Real Estate2024-11-25T15:10:29+01:00

Rent and Real Estate

Investments in real estate and project development can generate good returns and are often also part of the provision for old age. The better you know how to arrange this “at the front end”, the more the intended goal will be achieved. LVH Lawyers advises on the purchase and sale of real estate, on commercial renting and leasing and on project development, and assists you in your relationship with other entrepreneurs and stakeholders, but also in your relationship with the government.

If you are dealing with a real estate transaction or project development that does not proceed as desired and expected, it is important to be well informed about your legal position in good time. Then you can make the right decisions. If a dispute does not lead to a solution, then your point of view must be put forward well and convincingly in court. That, too, is our profession.

In short: we can help you make responsible investments in real estate and optimise your returns.

More about Rent and Real Estate

Click further if you would like to learn more about how we can advise you on the following areas/topics:

SPECIALIZED LAWYERS

These are our lawyers who are specialized in this area.

Action on taxation in box 3

Action on taxation in box 3

As we all know, there has been a lot of recent movement on box 3 taxation. Box 3 primarily taxes savings, investments and real estate. The assets in this box were previously taxed on the basis of a flat rate of return: the tax authorities set an assumed percentage, regardless of the actual return.

This meant that many taxpayers paid taxes on a return they had not actually received. You may also have overpaid taxes in the past. If so, chances are you may be eligible for legal redress!

A quick look back at what happened

  • In 2017, the levy system was changed. Flat rate returns and a notional distribution of assets were introduced depending on the size of the assets.
  • In late 2021, however, the Supreme Court, in the so-called Christmas Judgments, ruled that this system was untenable. The assumptions on which the taxation was based turned out to be legally incorrect.
  • This led to a compensation scheme for those affected and the introduction of a new, more detailed system for box 3. This system serves as a temporary solution until a system is introduced in which the actual return is taxed.
  • In June of this year, the Supreme Court also ruled on this temporary scheme, stating that investors are still disproportionately taxed.
  • The current compensation round targets this group of taxpayers. It is up to them to prove that their actual return is lower than the calculated fixed return.

Whether you are eligible for the so-called restoration of rights depends on the actions you can still take (this year). In addition, restoration of rights is only possible if the actual return turns out to be lower than the fixed return. Our tax expert David Harreman can advise you and his clear approach ensures that you will soon know what you can do.

What this means for you per tax year

Tax year 2019

Only if your final assessment was not yet irrevocably established on December 20, 2021, and you submit a request for ex officio reduction before the end of 2024, you will be eligible for the rebuttal scheme in tax year 2019.

Tax year 2020

Only if your final assessment was not yet irrevocably established on December 20, 2021, and you submit a request for ex officio reduction before the end of 2025, you will qualify for the rebuttal scheme in tax year 2020.

As of tax year 2021 and beyond

The Tax Office has not yet determined the final assessments for 2021, therefore it is certain that you are eligible for the rebate scheme. A revised return can still be filed for this year(s), if the actual return turns out to be lower than the fixed return.

Why request an ex officio reduction

By submitting a request for ex officio reduction, you actually indicate to the Tax Authorities that you do not agree with the amount of the imposed assessment. You can submit this request no later than five years after the assessment was imposed. After five years revision is no longer possible. This means that the amount of the assessment is final. Even if you can prove that you have paid too much tax because the standard return was higher than the actual return. A missed opportunity.

Counter evidence scheme

The methodology as applied by the Supreme Court in recalculating the actual return is embraced by the State Secretary. This methodology will be laid down in legislation that is expected to be introduced in June 2025. From then on, this methodology can actually be used, and the rebuttal rule can be applied.

Do you want to make sure you do not miss out on your right to legal recovery for the years in which you may have overpaid taxes?

Then contact David Harreman or Maxime Visser for personal advice. They can help you take the right steps in time to ensure that you make optimal use of the compensation possibilities.

Prejudgment attachment: what is it and how does it work?

You may have seen the term “prejudgment attachment” pass by. In this article we will explain what prejudgment attachment is and how the process of prejudgment attachment works.

What is precautionary attachment?

The word “conservatory” is derived from the verb “conserve,” or preserve. When an attachment is made, goods or property are preserved until the court has made a final decision. A prejudgment attachment is usually used to prevent the other party from disposing of or mortgaging goods or property. There are various types of prejudgment attachment possible. Consider, for example, prejudgment attachment:

  • under third parties (such as bank seizures and wage garnishment);
  • under the debtor himself;
  • on an immovable property (such as seizure of a home);
  • on movable property (such as seizure of cars, boats, or trading stock);
  • on registered shares, and registered securities that are not shares;
  • On ships;
  • on aircraft.

To illustrate an example. Car company X has sold a car to Y. Subsequently, Y fails to pay the invoice of the car to X. Y can pay the invoice, but has no desire to pay the invoice. In that case, X could, for example, consider making a prejudgment attachment on the car or on Y’s bank account.

When may you have a prejudgment attachment imposed?

The process of garnishment works as follows. A lawyer files a petition with the preliminary relief judge of a district court. This petition is also called an ‘attachment petition’. The application for attachment indicates, among other things, what type of precautionary attachment is desired and what the underlying claim is.

The application for attachment is then summarily reviewed by the interim relief judge of a court. The judge in preliminary relief proceedings informs the lawyer whether or not to grant ‘leave’ (permission) for the attachment to be made.

If the judge grants leave, the lawyer receives a so-called ‘leave order’. As soon as the order for leave has been received, the bailiff can go ahead and impose a prejudgment attachment.

What happens after a prejudgment attachment has been levied?

After the precautionary seizure has been made by the bailiff, a ‘claim in the main action’ will often still have to be filed. This is a procedure before the court concerning the dispute on which the attachment is based. In most cases, the claim in the main action is instituted by issuing a writ of summons. It is also possible that the precautionary seizure is made during ongoing proceedings. In that case, it is not necessary to institute a new ‘claim in the main action’.

Would you like to know more about prejudgment attachment?

Would you like to assess whether a prejudgment attachment can be levied on the assets of your counterparty, or has a prejudgment been levied on you yourself, and would you like advice on this? Then you have come to the right place. Please feel free to contact us. Gentia Niesert, procedural law attorney at LVH Advocaten in Rotterdam, will be happy to help you.

Request for debt restructuring and Corona: the tax collector thinks along

Request for debt restructuring and Corona: the tax collector thinks along

Requests for restructuring of tax debt

Until further notice, the Tax Authorities will approach requests for restructuring of tax debts with a flexible attitude. This applies in particular to requests from entrepreneurs whose businesses are fundamentally sound and who have been affected by the Corona crisis. For these entrepreneurs, the generous corona deferral policy may prove to be of no avail. But other entrepreneurs are also eligible for the more flexible approach. The flexible approach applies to all tax debts.

What does the flexible approach entail?

An important condition for the restructuring of tax debts is the existence of a viable enterprise. Whether this is the case must be assessed by an external party deemed suitable. This party should be the bank, an auditor or a restructuring expert. The assessment will include a forecast of the capacity to meet the costs of running the business, (re-)financing the business and the company’s remuneration. In addition, the forecast must show that the costs incurred during the reorganisation can also be paid. In some cases, the recipient may investigate the viability on his own initiative.

Entrepreneur cannot pay the tax debt

In addition to the fact that a viable enterprise must be present, it must also be shown that the entrepreneur is not or not fully able to pay the tax debts. Not even with the help of the generous deferral scheme in connection with the corona crisis. It should be noted, however, that the tax debt for which the restructuring is requested may not have arisen as a result of serious culpable acts or omissions on the part of the entrepreneur.

What is a debt restructuring proposal?

There is a reorganisation proposal. This means that unsecured creditors must also agree to the restructuring of the debts to those creditors. Only when that condition is met and the offer to the recipient is substantial and at least double the percentage offered to the unsecured creditors, can one speak of reorganisation of the debts.

How can the reorganisation be requested?

A request for debt restructuring can be submitted to the tax authorities using a prescribed form. A request will only be processed if it is actually complete. If the request is not complete, the tax collector will give the applicant 90 days to complete or rectify it.

What does a request for remediation comprise?

A complete request for restructuring includes, in addition to the prescribed form, a positive external assessment of the viability, an agreement from all creditors, a motivated statement from the entrepreneur about the cause of the financial problems and a liquidity forecast for the next 24 months. If the entrepreneur is also included in the COVID-19 deferment scheme and the associated payment scheme, the forecast must show that this payment scheme will also lead to the full payment of the tax debts.

When will a request for restructuring be granted?

A complete request will be assessed by the recipient, whereby the recipient may also examine the viability of the enterprise. If all conditions are met, the recipient will grant the application. The tax collector will reject the request if there is evidence of bad faith on the part of the taxpayer. In addition, the tax collector will reject the request if during the application no new obligations have arisen, the required declarations have not been submitted, there are multiple taxpayers, the taxpayer has been granted a moratorium on payments or is in a state of bankruptcy, and/or the Dutch Natural Persons Debt Rescheduling Act (WSNP) applies to the taxpayer.

In addition to a request for restructuring for a company that is being continued, the tax collector can also process a request for restructuring if there is a desire to terminate the company.

Granting the request for reorganisation

If the request meets the conditions and the recipient agrees with the request, the recipient will grant the reorganisation by means of a decision. This decision includes the condition that the reorganisation amount must be paid in one lump sum. In addition, in specific cases, it is possible to request a payment scheme in which the agreed amount is paid in 12 equal monthly instalments.

When can the decision be revoked?

The decision to grant remission is a conditional decision and can be revoked if it appears that the entrepreneur provided incorrect information which he knew or should have known was incorrect, if the entrepreneur is declared bankrupt, is granted a suspension of payments or is admitted to the WSNP. In addition, the decision can also be withdrawn on the basis of other conduct on the part of the taxpayer. For example, not meeting the tax obligations and not complying with the payment scheme for the agreed amount.

The tax collector can, however, give the entrepreneur the opportunity to rectify the shortcomings within a certain period of time.

In the end, a nice arrangement has been made whereby the recipient has the motto: in case of doubt, grant. Although collecting in case of doubt is not always the most sensible thing to do, at times it may be really necessary to try and avoid bigger problems.

Need advice from a lawyer in Rotterdam?

Do you have any questions about the collection rules regarding the tax debt arising from the corona postponement? Then please contact our lawyers Rob Steenhoek and David Harreman.

Sick employees; Reintegration second track in SMEs

Suppose your employee has been sick for almost a year. He holds a defining position within your company. You therefore want to appoint a replacement, because it looks like the sick employee will not be able to return to his original position. Is this allowed?

If it were up to the legislature, yes, but not at this time.

Bill on reintegration obligation second year of illness

A bill is pending, which offers small and medium-sized employers the possibility to fully focus on reintegration in the second track, i.e. reintegration with another employer, from the start of the second year of illness (no earlier and no later). Under conditions, second-track reintegration may be closed.

Completion of the reintegration first track

Closing the first track with the current employer is possible if the employee agrees. The consent by the employee is entirely voluntary, must be in writing, the employee must be demonstrably informed (in writing) of the two-week reflection period, and the employee is free to attach any additional conditions to the consent.

UWV permission?

If the employer and the employee have not reached a joint agreement on the closure of the first track and the employer still wants to close the first track, he must ask the UWV for permission.

After the conclusion of the first track and after the end of the notice period, the employer can ask the UWV for permission to terminate the employment contract, regardless of whether the employee is sick or better.

Advisory Council for the Judiciary

Earlier this year, the Council for the Judiciary advised on this bill, stating that it does not provide relief from the (long) obligation to continue paying wages, which is perceived as burdensome by SMEs. Furthermore, the necessity of the proposal is questioned. In the current situation, the employer can have the job temporarily filled by a temporary worker or a seconded employee. A fixed-term employment contract, for the duration of the employee’s illness, can also be entered into.

Moreover, the Council does not expect this bill to lead to more indefinite contracts. Caution remains necessary in this regard, given the duration of two years of wage payment.

Finally, according to the Council, the new ground for termination adds little to the current system of dismissal, where after two years of illness, parting can be done anyway through a vso or through the UWV.

Therefore, it remains to be seen whether the new administration will pass this bill and send it to the EK. If so, you as a small employer will have faster clarity in the reintegration process.

Questions about reintegration sick employee?

Do you have questions about the reintegration of a sick employee? Or are you curious about the status of this bill. Please contact Richard Ouwerling.

Testing an employee for alcohol or drugs: allowed or not?

The AVG states that testing employees for substance use is not allowed. According to the Personal Data Authority, it is only permissible to have employees undergo alcohol and/or drug testing if there is a legal basis for doing so.

Consent for alcohol or drug test

For now, the permission is there only for certain professions in the Shipping Act, the Railways Act, the Local Railways Act, and the Aviation Act. Consider, for example, checks on pilots and train drivers. They may be required to take a breathalyzer test because they are responsible for a large group of passengers during their work.

On May 10, 2022, the Minister of SZW announced in a letter that the Working Conditions Act will be amended to allow testing. The amendment to the law will first give companies covered by the Major Accident Hazards Decree (Brzo companies) these testing options. This involves about 400 companies where testing for specific functions will soon be required. To be allowed to test, an employer must have a proper alcohol, drug and medication (ADM) policy (tool). This bill is still in the pipeline and it is unclear, given the outgoing administration, whether this will become new legislation.

Alcohol or drug test to prevent workplace accidents

Many companies, where the risk of workplace accidents is high, do test their employees for alcohol or drugs according to their regulations. So that is formally against the law, but according to these companies (mostly rightly) privacy is secondary to safety. These employers invoke their right of instruction (art. 7: 660 BW). This is limited by good employment practice. If the employer’s regulations interfere too far with the right to privacy, the result may be that these regulations do not stand.

There is not much case law on this point. Based on a Supreme Court ruling, among other things, it seems that taking alcohol and drug tests at work is permitted, provided strict conditions are met (necessity, proportionality, subsidiarity).

