensures secure transmission of testing and vaccination information to passengers;
- It allows the passenger to (a) create a digital passport, (b) verify a test or vaccination, and (c) share the test with authorities to travel. Also, the passenger can easily manage their travel information digitally without contacting third parties.
Safe travel with the IATA Travel Pass?
This initiative will hopefully allow people to travel safely again soon. Meanwhile, the digital corona passport has been tested on various components. On March 15, 2021, the app was used on a Singapore Airlines flight to London where the actual management of health data was also tested. The IATA Travel Pass has been successfully implemented, according to IATA’s CEO Alexandre de Juniac. IATA expects to launch the app in April 2021 for iOS and Android devices.
Whether everything will go as smoothly as IATA hopes remains to be seen. They will now have to gain the trust of governments to open borders without quarantine. Verifying tests and vaccinations of travelers should help. It will also be questionable whether all airlines will participate, as there are (yet to be determined) costs involved. On the other hand, there is an urgent demand within the aviation industry for a cost-effective international solution for safe travel.
An important issue is of course how traveler data will be protected. IATA states that travelers themselves have control over their data and that IATA does not store it centrally. Only the traveler releases the data to the relevant authorities.
Legal questions related to aviation?
LVH Advocaten is a specialist in the field of aviation. Do you have any questions as a result of this article or any other aviation related topic. Please feel free to contact us for more information.
The pilot’s employment contract: points of interest and details for airlines
For most employees, it can be determined with some ease whether they have an employment contract and what law applies to that employment contract. Pilots, on the other hand, occupy a special position within labor law because of the international elements that tend to fester.
In this article, we discuss some points of interest and specifics regarding the pilot’s employment contract that are important for airlines.
Dismissal procedure pilot in Dutch court
If an airline wants to proceed with dismissal proceedings, it is wise to think about a number of points in advance. These include assessing which court has jurisdiction and which law applies.
Dutch court jurisdiction over pilot with international labor contract
In an international working relationship with a pilot, the court will first consider whether the pilot is an employee within the meaning of the European Regulations. This is tested on the basis of European case law. There is an employment contract when there is a durable link that gives the employee a certain place in the organization and the pilot has provided under performance for a certain time for a fixed monthly remuneration.
The court can then use the Brussels I-bis Regulation (EEX Regulation II) to assess whether jurisdiction exists. The parties can agree on a choice of forum clause. However, such a choice of forum is only allowed if the employee also has the option of submitting the dispute to other courts.
If no choice of forum has been made, then it must be determined who the defendant is and then it can be examined which courts have jurisdiction Article 21 and 22 of EEX Regulation II. Suppose the employer is a Dutch airline that wants to file a request for dissolution and the employee’s place of employment is the Netherlands and he lives there as well, then the Dutch court has jurisdiction. In fact, the court of the member state where the employee is domiciled has jurisdiction.
On the other hand, if an employee wants to initiate the proceedings, he or she has a choice between the courts of the country of (1) the employer’s residence or (2) the place where the employee usually worked.
Applicable law
Which law applies is determined by the Rome I Regulation (for employment contracts concluded on or after Sept. 17, 2009). Parties often agree on a choice of forum in international agreements. This means that they agree that, for example, Dutch law is applicable. However, there are three limitations to the choice of law: (1) If there is an international employment contract and all connecting factors are in one country, the mandatory law of that country applies and takes precedence over the choice of law. (2) Certain special mandatory rules take precedence over the choice of law (for example: Working Hours Act and General Equal Treatment Act). (3) The choice of law may not lead to loss of protection of mandatory provisions of the law that would apply to the employment relationship in the absence of choice of law.
If no choice of law has been made, then (1) the country of habitual employment must be determined, (2) failing which, the country in which the establishment that hired the employee is located is held. (3) If there is a closer connection with another country, then the law of that country applies.
Supreme Court proceedings on labor agreement poloot and competent court
The Supreme Court ruled on the question of jurisdiction last year in a case between Netjets and a pilot. The question was whether the Dutch court had jurisdiction to take cognizance of an employment dispute between a UK-based airline regarding the termination of the employment contract. The court had assumed jurisdiction because Schiphol was the home base within the meaning of Annex III of Regulation 3922/91 and therefore the place from which the pilot habitually worked. The Supreme Court confirmed this. The Court correctly held that the main part of his obligations were fulfilled from Schiphol. The pilot performed his assignments from Schiphol Airport and returned there after each tour. The pilot also received his instructions at home via email or app. In addition, after accepting an assignment, the pilot made sure that he was present at Schiphol in uniform at the appointed time. The Dutch court thus had jurisdiction.
Questions regarding dispute international labor agreement pilot?
Contact Lisa Kloot of LVH Lawyers for more information on aspects of the pilot’s employment contract. She specializes in employment law and is active within the aviation industry.
Medium-sized business premises or other business premises: what is the difference and how do you determine which is which?
There are two different rental regimes for commercial property: rental for medium-sized business premises, such as stores and catering establishments (7:290 business premises) and other business premises (7:230a business premises). The applicable rental regime is indicated by the section of the Dutch Civil Code that applies to that rental regime. Rent for medium-sized business premises is regulated in Section 7:290 of the Dutch Civil Code and is therefore also referred to as 7:290 business premises. Section 7:230a of the Dutch Civil Code regulates the rent for other business accommodation, the so-called 7:230a business accommodation. This article explains the difference between medium-sized business premises and other business premises and how to determine what type of business premises is involved in your case.
Difference between medium-sized business premises and other business premises
Different statutory regulations apply to both rental regimes. It is therefore important to make a distinction between medium-sized business premises and other business premises. The rules that apply to medium-sized business premises assume a high degree of protection for the tenant. This protection is mainly expressed in the fixed lease terms, the limited possibilities for the lessor to give notice, the system of adjusting the lease price and the right of substitution. Leases for other business premises, on the other hand, assume a large degree of contractual freedom between the parties.
Importance of type of business accommodation for termination of lease
The distinction between medium-sized business premises and other business premises plays a particularly important role in the event of termination or cancellation of the lease. A tenant of medium-sized business premises (7:290 business premises) enjoys rent protection. This means that a landlord cannot terminate the lease until he has met the legal requirements. In addition, under certain circumstances a tenant can claim compensation for moving and furnishing costs and/or goodwill compensation.
If you would like to know more about the termination options of a lease of medium-sized business premises? Then click on “How does the termination of a lease for medium business premises work?”
If a lease for other business premises (7:230a business premises) ends, the tenant can, in principle, claim eviction protection.
You can read more about eviction protection in: “How does eviction protection work for a tenant in the lease of office space (and other business space)?”
For a tenant of commercial space, it is important to know whether he is entitled to rent protection or eviction protection. For this reason it is important to know whether the rent regime of Section 7:290 of the Dutch Civil Code or Section 7:230a of the Dutch Civil Code applies. For the landlord, it is important to know which tenancy regime applies, so that he can terminate the lease in the right way.
When is there medium-sized business accommodation?
Medium-sized business premises or 7:290 business premises are defined as:
- a built-up immovable property or part thereof which, pursuant to a rental agreement, is intended to be used as a retail business, a restaurant or bar business, a collection or delivery service, or a craft business, however, only if
- in the rented space there is a room accessible to the public for the direct delivery of movable goods or for the provision of services.
Furthermore, 7:290 business premises also includes a hotel or camping business (camping site) and a house dependent on the 7:290 business premises (think of the pub owner who lives above his pub).
Almost all stores, bars and restaurants are 7:290 business premises.
When is there other business accommodation?
Other business accommodation or 7:230a business accommodation exists when there is a lease of immovable property (a building) or a part thereof that does not qualify as 7:290 business accommodation and also does not qualify as living accommodation. This is therefore a residual category.
In other words, if the requirements of 7:290 business premises are not met (and it is also not a residential property), it is a 7:230a business premises.
The best known example of 7:230a business accommodation is office space.
How do you determine whether it is medium-sized business premises or other business premises?
In practice, it may not be clear whether the property is medium-sized business space or other business space. Sometimes there is even a situation in which both rental regimes are combined. The main rule is then that both rental regimes apply next to each other to one rental object, if possible. However, we have already seen above that different protection rules apply to the different rental regimes. These protection rules for the tenant of business premises cannot be combined with each other (a tenant cannot have both rent protection and eviction protection). Therefore, it must be determined which rental regime applies. This is done as follows.
First of all, it must be examined whether actual splitting of the central business accommodation and the other business accommodation is possible. This is the case, for example, when the publicly accessible area (the store or the collection counter) can actually/constructively be separated from the other business space (for example, the storage area) as a separate area. In other words, can both spaces be used by different tenants? If splitting is possible, the publicly accessible area (the store) is governed by the rental regime of Article 7:290 of the Dutch Civil Code and the other business area by Article 7:230a of the Dutch Civil Code.
In assessing whether splitting the lease is possible, we look at:
– the circumstances of the case;
– the use that the parties had in mind when concluding the contract;
– the use that is currently made of the leased property;
– the layout of the leased property in relation to that use; and
– the consequences of any division for the tenant’s (agreed and actual) use.
All these circumstances carry equal weight. The decisive factor is therefore not whether or not there is such (structural and/or functional) cohesion and economic connection between the relevant premises that they cannot be used by different lessees without practical objections.
Secondly, if splitting is not possible, the rental regime must be determined on the basis of the predominant use. The rental regime of Section 7:290 of the Dutch Civil Code shall not apply if the leased property is used predominantly for a purpose other than to carry on a business as referred to in Section 7:290 of the Dutch Civil Code (store, catering establishment, collection or delivery service or craft business). The intention of the parties when entering into the lease is important in this respect.
If, for example, there is a store with a (large or small) storage space that fully serves the sale of the store, the lease regime of Section 7:290 of the Dutch Civil Code will apply. The storage space is then also a medium-sized business area (7:290 business area). The same applies the other way around. A showroom in which only small items are sold will fall entirely under the rent regime of Section 7:230a of the Dutch Civil Code.
Consequences of the applicable rent regime business premises and termination or cancellation of the lease
As mentioned above, the applicable rent regime for business premises determines which protection rules the tenant can invoke if the rental agreement is terminated or if the agreed rental period ends. If a tenant of other business premises wants to invoke eviction protection, he must timely file a petition with the court. The deadlines are short. If a petition is not filed in time, eviction protection can no longer be claimed.
It is also important for the lessor to know which rental regime applies to the lease of business premises. This way the lessor knows how he can terminate the lease. This is particularly important if the landlord has plans for the rental property. It must be clear to the landlord when he can again freely dispose of the leased property (without a tenant) and whether or not he is obliged to offer compensation for removal or furnishing costs or goodwill. Therefore, it does not always make sense to wait for a decision of the Subdistrict Court which rental regime applies to the lease of business premises.
The letter of intent in a business takeover
The letter of intent in a business takeover
A business takeover ultimately involves concluding a purchase agreement. A whole process precedes this. In the preliminary phase, it is possible to conclude a letter of intent. In this article, I will tell you more about this.
The purpose of a letter of intent
With a letter of intent, the potential seller and buyer record that there is mutual serious interest in having a transaction take place. Furthermore, the outline of a transaction is usually already outlined. It states what exactly will be sold as part of the transaction. Entering into a letter of intent is not mandatory. Such an agreement is usually concluded at a stage when the buyer has already been able to form some idea about the company, but no extensive due diligence has yet been carried out.
A letter of intent may already state the intended price and the assumptions and valuation method on which the price is based. It can also include a timeline, including an intended date for the company to become for the account and risk of the buyer.
To what extent is a letter of intent binding?
To what extent a letter of intent is binding depends on the content of the agreement. For example, the agreement may include a provision regulating which provisions are binding and which are not. Sometimes a letter of intent is used to already steer strongly towards the conclusion of an acquisition agreement. It is also possible that the intention agreement is precisely meant to record that the parties are interested in exploring the possibilities of a transaction, but that there is no or virtually no commitment to reach a takeover agreement (i.e. that the parties are free to walk away from the negotiations).
Sometimes a letter of intent also includes a confidentiality clause. It makes sense to include that the agreements on this are binding. A non-disclosure agreement can also be fine in a separate document. You can read more about the confidentiality agreement in “Commercial contracts: ‘the non-disclosure agreement'”.
I recently came across a provision in a letter of intent which stipulated that the seller will provide the buyer with all information that is or could be relevant to the buyer. This provision emphasises the seller’s duty of disclosure, while the buyer’s duty to investigate is not mentioned. Should a buyer later believe that what was bought does not conform to the contract, such a provision may play a role in assessing the extent of the duty of disclosure and duty to investigate.
Exclusivity
A letter of intent usually includes a binding provision on exclusivity. A buyer will incur costs as part of due diligence and will prefer that the seller not negotiate with other interested parties in the meantime. It is common to agree on a fixed term of several months, as due diligence and contract negotiations usually take quite some time.
Advice on letters of intent
Thus, a letter of intent outlines the contours of an envisaged transaction and indicates the parties’ serious interest in making a transaction happen. A letter of intent may contain legally binding provisions, but this depends on the content of the agreement. Usually, provisions on exclusivity and confidentiality are binding. Due to the fact that letters of intent can contain binding provisions, it is advisable to seek advice from a specialist in the field of company takeovers at that stage of the business acquisition process.
If you have any questions about company takeovers or would like guidance in an acquisition process, please contact Peter de Graaf of LVH Advocaten.
A solar farm: movable or immovable property?
Without energy, everything comes to a standstill. When speaking of energy, the emphasis is increasingly focused on alternative energy sources, partly stimulated by government measures (subsidies etc.). Often, people speak of ‘green’ energy and a good example is solar energy.
A recent decision of the Gelderland district court on solar panels aptly describes how the generation, storage and supply of solar energy may also have various important legal implications. This ruling is about a solar farm that is partly located in the municipality of Montferland. The solar farm consists of a solar power plant for the generation of electricity from solar energy by means of solar panels. In the context of a tax assessment on the basis of the Valuation of Immovable Property Act (WOZ), the central question was if this solar farm had to be designated as movable or immovable property. The levy officer of the municipality of Montferland believed it was immovable which resulted in a considerable property tax (OZB) assessment.
Immovable property
For the interpretation of the concept of immovable property in the property tax law (OZB), the court first falls back on section 3:3 of the Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek). This section states, amongst others, that immovable designates the buildings and works that are durably connected to the ground, either directly or through a connection with other buildings and works. According to established case law, it is called durable connection with the ground if the relevant building is designed to permanently remain in place, according to its nature and construction. Whether a building is designed to remain in place permanently, results from the intention of the builder, insofar as this has been made public (amongst others Supreme Court ruling HR 31 October 1997, NJ 1998, 97 (Portacabin)).
Permanent designation
About 36,000 solar panels have been installed on the solar farm. Of those, about 24,000 are on the territory of the municipality of Montferland. The solar panels are on steel profiles that are attached to a steel base as well. The base is placed about 80 to 90 centimetres into the ground. The solar panels, the profiles and the base are fitted with bolts and nuts and are easy to dismantle. The solar panels are connected with cables and collection boxes to a transformer, which in turn – in short – is connected to a brick factory. Furthermore, the solar farm is enclosed with a barbed wire fence.
On the basis of these visible appearances, the court rules amongst others, that the solar park as a whole according to its nature and construction is designated to remain permanently in place and that this designation is expressed to the outside world. According to the court, the fact that the steel profiles and the base of the panels are easily dismantled and transported to another location does not affect the permanent designation.
Why interesting
In practice, the ruling is interesting for a number of reasons. Firstly, the court has decided that the solar farm is an immovable property and can, therefore, be pertained in the OZB. Moreover, the ruling is interesting for the finance practice. Surely, a right of mortgage and not a right of pledge may be established on an immovable property. For the litigation practice, and then mainly as a part of seizure, the distinction between movable / immovable property is important as well. Namely, to both types of property, various statutory provisions apply. The ruling clearly shows that the sector group Energy requires a multidisciplinary approach. Therefore, various specialists have combined knowledge and expertise in the Energy Team of LVH Advocaten in order to provide you with the best possible result.
Information
If you have any questions about or comments on this article, please feel free to contact the Energy Team of LVH Advocaten.