Employer’s duty of care

An employer may argue that, given the nature of the business activity, it has a far-reaching duty of care (necessity), so the right to privacy must give way somewhat (proportionality). Furthermore, the employer could argue that a breathalyzer test in the case of suspected alcohol is much less invasive than a blood test, thus meeting the requirement of subsidiarity. Employers can lay down these rules in a so-called ADM policy. The Works Council has a right of consent. Should an employee argue in any case that the ADM policy and/or the test were not permissible, even then, in labor cases, the evidence can almost always be used. Excluding illegally obtained evidence is not common.

Conclusion

If you have any questions on this topic, please contact Richard Ouwerling, an attorney specializing in employment law.

Breakthrough; corporate tax interest is unreasonably high, here’s what you can do.

Breakthrough; corporate tax interest is unreasonably high, here’s what you can do.

On 7 November 2024, the North Netherlands Court ruled that a tax interest rate of 8 per cent on a 2021 assessment is not reasonable. This landmark ruling opens up new opportunities for taxpayers who have faced high corporate tax interest rates. What does this ruling mean specifically for you, and what steps can you take now?

What is tax interest?

Tax interest is charged by the Tax Authorities when there is a delay in imposing a tax assessment. It is designed to encourage taxpayers to file their returns on time and prevent the Tax Administration from inadvertently acting as a savings account.

Interest is calculated from 1 July according to the year for which tax is due. Since 2022, tax interest has been set at 8 per cent for corporate income tax, and in 2024 it has even increased to 10 per cent. This high rate is based on the statutory commercial interest rate, but the court has now ruled that this link is not tenable.

Why is the tax rate too high?

The court has ruled that the 8 per cent rate violates the principle of proportionality. The principle of proportionality holds the measures taken by the government must be in reasonable proportion to the aim the government is pursuing with that measure. The aim of the measure is for taxpayers to file their tax returns. And so now the court has decided that the application of an 8 per cent tax interest rate leads to unnecessary adverse effects on taxpayers.

The court’s main considerations for this were:

Trade interest is not comparable: Tax interest is linked to trade interest, but taxation is not a business transaction between private parties. As a result, this comparison is not justified.

Unequal treatment: Tax interest is higher than that applicable to other taxes, such as income tax, for no good reason.

Default interest is different: Tax interest should not be compared to default interest, which is charged if an assessment is not paid on time. Instead, tax interest refers to situations where a final assessment has not yet been imposed.

Reduction to 4 per cent

The court ruled that tax interest in this case should be reduced to 4 per cent. This rate corresponds to the tax interest rate applicable to other taxes, such as income tax, until July 2023. This ensures fairer treatment of taxpayers.

Opportunities for action

Have you been charged tax interest? If so, you may be able to do the following:

Final or additional tax assessment

File an objection within six weeks of receiving the final or additional tax assessment imposed after 2022 if you believe the tax interest charged is unreasonable.

Provisional assessment

If tax interest has been calculated on a provisional assessment, you can file a request to review the interest within six weeks of the final assessment. Therefore, if tax interest has been charged on the provisional assessment, in addition to objecting to the final assessment, a request for review for tax interest on the provisional assessment must also be filed.

How to avoid tax interest?

To avoid incurring high tax interest in the future, you can do the following:

File a tax return on time: If your tax return is filed on time and the assessment is determined without amendments, no tax interest will be charged.

Apply for a provisional assessment: By applying for a provisional assessment in advance and making an accurate estimate of your taxable profit, you will avoid paying interest on an unexpectedly high tax assessment afterwards.

Check your estimates: Make sure your provisional assessment matches the final assessment. This will avoid unnecessary costs.

Need help?

Do you have questions about the implications of this ruling or would you like advice on how to limit tax interest? Please contact our tax advisor David Harreman. He will be happy to help you arrange your tax affairs efficiently and avoid unnecessary costs.

Employee termination: ‘We are going to quit’, clear and unambiguous?

Employee termination: ‘We are going to quit’, clear and unambiguous?

It is more common than thought: an employee terminating their job in an emotional state. This termination may obviously be due to a conflict or discussion at work (e.g. about reintegration). It may also be that the employee feels pressured by his employer to quit.

Often, the employee only realises afterwards that he is then not entitled to WW benefits. The employee changes his mind and wants to go back on the termination.

Employee termination: clear and unambiguous

Any employee can terminate his employment contract. This can be done verbally or in writing. In a conversation, an employee makes a remark like “I’m not coming back here” or “I’m quitting”. This can therefore also be seen as a formal termination of the employment contract under circumstances.
However, there must be a clear and unambiguous statement by the employee, aimed at termination. This requirement does not apply to the employer in case it has given notice.

The employee is bound by the notice unless there is a lack of will, such as threat, fraud or abuse of circumstances. The employee must invoke this within two months. If he fails to do so, the termination is fixed.

The employer certainly has a duty to investigate in case of verbal or emotional termination. The extent of this duty to investigate depends on various circumstances.

We are going to quit is not a direct termination of employment contract

A good example of a termination that was not seen as clear and unambiguous is that of a head coach of FC Volendam. Here, the arbitration tribunal ruled that the media statement “We are quitting” did not constitute a clear and unambiguous termination will.

The Arbitration Committee (and also the North Holland District Court) considered – with reference to Supreme Court case law – that an employer may not quickly assume that an employee has given notice of termination given the far-reaching consequences of voluntary termination (no entitlement to benefits and transition compensation). Furthermore, the key issue is whether, given the circumstances, the other party was reasonably entitled to construe the statement as a termination. In the present situation, there was reason for the employer – if it believed there was a termination – to investigate whether the employee had intended a termination. After all, the statement was addressed to the media. The employer’s press secretary was only in the cc. Also, the content of the statement “We are going to quit” is not a direct termination. After all, this could also mean that the employee would quit at FC Volendam in the future.

Notice period and interim termination?

The employee must observe a notice period, except when terminating during the probationary period or for an urgent reason.

A fixed-term employment contract can only be terminated prematurely if this has been agreed in writing. The employee who terminates without a notice period is liable for damages over the non-observed notice period.

Termination during illness?

If an employee terminates while sick, this may constitute an act of prejudice towards the UWV. The employee is then not entitled to ZW.

Conclusion

  • The employer should ensure that an employee understands that he may lose his right to ZW benefit, WW benefit and the transition allowance.
  • Give a reflection period to the employee who terminates in an emotional state.
  • Confirm the termination in writing. Address the circumstances of the case and state that you have made the employee aware of the consequences.
  • If in doubt, seek legal advice immediately.

Want more information on employee termination? Contact Richard Ouwerling. He is an employment law lawyer at LVH Advocaten in Rotterdam and deals with the termination of employment contracts.

Preliminary questions Supreme Court: Rent price change clause

On November 29, 2024, the Supreme Court gave a preliminary ruling on a rent modification clause in rental agreements with consumers. The Supreme Court answered the question of whether in the liberalized rental sector a rent modification clause with a surcharge of up to 3% (storage clause) in addition to an indexation clause is unfair. First, it is important to distinguish between the indexation clause and the storage clause. In principle, both the indexation clause under consumer price index and a storage clause with a maximum percentage of 3% are not unfair. The preliminary ruling is detailed below.

The facts

Underlying the Supreme Court’s preliminary ruling are two cases. These are between ASR as landlord and two different tenants who have fallen into rent arrears. The leases stipulate the following with respect to rent adjustment:

“10.2 The provisions of Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of this Lease and Article 18 of the General Provisions forming part of this Lease shall not apply. Instead, the parties agree as follows:

  1. The last applicable rent may be adjusted by Landlord for the first time as of July 1, 2016 and annually thereafter. Such adjustment shall be made by applying the monthly index figure according to the Consumer Price Index (CPI), all households series (2006 = 100), published by Statistics Netherlands (CBS). It is checked how the index figure for the calendar month that is four calendar months prior to the calendar month in which the rent is adjusted relates to the index figure for the calendar month that is sixteen months prior to the calendar month in which the rent is adjusted. That ratio shall be expressed as a percentage. The rent payable on the modification date shall be modified by that indexation percentage plus an additional surcharge to be determined by the lessor of up to 3% over the last applicable rent.
  2. If application of the provisions of this article under 1 cannot result in a rent adjustment of a maximum of 3%, the last applicable rent may nevertheless be increased by the lessor by a maximum of 3%, until, in the event of a subsequent indexation, the index figure of the calendar month lying four calendar months before the calendar month in which the rent is adjusted. That ratio shall be expressed as a percentage. The rent due on the modification date shall be modified by that percentage of indexation plus an additional increment to be determined by Landlord of up to 3% over the last applicable rent. (…)”

The question in both cases is whether there is an unfair term within the meaning of Directive 93/13. If it is, the provision must be annulled. In other words, then the provision is not valid.

As a result of these two cases and because there are questions about the scope and consequences of the annulment of such a clause, the subdistrict court submitted preliminary questions to the Supreme Court.

The preliminary questions

In summary, the Subdistrict Court submitted the following four questions to the Supreme Court:

1 A. Is the storage clause unfair?
1 B. Are the storage clause and the indexation clause separately reviewable clauses?
2. What are the consequences of disapplying an unfair clause?
3. What should and may a court do on its own motion if the rent modification clause is found to be unfair?

The Supreme Court’s answers

Answer to question 1B
First, the Supreme Court addresses question 1B. That question raises the issue of whether, for the purpose of assessing its unfairness, what is provided in Article 10.2 of the lease agreement about storage (‘the storage clause‘) is separate from what the same provision contains about indexation (‘the indexation clause‘). The Supreme Court held that the unfairness of the storage clause can and should be tested separately.

The indexation clause and a storage clause have different purposes. The purpose of an indexation clause is to compensate for monetary depreciation. As a rule, the purpose of a storage clause is to compensate the landlord for cost increases in excess of inflation and to keep the rent in line with changes in the value of the property.

Response to Question 1A
Question 1A raises the issue of whether a storage clause that requires the tenant to pay an annual surcharge on the rent of up to 3% over and above the indexation according to the consumer price index is unfair within the meaning of Directive 93/13. The Supreme Court rules that such a storage clause is not unfair.

The Supreme Court does note that when assessing the unfairness of a clause in a contract, all the circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the contract must be taken into account. The cumulative effect of all the terms in the contract in question must also be considered. In other words, when assessing the storage clause, consideration must also be given to what effect it has in combination with (inter alia) the indexation clause.

The storage clause is not unfair because its financial consequences are foreseeable for a tenant at the time the lease is concluded and the annual rent increase with a maximum percentage is usually within acceptable limits.

The Supreme Court also ties in with recent legislation:

“3.2.9 Dutch legislation for the liberalized rental sector is based on the premise that the landlord has a legitimate interest in changing the rent annually. The Maximum Rent Increases for Liberalized Rental Agreements Act (Wet maximering huurprijsverhogingen geliberaliseerde huurovereenkomsten), which came into force on May 1, 2021, and the Affordable Rent Act (Wet betaalbare huur), which came into force on July 1, 2024, assume the existence and permissibility of a rent modification clause. The Maximum Rent Increases Act and the Affordable Rents Act compulsorily regulate the maximum rent increase allowed annually, with a maximum percentage prescribed for surcharges on top of the rent indexation. Section 7:248 (3) of the Civil Code provides for leases of living space in the liberalized sector that to the extent that application of a rent modification clause leads to a more far-reaching increase in the rent than permitted by law, the clause is null and void to that extent and the rent is then deemed to have been increased by the maximum permitted increase.”

Answer to Question 2
Question 2 raises the issue of the consequences of disapplying an unfair term.

The Supreme Court rules that when a storage clause is found to be unfair, the clause must be disapplied. The tenant must be put in the situation he would have been in without that clause. Thus, a rent increase based on a storage clause that is found to be unfair is not possible. Not for the past nor for the future. Any rent increase a tenant has paid on the basis of an unfair storage clause is undue payment within the meaning of Article 6:203 of the Dutch Civil Code (undue payment), so the tenant can claim repayment thereof.

Answer to question 3
Question 3 raises the question of what the court may and must do ex officio if a storage clause is found to be unfair.

The Supreme Court ruled that when a landlord claims rent arrears, the court must ex officio deduct rent increases based on an unfair clause. The court may not ex officio set off a tenant’s rent debt against a tenant’s claim for undue payment in respect of past rent increases paid under the unfair storage clause. Indeed, setoff must be invoked.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court ruled that in the case of a rent adjustment clause, a distinction must first be made between a storage clause and an indexation clause. However, when testing the unfairness of the storage clause, the cumulative effect with the indexation clause must be considered. A consumer price indexation clause and a storage clause with a maximum percentage of 3% are, in principle, not unfair. Should a storage clause be unfair, it should be disapplied. The tenant can then claim repayment of the rent overpaid under the storage clause or invoke set-off.

Are you a landlord and would you like to know the consequences of this preliminary ruling on your real estate portfolio or would you like to have a provision in the lease reviewed or amended? If so, please contact LVH Lawyers.

Change to box 3 levy on income from savings and investments

Change to box 3 levy on income from savings and investments

Change to box 3 levy as of 2022

On December 24, 2021, the Dutch Supreme Court issued a ruling that may have consequences for you as a taxpayer. In this ruling, the Supreme Court decided that the box 3 levy on income from savings and investments is in conflict with the European Convention on Human Rights. This article discusses the judgment and the consequences it may have for you.

How does the box 3 levy work?

Since 2017, box 3 has a flat-rate system. With this system, the legislator aims to match the returns achieved on average by taxpayers in previous years. With the flat rate, an average is taken that applies to all taxpayers. It is assumed that part of the assets consists of investments and part of the assets consists of savings. The part that is assumed to consist of investments is assumed to yield a higher return than the part that consists of savings. Because the balance between savings and investments can differ in reality from the average taken, the calculated in reality can differ from the actual return achieved.

Lump-sum system in violation of European property law and the prohibition on discrimination

In this judgment the Supreme Court ruled that the fixed sum system of box 3 is in conflict with the European law on property and the prohibition on discrimination. According to the Supreme Court, there is no reasonable relationship between the interests that the legislator wanted to serve with the system and the inequality caused by the system.

Difference between actual return and taxed return lump sum system

This case involved the interested party and his wife with assets of approximately EUR 1 million. Eighty percent of these assets consisted of savings. The flat-rate system ensures that interested parties are taxed on a higher return than was actually achieved. The Supreme Court ruled here that this is not allowed. For this reason, the actual return is included in the tax for interested parties.

What does the change in the box 3 levy mean for you as a taxpayer?

If your actual return is lower than the fixed return, the judgment may have consequences for you as a taxpayer. You can object to the income tax assessment. You can do so once you have received the final assessment. Please note: you have 6 weeks from the date of the final assessment to file an objection. Your objection may be designated as a mass objection. If this is the case for 2017 and 2018, you can invoke the Supreme Court ruling. The tax in box 3 can then be recalculated based on the actual return. This can ensure that you pay less tax.

Until when is an action against the income tax assessment possible?

If the period for objection has expired, you could request an ex officio reduction of the assessment. However, the Minister has imposed conditions on the possibility of granting an automatic reduction. For example, an automatic reduction is no longer possible if 5 years have passed since the end of the calendar year to which the relevant assessment relates.

Objection box 3 levy for 2020 and 2021

For the 2020 and 2021 tax returns, it is also important to register for the mass objection (if the actual return is lower than the fixed return). The tax authorities have yet to decide what they will do with the ruling. In principle, the ruling only affects taxpayers who participate in the mass objection, which is why it is necessary to register for the mass objection.

Looking for a tax lawyer in Rotterdam?

Would you like to know more about the steps you can take against the assessment in box 3 and what the Supreme Court ruling will mean for the fixed box 3 levy? Please contact our tax lawyer David Harreman.

End of an addicted employee’s employment contract?

Abuse of alcohol or drugs can lead to major problems in the workplace. Think of unsafe situations, dysfunction and regular and/or long-term disability. The employer sometimes wants to unilaterally terminate the employment contract in such a situation. What are the possibilities.

Dissolution by the subdistrict court?

Of course, whether dissolution is possible depends on the circumstances of the case.

If addiction is an issue, it is often assumed on medical evidence that the employee is incapacitated. The employer then runs up against the ban on notice (during illness). Since the introduction of the WWZ, the subdistrict court tests whether the reasons for termination are related to the ban on notice. If there is the slightest connection to this prohibition on notice, a request for dissolution (for example, on the grounds of primarily culpable conduct and, in the alternative, a disrupted working relationship) will fail.

However, when an employee fails to fulfill his reintegration obligations without good reason, the prohibition on notice can be set aside. This can of course consist of not cooperating with a plan of action or not following the instructions of the occupational health physician. If the employee seeks treatment for his addiction or terminates his treatment (without good reason) prematurely, this also qualifies as a violation of these reintegration obligations.
If, for example, the (rehab) clinic would argue that the treatment is no longer of any use because the employee keeps relapsing into his addiction, then dissolution could also be considered.

Instant dismissal as an alternative?

Drunkenness or other debauched behavior (drug use) can also be an urgent reason for summary dismissal. If the behavior is serious enough, weighed against the personal circumstances of employer and employee, in the majority of cases the summary dismissal will stand. The employer does not face a notice prohibition when summary dismissal occurs.

However, often the transitional compensation must still be paid.
On the one hand, it is established case law of the Supreme Court that no culpability is required for the acceptance of a summary dismissal. In case of addiction, often no culpability will be assumed, but this therefore does not affect the urgent reason. On the other hand, there is always a silver lining. If there is no serious culpability (i.e. in the case of addiction), the employee retains his entitlement to the transitional compensation.

Thus, a summary dismissal followed by the offer of a settlement agreement containing the transitional compensation can be a good alternative to a complex and unlikely dissolution procedure (with appeal).

More information?

Are you dealing with an addicted employee and would you like to know more about reintegration, dismissal or a legally valid ADM policy? Then take part in LVH Advocaten’s latest labor law meeting on October 26. Other current labor law developments will also be discussed.

How does rent protection work for tenants of medium business space when terminating the lease?

How does rent protection work for tenants of medium business space when terminating the lease?

There are two different lease regimes for the lease of business space: lease for medium business space, such as stores and catering establishments (7:290 business space) and other business space (7:230a business space). This article discusses rent protection for tenants of middle business space, such as stores, catering and crafts (7:290 business space) . The rules that apply here assume a broad degree of protection for the tenant. This is because it is important for the tenant to be able to build up a business and generate income and goodwill. Rental protection is expressed in particular in the fixed lease terms, the limited termination options for the landlord, the system of rent adjustment and the right of substitution. This article specifically discusses the rent protection a tenant has when the landlord wants to terminate the lease for medium-sized business premises.

When may a lease be terminated?

A lease for medium business premises may only be terminated by the end of a specified lease term. The term regulation applies to such leases. The starting point is an initial lease term of five years. If the lease is not terminated, it is extended by five years. Notice of termination of the lease for a medium-sized business premises can only be given at the end of the lease term, for example, after the first five years.

From ten years, continuation is indefinite, unless a different duration is agreed upon in the lease. If the lease runs indefinitely, it can be terminated by any date.

How should a lease for medium business space be terminated by the landlord?

If a landlord wants to terminate the lease, he must send a registered letter or have a bailiff’s writ served. This way, the landlord can prove that the tenant has received the termination letter. The notice period for the landlord is always at least one year. If a shorter notice period is agreed upon in the lease, it is not valid. For a landlord, however, a longer notice period may be agreed upon, for example one and a half years or two years. For the tenant, a shorter notice period may be agreed upon, for example six months.

Example:

Thus, if a lease runs from April 1, 2020 to March 31, 2025, the landlord must ensure that the termination letter reaches the tenant before March 31, 2024.

The landlord must also state the grounds for termination in the termination letter. If there are no grounds for termination in the landlord’s termination letter to the tenant, the lease termination is not valid.

What are the grounds for termination in medium-sized business premises?

A lessor can only terminate the lease if one or more of the grounds for termination listed exhaustively in the law are present. For a medium-sized business premises lease with a duration of ten years or more, a landlord has more grounds for termination at his disposal than for a five-year lease.

Grounds for termination of lease agreement first five years:

  • the tenant’s business conduct is not as befits a good tenant; and/or
  • the landlord wants to personally take the leased property into permanent use and urgently needs the leased property for that purpose (“urgent own use”).

Additional grounds for termination after 10 years:

  • the tenant does not agree to a reasonable offer to enter into a new lease;
  • the landlord intends, pursuant to a current zoning plan, to achieve a zoning on the leased property; and
  • the landlord’s interests in terminating the lease outweigh the tenant’s interests in continuing the lease (“balancing of interests”).

What are the consequences of the landlord’s termination of the lease for medium business space?

If the landlord has terminated the lease, the lease will only end if the tenant has given notice of consent to the termination within six weeks. If no (consenting) notice is received from the tenant within six weeks, the landlord may ask the court to fix the termination date of the lease. In such proceedings, the landlord may only invoke the grounds for termination stated in the termination letter.

Is the tenant entitled to compensation for terminating the lease?

In four cases, the tenant may be entitled to compensation upon termination of the lease of a medium business space. These are:

  • an allowance for moving and furnishing expenses;
  • an allowance for goodwill;
  • demolition of the leased property for the public interest; and
  • rescission due to realization of zoning plan.

If the parties do not agree between themselves, they can go to court for this.

When temporarily leasing medium business space, a tenant has no rent protection

Importantly, when the tenant and landlord of medium-sized business premises enter into a lease for the duration of two years or less, there is no rent protection for the tenant. The idea is that parties are free to do what they agree for a certain duration. The tenant and landlord of medium-sized business premises may, in the case of a lease for two years or less, choose how the agreement ends. This can be done, for example, by giving notice, by the occurrence of a resolutive condition or by operation of law after the expiration of the agreed contract term. When the landlord terminates a temporary lease, the landlord is not bound by the legal grounds for termination. Nor does the temporary lease for medium-sized business premises end only after the court is called in to determine the end date (if the tenant does not agree to the termination). Thus, a tenant of a middle business space with a temporary lease has no rent protection.

Lease term of two years or less must be expressly stated in the lease for medium business space

A tenant of medium-sized business premises is not entitled to rent protection if the lease expressly states that it is a temporary lease (pursuant to Section 7:301 of the Dutch Civil Code). In practice, this does not always go well. For example, a five-year lease with an interim termination option after two years does not always prevent the tenant from claiming rent protection. It must also be explicitly stated that the first two years are intended to be a temporary lease for the duration of two years. If it is not explicitly stated that there is a temporary lease, the tenant of medium business premises does have rent protection.

Suspension of employee; when and for how long?

Suspension of employee; when and for how long?

Today, the summary proceedings in which Tom Egbers is demanding the lifting of his suspension by NOS after a year take place. The questions that come into play here are: when can you suspend an employee and isn’t a year of suspension far too long?

Suspension and non-action; the difference

A suspension also prohibits the employee from performing his work. The term suspended, unlike suspension, is used in a situation where there is no culpable action by the employee. However, in case law, the term suspended has effectively the same meaning as a suspension and the same employment-law consequences.

Nature of the measure of suspension

There are two types of suspension. As an order measure or sanction measure.

As an order measure to restore calm in the workplace. The employer must have compelling interests against which the employee’s interests are outweighed.
Another order measure may be that the employer wants to terminate the employment contract and suspends the employee in anticipation of this. It could also be that the employer wants to terminate the employment contract after an investigation and therefore maintains the suspension. Wanting to terminate the employment contract is in itself insufficient for (maintaining) suspension. There must be additional circumstances. The employer must have a good weighty reason for this, e.g. that the employee’s presence has negative consequences for business operations (loss of customers, major damage, justified fear of unrest on the shop floor, fear of frustration investigation).

As an employer, you can also impose a suspension as a punishment. You must then communicate this to the employee immediately (and put it in writing). Again, reasonable and sufficiently serious grounds are required, which outweigh the employee’s overriding interest in continuing to perform his work. After all, a suspension is always diffuse in nature.

Good employment practices

According to established case law, the employer must behave as a ‘good employer’ when suspending or suspending an employee. This means that it would be wise to:

  • weigh up all the circumstances of the case and the interests at stake and describe them in the letter setting out the suspension (or suspension from duty);
  •  indicate that a less severe remedy, such as an official warning or final written warning, will not suffice;
  • give an estimate of how long the suspension will last;
  • finally, indicate that salary and holiday pay will be paid as long as the suspension continues.

Communication of reason for suspension

The reason must be communicated to the employee immediately. Suspending an employee without giving reasons is unlawful (Amsterdam Court of Appeal 8 March 1974, NJ 1974, 487). By clearly communicating the reason by the employer to the employee, the employee may be able to prove the falsity of the reason or it may appear that the reason given would not be reasonable.

Substantive review

As a basic principle, a ‘good employer’ may only deny an employee the opportunity to perform the agreed work if the employer has reasonable grounds for doing so. Those grounds must be sufficiently serious, given the employee’s, in principle, substantial interest in continuing to perform the stipulated work. This balancing of interests is not tested marginally by the court, as the following standard suspension ruling shows.

A judge will therefore test a suspension on all the circumstances of the concrete case, such as:

  • the seriousness of the employee’s conduct;
  • whether the employer can be required to allow the employee to return to work;
  • the duration of the employment relationship;
  • the employee’s position.

Claim for reinstatement

A suspended employee can therefore try to force reinstatement in summary proceedings. The following test applies to a claim for reinstatement:

  • First, the weighty interest in suspension must again be made plausible (see above);
  • Next, it must be assessed whether granting the reinstatement claim would not lead to an untenable situation in the workplace.

Interim relief judges apply the principle of reinstatement, unless it is plausible that this will lead to an unworkable situation, which is detrimental to the employer’s business.
If the suspension lasts too long, this may be grounds for the court to order the employer to lift the measure. Earlier, the ast Brabant District ECourt ruled that a suspension of more than five months by the UWV, without further measures, was too long. It is therefore also certainly not inconceivable that Tom Egbers will be proved right in the summary proceedings he filed.

Please note that an applicable collective agreement may explicitly specify the circumstances under which an employer can impose a suspension. In addition, the collective agreement may state whether or not the employer is liable to pay wages in the event of suspension as a disciplinary sanction. Incidentally, the basic principle is that the employer must continue to pay wages in the event of a suspension. An exception may be if the suspension falls entirely within the employee’s sphere of risk, for example if he has been taken into (provisional) custody.

Conclusion on suspension

Suspension should not be taken lightly. There are so many legal hooks and eyes to a suspension, that it is wise to seek legal help when you want to suspend or suspend someone. After all, suspending an employee unfairly or for too long can lead to an employment conflict and possibly entitle you to fair compensation.

If you have any questions about suspension or non-action, please contact Richard Ouwerling of LVH Advocaten.

Is interest on a rental debt also a debt of the estate?

On 24 December 2021, the Supreme Court ruled on the question of whether statutory or contractual default interest on rent owed as an estate debt is an estate debt. The judgment is of great importance for practice, because in most corporate insolvencies there is a lease running on the business premises on the date of the bankruptcy. This results in estate debts concerning the rent owed for the period after the bankruptcy date. First, we will explain the concept of estate debts and then discuss the judgment.

What is meant by estate debts in bankruptcy?

Estate debts can be regarded as the costs of the bankruptcy. Only when the debts of the estate can be paid in full can payments be made to creditors with preferential rights. Only when the preferential creditors can be paid in full can distribution be made to creditors without preferential rights, i.e. the unsecured creditors. Incidentally, pledgees and mortgagees have a special position, but this will not be discussed further in this article.

When must an estate debt be paid?

Estate debts give rise to an immediate claim on the bankruptcy estate. However, settlement of an estate debt cannot always be enforced, because the trustee in bankruptcy may postpone payment if it is uncertain whether the estate debt can be fully settled. This depends on the available and expected financial resources, but also on any other existing and future estate debts and the applicable order of priority among the estate debts.

What are the grounds for the creation of estate debts?

In the important 2013 judgment Koot Beheer / Tideman q.q., the Supreme Court clarified when there are estate debts. These are only the debts that give rise to an immediate claim on the bankruptcy estate, either

– (i) pursuant to the law,

– (ii) because they have been contracted by the trustee in his capacity (in the sense that his will has been directed towards them),

– (iii) because they are the result of an action by the liquidator in contravention of an obligation or duty to be performed by him in his capacity.