On behalf of the Energy Team, this contribution has been provided by Ben van Nieuwaal and Daniël van Genderen.
Ship Arrest in The Netherlands
The Kingdom of The Netherlands is party to several international conventions within the maritime field, including the International Convention Relating to the Arrest of Sea-Going Ships (Brussels, May 10, 1952).
It is possible to arrest a vessel in the Dutch jurisdiction in order to obtain security only. The petitioner is not obliged to commence substantive proceedings in the Netherlands regarding the claim itself. It is common practice that arrest of ships are made in the Netherlands in order to obtain security, while the main arbitration or court proceedings are being conducted elsewhere. The Dutch court will fix a term for the initiation of proceedings on the merits of the case, in order to maintain validity of the arrest. The term will be fixed at the discretion of the court and varies form eight days from the arrest to several weeks.
Arrest Procedure
Arresting a ship in the Dutch juridiction is a relatively straight forward matter, and can be arranged quickly and at a reasonable cost.
The petitioner must be represented by a Dutch lawyer admitted to the bar. The arrest petition should be submitted at the District Court of the port where the ship has called or is expected to arrive, like Rotterdam, Amsterdam, IJmuiden or Moerdijk. Ships heading for Antwerp in Belgium can be arrested on the roads of Flushings (Vlissingen).
The petition may be filed prior to the vessel entering the port. The petition must contain the following information:
- a brief description of the claim and the legal basis thereof;
- the name and domicile of the Applicant and the Respondent;
- the name of the vessel;
- the place of registry of the vessel;
- an estimate of the amount of the claim, and;
- a description why the claim is enforceable against the vessel.
Documents supporting the allegations should be filed with the petition. A well presented case with available supporting evidence increases the probability of obtaining and maintaining an arrest award.
A ship arrest petition is an ex parte request to the Court. Usually no oral hearing takes place, hence the defendant will not be heard. The Ship Owner or any other interested party may, however, apply for a hearing to be held on short notice, if he wishes to dispute that the legal requirements obtaining arrest are satisfied. Such a hearing will normally be scheduled within a few days.
If the District Court grants the petition for arrest, the court will issue an arrest order. The decision is usually issued within twenty-four hours after receipt of the petition. In urgent cases we can even contact the Court during the weekend and ask and obtain leave for arrest during the weekend.
To effect the arrest the arrest order is served upon the Master of the vessel by the Bailiff. The Port Authority and the Pilots Association are also informed, in order to prevent a vessel from fleeing from the arrest.
It is not necessary for the petitioner to issue any formal Power of Attorney when instructing legal counsel in The Netherlands in connection with an arrest application. In some jurisdictions such Power of Attorney must be submitted to the court, duly notarized and legalized. This may be a time critical factor when preparing for an arrest.
There are no substantial fees payable to the court in connection with an arrest. The petitioner may, at the discretion of the court, be required to post security for wrongful arrest. This is not standing practice, but can sometimes play a role, for example upon request of Owners at a hearing following the arrest.
Claims in respect of which a ship may be arrested
Ships flying the flag of one of the contracting states may be arrested for maritime claims as listed in Article 1 (1) of the 1952 Arrest Convention:
- damage caused by any ship either in collision or otherwise;
- loss of life or personal injury caused by any ship or occurring in connexion with the operation of any ship;
- salvage;
- agreement relating to the use or hire of any ship whether by charterparty or otherwise;
- agreement relating to the carriage of goods in any ship whether by charterparty or otherwise;
- loss of or damage to goods including baggage carried in any ship;
- general average;
- bottomry;
- towage;
- pilotage;
- goods or materials wherever supplied to a ship for her operation or maintenance;
- construction, repair or equipment of any ship or dock charges and dues;
- wages of Masters, Officers, or crew;
- Master’s disbursements, including disbursements made by shippers, charterers or agent on behalf of a ship or her owner;
- disputes as to the title to or ownership of any ship;
- disputes between co-owners of any ship as to the ownership, possession, employment, or earnings of that ship;
- the mortgage or hypothecation of any ship.
If the claim falls outside the scope of the 1952 Arrest Convention, and is thus not regarded as maritime claim, it is still possible to arrest other objects than the vessel, e.g. the bunkers. From a practical viewpoint, an arrest of the vessel’s bunkers may be as effective as arresting the vessel itself, and may often lead to security being put up. The bunkers must, however, be owned by the debtor, and it is important to keep in mind that under a time charterparty, the bunkers are normally owned by the Charterers, not the Owners.
The arrest of ships flying flags of countries who are not a party to the 1952 Arrests Convention is generally admissible for both maritime claims and non-maritime claims.
Security
If an arrest is granted, the debtor may arrange for the release of the vessel by putting up security as quickly as possible. Security is often put up on the Rotterdam Guarantee Form 2008. This form is traditionally used to put up security in shipping in the Netherlands.
Most P&I Clubs will be prepared to issue a Letter of Undertaking (Club Letter), and this is very often commercially acceptable as a guarantee in order to lift an arrest. It should, however, be noted that some creditors uphold that a Club Letter does not provide sufficient security as required by Article 705 of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure. In most cases the arrestor will accept a Club Letter from a reputable P&I Club, and the vessel will then be released according to such mutual agreement. However, if the claimant sticks firmly to the formal legal requirement, the debtor may be forced to put up a bank guarantee from a Dutch Bank of good standing.
Liability for wrongful arrest
Arrests are made at the risk of the arresting party. If proceedings on the merits of the case are lost, the arresting party is liable for damages sustained by the Ship Owner as a result of the wrongful arrest. The Ship Owner has a duty to mitigate its damages, such as by way of offering alternative security, thus avoiding unnecessary detention. In some cases Ship Owners are not in a position to offer alternative security. In such cases the stakes are high.
Information
If you would like to investigate the possibility of conservatory arrest of ships and other assets in The Netherlands in further detail or you are the party affected by an arrest, please contact our office 0031 10 209 2777 or by e-mail info@lvh-advocaten.nl.
Transportation industry workforce shortage solutions
Like many other industries, the transportation industry is understaffed to keep up with growth. Job openings remain high and retirement attrition continues to increase. In this article, I discuss possible solutions.
Peer hiring
Peer hiring can be a solution when staff shortages occur. Collegial hiring is a variant of hiring personnel, where one entrepreneur makes his or her own personnel available to a fellow entrepreneur “on a non-profit basis”. Peer hiring does not involve the hiring out of personnel by the lender on a professional or business basis. Peer hiring is a temporary affair.
Peer-to-peer hiring involves the risk of hirer liability. This concerns liability for the payment of contributions and taxes on the hired employee’s wages. Agreements on this and, for example, employer liability should be made in a hiring agreement.
Employing self-employed truck drivers
In the transport sector, it is becoming increasingly common for carriers to hire self-employed drivers so that no employment contract needs to be concluded. However, when regularly or repeatedly using a self-employed driver, a transporter runs the risk that the tax authorities and/or a judge will subsequently determine that it is an employment contract rather than a contract for services.
According to the Road Goods Transport Act (Wwg), however, a transport company is prohibited from carrying out transport operations with drivers who are not employed by the company. This is the so-called requirement of employment.
To make it clear that an employment relationship exists, the transportation company and the driver must jointly prepare a statement that:
- the transport is carried out at the transport company’s expense and risk
- a pay and authority relationship exists between the transportation company and the driver;
- the driver is employed by the transport company, which has a Euro permit for professional transport.
Own transportation
Under the Road Goods Transport Act, it is permissible to hire a self-employed person as a driver in own transportation. In own transportation, the requirement of employment does not apply. Own transportation is the transportation of goods owned by the company or which the company trades, rents, leases, handles, processes or repairs.
ZZP-er
ZZP-ers must have their own Euro permit and their own truck. In practice, this last requirement in particular often causes problems because it requires a very large investment. Therefore, the form of leasing or renting is often chosen. A model agreement for professional freight transport has existed for some time: vbvo_beroepsgoederenvervoerder_branchemodel_dv10211z4ed.pdf (belastingdienst.nl)
This agreement contains all kinds of provisions that the parties must meet in order to demonstrate the self-employed driver’s independence (including a license, own car, own fuel, right to outsource transport again, etc.) This is where the shoe pinches. It is known that in the transport sector many self-employed drivers do not (cannot/will not) meet these requirements. If, in practice, the conditions of the model agreement are not met, there is a risk of retrospective taxation by the Tax Authorities regarding missed payroll taxes, although the DBA Act is currently not enforced by the Tax Authorities unless there is ‘malicious intent’ on the part of the client.
TLN wants an exception for professional freight transport in the cabinet’s new rules for self-employed workers. Licensed freight transport is already subject to quite a few rules.
Payrolling
In payrolling, a company’s staff is “employed” by the payroll organization. Legal employership and payroll administration are entirely the responsibility of the payroll organization. However, payroll companies are obliged to apply a number of elements from the industry’s collective bargaining agreement to payroll contracts: the so-called hirer’s remuneration. The problem is that the hirer does have to take care of recruitment and selection of the relevant employees itself, which remains difficult with an already growing staff shortage.
Moreover, payrolling is not entirely without risks. For example, the client is partly responsible for payroll taxes for the payrolled employees, among other things. If the payroll company does not pay these to the tax authorities, the tax authorities can come and collect them from the entrepreneur. Moreover, the payroll restriction is sometimes seen through, if the construction is set up solely to take away the labor law protection of the employees. Also, situations where it is unclear to the employee with whom he has an employment contract are not allowed: the employee must clearly and unambiguously agree to this construction.
Broadcast
The difference between payrolling and staffing is mainly in the recruitment of the workers. In payrolling, the transportation company recruits the workers itself; in temporary staffing, they are recruited for the employment agency.
Under the ABU collective agreement, the temporary employment agency is obliged to apply the hirer’s remuneration from day one. As a result, temporary workers in professional freight transport are entitled to the hirer’s remuneration in accordance with the Professional Goods Transport collective agreement from the first working day.
Incidentally, only temporary employment agencies, which are designated by the Minister of Infrastructure and the Environment, are allowed to dispatch drivers. A driver then needs a declaration of posting. He must be able to show this on the road during inspections. Finally, the temporary employment agency must have a designation from the Kiwa Register. In itself, temporary employment is a safe construction if a certified and specialized agency is used, but it often turns out to be quite expensive, with margins that are simply too small.
Conclusion
Thus, each form of engagement has its advantages and disadvantages. If you have any questions or would like legal advice, please contact Richard Ouwerling, telephone number 0031 10 209 27 77.
CMR forum shopping
Article 31 of the Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road (CMR) provides a wide choice of jurisdictions in which legal proceedings might be commenced. This includes the courts of a country within whose territory the defendant is ordinarily resident or has his principal place of business, or the place where the goods were taken over by the carrier or the place designated for delivery.
In the pursuit of legal certainty, the CMR is to be applied autonomously, so that the parties to the contract know what to expect, regardless in which country their case is tried. But this is only theory. The choice of forum should be exercised carefully. The courts of different countries often reach widely differing conclusions in their interpretation of the CMR.
Negative declaration proceedings
It has become evident that certain countries are more friendly towards carriers, and other countries more friendly towards cargo interests. The Netherlands traditionally has a name to uphold as a carrier friendly jurisdiction, where more “continental” countries such as Germany and France, are more “shipper-friendly”. The choice of forum is not restricted to those parties who are claiming compensation under the Convention. By seeking a so called negative declaration, a declaration that the carrier has no (or only limited) liability in any given case, a carrier can actively seek to determine in which jurisdiction any dispute is to be resolved. Article 31 Section 2 of the CMR provides that where an action arising out of carriage under the Convention is “pending” before a competent court, “no new action shall be started between the same parties on the same grounds unless the judgment of the court or tribunal before which the first action was brought is not enforceable in the country in which the fresh proceedings are brought”.
Time may be of the essence
So if damage occurs, time may be of the essence. The party that initiates proceedings first can benefit enormously from the mere initiation of proceedings, whether or not the case will be actually tried or settled shortly thereafter.
For instance, upon delivery of goods carried from The Netherlands to France, damage occurs and parties face the question where to bring suit. The carrier that is on the defence will probably be called before the French court by cargo interests. It is therefore advisable for the carrier to strike first and bring the case before a Dutch court, in order to make a Dutch court formally declare that the carrier is not liable. The carrier has thus ensured that his case will be tried in a carrier-friendly jurisdiction. This legal version of the “pre-emptive strike” is wide spread.
The German courts have not sat still and they have interpreted Article 31 Section 2 CMR in such a way that the pre-emptive strike seems to have lost a lot of its worth for carriers. In a decision of 20 November 2003 the Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) decided that a declaratory action did not constitute a pending action and did not prevent the plaintiff from initiating further proceedings in Germany.
Position on limitation and damages in the Netherlands
Under Article 29 CMR the carrier is not entitled to avail himself of the provisions of this chapter which exclude or limit his liability or which shift the burden of proof if the damage was caused by his wilful misconduct or by such default on his part as, in accordance with the law of the court or tribunal seised of the case, is considered as equivalent to wilful misconduct.
So what is the Dutch equivalent of wilful misconduct? The Supreme Court of The Netherlands has ruled that under Dutch law, the equivalent of wilful misconduct is acting “recklessly with knowledge that damage would probably result”. This is the same term as used in the Warsaw Convention and has given raise to similar debate, focusing on whether a subjective or objective test should be applied in determining whether the reckless actor had knowledge that damage would probably result.
In The Netherlands the Supreme Court has held that in accordance with the laws of The Netherlands the equivalent of wilful misconduct under Dutch law comes down to subjective conscious recklessness, which is nearly equivalent to intent. As a result, if proceedings are brought in The Netherlands, the carrier nearly always benefits from the Conventions rules regarding the limitation of damages, unless where there is sufficient proof of intent, like for example theft by the driver (Overbeek v. Cigna & Philip Morris v. Van der Graaf, HR 5 January 2001, NJ 2001/391 and 392).
Custom duties and other charges
There are also other grounds for carriers to initiate negative declaration proceedings in the Netherlands, such as the Dutch interpretation of Article 23 Section 4 of the CMR:
“In addition, the carriage charges, Customs, Duties and other charges incurred in respect of the carriage of the goods shall be refunded in full in case of total loss and the in proportion to the loss sustained in case of partial loss, but no further damage shall be payable.”
In a case where the consignment has been stolen during carriage, the cargo interests may be facing additional charges, taxes and levies, such as excise duties, penalties and VAT payable. Authorities may decide that the stolen goods are deemed to be imported in the country where they have been stolen. As a consequence cargo interests may be confronted with liabilities, that exceed the limitation considerably and in some cases – liquor, cigarettes – even exceed the value of the goods. The question is whether the cargo interests can reclaim these levies based on Article 23 Section 4 CMR (so on top of the limited liability).
Here again the answer to this question depends on the court where the case is tried. National courts disagree on the scope of costs mentioned in paragraph 23 section 4 CMR: what are “other charges incurred in respect of the carriage of the goods”?
The broad interpretation of the English Courts
Two doctrines have evolved. In London, the House of Lords has ruled in Buchanan & Co. v. Babco Forwarding & Shipping (UK) [1978] A.C. 141, “other charges” include expenses consequential on the way in which the carriage was actually carried out; and hence that they include the expenses consequential on breach of the contract of carriage, such as the cost of surveying damaged goods, the amount of extra duty or VAT payable because the goods did not reach their designated destination, and return carriage charges. English courts have therefore taken a broad interpretation of “other charges”. Other countries that favour a broad interpretation are Belgium and France.
The narrow interpretation of the Dutch Courts
The Dutch Supreme Court has chosen a more narrow interpretation. In a 2006-ruling Phillip Morris v. Van der Graaf (HR 14 July 2006, NJ 2006/599) the Supreme Court held that paragraph 23 section 4 of the CMR-treaty is to be explained in a narrow sense. The Supreme Court held that no other costs will be refunded, with the exception of those pertaining to a normal execution of the carriage as such. So costs pertaining to a certain customs regime will not be refunded. Also, duties and other charges that came to life due to the theft, need not be refunded.