Regulation on termination of lease in case of bankruptcy

Section 39 of the Bankruptcy Act provides that if the bankrupt is a tenant, both the trustee in bankruptcy and the lessor may terminate the lease prematurely. In short, a notice period of three months has to be observed. From the date of the bankruptcy, the rent will be a debt of the estate. This is therefore an example of the first category of estate debts referred to in the Koot Beheer / Tideman q.q. judgment: an immediate claim on the bankruptcy estate by virtue of the law.

Opinions of Subdistrict Court and Court of Appeal on interest as estate debt

A landlord claimed before the Subdistrict Court that the trustee should be ordered to pay the rent owed to the estate, plus interest. In addition, in appeal it was claimed that the Court of Appeal should rule that the interest on the rented estate debt should also be qualified as a claim against the estate (by way of a declaration for rights).

The Subdistrict Court and the Court of Appeal rejected the claims. The Court of Appeal assessed whether the interest on the leasehold estate debt fell under one of the categories mentioned in the Koot Beheer / Tideman q.q. judgment. In other words, according to the Court of Appeal, the law does not recognise the interest on the rental estate debt as a claim against the estate. Evidently, according to the Court of Appeal, the interest payment obligation, as such, does not qualify as an estate debt in the second category either.

Is the interest on the rent a debt of the estate as a result of an act of the trustee in breach of an obligation or duty to be fulfilled by him?

The Court of Appeal considered that for the question whether the interest on the estate rent should at any time be qualified as an estate debt of the third category, the situation of the estate should also be taken into account. The Court of Appeal reasoned as follows. In principle, it is not the fault of the trustee if the assets of the bankrupt turn out to be insufficient to (fully) pay estate debts such as the ones in question. The trustee in bankruptcy has to make do with the assets as he finds them. Insofar as the trustee in bankruptcy is unable to pay the debt in question, excluding interest, out of the estate with due observance of the legal precedence, he shall not be in default in his capacity as trustee. Therefore, to that extent, no interest shall be owed by him as a debt of the estate. The same applies in principle as long as it is uncertain whether he will be able to pay the debt in this way. The Court of Appeal is of the opinion that in the case at hand the trustees have not been in default.

Judgment of the Supreme Court: interest on estate rent debt is an estate debt

The landlord appealed to the Supreme Court and argued that the Court of Appeal had wrongly ruled that the landlord was not entitled to a claim against the estate in respect of interest on the leasehold debt.

The Supreme Court put first and foremost that the bankruptcy does not change existing reciprocal agreements. The rent has been owed to the estate since the date of the declaration of bankruptcy. The claim to payment of the rent, even where it has been treated as a debt of the estate, remains a claim by the landlord against the insolvent tenant under the tenancy agreement concluded between them. The question of whether default exists with regard to the claim to pay rent must be answered on the basis of the lease and the statutory provisions applicable to default, according to the Supreme Court.

Then comes the key consideration:

If default exists with regard to the payment of a claim on the estate, and the creditor is entitled to compensation in the form of statutory (commercial) interest (Article 6:74 DCC in conjunction with Article 6:119 et seq. DCC), the nature of a claim on the estate as an immediate claim on the estate implies that the obligation to pay this interest associated with the estate claim must also be regarded as a debt of the estate.”

Even if the trustee is allowed to postpone payment, interest on estate debt is an estate debt

The Supreme Court considered that the purpose of the rules which may result in the trustee in bankruptcy sometimes being able to defer payment of an estate debt is to guarantee the equality of estate creditors, and any different ranking of their claims. According to the Supreme Court, these rules do not justify that the claim for compensation in the form of interest lapses if the claim is not paid or not paid on time.

Can contractual default interest on the estate rent also be regarded as a claim of the estate?

It is possible that parties to a lease agreement have agreed that instead of the statutory commercial interest a contractual default interest applies. The Supreme Court considered that the default interest on the rental estate debt should also be regarded as an estate debt. There is no reason to approach this differently than the statutory interest.

Looking for a lawyer in insolvency law in Rotterdam?

Should you wish to seek advice on insolvency law, such as on the rights of a landlord in the event of a tenant’s bankruptcy, estate debts and the ranking of creditors, please contact Peter de Graaf of LVH Advocaten.

May you offset a negative leave balance?

Your employees are entitled to vacation days, but sometimes they take too many. May you set off excess vacation days against salary without consulting your employee?

Set off leave balance during employment

The law stipulates in which cases you as an employer may set off claims against wages during employment. This is allowed, for example, if your employee must pay compensation, has outstanding fines or has received too much pay. However, a claim due to excess vacation time is not included in the law. Setoff is therefore not allowed, unless a contractual provision allows it. So don’t forget to include this in the employment contract.

Set-off can only take place up to a maximum of one-tenth of the salary per month. Also, your employee must always receive at least the minimum wage. Any claims can therefore only be recovered from the wages your employee receives above the minimum wage limit.

Set off leave balance at the end of employment

The possibility of set-off at the end of employment is broader. Settlement with wages is possible, if those wages do not fall below the so-called ‘attachment-free foot’. This means, that you have to pay at least about 90% of the social security standard to your employee, so that your employee can at least pay his fixed expenses that month. Because of this broader set-off power, you and your employee can also agree by contract, that you will refund or set off excess vacation days at the end of employment.

What if you have no contractual set-off power?

That issue came up, among others, in an Oct. 18, 2021 ruling by the Central Netherlands District Court.
The common thread is that as an employer, you are responsible for the creation of a high negative leave balance, especially in the case of a temporary employment contract. You should not assume that this will be restored during the course of a subsequent year by working unpaid additional hours (the “time-for-time” system). The negative balance should not be so high that it cannot be made up by your employee during employment, with the result that you have to set off a (too) large amount against the salary. Of course, your employee also has his or her own responsibility in this.

In an employment relationship, where your employee works too few hours too quickly and where incentives are lacking to prevent arrears, this is primarily the responsibility of you as the employer.

Informing about and recording vacations

It is therefore in your best interest to regularly inform employees of their shortfall in accrued vacation days. In addition, you would be wise to lay down the settlement option by contract.

Conclusion

If you have any questions on this topic, please contact Richard Ouwerling, a lawyer specializing in labor law.

Limitation period for spouse’s power to annul legal acts performed without consent

Limitation period for spouse’s power to annul legal acts performed without consent

For certain legal acts, one spouse requires the consent of the other spouse. If this consent is not given, the other spouse may annul the legal act. In short, this applies to decisions regarding the family home, gifts, security (such as guarantees) and hire purchase. In an earlier judgment (concerning the Dexia share lease affair), the Supreme Court already ruled that consent is also required for securities leasing, because this is in fact a form of hire purchase (or purchase by instalments). A limitation period of three years applies to invoking annulment. The Supreme Court recently handed down a judgment on the question of when this period begins to run. This judgment is discussed in this article. This judgment also relates to the Dexia share lease affair.

Legal provisions spouse’s consent, annulment and limitation period power of annulment

The cases in which a spouse requires the consent of the other spouse are listed in Section 1:88 of the Civil Code. In 2008, the Supreme Court ruled that securities leasing also falls under this provision. Article 1:89 of the Civil Code stipulates that the non-acting spouse may annul a legal act (such as entering into a securities leasing agreement) that has been performed without the necessary consent. Upon annulment, the agreement is deemed never to have existed. Article 3:52(1), preamble and under d, of the BW stipulates when the limitation period begins and ends. The legal claim to invoke annulment expires:

three years after the power to invoke this ground for annulment has become available to the person entitled to it.’

This phrase could give rise to three possible starting points:

  1. The moment at which the legal act is performed (in the case of securities leasing, this is the moment at which the agreement is concluded);
  2. The moment at which the other spouse becomes aware that the legal act has been performed;
  3. The moment at which the other spouse is both aware that the legal act has been performed and aware of the right (i.e. the legal authority) to annul the legal act. This therefore also requires legal knowledge and insight.

It was already clear that moment 1 did not apply. However, the Supreme Court has now clarified whether moment 2 or moment 3 applies.

Securities leasing without the consent of the spouse

The case in this matter was fairly straightforward. In 1999, a husband entered into a share leasing agreement with (a legal predecessor of) Dexia, but without the consent of his wife. The payments for the share lease agreement were made from a joint account. In February 2006, the spouse invoked annulment. Dexia invoked the statute of limitations.

Court of Appeal’s ruling on limitation period for right of annulment

Both the District Court and the Amsterdam Court of Appeal ruled that Dexia could not invoke the limitation period. The District Court declared that the lease agreement had been validly annulled and ordered Dexia to repay the sums of money. The Court of Appeal upheld this judgment.

The Court of Appeal first referred to a judgment of the Supreme Court of 10 July 2015, in which the Supreme Court ruled that the limitation period should only start to run when the non-acting spouse becomes aware of the existence of the lease agreement. The moment of awareness of the legal right to invoke the annulment therefore did not play a role. However, the Court of Appeal considered that, after 2015, views on when actual awareness can be assumed to exist had evolved. From a judgment of 12 January 2024 of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal concluded that it has also become important when the entitled party had the knowledge and insight necessary to consider taking measures in response to the facts. According to the Court of Appeal, the burden of proof therefore rests with Dexia to demonstrate that, prior to 13 March 2000, the spouse was not only aware of the lease agreement, but also had the knowledge and insight to understand that her consent was required. According to the Court of Appeal, Dexia has failed to do so.

The date of 13 March 2000 is relevant because that was when a class action was initiated, which suspended the limitation period. Incidentally, it is difficult to imagine that the spouse had knowledge and understanding of the right to invoke annulment before that date. The Court of Appeal noted that it was not until 2002 that the view that share leasing is in fact hire purchase became public. And it was not until a judgment of 28 March 2008 that the Supreme Court confirmed this.

The limitation period commences at the moment when the spouse becomes aware of the legal act

Dexia is appealing to the Supreme Court. Dexia’s complaint is that the Court of Appeal failed to recognise that, for the limitation period to commence, it is sufficient that the non-acting spouse is actually aware of the lease agreement. The Supreme Court considers the complaint to be well-founded. The Court of Appeal’s ruling, to the effect that it is relevant that the non-acting spouse had the knowledge and understanding that the conclusion of the agreement required his or her consent, is incorrect. Requiring that such knowledge and understanding be present would not be in accordance with the proper course of legal transactions.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court notes that the case law of the Supreme Court to which the Court of Appeal referred does not alter this. According to the Supreme Court, that case law also refers to actual knowledge of facts and circumstances relating to the existence of damage.

When are knowledge and understanding of legal position important?

It is remarkable that the Court of Appeal believed that the Supreme Court had changed course, but the Supreme Court indicates that this is not the case.

In the judgment of 12 January 2024, to which the Court of Appeal referred, the Supreme Court ruled:

When assessing whether the injured party was actually aware of the inadequate or incorrect conduct of the liable person, the court must take into account whether the injured party had the knowledge and insight to be able to assess the soundness of the conduct.’

This case concerned incorrect advice that had been received. It was only when the injured party realised that it had received incorrect advice that it actually became aware of the negligent conduct of the liable person and realised that damage had been caused as a result of that negligent conduct.

Start of the limitation period for the power of revocation in the case of a guarantee

As mentioned above, a spouse sometimes also needs the consent of the other spouse when entering into a guarantee. This applies to private guarantees. Without consent, the guarantee is voidable. You can read more about the difference between a commercial and a private guarantee here.

In view of the Supreme Court ruling discussed above, we can assume that the limitation period for invoking the power of annulment also commences at the moment when the other spouse becomes aware of the guarantee. The moment at which that spouse first becomes legally aware of the power to invoke annulment is irrelevant.

Lawyer Rotterdam

If you would like advice on securities, such as guarantees, please contact Peter de Graaf.

The judgment discussed concerns Supreme Court 18 July 2025, ECLI:NL:HR:2025:1168.

Effective employee participation through clear ground rules

Effective employee participation through clear ground rules

Effective cooperation with the works council benefits your operations. This requires clear ground rules. How are these established, what do they achieve and what are the pitfalls?

Lack of clarity on employee participation; duty to advise or not to consent

Sometimes it is not clear whether a proposed decision of the company requires advice or consent. Not infrequently, director and works council have discussions about this, which degenerate into disputes. This leads to delays in decision-making (and in business operations) and usually does not benefit smooth cooperation and mutual trust. A company agreement can offer a solution.

What does the Works Councils Act (WOR) say about a company agreement?

Section 32 WOR contains provisions on the works council agreement. By written agreement, the entrepreneur and the works council can mutually agree on powers of the works council. The condition is that the works council can only be granted additional powers.

Possibilities in the works agreement

In the works agreement, the entrepreneur and works council can arrange that certain intended decisions require the advice or consent of the works council. Or that consultations will be held on certain subjects. While this is not required under the WOR.
At first sight, it seems that by entering into such an agreement, the entrepreneur restricts himself unnecessarily in his decision-making. But there are also advantages for the entrepreneur by entering into a company agreement.

Possible agreements between entrepreneur and works council

An example. The employer can agree with the works council that consultations will be held on changes to employment conditions and that the parties aim to reach agreement on all proposed changes. Additional agreements can then also be made, for example:

  • that consultations will be held on certain topics (such as the level of remuneration), but no agreement needs to be reached;
  • that if no agreement is reached during the consultations, the works council will not invoke the right of consent regarding individual parts of the employment conditions (so that Section 27 of the WOR does not apply);
  • That the works council will observe confidentiality on certain matters;
  •  that parties will seek advice or mediation if they cannot reach agreement.

Such agreements ensure that discussions are less likely to degenerate into protracted disputes and also that decision-making can be accelerated.

Pitfalls and points of attention when concluding company agreements for effective employee participation

It is very important that the company agreement specifies precisely which decisions require advice or consent. If not, discussions may arise as to whether a proposed decision requires advice or consent. Or discussions may arise about the scope of the obligation to advise or consent.
Furthermore, it is not wise to give the works council additional advisory or consent rights incidentally, outside a company agreement, because this could set an (undesirable) precedent.

Need advice on effective employee participation?

Do you need advice on the corporate agreement or effective cooperation with the works council? If so, please contact corporate law lawyer Peter Verheijden

Breaking off negotiations: what about liability?

A contract does not come about overnight. A possible cooperation must first be investigated and desired terms of a contract must be discussed at length. Sometimes even several parties are initially negotiated simultaneously before a contract is concluded. It is important that there is room to ‘freely’ start and break off negotiations, and fortunately there is. However, this is limited in case law.

Reasonableness and fairness

Already in the 1950s it was determined that parties who negotiate with each other are governed in their relationship by reasonableness and fairness. In other words, they must take into account each other’s legitimate interests. In 1982 the Supreme Court considered that this obligation may entail that breaking off negotiations is unlawful.

Is breaking off unacceptable?

Breaking off negotiations is not easily unlawful. The Supreme Court emphasized in 2005 that the “breakup freedom” can only be departed from if breaking off negotiations is unacceptable. This unacceptability may exist due to various circumstances, but mainly due to legitimate expectations of the other party that an agreement will be reached. Also important is the attitude of the aborting party and whether there were unforeseen circumstances during the negotiations, for example.

Continuing negotiations or damages? Positive and negative contract interest

If it turns out that breaking off negotiations was unlawful, the court can force the breaking off party to continue negotiating anyway. Damages can also be claimed. The latter can be done in two ways. Depending on the situation, damage can be compensated in such a way that the other party is put in the position as if negotiations had never taken place (negative contract interest) or in such a way that the other party is put in the position as if negotiations had continued and a contract had been concluded (positive contract interest).

Not unlawful, but reimbursing costs incurred

What if the termination was not unacceptable, but you, as the other party, suffered significant damages? For example, because you incurred high costs for the negotiations? Even then there are possibilities. Earlier this year the Supreme Court emphasized that even if breaking off negotiations is acceptable, under certain circumstances the breaking off party can be obliged to reimburse (part of) the costs incurred. On a specific ruling in that area, see also this article. The breaking off by the franchisor was not unlawful, but its conduct meant that it had to reimburse the costs incurred by the candidate. After all, even negotiations are still governed by reasonableness and fairness.

Advice?

Whether or not there is liability to compensate damage or (part of) costs incurred in the event of broken negotiations always depends on specific circumstances. Are you engaged in negotiations and in doubt whether to continue them? Or have negotiations stopped while you have already incurred costs? For a look at the specific issue and advice on possible liability, please contact Jacolien Leuvenink.

The letter of intent in a business takeover

The letter of intent in a business takeover

A business takeover ultimately involves concluding a purchase agreement. A whole process precedes this. In the preliminary phase, it is possible to conclude a letter of intent. In this article, I will tell you more about this.

The purpose of a letter of intent

With a letter of intent, the potential seller and buyer record that there is mutual serious interest in having a transaction take place. Furthermore, the outline of a transaction is usually already outlined. It states what exactly will be sold as part of the transaction. Entering into a letter of intent is not mandatory. Such an agreement is usually concluded at a stage when the buyer has already been able to form some idea about the company, but no extensive due diligence has yet been carried out.

A letter of intent may already state the intended price and the assumptions and valuation method on which the price is based. It can also include a timeline, including an intended date for the company to become for the account and risk of the buyer.

To what extent is a letter of intent binding?

To what extent a letter of intent is binding depends on the content of the agreement. For example, the agreement may include a provision regulating which provisions are binding and which are not. Sometimes a letter of intent is used to already steer strongly towards the conclusion of an acquisition agreement. It is also possible that the intention agreement is precisely meant to record that the parties are interested in exploring the possibilities of a transaction, but that there is no or virtually no commitment to reach a takeover agreement (i.e. that the parties are free to walk away from the negotiations).

Sometimes a letter of intent also includes a confidentiality clause. It makes sense to include that the agreements on this are binding. A non-disclosure agreement can also be fine in a separate document. You can read more about the confidentiality agreement in “Commercial contracts: ‘the non-disclosure agreement'”.

I recently came across a provision in a letter of intent which stipulated that the seller will provide the buyer with all information that is or could be relevant to the buyer. This provision emphasises the seller’s duty of disclosure, while the buyer’s duty to investigate is not mentioned. Should a buyer later believe that what was bought does not conform to the contract, such a provision may play a role in assessing the extent of the duty of disclosure and duty to investigate.

Exclusivity

A letter of intent usually includes a binding provision on exclusivity. A buyer will incur costs as part of due diligence and will prefer that the seller not negotiate with other interested parties in the meantime. It is common to agree on a fixed term of several months, as due diligence and contract negotiations usually take quite some time.

Advice on letters of intent

Thus, a letter of intent outlines the contours of an envisaged transaction and indicates the parties’ serious interest in making a transaction happen. A letter of intent may contain legally binding provisions, but this depends on the content of the agreement. Usually, provisions on exclusivity and confidentiality are binding. Due to the fact that letters of intent can contain binding provisions, it is advisable to seek advice from a specialist in the field of company takeovers at that stage of the business acquisition process.

If you have any questions about company takeovers or would like guidance in an acquisition process, please contact Peter de Graaf of LVH Advocaten.

Airline liability

What if a passenger suffers bodily injury?

Montreal Convention

Liability in international air transport is regulated in particular by the Montreal Convention (hereinafter: the Convention). The Convention provides rules for European member states on when and for what type of damage airlines are liable. In doing so, the Convention covers both freight and passenger transport and distinguishes between different types of damage:

  • property damage;
  • damage to luggage;
  • damages resulting from death or bodily injury to a passenger.

This article focuses on the latter type: damages for death or bodily injury to a passenger.

Damages for death or bodily injury to a passenger

With respect to these damages, the Convention provides that the air carrier is liable, “by reason only of the fact that the accident which caused the death or injury occurred on board the aircraft or during any act connected with the boarding or disembarkation of the aircraft” (Article 17(1)).

In other words, if something happens on or around the aircraft that results in death or bodily injury, the airline is liable. That’s the bottom line. So that liability goes pretty far.

There is an exception to this principle. Indeed, if there is fault or negligence on the part of the passenger concerned, the airline may be relieved of liability (Article 20). The airline will then have to prove that a) there was fault or negligence on the part of the passenger and b) that this fault or negligence caused or contributed to the damage. If this succeeds, the airline will not be liable for (part of) the damage.

Court ruling on personal injury passenger

The Court of Justice of the European Union recently ruled (C-589/20) on a case involving personal injury to a passenger. This was in response to a preliminary question – a request for interpretation – on the Convention raised by the Austrian court.

This case involved the question of liability for Austrian airline Austrian Airlines. In mid-2019, a couple flew to Vienna with their child. After arriving at the airport, the husband, while descending the airplane stairs, almost fell down. His wife walked behind him with both her arms full and fell, in the same spot. The woman broke an arm and thus suffered bodily injury. She is suing Austrian Airlines for damages.

According to the court, there was no evidence that anything was wrong with the stairs in question and the woman did not take any precautions to prevent her fall, despite seeing that her husband almost fell. The Austrian court rejected the woman’s claim. When the woman appealed, the Austrian Court turned to the Court of Justice for an explanation of the Montreal Convention.

Court’s interpretation of Montreal Convention articles

The Court explains that Article 17 of the Convention does not mean that an airline is only liable for damages resulting from a “typical aviation risk. Thus, the accident need have nothing to do with flying or the movement of the aircraft itself. When a passenger falls for a completely unclear reason on an aircraft staircase with which there is nothing wrong, there is already an accident. The airline may therefore be liable for this.

The Court then turns to the next question, namely on the interpretation of Article 20. It explains that the purpose of Article 20 is to strike a balance between the interests of both the airline and the passengers. The Court emphasizes that the airline may be relieved of liability to the extent that it proves, given all the circumstances of the case, that it was the fault or negligence of the passenger that caused or contributed to the damage suffered by the passenger. Whether this is the case in a specific case should be left to the national court, according to the Court. Indeed, the Convention does not provide any specific rules on this proof.

Dutch court on fault and negligence passenger in personal injury case

The national court will thus have to assess whether an airline has proven that the damage was (partly) due to fault or negligence of the passenger concerned. In doing so, all circumstances of the case will be taken into account, such as, for example, the attention that can be expected of a passenger (with or without children) or to what extent the passenger sought adequate medical assistance after the accident. In assessing these various circumstances, the Dutch court will look to the rules of national law.

Advice on aviation and law?

LVH Advocaten is experienced in assisting airlines against various types of passenger claims. Do you have any questions as a result of this article? If so, please contact Jacolien Leuvenink.

Liability of foundation director in case of rained-out festival

Liability of foundation director in case of rained-out festival

A director of a foundation can also run the risk of being held personally liable. This is nothing new, but is demonstrated once again by a recent judgment of the East Brabant District Court. The director of a foundation set up to organise a festival had entered into new financial commitments a day before the start of the festival, while weather forecasts were poor. This resulted in personal liability of the director towards the relevant creditor. This article explains the case and discusses the legal framework. The case provides a nice example of a situation where the court found that a director was personally culpable.

Festival budget

In early 2019, a foundation was established and the director was appointed. This foundation aimed to organise a festival to mark the 200th anniversary of Best municipality. The festival would take place from 16 to 18 August 2019. The municipality provided €200,000 for the organisation of the festival. Furthermore, the budgeted revenue of €849,000 largely consisted of expected revenue of €500,000 from coin sales.

Budget of festival does not materialise due to bad weather

Festival will be organised. In early August 2019, a tender from a security company is accepted and a down payment is made. The director has purchased additional security services from the security company on behalf of the foundation on 15 August 2019 (the day before the start of the festival) and on 19 August 2019 (the day after the festival).

The weather is very bad during the festival. Audience attendance is much lower than expected. Income from coin sales is very disappointing. The foundation is unable to pay all creditors. Available funds are still being distributed to creditors. In that context, the security company receives 15% of the outstanding invoice amounts. In October 2020, the foundation was declared bankrupt.

Foundation director liable to creditor?

The security company holds the director personally liable for the unpaid invoice amounts. These include amounts arising from the acceptance of the first offer, but also the amounts that have become due as a result of giving the (additional) orders of 15 and 19 August 2019. As the director disputes the liability, proceedings will be initiated against him.

The legal framework for directors’ liability

The court sets out the legal framework for external directors’ liability. A director’s liability can only exist if he can be blamed for a serious personal wrongdoing. The court logically refers to the standard from the Supreme Court’s Beklamel judgment and considers:

“There can be serious personal culpability on the part of a director, leading to outside directors’ liability, if, when entering into that commitment, he knew or ought reasonably to have understood that the company would be unable to fulfil its obligations and would have no recourse, except in circumstances to be adduced by the director on the basis of which the conclusion is justified that no serious reproach can be made against him personally in respect of the wrongdoing (see, inter alia, HR 6 October 1989, ECLI:NL:HR:1989:AB9521, NJ 1990/286 (Beklamel)). In essence, this so-called “Beklamel criterion” entails the requirement that the director knew or should have understood, when entering into the commitment, that the company’s creditor would suffer damage as a result of his actions (see HR 5 September 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:2627).”

You can read more about the Beklamel standard here.

Did the director know or should have known that the foundation could not fulfil obligations?

The court assesses whether, at the time the obligations were entered into, the director knew or should have known that the foundation would not be able to fulfil its obligations to the security company. The court sees no harm in entering into the first offer. At that time, the director could not have known that coin sales during the festival would be severely disappointing due to unusually bad weather.

The assessment is different regarding the commitments made on 15 and 19 August 2019. According to the court, the weather forecasts on 15 August 2019 for the following days were already bad. Thus, the director should have realised that, due to the predicted bad weather, attendance would be low and revenue from coin sales would be disappointing. At the time of signing the tender for additional work on 15 August 2019, the director should have reasonably understood that the foundation would not be able to meet its obligations to the security company. The same applies to the order given on 19 August 2019. At that time, the festival had already been held, so the director certainly should have reasonably known that the revenues were much lower than the budget.

Director ordered to pay damages

Thus, because of the wrongful act committed against the security company, the director is personally ordered to pay the invoice amounts arising from the orders given the day before and after the festival (to the extent that they have not been paid).

The ruling has strong similarities with a judgment of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal concerning the festival 200 years Stadsrechten in Zaandam. That case also concerned a rained-out festival, where the director had still entered into obligations when (according to the court) he should have understood that the foundation would no longer be able to fulfil the obligations. In that case, too, the verdict was that the director was personally liable.

VAT in claim for damages?

The security company also claimed the VAT amounts from the unpaid invoices in its claim for damages. This was also defended by the director. The director disputes that the VAT would have been remitted and furthermore, the security company could reclaim this VAT. This has not been refuted by the security company. The court therefore honoured the director’s defence on this point. Again, this judgment is not surprising.

The director could also have argued that there is no VAT-taxed supply against the compensation. VAT is only charged on compensation for goods or services. It is only because of the fact that the security company suffers damage that the compensation is claimed. Therefore, this is not a VAT-taxed supply.

If it is certain that a receivable is irrecoverable, the VAT already paid from the relevant invoice can be reclaimed from the Tax Authorities. In any case, a claim will be considered uncollectible as soon as 1 year has passed since the final payment date.
Incidentally, a claim for compensation may be subject to VAT under certain circumstances.

External liability director foundation

The case discussed concerned external liability towards one creditor. The claim was based on the tort law article (Section 6:162 of the Civil Code) and the legal framework was further developed in case law (jurisprudence).

Act on Management and Supervision of Legal Entities and directors’ liability for foundations

In the area of liability of foundation directors, quite a lot has changed with the introduction of the Management and Supervision of Legal Entities Act 2021. Section 2:138(1) of the Dutch Civil Code, concerning liability of a director of a public limited company for clearing the estate deficit if the bankruptcy was caused by improper management, now applies to all foundations. Previously, the liability scheme only applied mutatis mutandis to foundations subject to corporate income tax.