Initiation of proceedings in The Netherlands
Under Dutch law, a Dutch court case is pending as soon as a writ of summons has been served. In cases where time is of the essence, it is possible to draft the writ within hours or days, all depending on the availability of the necessary information and the complexity of the case. So the time between the decision to initiate proceedings in The Netherlands and the time at which proceedings are actually pending can be short and will avoid unpleasant surprises, such as the other party initiating proceedings in a less carrier friendly jurisdiction.
Forum shopping should always be considered for claims falling under the scope of the CMR regime. Staying one step ahead can make all the difference.
Information
If you have any questions on this subject, please contact our office 0031 10 209 2777 or by e-mail info@lvh-advocaten.nl.
Temporary law on transparency turboliquidation
Temporary law on transparency turboliquidation
A boom in bankruptcies was expected at the beginning of the Covid pandemic. This expectation did not materialise, partly due to the many support measures that the government has rigged for business. Many companies took advantage of NOW, TVL and also special tax deferral schemes. These schemes have now expired and companies have to stand on their own feet again and possibly repay excess support received. From 1 October 2022, entrepreneurs will also have to repay deferred taxes. For this, they have a deadline of five years. It was revealed this week that tens of thousands of companies have not yet started repaying these deferred tax debts. The tax authorities recently sent warning letters.
Despite the end of support measures, there has not yet been a big increase in bankruptcies. For now, there is only a slight increase. The introduction of the WHOA (Homologation of Private Arrangements Act) has only limited reach so far and cannot be seen as a cause of the low number of bankruptcies.
However, a trend of entrepreneurs themselves deciding to quit can be observed. For the private limited company, this brings turboliquidation back into the picture. In August 2021, LVH reported in an article on turboliquidation that a draft bill Temporary Turboliquidation Transparency Act had been drafted. On 16 February 2023, the second chamber passed the bill as a hammer piece. On 14 March 2023, the first chamber disposed of the bill as a hammer piece. The date of entry into force will be further determined. The purpose of the bill is to increase the protection of the position of creditors and transparency on the scheme and thus prevent abuse.
Turboliquidation
Turboliquidation is a quick way to dissolve a private limited company. This form is designed for companies that have no assets. Since there are no assets, there are no assets that need to be liquidated. There will be no liquidator and the company is immediately dissolved and deregistered from the Chamber of Commerce. This method of dissolution is settled in a few days. Creditors often only notice later that the company on which they have a claim has been deregistered and no longer exists.
Reopening liquidation
If a creditor does not agree with the way the company’s assets have been liquidated – and in the case of a turboliquidation, no liquidation has taken place – the creditor can request the court to reopen the liquidation. Any creditor can make such an application. However, if these proceedings show that there are no assets that can still be liquidated, reopening the liquidation is pointless. There is no interest. The creditor must therefore make a plausible case that there is still a potential benefit to be expected. The court must exercise restraint in assessing this potential benefit. The presence of such a benefit may be assumed quickly.
Company in liquidation
If the company grants the application to reopen the liquidation, the company will revive (in liquidation), but only for the purpose of settling the reopened liquidation.
Appointment of liquidator
The court will appoint a liquidator who will have to examine whether there are any assets and, if so, distribute those assets. Not infrequently, the court will draw from the known pool of liquidators when choosing a liquidator.
Costs
A creditor should not proceed too lightly to request the reopening of the liquidation. The company whose liquidation has been reopened has no funds (yet) so the creditor will have to pay the liquidator’s costs. If the liquidator subsequently concludes that there are no assets that still need to be liquidated, the creditor will have had a lot of costs without any proceeds (a benefit still to be distributed).
Impact temporary law transparency turboliquidation
Under the new law, in the event of a dissolution without assets, the board must file a balance sheet and a statement of income and expenditure for the financial year in which the company was dissolved with the trade register within 14 days. This must include a description of the cause of the lack of assets at the time of dissolution, the manner in which the company’s assets have been realised and how the proceeds have been distributed.
Immediately after these documents are filed, the board of the company must notify the unpaid creditors in writing.
Penalties for liquidation in breach of the new law
If the board of the company does not comply with the obligations under the Temporary Transparency Turboliquidation Act, the court may, at the request of the public prosecutor’s office, impose a board ban or a fine if:
the board has not filed the previously mentioned documents;
the management board has significantly prejudiced creditors;
the board has been involved in a dissolution without assets at least twice before in the 2 previous years, unless the board is not to blame.
Changed position of creditors
Will the new Temporary Act on Transparency of Turboliquidation really improve the position of creditors now? That remains to be seen. The board of the company to be dissolved will have to take some additional measures. But the obligation to file documents and communicate to creditors does not take away the fact that the decision to dissolve has been taken and creditors are confronted with the consequences of this decision afterwards. If they believe the liquidation was not carried out correctly, the ball remains in the creditor’s court to apply for the liquidation to be reopened. The new law does not change this.
Looking for a corporate law lawyer?
If you would like to know more about the dissolution of a company, turboliquidation or a request to reopen the liquidation, please contact Rob Steenhoek.
Carolina Corijn
Legal assistant
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Accountant’s liability for advice on group structure
The Arnhem-Leeuwarden Court of Appeal recently handed down a ruling on the liability of an accountant for advice on a group structure. Can an accountant (in this case it concerned an accountant, but it also applies to other advisors) be liable to bankruptcy creditors as a result of the advice he provided to the bankrupt company?
Advising on the establishment of an inherently risky group structure
The accountant advised a client. As a result of this advice, a group structure was created, with a production company in which all costs (purchase of materials, rent, personnel) were incurred without any assets being available for recovery. These assets were owned by other group companies and were leased from these other group companies. In addition to the production company, a sales company was also established. This sales company realized all sales to third parties, whereby only the materials produced by the production company would be sold. The source of income for the production company therefore consisted exclusively of the orders it would receive from the sales company. The sales company only had to pay a market price once it had received payment from the end customer. Ultimately, the production company went bankrupt and the debts in that production company remained (partly) unpaid. The trustee took the position that this was the result of the accountant’s advice. The recommended structure was inherently so risky that bankruptcy was inevitable.
Liability for debts?
How does it work again?
A private limited company is a legal entity and, in principle, creditors can only recover their claims from the assets of that legal entity. In exceptional cases, a director may be liable to creditors on various grounds, for example if he has caused a company within the group to be unable to meet its obligations because recoverable assets have been withdrawn. The trustee has argued that the special duty of care that a director has towards the company’s creditors can be extended to the advisor who provides the director with advice that entails disproportionately high risks for the creditors, whereby the advisor also knows that his advice will be implemented.
But can a third party, in this case the accountant who advised the director, also be liable to those creditors?
Standard for professionals
The standard for the liability of a professional (such as an accountant) is that he must exercise the care of a good contractor towards his client. An accountant can be expected to exercise the care that can be expected of a reasonably competent and reasonably acting professional. If an accountant’s advice falls within this standard, he is not liable to the creditors. Only in special circumstances can advice given by the accountant to the company (his client) also constitute a wrongful act (directly) towards the creditors, if that advice can be qualified as a wrongful act towards those joint creditors. In such a situation, a trustee may hold the accountant liable on behalf of those joint creditors.
As long as an advisor takes on the care of a good contractor and his advice is within the bounds of what may be expected of a reasonably competent and reasonably acting professional, he will not easily reach the high threshold of liability to creditors.
The court of appeal assesses the advice on the basis of the standard. Like the district court, the court of appeal believes that the chosen group structure is by no means unlawful. Separating assets in one group company and production in another group company is a structure that occurs much more frequently. Advice to set up a group in this way is therefore not advice that cannot be expected from a reasonably competent and reasonably acting professional. So no liability for the accountant.
The trustee had also raised other issues that led to the company’s bankruptcy and the lack of recourse for creditors. However, it was not established that these issues had been advised by the accountant. In any case, it was not clear that the accountant’s advice had such a significant influence that it determined the company’s policy. There was no evidence of specific advice from the accountant that made the bankruptcy inevitable.
In these proceedings, the outcome was favorable for the accountant. After the court initially rejected the trustee’s claim, the court of appeals upheld that ruling. Nevertheless, accountants (as well as other advisors) must be aware that their advice is not without obligation. Advice given to clients must meet the standard of care that may be expected of a reasonably competent and reasonably acting professional. If this is not the case, the accountant may also cause the company (his client) to commit a wrongful act (directly) towards the creditors, if that advice can be qualified as a wrongful act towards those joint creditors.
Looking for a corporate law attorney?
Would you like to know more about liability in bankruptcy? Feel free to contact Rob Steenhoek of LVH Advocaten. He specializes in insolvency and corporate law and will be happy to assist you.
Breaking off negotiations: what about liability?
A contract does not come about overnight. A possible cooperation must first be investigated and desired terms of a contract must be discussed at length. Sometimes even several parties are initially negotiated simultaneously before a contract is concluded. It is important that there is room to ‘freely’ start and break off negotiations, and fortunately there is. However, this is limited in case law.
Reasonableness and fairness
Already in the 1950s it was determined that parties who negotiate with each other are governed in their relationship by reasonableness and fairness. In other words, they must take into account each other’s legitimate interests. In 1982 the Supreme Court considered that this obligation may entail that breaking off negotiations is unlawful.
Is breaking off unacceptable?
Breaking off negotiations is not easily unlawful. The Supreme Court emphasized in 2005 that the “breakup freedom” can only be departed from if breaking off negotiations is unacceptable. This unacceptability may exist due to various circumstances, but mainly due to legitimate expectations of the other party that an agreement will be reached. Also important is the attitude of the aborting party and whether there were unforeseen circumstances during the negotiations, for example.
Continuing negotiations or damages? Positive and negative contract interest
If it turns out that breaking off negotiations was unlawful, the court can force the breaking off party to continue negotiating anyway. Damages can also be claimed. The latter can be done in two ways. Depending on the situation, damage can be compensated in such a way that the other party is put in the position as if negotiations had never taken place (negative contract interest) or in such a way that the other party is put in the position as if negotiations had continued and a contract had been concluded (positive contract interest).
Not unlawful, but reimbursing costs incurred
What if the termination was not unacceptable, but you, as the other party, suffered significant damages? For example, because you incurred high costs for the negotiations? Even then there are possibilities. Earlier this year the Supreme Court emphasized that even if breaking off negotiations is acceptable, under certain circumstances the breaking off party can be obliged to reimburse (part of) the costs incurred. On a specific ruling in that area, see also this article. The breaking off by the franchisor was not unlawful, but its conduct meant that it had to reimburse the costs incurred by the candidate. After all, even negotiations are still governed by reasonableness and fairness.
Advice?
Whether or not there is liability to compensate damage or (part of) costs incurred in the event of broken negotiations always depends on specific circumstances. Are you engaged in negotiations and in doubt whether to continue them? Or have negotiations stopped while you have already incurred costs? For a look at the specific issue and advice on possible liability, please contact Jacolien Leuvenink.
The on-call worker as a flexible shell; 6 points to consider
The on-call worker as a flexible shell; 6 points to consider
If your company’s staffing requirements fluctuate widely, an on-call agreement can be a solution. With an on-call agreement, a flexible layer of employees can be formed and employees can be deployed for a varying number of hours each time.
There are various on-call agreements, such as a zero-hours contract and a min-max contract. The use of on-call agreements has some legal concerns.
1. Call and notice period
The standard rule is that the employee must call for work at least 4 days in advance, e.g. by e-mail or WhatsApp message. The notice period for a zero-hours contract is the same as the on-call period: 4 days.
2. Minimum payout of 3 hours per call
Every time you call up an employee, you must pay the employee a minimum of 3 hours’ pay. Even if he only works for 1 hour.
3. Exclude legal presumption of work scope
In principle, the employee can invoke the legal presumption of work scope. This means that the contract automatically changes in hours to the number of hours the employee has worked on average over the past 3 months. You can exclude this legal presumption in the first 6 months of the contract.
4. Notification and higher WW contribution
As an employer, you are now obliged to report on the payslip that the employment contract is an on-call contract, and you also pay a higher WW premium for on-call workers than for permanent employees.
5. Fixed scope of employment
You must make your employee employed by you on an on-call contract a written offer of a fixed scope of work after every 12 months. When calculating those 12 months, you must include the period of hiring and/or legal predecessors.
The written offer for the fixed scope of work must be at least equal to the average scope of work in those previous 12 months. It is up to the employee to respond to it with a refusal or acceptance of the hours offer within one month.
Did you fail to make the offer or make it too late, or you cannot prove that the offer made was refused? Then, even after a longer period of time, your employee can still claim the salary that was lost as a result from that thirteenth month. The employee has then not worked that difference in hours, but still has a wage claim to recover from your company.
6. Duty to report unpredictable work pattern
Since 1 August last, the Transparent and Predictable Terms of Employment Act has come into force under a European Directive of the same name. This law stipulates that in case of an unpredictable work pattern, the employer must agree on a reference period (days and hours) during which the employee can be called up. If the employer does not comply with this or the employee is called outside the framework, the employee may refuse the call.
Need help drafting an on-call contract?
So far, the main points of interest in an on-call contract. As an entrepreneur, do you want to use on-call employees and need help drafting a watertight contract? Contact Richard Ouwerling, lawyer at LVH Advocaten in Rotterdam for more information.
What possibilities are there for (interim) adjustment of the rent of medium-sized business premises
What possibilities are there for (interim) adjustment of the rent of medium-sized business premises
Leases for shops, catering establishments, takeaway or delivery services and crafts businesses are called medium business premises leases. Specific legal provisions apply to these types of leases, the basic principle being a high degree of protection for the tenant. One of these rules concerns the legal system of rent adjustment. This article explains which possibilities there are to adjust the rent of medium-sized business premises outside the statutory system.
Rent adjustment in medium-sized business premises
The basic principle in medium-sized business premises is that the lessor and lessee are free to agree on the initial rent and its increase. Once a rent has been agreed and the way it will be increased, it cannot simply be adjusted. In principle, this can only be done after the agreed rent period has expired and in other cases only after five years. This means that if an (initial) tenancy period of 10 years has been agreed, the rent can only be adjusted after 10 years have elapsed. If the landlord and tenant then fail to agree on a new rent, the rent will have to be determined by the court. This will require following the laborious rent review scheme. The rent review scheme will not be discussed in this article.
However, it also happens that the tenant and landlord of medium-sized business premises agree on a new rent before the agreed term has expired or within five years of the previous rent review. There can be various reasons for this. One example is that the lease does not provide that the initial rent can be increased and the initial lease period is long, while after some time the tenant is quite willing to pay more rent.
Deviation from statutory regulation of rent review for medium-sized business premises possible
It is possible to deviate from the statutory regulation of rent review for medium-sized business premises. This means that a new rent can be validly agreed even before the agreed rent period has expired or within five years of the previous rent review. There are at least three options for this.
Interim rent adjustment of medium-sized business premises with permission of the subdistrict court
If the landlord and the tenant of medium-sized business premises want to make sure that their agreement on the adjusted rent will stand, the subdistrict court can be asked for its prior consent. The subdistrict court should then be asked to declare the statutory regulation on rent review wholly or partly inapplicable.
Interim rent adjustment without permission of the subdistrict court
In practice, however, it is quite conceivable that tenant and landlord do not like this route. If there is sufficient trust between the parties, the price agreement made can also simply be laid down in an allonge to the lease. However, it should be borne in mind that such an agreement is voidable. Only the lessee of the medium-sized business premises can invoke such voidability. A limitation period of three years applies to invoke the voidability of the agreement on the adjusted, often higher rent made in deviation of the statutory regulation. The limitation period starts to run as soon as the landlord invokes the clause, but may also start to run at an earlier point in time if the tenant can actually exercise that power of annulment at an earlier point in time. This is usually from the moment the agreement on the higher rent is made or recorded or from the moment the landlord claims the higher rent.
Including an agreement on a new, often higher rent for medium-sized business premises in an allonge is therefore not entirely without risk for a landlord if the agreement is not in line with the legal regulation on rent review. For about three years, the landlord of medium-sized business premises has to reckon with the risk of the tenant appealing for annulment of that agreement.