Presumption of directors’ liability for a foundation

Article 2:138 paragraph 2 of the DCC contains a presumption of proof that the bankruptcy was caused by improper management if there is a failure to file annual accounts or if the obligation to keep administrative records has not been met. This presumption of proof only applies (by virtue of Article 2:300a paragraph 2 of the DCC) to the foundation in the following cases:

  • a foundation subject to corporation tax; or
  • a foundation required by or under the law to prepare financial statements that are equal or equivalent to annual accounts.

You can read more about the presumption of evidence and the possibility of overturning it here.

The volunteer director of a foundation because of idealistic objectives

Thus, a board member of a foundation should be aware that there is a lot of responsibility involved in the board position and that board liability may be lurking under some circumstances. This can apply to a large commercial foundation with a professional board, but also to the small foundation with an (unpaid) board member who only wants to contribute because of idealistic objectives. People who want to take on such a board position should reconsider whether they are suitable for it. This was therefore one of the objectives of the new legal regulation.

Incidentally, the court still has the option to moderate the director’s liability. You can read more about that here. Possibly, the court will be a bit more lenient in the case of the unpaid director (and who, incidentally, has not enriched himself either) who took up the position because of idealistic objectives.

Corporate and insolvency law lawyer in Rotterdam

If you have questions about directors’ liability or have a conflict with a receiver, please contact Peter de Graaf.

Reopening liquidation after turboliquidation

If the business activities of a legal entity are discontinued, it must be considered how the legal entity will be wound up. If there are no more assets at all, a turboliquidation can take place. This is dissolution without the appointment of a liquidator. The legal entity then ceases to exist immediately. A resolution for dissolution is passed and the board notifies the Commercial Register of the end of the legal entity’s existence (Article 2:19 paragraph 4 BW).

Turboliquidation can also take place if the legal entity is still indebted to creditors. However, unpaid creditors can revive the legal entity by filing for bankruptcy or by reopening the liquidation (Art. 2:23c BW). This will require proof that the legal entity still has a possible benefit. Without a possible benefit, there is no interest in reviving the legal entity. After all, it is then clear that there is nothing to distribute among the creditors.

The ‘s-Hertogenbosch Court of Appeal recently issued a judgment on the request to reopen a liquidation. This is interesting because it shows the options available to a creditor facing a debtor who has been dissolved. The following was the case.

Turboliquidation of the debtor

A construction company built and delivered a home to a client under a construction contract. Defects were found upon delivery. The construction company was held liable. The client had an expert report dated July 13, 2021, which showed that repair costs were estimated at €87,653. The client had a draft subpoena prepared to claim damages. Before this summons could be issued, the construction company was dissolved by turboliquidation on Aug. 12, 2021. The principal was thus faced with a no longer existing debtor.

Procedure for reopening liquidation in court

The principal (hereinafter “creditor”) applied to the court for the reopening of the liquidation. The court held that although it was plausible that the creditor had a claim, due to the lack of benefit, the application should be rejected, due to lack of interest.

Appeal proceedings on reopening liquidation

The creditor has appealed. The creditor points out that the 2018 and 2019 annual figures show that the construction company still had significant cash and cash equivalents and positive equity. It further points to the circumstances that (i) the construction company’s shortcomings were serious (ii) the extent of damages was substantial and (iii) the turboliquidation was carried out with the knowledge that the creditor wished to initiate proceedings.

The construction company raises a defense, claiming that there were no more assets at the time of dissolution. In doing so, no financial data are shown at all.

The Court met the creditor and held:

“Unlike the court has considered in paragraph 3.3. of the contested decision, the court of appeal is of the opinion that it follows from the text of article 2:23c paragraph 1 BW that (in this case) it is sufficient that [appellant] et al. make it plausible that they have a claim on [respondent]. They do not also have to make it plausible that there is a possible benefit. Paragraph 1 of article 2:23c DCC states that the court may reopen the liquidation “if (…) another creditor or person entitled to the balance arises or (emphasis added by the court) the existence of a profit appears.”

And further:

“Although the court of appeal is of the opinion that [appellant] et al. do not also have to prove that there is a benefit, reopening the liquidation is of course of little use if ultimately there can be no payment of (part of the) damages to [appellant] et al. because [respondent] has no benefits. This could mean that [appellant] et al. have no interest in reopening the liquidation. However, this consideration does not prevent reopening in this case either. To this end the court of appeal considers as follows.”

Has the presence of assets been demonstrated?

The Court then considered that the creditor had made it plausible that assets were still present at the construction company at the end of 2019. It is impossible to ascertain what happened to the assets thereafter. However, the Court believes that the creditor cannot be required to further substantiate a claim to the extent that data necessary for such substantiation is in the domain of its counterparty. It would have been more up to the construction company to provide further data to support its position (that there were no more assets) as part of the dispute.

Thus, the Court considers it sufficiently plausible that at the time the construction company was dissolved, there was still some income and reopens the liquidation.

Temporary law on transparency turboliquidation

On Nov. 15, 2023, the Temporary Tuboliquidation Transparency Act will enter into force. This law aims to improve the legal protection of creditors.

Under the new law, in the event of a dissolution without assets, the board must file a balance sheet and a statement of assets and liabilities for the fiscal year in which the company was dissolved with the trade register within 14 days. This must include a description of (i) the reason for the lack of assets at the time of dissolution, (ii) (if applicable) the manner in which the company’s assets were disposed of and how the proceeds were distributed, and (iii) (if applicable) the reasons why a creditor or creditors remained wholly or partially unpaid. Also, all financial statements must be filed with the Chamber of Commerce.

Immediately after these documents are filed, the board of the company must notify the unpaid creditors in writing.

Conclusion

In the ruling under discussion, the Court helped the creditor somewhat by considering that it would have been up to the debtor to show that there were no more assets.

If the Temporary Law on Transparency Turboliquidation is enacted, creditors should be able to find more information about what happened at a dissolution (or, in other words, how the condition, in which there are no more assets, arose). This could work, but there is still a risk that a malicious debtor could file inaccurate information. The Chamber of Commerce is not going to check the filed information for accuracy. So a creditor who believes that the dissolution is unjustified will have to initiate a request for reopening the liquidation or a bankruptcy petition himself.

Looking for a business law attorney?

If you would like to learn more about corporate dissolution, turboliquidation, petition for reopening of liquidation or bankruptcy filing, please contact Peter de Graaf.

Suspension and annulment of non-competition and non-solicitation clause: the balancing of interests

In a previous article, we wrote about the actions employees can take against a non-competition and/or non-solicitation clause. A non-competition clause can be challenged by employees if the clause unfairly disadvantages the employee. But how should an employer defend against this? In this article, on the basis of a concrete example, a judgment from the Amsterdam Court of Appeal, we examine in more detail the suspension (interlocutory proceedings) and nullification (proceedings on the merits) of a non-competition and non-solicitation clause and the balancing of interests that takes place.

Amsterdam Court of Appeal ruling: suspension of non-competition clause balancing interests

What was going on? The employee had been employed as a Trader Analyst for about 9 months when she terminated the employment contract. The employee then entered into a settlement agreement with the (former) employer in which they terminated the employment contract by mutual agreement and agreed that the non-competition clause would remain in effect. Just under a week later, the employee informs the employer that she will be working at another company as a Quantative Trader Associate. The employer responds, stating that the non-competition clause does not allow for this. The employee still joined the new employer.

The employee claimed before the subdistrict court, primarily, complete suspension of the non-competition clause and, in the alternative, that the clause be limited to such an extent that she could enter the service of the new employer. The subdistrict court granted the subsidiary claim. The former employer appealed.

Appraisal of suspension of non-compete clause on appeal

On appeal, the former employer put forward several arguments as to why the non-competition clause should be enforceable. The court of appeal thus began to assess whether the employer has an interest in enforcement. In particular, it was important whether the former employer could make it sufficiently plausible that the employee’s transfer would affect the former employer’s business. The court concluded that the employee did not have such knowledge of relevant commercial and technical information or unique work processes, or competitively sensitive information that the new employer could use. In doing so, the court considered it important that although the companies were both active in the field of cryptocurrency, at the ex-employer the employee was only active as a Trader Aanalyst in the Equity Options team and not in the Crypto Derivatives team. Thus, there was no evidence that the employee had gained knowledge and experience in cryptocurrency options trading and could disadvantage the ex-employer.

It follows from these considerations that the mere fact that employers are in the same industry does not prevent an employee from making the switch. The employee’s position and knowledge are of great importance in determining whether the non-competition clause can actually be enforced, even if the clause is validly agreed upon. The court then went on to weigh the parties’ interests. Among other things, the court found it significant that the employee had been employed for less than nine months and had only started working on equity options after four months. The court also considered that the employee had a clear interest in free choice of employment and that the employee’s financial position had improved significantly.

This balancing of interests led the court to conclude that the employee’s interest in being released from the non-competition clause outweighed the employer’s interest in maintaining it, and that the employee was unfairly disadvantaged by the clause. Indeed, the employer could not make the concrete disadvantage caused by the transfer plausible.

Defense of employer for enforcement of non-compete and non-solicitation clause

As an employer, do you want to enforce the competition and relationship clause? If so, first have the clause reviewed by a lawyer or employment law attorney to determine the validity of the clause. Next, see if the clause is applicable to the situation. Finally, you can see if the clause can be enforced. It is important that the departure of the employee to a competitor can cause actual damage to the organization in connection with the knowledge and skills acquired during the employment.

Information about competition and relationship clauses?

Want to know more about the legal validity, applicability or voidability of competition and relationship clauses? Contact Richard Ouwerling, employment law attorney at LVH Advocaten in Rotterdam. He advises and litigates on competition and relation clauses.

International trade: the Vienna Sales Convention

International trade: the Vienna Sales Convention

There is constant trading between business parties. Products are bought and delivered to be used, processed or, for example, resold. More than once these trading relationships cross the border of the Netherlands or even Europe. To prevent all kinds of different legal rules from applying in these trading relationships, there is the UN Convention on the International Sales of Goods (CISG), or the Vienna Sales Convention (“the Convention”). This Convention provides rules for international sale of goods.

What does the Vienna Sales Convention regulate?

The Convention defines how a sales contract is formed and the rights and obligations of buyer and seller. According to the Convention, a commercial sales contract does not necessarily have to be concluded in writing. In addition, the Convention provides rules on what should be expected of the various parties in certain situations, such as when delivered products are defective or unsuitable.

When does the Vienna Sales Convention apply?

The Convention automatically applies to the purchase of movable property between two professional parties established in different member states. Since 85 countries, including the member states of the European Union, are parties to the Convention, there is a significant chance that the Convention will apply to a contract between a Dutch and foreign trader.

The applicability of the Vienna Sales Convention can be excluded. Parties must then explicitly exclude the applicability of the Convention (or part of its provisions) in their contract or general terms and conditions.

Differences Treaty and domestic law

Treaty rules differ from Dutch law in several respects. For example, under the Convention, the buyer can choose to claim damages immediately if the seller fails to fulfill his obligations. For a seller this can be disadvantageous compared to Dutch law, which states that in such a case the seller must first be given the opportunity to fulfill his obligations. Only then may alternative damages be claimed.

By contrast, the buyer has a so-called duty of inspection under the Treaty: the buyer must check the product after delivery within the shortest possible time. Should anything then be wrong, he must inform the seller of this within a reasonable period of time. Under our national law, the buyer does not have such an obligation to inspect, but must in principle only complain to the seller within a reasonable time after discovering a defect. The Convention thus requires a more active and investigative attitude on the part of the buyer and gives the seller more certainty that he will not be confronted with a complaint after a long time.

Finally, under the Convention, it is more difficult to dissolve a sales contract. Whereas in our national law this is in principle possible in case of a shortcoming in performance, under the Convention what matters is, among other things, whether the other party has actually suffered damage due to the shortcoming and whether this damage was foreseeable. Once the products have been delivered or the price has already been paid, dissolution is even possible only in some very specific cases.

Advice?

Would you like to receive advice on an (international) sales contract, the applicability or interpretation of the Vienna Sales Convention? Then please contact us. Jacolien Leuvenink will be happy to assist you.

Critical building supervision or hasty enforcement?

Critical building supervision or hasty enforcement?

There are times when the public authority suspects that the quality of a building is not up to scratch. This is not always easy to prove. Especially when it comes to technical regulations, the compliance of which can only be determined through extensive testing. That was the subject of a recent case at the Administrative Law Division of the Council of State. The central issue was the Building Decree.

Buildings Decree standards

According to the Buildings Decree, a building must comply with various standards. Those standards concern, among other things, the architectural quality of the construction, the health of persons and safety. Among the safety standards are, for example, regulations aimed at preventing the risk of fire starting and spreading.
The fire brigade, which oversees safety in buildings on behalf of the public authority, distinguishes various fire compartments in a building. The boundaries of those compartments determine the maximum range within which fire is allowed to spread. To prevent fires from spreading to another compartment, fire barriers must be in place. These must be suitable for preventing the spread or spread of a fire for at least 20 minutes.
The fire resistance of the facilities is assessed according to the methodology described in NEN standard 6068. All calculations of fire spread required for applying for a building permit must be carried out according to this standard.

Uncertainty about fire resistance of floor system

During a fire safety check of a property in Nijverdal, doubts recently arose about a rather old storey floor. The floor in question was a so-called Perfora floor, a lightweight floor system of ceramic hollow brick, which was used until the 1970s. There was no known test data on this relatively dated floor system. It was therefore unknown how long the shape of the floor would be maintained during a fire. Probably the stability of the floor would be weakened, was the assessment of an engineering firm called in. What the further impact would be on the extent of an outbreak of fire was not entirely clear. However, it was expected, the expert said, that the fire resistance would not last 20 minutes.

Procedure up to the highest instance

The municipal council decided to intervene. For it, the risk of fire was too high and the suitability of the fireproofing too unclear. The college omitted further investigation because a test of the fire resistance of the structure was not properly possible. This would in fact require testing a substantial area of the material in question, but this was not available. The college therefore left the uncertainty to the owner.
An order under penalty was therefore imposed on the owner. The owner had to ensure that the floor would meet the requirement of a fire resistance between fire compartments of 20 minutes, according to the standard of NEN 6068. For every week the owner did not comply, it had to pay a sum of twenty-five hundred euros. A hefty financial burden, on top of the costs the owner would already have to incur for investigating, adjusting and possibly replacing the floor.
The owner opposed this in administrative proceedings, which went all the way to the highest court.
The court eventually ruled in favour of the college. According to the court, the college was entitled to rely on the expert report. This would have shown sufficiently that the floor did not meet the applicable standard.