Interim rent adjustment through a new lease agreement
If the parties want more certainty about the validity of the agreement made on the adjusted rent, but do not want to go to the subdistrict court for prior permission to do so, there is another option. The tenant and landlord of the medium-sized business premises can terminate the existing lease by mutual consent and then conclude a new lease. As mentioned, at the start of the lease, the parties are free to determine the amount of the rent. The new lease will then state the new rent. A point of attention is that in such a case, the terms that play a role in the termination of the lease also start running again.
Suspension of employee; when and for how long?
Suspension of employee; when and for how long?
Today, the summary proceedings in which Tom Egbers is demanding the lifting of his suspension by NOS after a year take place. The questions that come into play here are: when can you suspend an employee and isn’t a year of suspension far too long?
Suspension and non-action; the difference
A suspension also prohibits the employee from performing his work. The term suspended, unlike suspension, is used in a situation where there is no culpable action by the employee. However, in case law, the term suspended has effectively the same meaning as a suspension and the same employment-law consequences.
Nature of the measure of suspension
There are two types of suspension. As an order measure or sanction measure.
As an order measure to restore calm in the workplace. The employer must have compelling interests against which the employee’s interests are outweighed.
Another order measure may be that the employer wants to terminate the employment contract and suspends the employee in anticipation of this. It could also be that the employer wants to terminate the employment contract after an investigation and therefore maintains the suspension. Wanting to terminate the employment contract is in itself insufficient for (maintaining) suspension. There must be additional circumstances. The employer must have a good weighty reason for this, e.g. that the employee’s presence has negative consequences for business operations (loss of customers, major damage, justified fear of unrest on the shop floor, fear of frustration investigation).
As an employer, you can also impose a suspension as a punishment. You must then communicate this to the employee immediately (and put it in writing). Again, reasonable and sufficiently serious grounds are required, which outweigh the employee’s overriding interest in continuing to perform his work. After all, a suspension is always diffuse in nature.
Good employment practices
According to established case law, the employer must behave as a ‘good employer’ when suspending or suspending an employee. This means that it would be wise to:
- weigh up all the circumstances of the case and the interests at stake and describe them in the letter setting out the suspension (or suspension from duty);
- indicate that a less severe remedy, such as an official warning or final written warning, will not suffice;
- give an estimate of how long the suspension will last;
- finally, indicate that salary and holiday pay will be paid as long as the suspension continues.
Communication of reason for suspension
The reason must be communicated to the employee immediately. Suspending an employee without giving reasons is unlawful (Amsterdam Court of Appeal 8 March 1974, NJ 1974, 487). By clearly communicating the reason by the employer to the employee, the employee may be able to prove the falsity of the reason or it may appear that the reason given would not be reasonable.
Substantive review
As a basic principle, a ‘good employer’ may only deny an employee the opportunity to perform the agreed work if the employer has reasonable grounds for doing so. Those grounds must be sufficiently serious, given the employee’s, in principle, substantial interest in continuing to perform the stipulated work. This balancing of interests is not tested marginally by the court, as the following standard suspension ruling shows.
A judge will therefore test a suspension on all the circumstances of the concrete case, such as:
- the seriousness of the employee’s conduct;
- whether the employer can be required to allow the employee to return to work;
- the duration of the employment relationship;
- the employee’s position.
Claim for reinstatement
A suspended employee can therefore try to force reinstatement in summary proceedings. The following test applies to a claim for reinstatement:
- First, the weighty interest in suspension must again be made plausible (see above);
- Next, it must be assessed whether granting the reinstatement claim would not lead to an untenable situation in the workplace.
Interim relief judges apply the principle of reinstatement, unless it is plausible that this will lead to an unworkable situation, which is detrimental to the employer’s business.
If the suspension lasts too long, this may be grounds for the court to order the employer to lift the measure. Earlier, the ast Brabant District ECourt ruled that a suspension of more than five months by the UWV, without further measures, was too long. It is therefore also certainly not inconceivable that Tom Egbers will be proved right in the summary proceedings he filed.
Please note that an applicable collective agreement may explicitly specify the circumstances under which an employer can impose a suspension. In addition, the collective agreement may state whether or not the employer is liable to pay wages in the event of suspension as a disciplinary sanction. Incidentally, the basic principle is that the employer must continue to pay wages in the event of a suspension. An exception may be if the suspension falls entirely within the employee’s sphere of risk, for example if he has been taken into (provisional) custody.
Conclusion on suspension
Suspension should not be taken lightly. There are so many legal hooks and eyes to a suspension, that it is wise to seek legal help when you want to suspend or suspend someone. After all, suspending an employee unfairly or for too long can lead to an employment conflict and possibly entitle you to fair compensation.
If you have any questions about suspension or non-action, please contact Richard Ouwerling of LVH Advocaten.
Everything you need to know about a unilateral modification clause
Everything you need to know about a unilateral modification clause
There may be reasons for you as an employer to unilaterally amend certain terms and conditions of employment if you are unable to reach an agreement with the employee(s). For example, to adjust the travel allowance because employees are working from home more often since the corona crisis. Then a ‘unilateral change clause’ from the employment contract can offer a solution
In principle, employers cannot simply change terms of employment unilaterally. After all, there is an agreement and both parties must respect the arrangements therein.
However, under circumstances, the employer must also be able to unilaterally amend the contractual agreements with an individual employee, in order to meet the interests of the collective of employees (e.g. the survival of the organisation). A unilateral modification clause can help the employer do this.
What is the unilateral modification clause
The unilateral modification clause allows the employer to make changes to the employment contract (in the future) without the further consent of the employee. Because the employer can easily include a unilateral modification clause in the employment contract and obtain the required consent of the employee upon commencement of employment to do so, the legislator set strict conditions for the use of this clause.
The employer can invoke a unilateral amendment clause if he has such a strong interest in the amendment that the employee’s interest, which will be harmed by the amendment, must give way to it according to reasonableness and fairness.
When may the employer unilaterally modify the employment contract?
Whether these conditions can be met depends very much on the factual circumstances of the case. As a starting point, if the works council (OR) agrees to a collective change in the employment conditions package, the employer’s overriding interest is deemed to be present. Does your organisation not have a works council? Then the assessment must be made whether the interests of the employee must reasonably give way to the interests of the employer.
Possibilities without unilateral change clause
If the employment contract does not provide for a unilateral amendment clause, it is only possible to unilaterally amend employment contracts by invoking the general standards of good employee conduct (Article 7:611 of the Civil Code).
Double test of reasonableness
However, the Supreme Court ruled in the so-called ‘Mammoet judgment’ that, when testing against Section 7:611 of the Civil Code, not only what can reasonably be expected of the employee in such a situation should be considered. The question of whether, given the situation, a good employer could have found reason to make a proposal to change the terms of employment should be considered first. It must then be assessed whether the proposal is reasonable, taking into account all the circumstances of the case.
This ‘double reasonableness test’ must be applied for each individual employee, which is particularly cumbersome if an employer wants to implement a collective change in the terms of employment. A unilateral change clause can then offer a solution, especially if the weighty interest of the employer appears to be present, because the works council has agreed to the collective change of the employment conditions package.
Therefore, check whether your employment contracts provide for a unilateral changes clause. Such a clause allows you to more easily realise unilateral collective changes to the employment conditions package, for instance in case of a change in the law or if business economic circumstances give reason to do so.
More information or advice on unilateral change clause ?
Want to know whether you can unilaterally change employment conditions, with or without a unilateral change clause? Contact Richard Ouwerling, lawyer at LVH Advocaten in Rotterdam for more information.
Reimbursement of extrajudicial costs: what is possible?
What are extrajudicial costs and what costs can you recover from a business partner?
These 2 questions are in fact addressed in every case where I assist a client who wants to recover a claim. In most cases we first look at whether a case can be solved out of court. In this process – before we go to court – the so-called extrajudicial costs are incurred for, among other things, writing to and consultation with the other party or his lawyer.
Jurisprudence out-of-court costs
In its judgment of 12 April 2019, the Supreme Court again addressed this issue and determined which extrajudicial costs are eligible for reimbursement and which are not.
In doing so, the Supreme Court first of all cited standard case law, which shows that drawing up and sending a reminder or another simple letter is not sufficient to claim compensation for extrajudicial costs.
Several extrajudicial activities carried out
In the aforementioned judgment of 12 April 2019, it was argued that a claim could be made for the recovery of extrajudicial costs because several actions had been taken, such as sending a letter of complaint, drawing up and sending an opt-out statement and a letter of bail. All in accordance with models, by the way.
Standardized and simple work
The Supreme Court ruled that the extrajudicial activities carried out involve no more than the drafting and sending of a few standardized documents. Such work should be placed on a par with the drafting and sending of a reminder or other simple letter as referred to in the aforementioned standard case law.
The Supreme Court has indicated that, pursuant to Section 6:96(3) of the Dutch Civil Code in conjunction with Section 241 of the Rv, these activities do not qualify for compensation in proceedings. They change colour (from extrajudicial costs to procedural costs, as it were) as soon as proceedings are commenced and are deemed to fall within the scope of the activities in preparation of proceedings. There is then no place for a separate reimbursement of extrajudicial costs.
Litigation costs only
The conducting of an intake interview, assessing the feasibility of the claimant’s claims and advising on this, as well as the collection of data to determine the extent of the claimant’s claims, do not qualify for compensation either. According to the Supreme Court, these are activities that must also be carried out in preparation of proceedings and therefore fall under Section 6:96(3) of the Dutch Civil Code and Section 241 of the Rv.
Compensation for extrajudicial expenses: when?
As a reminder, when is compensation for extrajudicial costs possible: When various substantive, i.e. more than 2 non-standard letters have been sent and/or there has been substantial consultation with the other party in order to reach an amicable settlement.
If you would like to know more about your possibilities of compensation for extrajudicial costs, please feel free to contact LVH advocaten.
Reduction of amount for which the director is liable
Reduction of amount for which the director is liable
A director is liable under article 2:248 paragraph 1 of the Dutch Civil Code (BW) to make good the deficit in the bankruptcy if the board has manifestly mismanaged its duties and it is plausible that this was a major cause of the bankruptcy. Based on paragraph 4 of this article of law, the court can mitigate the amount for which the director is liable under certain circumstances. The Supreme Court recently issued a judgment on the possibilities of mitigation. In this article I will briefly discuss the legal regulation concerning directors’ liability in bankruptcy and I will discuss the judgment of the Supreme Court.
Directors’ liability in bankruptcy due to improper management
Article 2:248 of the Dutch Civil Code concerning improper management is relevant in the event of bankruptcy of a private limited liability company (Article 2:138 of the Dutch Civil Code in the case of an NV). On the basis of this article, each director is jointly and severally liable towards the estate to settle the estate deficit, if the board has manifestly mismanaged its duties and it is plausible that this was a major cause of the bankruptcy. Only the bankruptcy trustee can make such a claim.
Legal presumption of directors’ liability
On the basis of paragraph 2 of article 2:248 of the Dutch Civil Code, the trustee’s position is strengthened if the annual accounts have been filed too late or if the administration does not provide the required insight. In such cases, improper management is established and the legal presumption applies that the bankruptcy was caused by improper management. Read more about the distribution of the burden of proof in the article Disproving the legal presumption concerning directors’ liability in bankruptcy.
Mitigation of director’s liability
If the director’s liability is established, it may be relevant whether there is a reason to moderate the amount for which the director is liable. In principle, the director is liable to settle the estate deficit. This means the debts of the company, minus any available income. Paragraph 4 of article 2:248 of the Dutch Civil Code states about the possibility of mitigation:
“The court may reduce the amount for which the directors are liable if it considers it excessive in view of the nature and seriousness of the improper performance of duties by the management, the other causes of the bankruptcy, and the manner in which this has been disposed of. The court may also reduce the amount of liability of an individual director if it considers this excessive in view of the time during which that director held office as such in the period in which the improper performance of duties took place.”
The first sentence applies to the board as a whole (i.e. this is a collective mitigation variant). The second sentence applies only to an individual director (i.e. this is an individual mitigation variant).
Process of directors’ liability
The judgment of the Supreme Court on the possibility of mitigation was preceded by the following. A bankruptcy trustee took legal action against two directors of a bankrupt B.V. It was claimed that the directors had improperly fulfilled their duties and were liable for settlement of the estate deficit, as well as an order to pay the deficit. The court allowed the claims. The Court of Appeal upheld the judgment.
Appeal to reduce amount of directors’ liability
The Court of Appeal also dealt with an appeal by the directors to reduce the amount for which the directors are liable. The Court of Appeal was of the opinion that there are no grounds for moderation, because it has not become plausible that there were other important causes of the bankruptcy, nor is there any indication that the estate was incorrectly settled by the trustee.
The grounds for mitigation are exhaustive
The directors go to the Supreme Court. They argued that the grounds for mitigation in article 2:248 BW were not exhaustive. They argue that they have also pointed out other circumstances and that the Court of Appeal should have discussed these in substantiated terms. One of the circumstances is that the companies of the group are the largest victims of the bankruptcy.
The Supreme Court does not follow this view and dismisses the appeal. It considered that both the text and the parliamentary history of Section 2:248 (4), first sentence, of the DCC show that the grounds for reducing the amount for which the directors are liable are exhaustively enumerated in this provision. Therefore, the Court of Appeal did not have to examine the arguments of the directors that relate to grounds for mitigation that are not included in this provision.
Lawyers in corporate law and insolvency law
Should you have any questions about directors’ liability please feel free to contact Peter de Graaf.
Ben van Nieuwaal
The instant dismissal by Ryanair due to refusal to change work locations is upheld
Last week, the decision of 4 December 2017 by the Subdistrict Section of the Subdistrict Court Oost-Brabant was published in Jurisprudentie Arbeidsrecht (JAR). In this decision, it is ruled that an instant dismissal by Ryanair Ltd. was lawfully given. An employee with Polish nationality structurally refused to cooperate in a change in her work location from Eindhoven to Dublin. Both parties agreed on an employment contract in which parties declared Irish law to be applicable. In addition, the employment contract explicitly stated that the employee could be transferred to another location at any time.
Competence of the Dutch court
As this was a cross-border dispute, the Subdistrict court first assessed whether the Dutch court was competent to assess this case. Although the employee performed only a small part of her work in the Netherlands, the Subdistrict court deemed itself to be competent in this case, due to the fact that the employee’s home base was located in Eindhoven. The Subdistrict court protects the weaker party herein.
Applicable law
The next question the court needed to assess was which law is applicable to this case. Based on the Rome I regulation, it was established that Irish law is applicable due to the choice of law made by the parties. The Subdistrict court also established that including a unilateral changes clause and Ryanair’s appeal to it are not in conflict with a Dutch binding judicial provision, so this has to be assessed according to Irish law as well.
Instant dismissal
According to Irish law, refusing a change in work location and the employee’s refusal to appear at planned hearings is gross misconduct. Based on the Irish legal provisions, these are grounds for immediate termination of the employment contract. Therefore, the instant dismissal was upheld. Consequently, all compensations claimed by the employee have been rejected.
In this case, Ryanair Ltd. was assisted by J.J. Croon and M. Bestebreurtje.
Privacy and Data Protection: Brexit and third countries
As we all know the UK left the EU with effect from 1 January 2021. How does this affect the transfer and processing of personal data in the UK. The Withdrawal Agreement entered into by the EU and the UK regarding the withdrawal of the UK from the EU sets out a certain transitionary period. This transitional period expired as from 1st July 2021, meaning that the UK is treated as a third country with respect to the transfer and processing of personal date. What does this mean in practice for privacy and data protection?
When can personal data be transferred to a third country?
The Regulation (EU) 2016/679 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (GDPR) sets out the rules for the transfer of personal data from controllers or processors in the EU to third countries and international organisations, as set out in Chapter V of the GDPR. The main rule is that personal data may only be transferred to a third country in the event that adequate protection level is available.
The Adequacy Decision of the EC regarding personal data
The good news is that on the 28th June 2021, the EU has passed a Commission Implementation Decision, decision on the adequate protection of personal data by the united kingdom – general data protection regulation (Adequacy Decision). The EU Commission has carefully analysed the law and practice of the UK and concluded that the UK ensures an adequate level of protection for personal data transferred within the scope of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 from the EU to the UK. After a period of 4 years, effective from 1st July 2021, the Adequacy Decision will be reviewed by the EU.
What is the Adequacy Decision?
This Adequacy Decision means that there are no consequences for the transfer and processing of personal data between an EU member state and the UK. There is no need to take action and there is no need to use Standard Contractual Clauses, or to use the Binding Corporate Rules (BCRs).
What are the Standard Contractual Clauses?
The EU has developed so-called standard contractual clauses (SCCs) under the GDPR for data transfers from controllers or processors in the EU/EEA to controllers or processors established outside the EU/EEA. These SCCs have been updated and the EU issued modernised standard contractual clauses on the 4th June 2021.
What are the Binding Corporate Rules?
The BCRs were developed by the UK to allow multinational corporations, international organisations, and groups of companies to make intra-organisational transfers of personal data across borders in compliance with the GDPR. These companies submit the binding corporate rules for approval to the EU.
When do you use Standard Contractual Clauses or the Binding Corporate Rules?
However, any company within the EU which transfers or processes personal data country outside EEA (European Economic Area) needs to obtain “adequate” protection. This means that either the SCCs or BCRs will need be used in order to transfer data from controllers or processors in the EU/EEA to controllers or processors established outside the EU/EEA.
Schrems II
The SCCs were updated as a result of the Schrems II judgment of the Court of Justice of 16th July 2020. The court ruled that simply entering into SCCs was not sufficient. Each organisation that exports personal data outside the EEA, needs to assess case-by-case whether the legislation of the receiving country meets the protection requirements that is in line with the SCCs.
What are the innovations of the new Standard Contractual Clauses?
The new SCCs provide businesses with an easy-to-implement template and offer a more legal predictability to European businesses. The new SCCs in particular help SMEs to ensure compliance with requirements for safe data transfers, while allowing data to move freely across borders, without legal barriers. The new SCCs covers all transfers in the entire chain from controller to (sub)processor to controller.
The main innovations of the new SCC include the following:
- One single entry-point covering a broad range of transfer scenarios, instead of separate set of clauses;
- More flexibility for complex processing chains, through a “modular approach” and by offering the possibility for more than two parties to join and use the clauses;
- Practical toolbox to comply with the Schrems II judgments, i.e. an overview of the different steps companies have to take to comply with the Schrems II judgment as well as examples of possible “supplementary measures” such as encryption, that companies may take if necessary.
In the event that an organisation already uses the old SCCs, a transitionary period of 18 months is provided within which the new version of the SCCs need to be used.
Are you looking for an lawyer experienced in the international aspects of privacy law, or if you have any queries or questions relating to the processing or transfer of personal data to a third country, please contact Madelon van Breemen.
The Enhancement Position of Receivers Act has entered into force
On 1 July 2017, the Enhancement Position of Receivers Act (Wet versterking positie curator) entered into force.
The government has been implementing a legislative programme aiming to reassess bankruptcy law for several years. Tackling bankruptcy fraud is an important pillar thereof. On 1 July 2016, the Revision Penalisation Bankruptcy Fraud Act (Wet Herziening Strafbaarstelling Faillissementsfraude) came into effect. In the context of tackling fraud, it was also deemed necessary to provide the receiver with a stronger position. The act of 1 July 2017 facilitates this.
Important change
An important change is that the obligation to provide the receiver with information is no longer exclusively vested in the director under the Articles of Association and the supervisor. Now, the obligation also rests with actual directors and with persons who were director, actual director or supervisor in the three years prior to the bankruptcy. Therefore, it is no use any more for a fraudulent director to deregister as director shortly prior to the bankruptcy and put a front man forward.
Third parties
Third parties who are in possession of the administration of the bankrupt entity due to the performance of their profession or business, are obliged to make this available to the receiver. The law explicitly notes that this also applies to accountancy firms. Furthermore, it has been stipulated, that, if necessary, the means to read their contents must be made available to the receiver. Third parties cannot claim a retention right to the administration. Therefore, an accountant cannot argue towards a receiver that he is only prepared to hand over after his outstanding invoices have been paid.
Detecting fraud
New is that the fraud detection duty of the receiver has been clearly anchored in the law. Point of investigation should be whether there have been irregularities that have caused the bankruptcy (or the deficit therein). In practice, receivers have been conducting such legitimacy investigations. The delegated judge must be informed of the findings. The delegated judge may indicate that he deems it necessary for the receiver to file a report with the competent authorities, in which case the receiver must comply.
Consequences for receivers
Receivers shall be pleased with the enhancement of the (information) position. The fraud prevention duty of the receiver is perceived with more criticism. The time spent on fraud prevention is compensated from the insolvency assets (if any). That may lead to less money being paid to creditors. In fact, the insolvency creditors or the receiver himself pay the bill for the performance of the task. The new act does however represent an opportunity to establish regulations at this point. It has been stipulated that by or pursuant to a general order in council, further regulations may be laid down on the financing of the activities of the receiver in the context of the fraud prevention duty.
Information
If you would like more information on this subject, please contact Peter de Graaf.
Scope of collective bargaining: which collective bargaining agreement do I fall under as an employer?
In a previous article, we wrote about the importance of a scope review and avoiding a financial noose. In that article, it was about Booking.com facing mandatory affiliation with the industry pension fund for the travel industry.
This time it is the online supermarkets Picnic, Flink, Gorillas, Getir and Hofweb that are facing the collective bargaining agreement Food Industry. In this article, we discuss the judgment of the Central Netherlands District Court of February 28, 2024, as well as the importance of a scope review.
Assessment court scope of scope collective agreement
In the proceedings before the District Court, the supermarkets claimed a declaratory judgment that they do not fall within the scope of the collective bargaining agreement for the food industry. It follows from the relevant CBA that “employers who operate one or more stores that meet the description in Article 2 under a”. The Court indicated that this provision should be interpreted using the “collective bargaining standard.”
Interpretation via collective bargaining standard
The collective bargaining standard means that a provision of a collective bargaining agreement must be interpreted according to objective standards. The reason for this is to protect third parties who were not present at the collective bargaining negotiations and thus are not familiar with the parties’ intentions. Such an explanation does not assign significance to documents other than the text of the collective agreement and explanatory notes, as follows from the DSM/Fox judgment.
The court considered that from the text of the CBA in conjunction with the definitions, that the CBA applies not only to employers who themselves operate a (virtual) store, but also to employers who are part of a group whose activities are related to the operation of a store by another legal entity in the group. Thus, operating oneself is not a requirement to fall within the scope. Since Picnic c.s. is predominantly engaged within the group in the sale of food through a virtual store and home delivery and the other companies perform activities related to that, they are covered by the collective bargaining agreement.
The importance of a proper scope study thus follows from this ruling. In its absence, an organization can be unpleasantly surprised with the applicability of a collective bargaining agreement with all its consequences. Picnic et al. have to apply the collective bargaining agreement that has been declared generally binding for the period of the declaration. This will require Picnic to make various changes to salary payments, rosters and more.
More information about the collective labor agreement and industry pension fund?
If you would like more information about the possibilities of a scope investigation for your organization to see if you are covered by a collective agreement or industry pension fund, please contact labor lawyer Richard Ouwerling.
Is it possible to stop paying the rent of business premises?
In recent weeks, Leeman Verheijden Huntjens Advocaten received many questions from both tenants and landlords of business premises about rent payment and other rights and obligations in these special times. Rent costs are one of the largest cost items in the retail and hospitality sector, so in order to get through these difficult times, tenants are investigating whether they are (temporarily) not allowed to pay rent or whether they are allowed to pay less rent.
The closure of shops and other business premises has rent law consequences. For example, what can you do as a landlord if the tenant (temporarily) no longer pays the rent? And what risks do you run as a tenant of business premises if you can no longer (fully) meet the payment of the rent or an operating obligation due to reduced turnover?
This article answers the most frequently asked questions regarding the payment of rent for retail premises, cafes, restaurants and other business premises during the corona crisis. The answers relate to both leases within the meaning of Section 7:290 of the Dutch Civil Code (shops and catering industry) and leases for (other) business premises within the meaning of Section 7:230a of the Dutch Civil Code (office premises).
Is the tenant of business premises allowed to (partially) suspend payment of the rent?
The main rule is that a tenant must continue to pay the rent of a retail space, catering or other business premises. This is only different if the tenant and the landlord jointly agree that the rent may be paid later or agree that the rent does not have to be paid (in part) for a certain period of time. Postponement of the rent payment or (partial) remission can prevent the tenant from going bankrupt, which is also in the landlord’s interest. On the other hand, a lessor also has financial obligations to fulfil.
The purpose of suspending the rent payment is to persuade the lessor to fulfil his obligations under the lease agreement. This is the case, for example, when there is a defect that the lessor has to remedy and, despite a reminder to do so, he does not remedy it. Moreover, the defect must be sufficiently serious and there must be a sufficient link between the suspension of the rental payment and the lessor’s failure to fulfil his obligation.
Claiming suspension of the rent payment is not possible due to closure of the business premises or reduced turnover. After all, suspension does not achieve the aforementioned objective.
Incidentally, many lease agreements exclude the right to suspend payment of the rent for the business premises.
What if the lessee of business premises no longer pays the rent due to the corona crisis?
Failure to pay the rent on time can be a ground for termination of the lease by the lessor. The lessor may also terminate the lease in the event of force majeure, for example due to a drop in turnover due to the corona virus. For this, the lessor must always go to court. A judicial dissolution usually only comes into play in the event of payment arrears of at least three months or if payment has repeatedly not been made on time in the past. If the court agrees with the lessor, he will dissolve the lease agreement and issue an eviction order.
After the proceedings have started, a tenant can still ‘stop’ the dissolution by paying the rent arrears or a large part thereof.
Tenants of business premises who foresee that they will not be able to pay the rent (on time) are advised to inform their landlord about this. In doing so, it is important that they provide an insight into their financial situation and make an estimate or a proposal as to when the rent can be paid and any rent arrears can be made good. If a tenant has the means, it is wise to at least pay (part of) the rent. Avoid a rent arrears of three months or more.
Most rental agreements contain a penalty clause for not paying the rent on time, even in case of force majeure. If a lessor of a shop, restaurant or other business premises claims this penalty, the lessee may ask the court to mitigate the penalty. It is expected that judges will honor a claim for mitigation if the late payment is the result of a (mandatory) closure and/or reduced turnover due to the corona virus.
Does it make sense for a tenant to invoke force majeure because of the corona crisis?
A successful invocation of force majeure (e.g. by corona) does not mean that the tenant no longer has to pay rent for the business premises. A landlord can demand payment from the tenant as soon as this is possible again. Force majeure does not stand in the way of this.
It is not possible for the landlord to claim compensation for failure to pay the rent on time in the event of force majeure.
It is not yet clear whether the Lessee can successfully invoke force majeure due to the corona virus and its consequences. Whether there is force majeure must be determined on the basis of the law, the agreement or generally accepted views. It will therefore depend on the circumstances of the case. When a business premises is closed down, it also plays a role whether this is voluntary or the result of a government measure relating to the coronavirus.
In the event of an obligatory closure of the catering establishment or shop, the lessee must comply with the government measure imposed. In that case, there is most likely a situation of force majeure. If the closure is not compulsory by the government, but due to a shortage of staff or reduced visitor numbers, for example, the position may be taken that there is simply an entrepreneurial risk. In general, tenants of business premises must take such entrepreneurial risks (such as an economic crisis or natural disaster) into account when concluding the lease. If the consequences of the corona virus are regarded as an entrepreneurial risk, invoking force majeure is unlikely to succeed. Clarity about this will ultimately have to follow from case law.
What if the lessee no longer complies with the obligation to operate?
Many leases for business premises include an operating obligation for the lessee. The leased property must then be used in accordance with the agreed purpose, such as clothing shop, café, restaurant or storage space. Such an operating obligation is usually combined with a penalty clause. If the lessee does not comply with the obligation to operate, he is liable to pay a fine and may claim damages from the lessor.
In this case, too, it is important whether the lessee can successfully invoke force majeure. If the closure of the catering facility or shop is the result of a government measure, the lessee cannot be blamed for not meeting his operating obligation. The lessee can then invoke force majeure. In that case, the lessor cannot claim a (contractual) fine or damages. If the closure is on a voluntary basis, there may be a violation of the obligation to operate. The reasons for the closure then fall under the normal entrepreneurial risk (see above). However, a tenant can ask the court for mitigation of the fine.
Can the tenant claim a rent reduction for the business premises?
A tenant can only claim a reduction in rent if there is a reduction in rental enjoyment as a result of a defect. A defect exists when the tenant does not have the rental enjoyment that he could expect when entering into the tenancy agreement as a result of a state or property of the rented property or any other circumstance that cannot be attributed to the tenant. The coronavirus and its consequences can most probably not be regarded as a defect. This means that the renter cannot claim a reduction in the rent. In case law it will ultimately have to be decided whether the consequences of the corona virus (e.g. closure) can be regarded as a defect and whether a lessee can claim a rent reduction as a result.
In most business premises leases, the right to rent reduction is limited to defects that the lessor knew or should have known when entering into the agreement. If such a provision is included in the lease, reliance on rent reduction will not succeed.
Can the lessee invoke unforeseen circumstances due to the corona virus?
After entering into a rental agreement for business premises, there may be unforeseen circumstances. If this is the case, one of the parties (i.e. the renter or lessor) can ask the court to change the rental agreement or dissolve it in whole or in part. This can only be claimed if, according to standards of reasonableness and fairness, it cannot be expected that the tenancy agreement for business premises will remain unchanged.
Unforeseen does not mean unforeseen, but it must be circumstances that have not been taken into account in the rental agreement. If, for example, the lease contains a provision stating that the rent must also be paid in the event of force majeure, this is no longer an ‘unforeseen’ circumstance.
An appeal to unforeseen circumstances is seldom honoured by the court, but if there ever could be a reason to do so, it is now. Thought can be given to dissolution of the tenancy agreement for the future or (temporary) alteration of the rent.
Tenancy law lawyer
As you have been able to read, not all questions can be answered unequivocally. A number of things are still uncertain. The advice is therefore to try to reach a settlement first. Also make sure you have a good record in writing of the agreements made. If this does not work out, please contact the tenancy lawyers of Leeman Verheijden Huntjens Advocaten for legal advice. They can advise you in your specific situation about which steps to take or which risks you run. If necessary, we will start court proceedings for you. The Tenancy Lawyers assist both tenants and landlords.
You can find more corona information in our helpdesk.
Minister Asscher announces measures that pertain to the obligation to continue to pay salary in the event of illness
Minister Asscher announces measures that pertain to the obligation to continue to pay salary in the event of illness
For the first 2 years of an employee’s illness, his employer is obliged to continue paying the employee’s salary. In a letter to Parliament of 21 April 2016, Minister Asscher announced a number of measures that aim to ease a few bottlenecks employers experience with regard to the obligation to continue to pay salary. Two of these measures are discussed below:
Measure 1: second-track reintegration a decision of the employer and employee
If, in the first two years of illness, an employer makes insufficient effort to reintegrate the employee, the Employee Insurance Agency (UWV) will impose a salary penalty. This means that the employer’s obligation to continue to pay salary is extended by 1 year. If an employer fails to initiate the process of reintegrating an employee with another employer – the so-called “second track” – or initiate this process too late, this may be cause for such a salary penalty. In practice, employers only initiate a second-track reintegration process in order to prevent a salary penalty. The announced measure makes the decision on whether or not to initiate a second-track reintegration process, and the timing thereof, a decision of the employer and the employee, based on the advice of the company physician. This is then included in the plan of action. UWV only checks whether the reintegration took place in accordance with the plan of action. Failing to initiate the second-track reintegration process, or doing so too early or too late, will no longer lead to a salary penalty being imposed.