Council of State whistles back

Although the expert had reported on his expectation that the floor construction would last less than 20 minutes, it had not actually been confirmed whether this expectation was correct. An enforcement decision should not be based on an expectation that the construction is inadequate. The fact that conducting further research was very difficult does not constitute a reason to think otherwise, according to the Council of State. That was the college’s problem. The enforcement order went down and the owner was spared a heavy financial noose.
An emotionally rather unsatisfactory decision perhaps, but the formal line taken by the Council of State fits in with the norms in the Building Decree. It does not stipulate that the owner is in breach if he fails to demonstrate that the floor meets the standards of NEN 6068. It is up to the public authority to prove that the floor does not comply. The difficult task for the college in this case, therefore, is to get this old floor system, of which not much material is available, reliably tested for fire resistance one way or the other. So far, then, the owner has the benefit of the doubt. And that saves quite a bit of money.

Administrative enforcement and LVH Lawyers

LVH Advocaten handles many administrative enforcement cases.

The wage guarantee scheme: continued payment of wages in the event of the employer’s bankruptcy

The wage guarantee scheme: continued payment of wages in the event of the employer’s bankruptcy

The Unemployment Insurance Act includes a scheme that entitles employees to payment in the event of payment problems on the part of the employer. The regulation is also called the wage guarantee regulation. It also regulates which benefits an employee can claim in case of bankruptcy of the employer. In this article I will discuss the main provisions of the wage guarantee scheme that apply in the event of bankruptcy and I will go into a recent judgment of the Supreme Court on this subject.

Bankruptcy of the employer

If an employer has gone bankrupt, the bankruptcy trustee will, in principle, proceed as soon as possible to terminate the employment contracts on the basis of Section 40 of the Bankruptcy Act. In any case, the trustee does not have to apply a longer term than six weeks. The law stipulates that the salary and premium debts related to the employment contract are estate debts. Estate debts refer to the costs of the bankruptcy. Estate debts have a very high rank and the trustee can be expected not to allow them to arise and accrue unnecessarily.

The wage guarantee scheme in the event of an employer’s bankruptcy

Pursuant to sections 61 and 64 of the Unemployment Act, the UWV takes over the wage payment obligation of the bankrupt employer. The period for which the wages are covered by the wage guarantee scheme is limited. Wages do fall under the wage guarantee scheme:

  • wages for a period of 13 weeks prior to the liquidator’s termination of the employment contract;
  • the wages for the notice period, up to a maximum of six weeks;
  • the vacation pay, the vacation allowance and the amounts, which the employer owes to third parties in connection with the employment relationship with the employee, for the year preceding the end of the six-week notice period (this is somewhat simplified).

The amounts are also capped by law. However, most people’s wages are less than the maximum amounts.

Wage claims that fall outside the wage guarantee scheme

It is clear from the above that not all conceivable claims arising from the employment contract are covered by the wage guarantee scheme. Depending on the situation, the employee then has an estate claim, a preferential claim on the basis of Section 3:288 opening words and under c to e of the BW (claim with privilege) or an unsecured claim (claim without privilege) or a combination of these.

UWV’s position in the wage guarantee scheme

The claims of the employee and third parties against the employer are transferred to the UWV, in so far as these claims are settled by the UWV. This means that the UWV acquires direct claims against the insolvent employer.
It may be beneficial to the estate if a restart takes place, whereby the employees are employed by the re-launched company. The relauncher becomes the new employer and therefore the bankrupt employer saves on wage costs. The Supreme Court recently issued a judgment on such a situation. This judgment is briefly discussed below.

Supreme Court ruling on wage guarantee scheme

The following facts emerge from the judgment. An employer, employing 84 people, goes bankrupt. A few days later, the trustee terminates the employment contracts with due observance of a six-week notice period. A few days after the declaration of bankruptcy, the company is restarted as a going concern. This means that the re-starter takes over the ongoing business activities of the bankrupt. The re-starter takes over the assets and employs the employees under the same conditions as they were previously employed by the bankrupt employer. The UWV will soon be informed about this by the insolvency administrator. The UWV will make payments to the employees on the basis of the wage guarantee scheme. These payments relate to the six-week notice period. This involves an amount of € 353,067. Subsequently the UWV submits a claim against the estate for this amount to the trustee. The trustee disputes this claim. The trustee believes that the employees were no longer entitled to wages from the bankrupt employer from the moment they started working for the re-starter.

No work, no pay?

The statutory regulation concerning the right to wages in the event of failure to perform work was amended on January 1, 2020. The Supreme Court notes that in this case, where the facts played out in 2016, the old regulation still applies. However, the Supreme Court notes that the new Article 7:628 (1) of the Dutch Civil Code does not intend to change the allocation of risks between the employer and employee. The new regulation implies that the employer is obliged to pay the salary determined according to the time frame if the employee has not performed the agreed work wholly or partially. This does not apply if the total or partial non-performance of the agreed work should reasonably be at the expense of the employee. Since the amendment of the law, it is therefore formulated as: no work, pay, unless…

Employee no longer willing to perform work?

The Supreme Court considered that if an employee, after his employer has been declared bankrupt, is reinstated in the employ of the acquirer on equal terms of employment for all or part of his business, the trustee in bankruptcy may deduce that the employee is no longer willing to perform work for the bankrupt employer. In such a case, the cause of the ceasing to perform the work should not lie with the bankrupt. From the moment of entering into service with the transferee, the employee is therefore no longer entitled to salary. The UWV was therefore not obliged to pay on the basis of the wage guarantee scheme. The trustee was therefore found to be in the right.

Strategy of employee in case of payment problems with employer

The wage guarantee scheme has only been discussed to a limited extent in this article. For employees who are employed by an employer who is unable to pay salaries, it is important to take action quickly, otherwise there is a chance that claims for benefits under the wage guarantee scheme will be lost. One strategy may be to file a report with the UWV and, in addition, to file for the employer’s bankruptcy.

Lawyers insolvency law and labour law Rotterdam

At LVH Advocaten we have specialists in the field of labour law and insolvency law. Please contact Peter de Graaf if you have any questions about the wage guarantee scheme, a bankruptcy petition and/or a restart. The judgment discussed can be found here.

The position of the SME entrepreneur as a creditor in a WHOA arrangement

The position of the SME entrepreneur as a creditor in a WHOA arrangement

On 1 January 2021, the Homologation Underhand Arrangement Act (WHOA) entered into force. This law introduced a new restructuring instrument. Its purpose is to prevent companies from being declared bankrupt while they are still (partially) viable. The statutory scheme includes a minimum protection for (smaller) SMEs. This is also referred to as the 20% rule. In this article I will explain the position of the SME as a creditor in a WHOA settlement.

Classification of creditors in the event of a WHOA agreement

Creditors and shareholders must be divided into different classes when a WHOA agreement is offered, if their rights in a liquidation of the assets in bankruptcy or offered on the basis of the agreement are so different that there is no comparable position. In any case, creditors who have a different rank in recovering the debtor’s assets will be assigned to different classes. A difference in rights exists, for example, between preferential creditors (creditors with rights of priority) and unsecured creditors (creditors without rights of priority).

Minimum payment to small SME creditors under WHOA agreement

Small SME creditors must, in principle, be paid at least 20% of their claim under the WHOA agreement if they:

  • have an unsecured claim for goods or services supplied;
  • or have an unsecured claim from an unlawful act (Art. 374 paragraph 2 Bankruptcy Act).

This may be deviated from if there are compelling reasons to offer less than 20%.

What is a small SME creditor under the WHOA?

These small SME creditors are defined as creditors where fifty or fewer persons are employed or who meet the criteria of Art. 2:395a of the Civil Code or Art. 2:396 of the Civil Code. These articles of law determine which companies qualify as micro or small businesses. This is the case when, on two consecutive balance sheet dates, at least two of the three requirements below are met:

  • the annual net turnover is less than € 12 million;
  • the balance sheet value is less than € 6 million;
  • the average number of employees during the financial year is less than 50.

Classification of SME creditor in separate class in WHOA agreement

If the requirement to offer at least 20% satisfaction of the claim to the small SME creditors is not met, these creditors should be classified in a separate class.

If this class does not agree to the arrangement, a creditor from that class can ask the court to reject the homologation of the arrangement. The court will then have to do so, unless a compelling reason has been shown for offering less than 20% satisfaction of the claim.

WHOA agreement must meet information requirements

Article 384, paragraph 2 sub c Bankruptcy Act stipulates that a request for approval of the composition will be rejected if the composition itself and the documents submitted with it do not contain all the information referred to in Article 375 Bankruptcy Act. This section of the law enumerates the information that a settlement agreement must contain. One of these information obligations concerns a statement showing on what serious grounds the class of small and medium-sized creditors is offered less than 20% of their claim.

Both to comply with this information requirement and to convince the creditors in question and the court that there are weighty grounds for offering less than 20%, it is important to pay sufficient attention to the statement.

Judgment regarding rejection of WHOA request

In a judgment of 10 November 2021 by the District Court of Midden-Nederland, a request for homologation of a WHOA agreement was rejected for various reasons. One of these reasons was that the small SME creditors had been offered less than 20% of the claim and that the creditors in question had not been placed in a separate class. According to the court, there was therefore a violation of section 374 of the Bankruptcy Act. In another article on our website you can read more about this judgment and find more information about the WHOA.

More information about the WHOA

You can read the following articles on our website about the WHOA:

Looking for a lawyer about the WHOA agreement in Rotterdam?

If you need legal assistance in offering a settlement under the WHOA or if you wish to object to the settlement as a creditor, please contact Peter de Graaf.

Sick employee does not cooperate in reintegration: employer actions

Sick employee does not cooperate in reintegration: employer actions

A reintegration process starts when the employer reports sick. Previously, we wrote an article about the steps that should be taken in a reintegration process. But what if the sick employee does not cooperate? Which actions can you take as an employer to get the reintegration process back on track or can the employer fire the sick employee if he does not cooperate?
In this article we discuss the actions or measures an employer can or should take if a sick employee does not comply with the obligations arising from the reintegration process.

Actions of the employer in case of non-compliance with the reintegration obligations

First of all, the employer must determine what exactly the reintegration obligations are that are not fulfilled. This determines to a large extent the action to be taken.

Warning not to comply with reintegration obligations

Sending a warning letter is a good first step when the employee does not comply with the reintegration. The employer is well advised to make clear which obligations the employee has, such as appearing at the company doctor, cooperating in drawing up the plan of approach and performing suitable work. Subsequently, the employer can schedule a meeting to discuss the obligations during reintegration.
If the employee disagrees with the advice of the company doctor, it is good that the employer points out in the letter that the employee can request an expert opinion from the UWV on the disability and reintegration.

Announcement of wage suspension or wage cut

If there is already a reason for a wage freeze or wage suspension (see below), it can be announced immediately that a wage freeze or wage suspension will be implemented in the event of non-compliance within a certain period.

Suspension of wages after violation of control regulations

A company is obliged to draw up a sick leave policy. For more information see our article on this subject. This policy contains control regulations concerning work disability, such as the procedure for reporting sick, the obligation to pass on accommodation details and the obligation to attend the company doctor’s surgery. If these control regulations are violated without a valid reason, the employer is allowed to suspend the salary.
If the employee complies with the control regulations again, he is entitled to continued payment of wages with retroactive effect. The wages that were not paid during the suspension must still be paid. No statutory increase or interest is owed on those wages.
Note: the wage suspension must be announced. Therefore, if the employer intends to implement a wage suspension, the employee must first be warned that he has violated the control regulations and that the employer has reasons to suspend wages. This gives the employee the opportunity to comply with the regulations after all.

Wage freeze after breach of reintegration rules

In the context of reintegration, the employee must among other things cooperate in drawing up an action plan and must perform suitable work if the company doctor advises this. If the employee does not cooperate without a valid reason, a wage freeze can be imposed. It is important that the employer uses this measure in time. If the employee has not or not sufficiently fulfilled the reintegration obligations and the employer has been inactive, the UWV may extend the obligation to continue paying wages after the end of the waiting period (in principle 104 weeks after reporting sick).

Please note: here too, the wage freeze must be announced.

Dissolution of the employment agreement of a sick employee

Failure to comply with the reintegration obligations may ultimately also lead to dissolution of the employment contract. The subdistrict court may grant the dissolution in the event of (seriously) culpable act or omission. This is the case if the employee repeatedly violates the reintegration obligations despite the written reminders from the employer and the applied wage freeze. The prohibition on giving notice during illness does not apply. Note: employer must have a UWV expert statement.

Summarily dismissing a sick employee

In extreme cases, summary dismissal is sometimes even possible if the employee does not fulfil the reintegration obligations. In this case, there must be additional circumstances. These could include, for example, the employee going on holiday abroad for an extended period of time without the employer’s permission during the reintegration process (Court of Appeal ‘s-Hertogenbosch ruling).

Want to know more about actions of the employer in case of non-compliance with reintegration?

It follows from the above that the employer must timely intervene during the reintegration process, so a UWV wage penalty can be prevented. For this, sufficient means are available. Want to know more about the possible actions? Richard Ouwerling of LVH Advocaten in Rotterdam will be pleased to help you determine the right strategy. He can help you, for example, in drawing up a sick leave policy, drafting warning letters and conducting employment law proceedings.

Sexual transgressive behavior in the workplace: is it seriously culpable?

Sexual transgressive behavior in the workplace: is it seriously culpable?

Sexual transgressive behavior in the workplace unfortunately occurs regularly. As an employer, you would think that this is an irrefutable reason for dismissal and that the behavior is seriously culpable, so that no transitional compensation is owed to the employee and the employee cannot claim unemployment benefits. However, practice is more recalcitrant. Case law shows that there is discussion about the (serious) culpability in the case of sexually transgressive behaviour. The role of the employer may be decisive in this respect.