Measure 2: Full invalidity benefit paid out earlier
After two years of illness, an employee can apply for a benefit under the Dutch Work and Income (Capacity for Work) Act (WIA). In the event of partial occupational disability, an employee is entitled to a benefit under the Dutch Return to Work (Partially Disabled) Regulations (WGA). If an employee is fully and permanently occupationally disabled, the employee is eligible for a benefit pursuant to the Full Invalidity Benefit Regulations (IVA). If, during the employment, it is already clear that an employee is fully and permanently occupationally disabled, the relevant employee can apply for such a benefit at an earlier stage. Such an early benefit under the Full Invalidity Benefit Regulations can be applied for after 3 weeks of illness, while the payments will start 13 weeks after the first day of illness at the earliest.
Employers cannot submit such an early application and are therefore dependent on the employee. The announced measure means that, in certain circumstances, the employer can apply for such an early IVA benefit as well.
The legal feasibility and the consequences of the announced measures are currently being explored. The legislative proposal is expected to be submitted sometime around the summer. Actually implementing these measures would be a good first step in easing the administrative burden put on employers when an employee becomes ill.
If you have a question about this subject, you can contact our office 0031 10 209 2777 or by e-mail info@lvh-advocaten.nl.
Court of Appeal rules that ‘pre-pack is a transfer of a company’
In case of a pre-pack, also called a pre-packaged insolvency, an intended receiver is working on a relaunch some time prior to the declaration of the bankruptcy, so a relaunch may be realised shortly after the declaration of the bankruptcy, possibly even the same day. The aim of the pre-pack is continuation of the company with the highest possible yield.
In case of a relaunch after bankruptcy, the buyer is not required to take over the entire staff, which is different in case of a transfer of a company. In case of a transfer of a company, the employees retain their rights based on the European Directive 2001/23/EC, which has been incorporated in Sections 7:662 – 7:666 of the Dutch Civil Code. As shown in Section 7:666 of the Dutch Civil Code, this does not apply if the employer is declared bankrupt, as the aim of a bankruptcy is to liquidate the assets of the company with the highest possible yield for the joint creditors.
The European Court of Justice has now ruled that employees in case of a pre-pack are protected by the rules that apply to the transfer of a company, that is to say, that the employees in case of a pre-packaged insolvency are transferred to the buyer with retention of their rights. In the procedure that led to this ruling, the so-called Estro case, there was a relaunch after bankruptcy, in which many employees lost their jobs, now that they were not transferred to the buying party. Dutch labour union FNV argued on behalf of a number of employees that this was actually a transfer of a company, which resulted in the entire staff being transferred to the buying party. The buyer however, argued that, based on Section 7:666 of the Dutch Civil Code, the stipulations of transfer did not apply to the circumstances under which the employer had been declared bankrupt. In short, the European Court ruled that the pre-pack is not aimed at the liquidation of the assets of the company, but at continuation of the activities after bankruptcy. Therefore, the pre-pack is not covered by the exclusion of the Directive.
It goes without saying that this ruling has consequences of the application of the pre-pack. It has become a lot less interesting for the buying party, given the fact that it is obliged to take over all employees. It is therefore to be expected that the pre-pack will be used a lot less.
Information
If you would like more information on this subject, please contact Peter de Graaf.
Tips and tricks for a cooperation agreement
Tips and tricks for a cooperation agreement
Under the guise of “together you are strong,” parties regularly enter into cooperation agreements. In this article, contract law attorney Gentia Niesert explains what a cooperation agreement is and provides some tips and tricks for drafting one.
Definition of cooperation agreement
A cooperation agreement is an agreement, in which parties make arrangements regarding their cooperation. It is important that the agreement matches the specific wishes of the parties. Gentia Niesert can draw up a customized cooperation agreement for you.
Topics in a cooperation agreement
What topics should be included in a cooperation agreement depends on the type of cooperation between parties. Below are a number of topics that appear in almost all cooperation agreements:
1. Purpose of cooperation
First, it is good to state what the purpose of the collaboration is so that it is clear to both parties.
2. Duration and termination of cooperation
Furthermore, it is important to include something regarding the duration of the cooperation agreement. For example, an agreement can be for an indefinite period of time or for a definite period of time.
It is also wise to agree on the possibility of terminating the agreement.
3. Financial compensation and payment period
The cooperation agreement can also include agreements on prices and payment terms and how to proceed if a party fails to meet his/her payment agreements.
4. Liability
It is also advisable to include in the cooperation agreement the liability of the parties.
5. Exclusivity
A cooperation agreement may further state whether or not the cooperation is of an exclusive nature, that is, whether the parties are also free to cooperate with other parties.
6. Intellectual Property
It may also be wise to arrange something regarding intellectual property rights.
7. Dispute resolution
Finally, it is advisable to include in the cooperation agreement how to proceed if parties have a dispute under the agreement. It can be included, for example, that in such a case the parties will submit their dispute to the competent court or engage a mediator.
Need advice on drafting/reviewing your collaboration agreement?
Are you looking to have a partnership agreement drafted or reviewed? Then you have come to the right place. Gentia Niesert, contract law attorney, will be happy to assist you.
WW premium: low or high rate?
With effect from 1 January 2020, the Labour Market Balancing Act (Wab) will introduce a new system for the WW premium. The sectoral premium differentiation will also be abolished, because many companies no longer belong to a single sector.
The Cabinet wants to encourage employers to offer employees permanent contracts The level of the WW premium will therefore depend on the type of contract. The WW-premium for employers will be lower when an employee is offered a permanent job instead of a temporary contract. The main rule is that the low premium applies to employees with a written employment contract for an indefinite period of time, unless it is an on-call contract. Zero hour contracts and mini-max contracts do not qualify for the low premium.
The following definition is used to establish: ‘written employment contracts for an indefinite period of time that clearly define the scope of the work to be performed’.
To be eligible for the low rate (2.94%), a written contract of employment for an indefinite period of time must therefore have been entered into. A tacit extension is not sufficient to qualify for the low rate. To avoid application of the high rate (7.94%), you can still enter into an employment contract for an indefinite period of time or agree an addendum to the fixed-term employment contract with your employees.
Because this change involves a large administrative burden for employers, employers will have until 1 April 2020 to comply with the abovementioned written requirement for application of the low WW premium (see Kamerbrief dated 9 December 2019). Until then, employers may apply the low premium, as long as they comply with the written requirement on time.
Advice: If you want to be eligible for the low WW premium, you must ensure that a written employment contract or a written addendum is present in the payroll administration as of 1 April 2020 at the latest. This must be signed by both employer and employee. This must show that the employee was already employed for an indefinite period of time before 1 January 2020.
Information
Do you have any questions about this article? Please contact Lisa Kloot on 0031 10 209 27 77 or send an e-mail (kloot@lvh-advocaten.nl).
Pratical Legal Corona Tips: How can your business enterprise conduct its formal meetings that require physical presence by law or deed?
Under the Dutch Civil Code (DCC), there are many requirements on how to convene certain general meetings of business enterprises. The one that causes the biggest obstacle is the fact that the DCC requires in some instances that such general meetings require the physical presence of the parties concerned. And this may not be possible or practicable during the period of the “intelligent” lock-down imposed by the Dutch Government.
The Government has come to the rescue again and has just drafted a new draft Emergency Act enabling business enterprises to conduct formal meetings on-line during the Corona crisis. This draft Emergency Act was submitted by the House of Commons on the 8th of April 2020, and considering the urgency of the matter, this draft Emergency Act will be implemented sooner than later. Once it has been implemented it will have retro-active effect to 23rd March 2020 to a certain date and will lapse on 1 September 2020. Thereafter the normal provisions in the DCC will apply again.
Please rest assured that this draft Emergency Act covers all sorts of business enterprises ranging from publicly quoted companies to owner associations that are required to hold a general meetings.
The draft Emergency Act does set out some conditions that need to be met for the above-mentioned business enterprises to make use of the rights set out therein to conduct general meetings that require physical presence. These are:
- The members of the general meetings must be able to follow the general meeting by way of a livestream, this can be by video or by audio.
- The members of the general meeting must be able to submit questions to be addressed during the meeting no later than 72 hours before the general meeting takes place. Furthermore, these questions will need to be shared with all the members and specifically dealt with during the meeting itself. This right must be communicated expressly to the members in the invitation to attend the general meeting.
- The resolutions adopted during these general meetings are valid in the event that the above requirements are met and remain valid even in the situation where one or more of the members have not be able to adequately follow the general meeting.
As there are very specific time-limits in the Dutch Civil Code for conducting general meetings for the preparation of the annual accounts, the Dutch Government has facilitated business enterprises by enabling that these general meetings can be conducted within a window of 10 months in total from the date of the end of the financial year. This means that an additional extension of 4 months is available on top of the normal 6 months period. Furthermore, the Dutch Government has extended the period within which the management board needs to hold an annual meeting.
Furthermore, the Dutch Civil Code sets out that the management can, under certain circumstances, be held personally liable in the event that the strict procedures for conducting these general meetings are not met. Given the fact that the Corona Crisis has turned the world upside down, the Dutch Government included a provision in this draft Emergency Act that non-compliance of the publication requirement does, under certain circumstances, not result in a formal breach if such non-compliance is due to the Corona Crisis.Such circumstance is in the event that a company is declared insolvent and where its management has not complied with the publication requirements in relation to the most recent annual accounts. In the event that such failure to meet this requirement is due to the Corona crisis, the management will not be deemed to be personally liable.
Specific rights for Associations
The draft Emergency Act has made it possible for Associations to hold an annual meeting by video or by audio. Furthermore, the draft Emergency Act enables the Association to apply for an extension of time of an additional 4 months to approve the Annual Accounts period after the end of the relevant book year.
In relation to inviting members to an annual meeting through electronic means, there are a number of formalities that need to be complied with. These formalities must be complied with and in the event that certain specific formalities are not complied with, this could under certain circumstances render the resolution null and void.
- The management board of the Assocation can call for an annual meeting to be conducted on-line provided the general meeting can be attended by its members through electronic means.
- The members also need to be given, 72 hours prior to the annual meeting, the right to ask questions regarding the agenda items, which questions can be communicated either in writing or by electronic means.
- These questions and answers are to be made available to all members during the annual meeting by electronic means.
- During the annual meeting all questions raised by the members should be reasonably dealt with.
In the event that the annual meeting cannot be attended by all members because of the connection or for a technical reason, then validity of the resolutions will not be affected. Furthermore, the votes of the members can be conducted by electronic means through this draft Emergency Act.
All in all, this is good news for all business enterprises and must be relief for many of them that the Dutch Government is proving to be so flexible and practicable. Please contact Madelon van Breemen for further information or advice.
Jacolien Leuvenink
Commercial Leases in the Netherlands
Dutch Commercial property leases are regulated by statute law. Different regimes apply to each category of property lease. As a general rule, the primary use of the premises determines the applicable legal regime.
Retail Business Premises
This category of premises mainly consists of shops, hotels, bars and restaurants. The rule of thumb being that the premises is open to the public. Rental agreements for this category must either be concluded for less than two years, or for at least five years. For lease agreements of less than two years duration no further mandatory rules apply. For agreements of longer duration, the lessee has the option to prolong the agreement to at least ten years. These Retail Business rental agreements do not terminate automatically upon lapse of their duration, but must be terminated by giving notice. Notice is subject to strict formalities:
- at least one year’s notice by registered letter or bailiff’s writ
- if given by lessor, the grounds for the notice must be specified in the notice.
If notice is given by the lessor, and the lessee does not agree with the termination, the lessor must apply to the court for a termination order. Notice by lessor after the first five year term is only legally possible in case of misconduct of the lessee or an urgent need, on the part of lessor, to use the premises himself for retail business purposes. In case of notice by the lessor after the ten year term (or at a later moment), the court must balance the parties’ interests, but must allow action for termination if one or more of a limited number of grounds is present. When the matter is brought before the court, the agreement only ends after the court has given its final judgment.
The law provides that the lessee who transfers his business to another party, may ask the court to substitute the new owner in his place as a lessee. The lessor is not able to prevent this from happening, as long as the new lessee is financially capable of fulfilling their obligations under the lease.
Termination of Retail Business leases
Retail Business leases can be terminated either by agreement, judicial dissolution (in cases of default), the lessee’s decision to give notice, or a court decision after the lessor’s notice based on one of the (limited) grounds listed in the Dutch Civil Code.
Offices and other Business Premises
In case of offices, factories and other buildings not covered by specific rules, the parties are free to agree on the terms of the contract. For termination of the lease by the lessor, it is necessary that the lessor summons the lessee to vacate the premises, by registered letter with receipt, or by bailiff’s writ. Thereafter, the lessee enjoys a two-month protection period during which it may decide to submit a request for prolongation of the lease to the cantonal court. The court will base its decision on an assessment of the interests of both parties. In accordance with the legislation the court can grant the request for prolongation for a maximum of three one-year periods.
Termination of Office leases
Office leases end automatically. If the lessee does not use the described protective prolongation period to extend the lease, the lessor may commence eviction proceedings.
General
The Dutch Civil Code contains a number of provisions generally applicable to rental agreements, of which the most important are:
- The Lessor is responsible for damage resulting from visible or hidden defects in property.
- The lessee may sublet in whole or in part, if reasonable objections of the lessor are not anticipated.
- Major maintenance and repairs are for the account of the lessor.
- Minor repairs and day-to-day maintenance are for the account of the lessee.
The general provisions mentioned above do not form part of compulsory law, and are frequently set aside in individual contracts. Lessors often make use of general conditions, which deviate from the Dutch Civil Code. It is therefore advisable to seek advice on the contract and the applicable general conditions from one of our lawyers before taking action.
Further information
For additional information please feel free to contact Daniël van Genderen.
Opinion of the Attorney-General: lessees of business premises are entitled to a rent reduction because of the corona pandemic
In a case concerning the question whether a lessee of business premises is entitled to a rent reduction because of the coronapandemic, the Subdistrict Court of Roermond asked the Supreme Court preliminary questions on March 31. The answer to these questions is important for legal practice, because the answers from the Supreme Court will also give other tenants and lessors of business accommodations something to hold on to when solving concrete cases. In short, the Attorney General’s opinion concludes that tenants of commercial premises are entitled to a rent reduction if there is a sufficiently serious loss of turnover due to corona.
What preliminary questions were asked?
The following four questions were asked:
- Should the government-imposed closure of the catering industry as a result of the corona crisis be considered a defect within the meaning of article 7:204 (2) of the Civil Code?
- If so, on the basis of which criteria should the degree of rent reduction be assessed?
- (Or) does the restriction in the use of the leased property constitute an unforeseen circumstance that can lead to a reduction in rent?
- If so, what circumstances of the case weigh in determining or apportioning damages?
Attorney General’s opinion on rent reduction for business premises due to corona
On September 30, 2021, the opinion of the Attorney General to the Supreme Court was published. In his opinion, the preliminary questions raised should be answered as follows.
Answer question 1:
Barring a different contractual arrangement, a forced closure of the catering industry in connection with the corona pandemic is in principle to be regarded as a circumstance not entirely attributable to the lessee as a result of which the property cannot provide the lessee with the enjoyment that the lessee may expect, so that to that extent there is a defect within the meaning of Section 7:204 (2) of the Dutch Civil Code.
Answer to question 2:
The legal consequences of this as regards the obligation to pay the rent should be assessed on the basis of (Article 7:207 Dutch Civil Code in conjunction with) Article 6:258 Dutch Civil Code.
Answer to question 3:
With regard to contracts for the rent of business premises concluded before the corona crisis, whereby the lessee depends on the arrival of the public for its turnover in the leased premises, such as in the case of catering establishments and stores, it may be assumed as a starting point that the corona pandemic and its consequences (the corona crisis) is an unforeseen circumstance which may mean that, according to standards of reasonableness and fairness, the lessor may not expect the lease to be maintained unchanged.
Answer Question 4:
The consequences to be attached to the corona crisis for the unaltered maintenance of the contract depend on the circumstances of the case. In principle, the corona crisis may lead to a temporary reduction in rent based on the prejudice suffered by the tenant as a result of the sufficiently serious loss of turnover of the tenant in the leased property attributable to the corona crisis. In determining the disadvantage, the amount received by the lessee in respect of the leased property in the form of Tegemoetkoming Vasteastenasten (TVL) may be discounted in the manner described by the Court of Appeal of Amsterdam 14 September 2021, (see the calculation below). As a starting point, the said disadvantage should be divided equally (50/50) between landlord and tenant. Circumstances that as such are separate from the disruption of the contractual balance between the performance of the lessor and lessee in the lease of business premises due to the corona crisis may justify a deviation from this starting point.
How does the calculation of the rent reduction work under the Attorney General’s opinion?
The Attorney General opts for the so-called “fixed expense method. This involves deducting the TVL from the actual fixed charges. The disadvantage suffered is then divided 50/50 between the parties (lessee and lessor of business premises).
The following formula is used: (total actual fixed charges – TVL amount) x (rent portion of actual fixed charges) x percentage of turnover reduction x 50%.
Example calculation of rent reduction due to corona according to Attorney General’s advice:
Suppose the rent is 40. The total fixed costs (including rent) amount to 160. The rent portion of the fixed costs is then 25%. The loss of turnover due to corona is 75%.
The rent reduction is then (160 – 100 = ) 60 x 25% x 75% x 50% = 5.6. The rent then becomes 40 – 5.6 = 34.4.
Supreme Court decision on rent reduction for business premises due to corona
The Supreme Court has yet to give a final ruling on the preliminary questions posed. It is not unusual for the Supreme Court to follow the Attorney General’s advice. Whether that will happen in this case remains to be seen. It is therefore not yet certain that the Supreme Court will opt for the same method of calculating the rent reduction.
Hidden defects: what to look out for?
It happens to almost everyone; you buy a product, car, house, machine, boat or appliance where at first glance nothing seems wrong, but later it turns out that there is a ‘hidden defect’ to the purchased product.
The question is then who is liable. In this article I give examples of hidden defects, explain what the obligations of the buyer and seller are and what one should pay attention to.
Definition of hidden defect
A hidden defect is a defect that becomes apparent after the purchase contract has been concluded.
Examples of hidden faults
Examples of hidden defects may include leaks, undiscovered cracks, rotten wood and asbestos in a home. Cars can also have hidden defects. Examples include reversed mileage, rusted through underside, engine problems or faulty brake line.
Machinery may also have hidden defects, such as missing control boxes/control units.
Whether something is a hidden defect always depends on the circumstances of the case. Do you doubt whether something is a hidden defect? Gentia Niesert, attorney at law in contract and procedural law, can advise you on this.
Obligation of the seller to disclose latent defects
The seller has a ‘duty of disclosure’. This means that if the seller is aware of a defect or could reasonably be aware of it, he/she must inform the buyer of it at . If the seller does not do this, the seller can be held liable for the damage suffered by the buyer as a result of the hidden defect.
Obligation of the buyer to investigate hidden defects
On the other hand, the purchaser has a ‘duty to investigate’. This means that the buyer must investigate whether there may be any defects. If a defect is visible, the buyer must ask the seller questions. For example, if the purchaser sees traces of leakage, but it is not immediately clear whether there is anything wrong, he/she must investigate. If the buyer does not fulfil this obligation to investigate, there is a chance that the buyer cannot recover damages from the seller.
What to look out for in hidden defects?
It is always advisable to check the contract of sale. Some purchase agreements contain clauses that say something about hidden defects. Think of an age clause in contracts of sale of houses, in which the seller is protected against hidden defects in ‘old houses’.
It is also advisable to keep an eye on the period within which the hidden defect must be reported.
Need advice on hidden defects?
Are you the purchasing party and have you discovered a hidden defect or are you the selling party and are you being held liable in connection with a hidden defect? Then you have come to the right place. Gentia Niesert, lawyer in contract law and procedural law, will be happy to advise you.
FAQ’s about maintenance payments
The following article answers some of the most frequently asked questions about maintenance (alimony) obligations in the Netherlands.
- What forms of maintenance obligations are there in The Netherlands?
- When is child maintenance owed?
- How is child maintenance determined?
- How is spousal maintenance determined?
- When does the obligation to pay spousal maintenance end?
- Is the payment obligation for spousal maintenance always limited to 12 years?
- My ex-partner is in arrears with their maintenance payments. What can I do?
- When are maintenance payments indexed?
- Can a court order for maintenance be revised at a later date?
- Is there any maintenance obligation when dissolving a registered partnership?
- Can I get any tax rebates on maintenance payments?
What forms of maintenance obligations are there in The Netherlands?
In The Netherlands there are two main maintenance obligations: child maintenance and spousal or partner maintenance. Child maintenance provides a financial contribution towards the upbringing and education of your children (legal/biological). Spousal maintenance is a financial contribution owed to the spouse left financially less well off after the dissolution of a marriage / civil partnership.
When is child maintenance owed?
A parent is legally obliged to pay a contribution towards the upbringing and education to the parent taking daily care of the child. Child maintenance is mandatory until the child turns 18 years of age. After the child has reached their majority a further contribution may be owed if the child is still studying or cannot financially provide for itself. In such cases maintenance is owed until the child turns 21 years of age.
How is child maintenance determined?
There are two ways in which child maintenance is determined. The first is that both parents, after consultation with their divorce lawyer, agree upon an amount and then include this in the divorce agreement. This constitutes a binding agreement and can, if necessary, be enforced should any default occur.
If the parents cannot agree upon an amount, the courts will determine an equitable maintenance obligation.
To determine the amount of maintenance the so-called TREMA guidelines are followed. Under these guidelines the total income of both parents during the marriage / relationship is determined and a percentage of this income is identified as the average cost for the upbringing of the children in that particular family. This percentage is deemed to be the amount necessary to house, feed, clothe and educate the children in a manner to which they are accustomed. When this need of the children has been determined, the financial capacity of the parents will be determined in order to compare what both parents should contribute according to their means.
If the parents have a co-parenting agreement whereby the children spend roughly half their time with both parents, separate financial arrangements can be made to split the costs of living between both parents rather than setting a fixed amount of child maintenance. These arrangements must be included in a divorce agreement or a written parenting plan.
How is spousal maintenance determined?
Spousal maintenance can be agreed between parties in the same manner as child maintenance (see above). Parties can also agree to waive their right to future maintenance, for example because both parties have enough income to support themselves.
If parties cannot agree on an amount, the courts will determine an equitable amount of spousal maintenance. Spousal maintenance is determined according to the so-called TREMA guidelines by comparing the financial needs of the spouse requesting maintenance and the financial capacity of the defending party to contribute to these needs. The financial needs of the spouse with less income is derived from the total income enjoyed by parties during the marriage. The guidelines assume that both parties must be able to continue this standard of living after the divorce. If the defending spouse does not have the financial means to support the other spouse in this standard of living, the maintenance obligation is adjusted accordingly, sometimes resulting in no maintenance being owed at all. The final amount determined by the courts is always a fine balance between the needs of one spouse and the means of the other.
When does the obligation to pay spousal maintenance end?
If the marriage has lasted less than five years and has remained childless, then the maximum maintenace obligation is equal to the amount of time parties were married. For example, if parties were maried for three years and six months and remained childless, then the maintenance obligation ends three years and six months after the marriage is dissolved. For marriages that have lasted longer than five years or shorter marriages from which children are born, the obligation remains in force for a maximum of 12 years. As an exception the spouses can agree on a shorter period or one spouse can ask the court to limit the period of 12 years to a shorter period.
Should the spouse receiving maintenance remarry or start co-habiting in a stable relationship, then any maintenance obligation ceases immediately from the moment of co-habitation or re-marriage. The obligation to pay maintenance may also cease prematurely if the spouse receiving maintenance starts earning enough income to support themselves and equal their standard of living during the marital period.
Is the payment obligation for spousal maintenance always limited to 12 years?
No. There are three exceptions to this rule:
- Parties can agree upon a longer period of maintenance.
- The law limiting the maintenance period to 12 years was first introduced on the 1st of July 1994. If parties were divorced before this date, then there is no limitation to the maintenance period. Maintenance is therefore owed indefinitely until a court order is obtained releasing the party paying maintenance from their obligation. If you have been paying maintenance to an ex-partner living in the Netherlands for over 15 years, then it is advisable to consult with one of our lawyers about the possibilities of legal action to annul any further maintenance obligation.
- The Dutch Civil Code contains a single exception to the rule in certain cases. Under certain circumstances, the spouse receiving maintenance can request an extension on the basis that they would encounter serious financial problems should maintenance cease. This could, for example, be the case if the spouse receiving maintenance has a serious disability and is therefore not able to support themselves financially in the future. A request for an extension of the maintenance period must be submitted to a competent court within three months after the maintenance period has expired. If no request is filed within this period, then no further claim for maintenance can be made.
My ex-partner is in arrears with their maintenance payments. What can I do?
The international recovery of maintenance is governed by International treaties. If the spouse owing maintenance lives in one of the member states, then you can take steps to recover the arrears via a government agency. In The Netherlands the LBIO is the competent authority and will recover maintenance within The Netherlands. If the spouse receiving (child or spousal) maintenance lives in the Netherlands and the other party lives in another treaty country, then the LBIO will recover the maintenance owed via one of its sister organisations.
To enlist the services of the LBIO, maintenance must first have been awarded by court order. If a maintenance agreement has not been ratified by the competent courts, then the LBIO cannot help with the recovery until you have obtained a court order. Recovery by the LBIO is free of charge for the party to whom maintenance is owing. For more information on this subject, please consult the LBIO website.
When are maintenance payments indexed?
Unless parties have expressly agreed otherwise, by law Dutch maintenance obligations are indexed for inflation on the 1st of January of each year. For more information on the current index percentages, please consult the LBIO website.
Can a court order for maintenance be revised at a later date?
Yes. Both written agreements and court orders regarding maintenance can be revised by the courts at a later date. The courts can revise previous maintenance obligations on the grounds of a significant change in the financial circumstances of one or both of the parties. An example would be unemployment of the party obliged to pay maintenance. Revision can also be sought if the original decision was based on incorrect financial information and is therefore unsound.
Is there any maintenance obligation when dissolving a registered partnership?
Yes. In the Netherlands, the law is the same for both marriages and registered civil partnerships.
Can I get any tax rebates on maintenance payments?
If you pay tax in the Netherlands, maintenance payments to an ex-partner are fully deductible from your Income Tax. For more information, please consult the Dutch Tax Authorities website.
Information
If your questions have not been answered or you wish for additional information on the above, please feel free to contact our Family Law Practice Group contact person.
Change in the Wage Guarantee Scheme
When an employer goes into liquidation, the employees are often left with arrears in the payment of their salaries. The liquidation does not cause the employment to be terminated immediately (the receiver still has to terminate the employment agreement), so even after the company goes into liquidation, the employees are still entitled to salary.
The Dutch Unemployment Insurance Act (Werkloosheidswet) provides for a scheme for this situation, also referred to as the Wage Guarantee Scheme. In summary, this scheme entitles the employee to subsequent payment of salary owed for the 13-week period preceding the company’s liquidation, the salary owed for the notice period (a maximum of 6 weeks) and payment of any holidays not yet taken and holiday pay for a period of up to 1 year preceding the end of the employment. This scheme has changed. Until 1 January 2016, the Employee Insurance Agency (UWV) compensated the full salary, i.e. everything that the employee is entitled to under the employment agreement, including expense allowances and third-party rights (pension premiums!). Extraordinarily, there was no upper limit to the amount of the wage. This has changed as of 1 January 2016. As of 1 January, the amount is limited to 1½ times the maximum daily wage (which is the maximum wage that serves as a basis for unemployment benefit). For 2016, the maximum daily wage has been set at € 4,393.00 per month. The Wage Guarantee Scheme has been maximised at 1½ times the maximum daily wage, i.e. € 6,590.00 gross. This means that, in the event of liquidation, employees whose gross salary is higher than that no longer receive their full salary. While, for the portion of the salary that employees are not compensated for, these employees have a (preferential) claim in the liquidation (and sometimes a claim against the insolvent company as well), it is plausible that this group of employees will be less willing to continue working for the curator after the liquidation.
If you have a question about this subject, you can contact Rob Steenhoek.
Right to compensation Regulation 261/2004 in case of multiple flight delay circumstances?
Airlines are subjected daily to various circumstances that may lead to a delay or cancellation of the scheduled flight. However, such disruption does not always lead to the obligation to pay compensation to passengers. In case of extraordinary circumstances that could not have been avoided even by taking all reasonable measures, no compensation is due.
LVH Advocaten regularly assists airlines in handling claims from passengers under EU Regulation 261/2004. This Regulation provides rules on compensation to air passengers in case of denied boarding, cancellation and long delays (3 hours or more) of flights.
The Court of Justice of the EU often deals with cases regarding Regulation 261/2004. In this article we take a closer look at a special situation that was handled by the Court. What if a flight has been delayed for a long time due to two or more circumstances, not all of which have the label extraordinary. Is there a right to compensation for passengers under the Regulation in those situations?
Pešková Judgment
In this judgment, passengers were to be transported from Bulgaria to the Czech Republic. However, the flight preceding the passengers’ flight faced two problems. First, there was a technical problem which took 1 hour and 45 minutes to repair. After that, the aircraft departed. However, during landing a bird-strike occurred. As a result, it was necessary to check the technical condition of the aircraft. After checking the flight re-departed. The total delay in arriving at the final destination was 5 hours and 20 minutes. So, there was a delay of more than 3 hours, but was there also a right to compensation?
Two or more causes of flight delay
In principle, according to the CJEU, when there is a delay of more than 3 hours at the final destination, a claim for compensation under Article 7 of the Regulation can exist, unless there is an extraordinary circumstance. In this case, however, the first part of the delay was not an extraordinary circumstance. In principle, resolving a technical defect is inherent in the normal exercise of an airline’s business. The bird strike, on the other hand, is an external cause beyond the airline’s control. The bird strike therefore does constitute an extraordinary circumstance as referred to in recital 14 of the preamble to the Regulation.
In the Pešková ruling the court ruled that in case of two or more causes, the delay caused by an extraordinary circumstance must be deducted from the total duration of the arrival delay. In this way, it can be assessed whether that non-extraordinary part of the delay amounts to 3 hours or more and therefore whether or not compensation can be claimed.
Extraordinary circumstance should not be counted
In short, the flight delay is effectively split into that part of the delay caused by an extraordinary circumstance and the part of the delay not caused by an extraordinary circumstance. For airlines, this is an important outcome. In practice, it is not unusual for a flight to be affected by multiple factors that can lead to a delay or cancellation. Consider, for example, the combination of technical defects and slot messages from air traffic management or the late arrival of the preceding flight and bad weather conditions. The Pešková judgment made it clear that different delay-causing events must be considered separately. Only if a delay of 3 hours or more was caused by a non-ordinary circumstance the Regulation can be invoked.
Need a lawyer in aviation?
If you have any questions about this article, please contact Gentia Niesert. She will be happy to assist you in all your legal matters, including any claims based on EU Regulation 261/2004.
Legislative proposal on Concentration of shipping cases with the District Court of Rotterdam adopted
Not all legislative processes take a long time. The legislative proposal was sent to the House of Representatives on 11 April 2016. On 21 June 2016, the Senate – like the House of Representatives – dealt with the legislative proposal as a formality, and adopted it. The law will take effect at a time to be decided by royal decree.
So what is going to change?
The District Court of Rotterdam will get exclusive jurisdiction to hear shipping cases.
This concerns cases that relate to the transport of goods over water, the exploitation of ships, damage to cargo and collisions. The aim of this concentration is to improve the quality of justice and the efficiency of the judicial process. In practice, this option was already made use of, for example by designating the Rotterdam court as the court having exclusive jurisdiction in commercial contracts. The idea of the legislative proposal is to make better use of the knowledge and expertise of the Rotterdam maritime division, and develop it further as the division handles more cases. The explanatory notes also point out the presence of ship-owners, stevedores, shipbrokers, shipbuilders and specialised law firms. While, in most proceedings, distance is not necessarily an issue, it is obviously convenient for us to only have to cross the Erasmus Bridge for maritime cases, which will definitely make a difference in preliminary relief proceedings in particular. However, the main thing is that this makes it possible to maintain a team of specialised judges in Rotterdam, which means that judges in other courts are no longer burdened with having to read up on complicated legal matter for a single transport case from time to time.
However, the latter will not be a thing of the past just yet. For example, in cases involving combined transport and in preliminary relief proceedings, a party may choose to turn to a different court. Still, the District Court of Rotterdam has been made jointly competent to hear a number of different kinds of cases, which means that there is at least an option of bringing the case before the Rotterdam court.
Consequently, the ‘wet division’ of the District Court of Rotterdam, which is traditionally specialised in civil maritime law as the harbour is located there, expects to hear more international cases. Therefore, it has chosen an easily translatable name (maritime division), and proceedings will – where required – be in English as well. The multi-judge division will handle more cases than before, and English-language summaries will be drawn up of international cases.
All in all, this simple legislative proposal has been a big step in enabling the District Court of Rotterdam to professionalize.
If you have any questions about this subject, you can contact our office 0031 10 209 2777 or by e-mail info@lvh-advocaten.nl.
Summary dismissal for urgent cause
Under Dutch law, employment contracts can be terminated with immediate effect for an ‘urgent’ cause, such as theft, fraud, or other very serious misconduct. A non-exhaustive list of acts that amount to urgent cause is provided in Article 7:678 DCC. Other than in case of giving notice, it is not necessary to ask and obtain a permit from the Employee Insurance Agency (UWV).
Certain formal rules should be observed. The employer has the obligation to act with due care and take the employee’s interests into consideration. The employer also has an obligation to communicate the urgent cause immediately to the employee and the termination should be effected as soon as possible after the employer became aware of the cause for termination. It is however allowed to do some research and/or to seek legal counsel first and it is advisable to indeed discuss the facts with a lawyer specialized in Dutch employment law, who can also be of assistance to draft a letter in which the reason for dismissal is described. It is advisable to suspend the employee in the mean time.
Any termination of an employment contract for cause can lead to court proceedings, in which the employee will ask the court to declare the termination null and void. In such a case, the employee may be entitled to receive his or her salary from the date of improper termination until the employment agreement is terminated in a proper way (e.g., by obtaining approval from the Employee Insurance Agency (UWV) to give notice or a court decision). It is therefore customary that immediately steps are taken to make certain that the contract of employment will end. In a lot of cases the matter will be settled before further legal measures become necessary, as both parties usually prefer clarity above long lasting litigation.
Further information
You are welcome to consult us before taking a major decision with regard to summary dismissal of an employee for cause. For any further information regarding this subject, you can contact our office, 0031 – 10 209 27 77 or by e-mail info@lvh-advocaten.nl
The restart
The term ‘restart’ is frequently used on the news when a large company has gone into liquidation. A recent example thereof is Imtech. But what exactly is a restart?
A restart is a transfer of the assets and activities of a company after its liquidation. The restarter purchases the assets from the receiver. Usually, it is agreed that some of the personnel will be taken over by the restarter as well.
In practice, it is important to arrange for a restart in the shortest possible term. After being put into liquidation, a company quickly falls apart. Customers become worried and start looking for an alternative supplier, personnel goes looking for another job and suppliers demand goods back. In order to slow this disintegration, a receiver will usually prefer to keep a company ‘going’ for a little while longer. Often, suppliers and service providers whose services the receiver needs demand all kinds of guarantees before supplying goods or providing services again. It is only natural for these parties to be wary of sustaining further losses. However, when it comes to providing payment guarantees, a receiver’s options are often limited, as a result of which a company can only keep going for a short time after being put into liquidation. At the same time, the receiver will enter into negotiations with those parties that are interested in the company. The restart agreement will be entered into with the party that makes the best offer. The restarter will have to be a legal entity or natural person other than the party that went into liquidation. In the event of liquidation, the debts remain. The proceeds from the sale can be divided amongst the creditors according to the statutory order of priority.
It is a good thing that the restart as an instrument exists. One positive effect is that a lot of jobs can be retained and the loss to the customers is limited. From an economic point of view, it is good that the ‘earning capacity’ is not lost. However, the option of going into liquidation (and subsequent restart) should not be abused to prejudice personnel and creditors improperly. Therefore, extra care must be taken if a party linked to the liquidation wishes to restart the company.
Further information
For additional information please feel free to contact Peter de Graaf.
Undesired planning developments: what to do?
In a densely populated country like the Netherlands, where room is becoming more and more scarce, it is important that spatial development procedures are carefully followed. For interested parties, it is important to follow such procedures carefully as well, and to object against any undesired developments in time and in the correct manner.
By law, certain procedures require that, to that end, you submit an opinion on a draft plan before – after the relevant plan is adopted – the proceedings can be brought before the court on appeal. An example of this is the zoning plan procedure. If you have failed to submit an opinion on the draft plan, the appeal against the adopted plan will in principle be held inadmissible. In such case, the proceedings will be unsuccessful due to a failure to observe a procedural requirement (submitting an opinion) and the court will not even consider the substance of the appeal. An example of this is a decision of 8 June of this year of the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State (‘the Division’).
This case centred around the construction of a soil wall with a baffle board and water storage. In order to make the construction thereof possible from a planning point of view, the Provincial Council of Utrecht submitted a draft provincial zoning plan amendment for consideration. The procedure for a provincial zoning plan amendment is similar to that for a municipal zoning plan. The planning area of the provincial zoning plan amendment was situated within the territory of the municipality of Woerden. The municipal executive of the municipality of Woerden (‘the executive’) submitted an opinion on the draft provincial zoning plan amendment on behalf of the municipal council of the municipality of Woerden (‘the council’). However, on appeal, the council objected against the provincial zoning plan amendment on its own behalf. As the council had not submitted an opinion on the draft provincial zoning plan amendment (after all, the executive had done that on behalf of the council), the Division held the council’s appeal inadmissible. The substance of the appeal was never even considered!
This decision shows how important it is to object to undesired planning developments in the correct (procedural) manner, and in time. Even administrative bodies (in this case, the executive) make very costly procedural mistakes in this. Therefore, it is important that you acquire expert legal advice in time in order to be able to take the procedural ‘hurdles’ and have the court consider the substance of the case. Despite the fact that legal representation by a lawyer is not compulsory in administrative law, engaging a lawyer can prevent unpleasant surprises after the fact, and contribute to successful proceedings.
If you have any questions about this subject, you can contact Ben van Nieuwaal.
Foreign Nationals (Employment) Act
Fines imposed by the Social Affairs and Employment Inspectorate
Employing foreign nationals in the Netherlands often requires a permit, the so-called work permit for non-EU nationals. This is provided for in the Dutch Foreign Nationals (Employment) Act (Wet arbeid vreemdelingen – Wav). At present, the permit requirement does not apply to employees from other EU countries or employees from the countries that are members of the European Free Trade Association EFTA: Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Iceland. For employees from all other countries, a permit must be applied for before the employee is allowed to get to work in the Netherlands. If that permit has not been obtained, there is a major risk of an inspection by the Social Affairs and Employment Inspectorate (formerly named: Labour Inspectorate), and a fine report.
Inspection by the Social Affairs and Employment Inspectorate
If, upon inspection, the Social Affairs and Employment Inspectorate finds that there have been violations, it will impose heavy fines. Certain sectors are subject to more frequent illegal employment inspections; this include the hotel and catering industry, horticulture, inland waterway transport and sports associations (that operate on a national or international level). During these inspections, which take place unannounced, the Social Affairs and Employment Inspectorate regularly finds foreign employees who are employed without a work permit having been granted. In such case, a fine report is drawn up and a fine can be imposed without judicial intervention being required.
The definition of employer
Please note! Even if you are not the employer yourself, you be faced with fines. If employees are hired through a temporary employment agency and it is discovered that there is no work permit, both the employment agency and the recipient can get a fine. The same applies to contractors and subcontractors; if the subcontractor employs an employee without a work permit, the fine may be imposed on the main contractor as well.
The Council of State argues that the party that actually has the foreign national perform work is the employer obliged to apply for a permit and that this employer is always responsible and liable for the presence or absence of the required work permit. Whether there is an employment agreement is not relevant. The fact that work is performed on the instruction or for the benefit of the relevant employer is enough for that party to be considered the employer.
On 4 May 2010, the Council of State ruled that the publishers of the De Volkskrant, De Telegraaf, Trouw and Algemeen Dagblad newspapers could be considered to be the employers of those delivering the papers. De Volkskrant, Algemeen Dagblad and Trouw each owe the minister a € 224,400.00 fine. De Telegraaf owes a € 298,000.00 fine. These were imposed even though these publishers did not employ foreign nationals themselves. So why did they receive these heavy fines anyway?
In these proceedings, it was established that the publishers had contracted the distribution of the papers out to a distribution company, which, in turn, had contracted the work out to a network of distributors that subsequently went on to hire deliverers.
Still, the publishers were considered the actual employers within the meaning of the Wav, and the high fines were upheld. The Council of State stated:
It is unlikely that [the publisher] had insufficient influence on the organisation of the distribution activities to ensure that measures were taken to prevent the papers from being delivered by foreign nationals without a work permit.
It may be concluded that the Council of State’s interpretation of the definition of employer is very broad, and imposes a considerable duty of care on companies that contract out work. Those who contract out low-value work, are wise to perform a risk analysis. In fact, in the case of temporary employment agencies, a work permit is always required, regardless of the contract the personnel deployed has with the temporary employment agency.
No work permit? Fines
In principle, the fine to be imposed amounts to € 12,000.00 per foreign national or, if the client is a private individual, € 6,000.00 per foreign national. In the event of repeated violations, these amounts can be increased by a maximum of 50%.
These amounts quickly become substantial. In June 2005, the Labour Inspectorate (now known as the Social Affairs and Employment Inspectorate) visited a transport company, which resulted in 23 employees made available by temporary employment agencies being taken away, as these were foreign nationals who had no work permits. The Labour Inspectorate imposed a € 184,000.00 fine on the transport company for allowing foreign nationals who had no work permits to perform work in the Netherlands. It resulted in lengthy proceedings, and eventually, the case was taken all the way to the Council of State. The Council of State finally delivered its decision on 1 July 2009. The fine imposed was upheld.
This does not mean that there is no point in instituting proceedings. Quite the contrary, there have been several more favourable decisions as well.
Objection and appeal
Mistakes in the preparation of a decision to impose a fine are not uncommon. One example from case law involved a general partnership that received a fine because one of its partners was a foreign national for whom a work permit should have been acquired. However, given the nature of the general partnership, the court found that there was no employment relationship between the general partnership and the partner. This meant that there was no employment in violation of the Wav. Therefore, the decision to impose a fine was declared void.
The court will also declare decisions void if there is no relationship of authority between the foreign national and the person or company on whom/which the fine has been imposed.
People tend to disregard the fact that this is a punitive sanction. Sufficient care must be taken in imposing such sanctions, including in those situations in which the law seems to make imposing fines easy. If, for example, there has been much too little investigation into the relevant facts and circumstances, the court will have to declare the decision to impose a fine void. The inspection, the imposition of the fine itself, or the decision-making process involved in taking a decision on an appeal may show significant faults.
As the law is complicated, careless mistakes are not uncommon either. In fact, in a decision of the Council of State of 16 July 2008, an appeal was allowed on multiple grounds. It had not been proved that the appellant had violated the Wav, the decision to impose the fine on the appellant had not been substantiated and the law only allowed for fines to be imposed on legal entities or natural persons on an individual level. In other words, you can do something to avoid having to pay an administrative fine.
Further information
For additional information please feel free to contact Mieke Bestebreurtje.
Use of a contiguous site in violation of the zoning rules
Old buildings are increasingly getting a new function. An old school building becomes a restaurant in retro style, a dilapidated mansion revives as a hotel and an abandoned office building gets e and new life as a student complex.
Such a transformed building often still includes a disused piece of land. Years after a building has been given a new function, the need may arise to use the adjacent land. The old schoolyard could provide space for a summer terrace, the hotel wants a more spacious parking lot in the garden of the old mansion, the student complex could use some bicycle storage on an unused driveway.
Different planning rules may apply on the adjacent land, because the zoning plan assigns a different purpose to the land than to the building. In the past, a permit may also have been granted in favor of the transformation to deviate from the purpose of the building, but not of the adjacent land. Thus, unpleasant complications can arise.
Permit for conflicting use as a contiguous site
The opaque accumulation of rules and exceptions that we know as environmental law brings counsel if one knows where to look. The Environmental Law Decree, in the second appendix under the fourth article, gives a list of activities for which a permit may be given for activities that conflict with a zoning plan. The ninth section of that article mentions the use of land adjacent to a building in violation of the zoning rules applicable to that land.
The extensive procedure with the decision period of 6 months, which is the starting point for permits in activities in conflict with a zoning plan, does not have to be gone through in this case. The shorter, regular procedure is applicable, with a decision period of 8 weeks. This also means that if the application is not decided on in time, the requested permit is given by operation of law. In this way, the land near a building can be used for a purpose that deviates from the zoning plan, without having to undergo a rigid process of planning decisions.
Conditions for permit
This possibility of authorization has been curtailed within strict limits. The legislature and courts strictly enforce the requirement that the land for which the permit is sought is actually adjacent to a structure. This is how the owner of a piece of land, with a house, a garden and a garage on it, found himself. He applied for a permit to extend the garden to a strip of land behind the garage. This was rejected because the strip did not border directly on the house.
In addition, the change of use of the adjoining property must serve only the use of the structure to which the property adjoins. A terrace at the restaurant is sufficiently related to the function of the building and will be considered to serve the use for the restaurant destination. Similarly, parking spaces will be considered to serve the use of the hotel zoning and bicycle storage will also be embraced by the residential zoning.
But does the desired use serve, for example, to provide space for a new activity that the owner has added to his business, then the slower, more laborious path of the extensive procedure will have to be followed to obtain permission to deviate from the zoning rules.
So here too the inevitable ifs and buts apply. Nevertheless, the regulation deserves attention. Should you encounter complications because the desired expansion of a permitted activity in an adjacent building clashes with the zoning on the adjoining property, it is useful to consider whether an appeal can be made to this regulation.
This article was written by mr. D.C. van Genderen.
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Part-time layoffs and secondment as solution to energy crisis
Part-time layoffs and secondment as solution to energy crisis
Bankruptcies are slowly increasing again as a result of the energy crisis, high inflation and the cessation (and repayment) of government support measures. Retail, agrifood and business services are particularly hard hit. Entrepreneurs in these sectors should anticipate even worse business times. In that context, when part of the turnover is lost, two alternatives to a (final) reorganization can be considered, namely part-time dismissal and secondment.
Part-time layoff as a solution
The first option is to reduce the hours of your employees. This way you can reduce your personnel costs. Part-time dismissal can be done through the UWV or through a settlement agreement. You pay a partial transfer fee in exchange for a reduction in hours. For the reduction in hours, your employee will be entitled to unemployment benefits. If necessary, you can agree on a return guarantee to the old scope of work. For older employees in greenhouse horticulture, the seniority scheme is also an alternative. This arrangement allows an older employee to work 20% less while retaining 90% of the salary.
Secondment as a solution
Another solution is collegial secondment. This has been done a lot in recent years in the industry and certainly offers a solution for the coming winter. Record these arrangements well in a secondment agreement. A risk to secondment is that you as a hirer (in addition to the lender) are jointly and severally liable for payment of wages, income tax and sales tax for the hired employees. In addition, chain liability may follow for you if the lender as formal employer fails to pay wages. Other risks include transfer of undertaking, applicability of a different collective bargaining agreement and conditions of employment, incapacity for work or an industrial accident of the posted employee. Finally, all employers who provide workers for a fee have a duty to register with the Chamber of Commerce. If you fail to comply with this obligation, the Inspectorate SZW can impose a fine on you. This fine is as much as €8,000 for the first 10 loaned workers.
More information or advice about part-time dismissal or secondment?
Do you have questions about part-time dismissal or secondment? Please contact Richard Ouwerling, attorney at law at LVH Advocaten in Rotterdam for more information.
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In 2019 and 2020, we approached LVH Lawyers for advice on how to end the case in a careful and competent manner. This was resolved in a completely practical manner and within a very short period of time. He always had his full attention for my story. It was settled very neatly. The cooperation was perfect!
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