In this article we first discuss when there is (serious) culpability. Next, we discuss the developments in case law concerning sexually transgressive behavior in the workplace. Finally, we will discuss the steps that every employer can take when transgressive behavior occurs in the workplace.

When is sexual harassment and transgressive behavior seriously culpable?

If there is evidence of (seriously) culpable behaviour, the employer can have an employee’s employment contract dissolved through the courts. There must be culpability. This means that the employee must be at fault for his/her actions or omissions. All circumstances of the case are reviewed by the judge when the employer requests the dissolution of the employment contract. For example, the position of the employee, the frequency of the behavior, the policy of the employer, the public nature of the impermissible behavior, etc. are considered.

It follows from case law that one form of culpable conduct is sexual harassment and transgressive behavior. Whether it is “seriously” culpable depends on the further circumstances. It depends on the seriousness of the act and against whom it is directed, as well as the concrete warnings or instructions from the employer in this regard.

Case law on sexually transgressive behavior

It follows from case law that judges do not agree on what conduct is seriously culpable and what conduct is merely culpable. This is an important difference. In the event of seriously culpable conduct, an employee is not entitled to transitional compensation and unemployment benefits. Below, we will discuss two legal cases concerning sexually transgressive behavior.

A case concerning the dismissal of a senior lecturer in exercise science is before the Supreme Court for the second time. In the first instance the subdistrict court ruled that there was serious culpability. Several students reported that they did not feel safe. The teacher had been warned in 2006 and 2010, prohibiting any form of physical contact. Nevertheless, the school received reports again. One of the reports concerns a buttock slap to a student and the other report concerns a student to whom the teacher twice gave a full body massage. This was followed by a dismissal. Given the behavior and dependent relationship between the teacher and the students, as well as the earlier warnings, the subdistrict court dissolved the employment contract without transitional compensation.

The Court of Appeal of Den Bosch, on the other hand, overturned the decision of the subdistrict court and dissolved the employment contract with the award of transitional compensation. The Court of Appeal was of the opinion that the facts and circumstances stated were insufficient for the conclusion that the employee was seriously culpable. One of the reasons for this is that the school itself would have had a share in what had occurred. The school has not been clear about what is and what is not acceptable in terms of transgressive behavior. The school would have thought too easily that in the absence of new signals “it would be all right”.

The case subsequently reached the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court set aside the order of the court of appeal and referred the case to another court. One of the reasons for this was that the Court of Appeal had not indicated why the lack of clarity regarding the limits to be observed was relevant to the seriousness of the reproach that could be made against the teacher. Nor was it shown that the failure to monitor the teacher detracted from the seriousness of the teacher’s conduct.

The Arnhem-Leeuwaarden Court of Appeal also ruled that there was no question of serious culpability. According to the Court of Appeal, the high exceptional provision of Section 7:673 subsection 7 under c of the Dutch Civil Code (which states that there is no entitlement to transitional compensation in the event of seriously culpable conduct) was not met. There is a question of culpable behavior in view of the biltik and the massages, but this is not seriously culpable. The massage was given in 2010 in violation of the ban. However, the massage lessons were part of the curriculum, it served a didactic purpose in the context of the profession and the school was aware of this. According to the court, the above makes the sexually transgressive behavior culpable, but not seriously so.

As mentioned, the case will go to the Supreme Court again. Thus, it remains unclear what is meant by seriously culpable behavior. It is clear that all circumstances play a role, including how the employer acted. In view of the above, the advice to employers is to take the steps listed below.

What steps can an employer take in the event of sexually transgressive behavior?

Rules of conduct regarding (sexually) transgressive behavior in the workplace

A first step employers can take is to draft a policy with clear rules of conduct. These rules of conduct should describe what conduct is inadmissible, i.e. sexually transgressive conduct and what sanctions are imposed when this conduct occurs.

Investigation after suspected (sexually) transgressive behavior in the workplace

If there is a suspicion that this behavior is occurring, it is recommended to conduct a careful investigation and to suspend the employee – if necessary – in the meantime.

Sanctions after (sexually) transgressive behaviour in the workplace

Then, depending on the situation, it can be determined what sanction is appropriate. This could be a written warning or termination of the employment contract.

When giving a written warning, it is very important that it is made clear in the warning which behaviour is undesirable and what the consequences are if the behaviour occurs again.

Monitoring the employee after (sexually) transgressive behavior in the workplace

Finally, the previously discussed judgments show that, depending on the circumstances, it may be beneficial to monitor an employee’s behavior or provide the right guidance to ensure that the sexually transgressive behavior does not recur.

Need help with transgressive behavior in the workplace?

Case law is currently unclear about when sexually transgressive behavior in the workplace is seriously culpable. This makes it all the more important for employers to take the right steps. Don’t wait, set up a policy, take preventive measures and take timely action.

Do you need help drawing up a policy or do you have a situation of transgressive behavior? Contact Peter Verheijden and Richard Ouwerling of LVH Advocaten in Rotterdam. These labor lawyers are happy to help you. They can draft a policy for you, they can assess situations of sexual transgressive behavior and implement sanctions.

Termination of banking relationship by bank

It is increasingly common for banks to terminate a relationship with a customer – sometimes dating back many years. Such termination of a banking relationship can have serious consequences for a business owner. Can a bank terminate a credit relationship? When is it allowed and when is it not? Below is a brief explanation of the background to such termination and the rights and obligations of banks and account holders.

WWFT and customer due diligence

In the WWFT (Law for the prevention of money laundering and financing of terrorism) the government has made banks responsible for detecting so-called financial-economic crime and other integrity risks. In recent years, the Public Prosecutor’s Office has conducted investigations at several banks because the banks did not properly carry out the obligations imposed on them. The client files at the banks were not in order. Several banks have paid fines (transactions to prevent further prosecution) of even hundreds of millions of euros. It is therefore not surprising that banks take their obligations to conduct customer due diligence seriously. Many an entrepreneur has by now familiarized himself with questions from banks and is becoming familiar with abbreviations such as KYC (Know Your Customer), CDD (customer due diligence) or AML (anti-money laundering). This customer research does not only affect entrepreneurs who are applying for a bank account, but also entrepreneurs who have been banking with the same bank for years.

General banking conditions

The agreement between the bank and the customer is governed by the General Banking Conditions. On the basis of these General Banking Conditions, the Customer is obliged to inform the Bank and to keep the Bank informed of his activities and the origin of the financial resources that the Customer places with the Bank. If the bank is unable to complete a customer due diligence, the bank must terminate the relationship with that customer. The bank is then unable to oversee the risk of abuse of the services offered by the bank. It is not necessary for a bank to have concrete indications that the customer is involved in criminal activities.

Obligation to cooperate in customer due diligence

Banks depend on the cooperation of customers to obtain information. Customers are obliged to inform the banks on the basis of the general banking conditions. The bank’s questions are many:

  • who are the shareholders;
  • who are the UBOs;
  • who are the suppliers;
  • who are the customers;
  • how is the turnover structured;
  • how to reduce the share of cash payments in turnover;
  • what is the background of payments to foreign bank accounts;
  • what is the customer’s screening policy;
  • etc. etc.

There are customers who cannot or will not fully answer the very extensive questions posed by banks, or at least are passive and do not actively cooperate in providing the requested information. A bank can then make use of the contractual right included in the general banking conditions to terminate the customer relationship.

Can the bank terminate the customer relationship?

A bank’s right to terminate the customer relationship is not unlimited. Banks have a social function and, by virtue of this, a special duty of care to customers. Banks must take the interests of those customers into account.  By terminating a relationship, the client loses access to the banking system and the consequences are serious for the client. After all, it is impossible to operate a business if you do not have a checking account with a bank. There may be circumstances that mean that it is unacceptable according to the standards of reasonableness and fairness for a bank to use its contractual power of termination. This involves a balancing of interests. There is the bank’s interest (for example, to meet the legal requirements of customer due diligence) and there is the customer’s interest (for example, to have access to the banking system).

Weighing up interests when terminating a customer relationship

What circumstances may play a role in this balancing of interests?

  • Is there sufficient insight into the origin of the client’s financial resources?
  • Is there sufficient insight into the client’s activities?
  • To what extent is there insight into the customer’s payment flows?
  • Is the customer meeting its obligations to the bank?
  • Are there many receipts from or payments to foreign parties?
  • Are the payments traceable to invoices?
  • Can any cash flows be sufficiently substantiated?
  • Does the customer have a screening policy for suppliers and customers?
  • Does the customer have access to the banking system through accounts at another bank?
  • Is there an explanation for rapid changes in turnover?

These are just a few of the circumstances that are cited in procedures. In addition, the specific circumstances of the customer itself are important.

What to do in the event of a customer inquiry by the bank?

It is important to take the investigation seriously. Banks are obliged by law to carry out the investigations and the customer is obliged by the general banking conditions to cooperate and provide the requested information. This can be a laborious process for both parties. An intention of the bank to terminate a customer relationship is usually announced well in advance. If further consultation does not lead to a solution, the customer can demand the continuation of the relationship in a preliminary injunction. The judge in preliminary relief proceedings may decide to do so if it is sufficiently plausible that in proceedings on the merits the client’s claim to restoring the customer relationship will be granted and that the client cannot be expected to have no bank account at his disposal until that time.

Looking for a corporate law lawyer in Rotterdam?

If, after reading this article, you have a question concerning the termination of a customer relationship by your bank or if you have another question in the field of corporate law, please contact Rob Steenhoek.

The pilot’s employment contract: points of interest and details for airlines

For most employees, it can be determined with some ease whether they have an employment contract and what law applies to that employment contract. Pilots, on the other hand, occupy a special position within labor law because of the international elements that tend to fester.

In this article, we discuss some points of interest and specifics regarding the pilot’s employment contract that are important for airlines.

Dismissal procedure pilot in Dutch court

If an airline wants to proceed with dismissal proceedings, it is wise to think about a number of points in advance. These include assessing which court has jurisdiction and which law applies.

Dutch court jurisdiction over pilot with international labor contract

In an international working relationship with a pilot, the court will first consider whether the pilot is an employee within the meaning of the European Regulations. This is tested on the basis of European case law. There is an employment contract when there is a durable link that gives the employee a certain place in the organization and the pilot has provided under performance for a certain time for a fixed monthly remuneration.

The court can then use the Brussels I-bis Regulation (EEX Regulation II) to assess whether jurisdiction exists. The parties can agree on a choice of forum clause. However, such a choice of forum is only allowed if the employee also has the option of submitting the dispute to other courts.

If no choice of forum has been made, then it must be determined who the defendant is and then it can be examined which courts have jurisdiction Article 21 and 22 of EEX Regulation II. Suppose the employer is a Dutch airline that wants to file a request for dissolution and the employee’s place of employment is the Netherlands and he lives there as well, then the Dutch court has jurisdiction. In fact, the court of the member state where the employee is domiciled has jurisdiction.

On the other hand, if an employee wants to initiate the proceedings, he or she has a choice between the courts of the country of (1) the employer’s residence or (2) the place where the employee usually worked.

Applicable law

Which law applies is determined by the Rome I Regulation (for employment contracts concluded on or after Sept. 17, 2009). Parties often agree on a choice of forum in international agreements. This means that they agree that, for example, Dutch law is applicable. However, there are three limitations to the choice of law: (1) If there is an international employment contract and all connecting factors are in one country, the mandatory law of that country applies and takes precedence over the choice of law. (2) Certain special mandatory rules take precedence over the choice of law (for example: Working Hours Act and General Equal Treatment Act). (3) The choice of law may not lead to loss of protection of mandatory provisions of the law that would apply to the employment relationship in the absence of choice of law.

If no choice of law has been made, then (1) the country of habitual employment must be determined, (2) failing which, the country in which the establishment that hired the employee is located is held. (3) If there is a closer connection with another country, then the law of that country applies.

Supreme Court proceedings on labor agreement poloot and competent court

The Supreme Court ruled on the question of jurisdiction last year in a case between Netjets and a pilot. The question was whether the Dutch court had jurisdiction to take cognizance of an employment dispute between a UK-based airline regarding the termination of the employment contract. The court had assumed jurisdiction because Schiphol was the home base within the meaning of Annex III of Regulation 3922/91 and therefore the place from which the pilot habitually worked. The Supreme Court confirmed this. The Court correctly held that the main part of his obligations were fulfilled from Schiphol. The pilot performed his assignments from Schiphol Airport and returned there after each tour. The pilot also received his instructions at home via email or app. In addition, after accepting an assignment, the pilot made sure that he was present at Schiphol in uniform at the appointed time. The Dutch court thus had jurisdiction.

Questions regarding dispute international labor agreement pilot?

Contact Lisa Kloot of LVH Lawyers for more information on aspects of the pilot’s employment contract. She specializes in employment law and is active within the aviation industry.

Indexation of rent by 14.5% in 2023 not unreasonable

Indexation of rent by 14.5% in 2023 not unreasonable

Many lessees of commercial space faced indexation of the rent according to the consumer price index (CPI) by a percentage of 14.5% in 2023. Several tenants of commercial space disagreed, and there have since been court cases about this. From the court rulings, the view emerges that indexation of the rent in 2023 by 14.5% is not unreasonable.

Rent indexation stipulated in lease agreement

Many leases for business premises stipulate that the rent is indexed annually based on the CPI. The ROZ model, for example, states that when the rent is indexed annually in January, the CPI of four months earlier is considered. For a rent increase as of Jan. 1, 2023, the CPI of September 2022 that came out to 14.5% is looked at.

Tenants disagree with 14.5% indexation

Tenants of commercial space believe they are being doubly burdened by the indexation. The tenants of commercial premises have to bear the high energy costs themselves and, in addition, get the increase in energy costs passed on in a higher rent. The Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) has now adjusted the calculation method. In other words, the percentage of 14.5% is too high. However, CBS has chosen not to apply the new calculation method retroactively. After all, a percentage of 0.21% applies to the rent price indexation as of January 1, 2024, because the previously used percentage of 14.5% was taken into account.

Court rulings on 14.5% rent indexation for business premises

There have now been rulings by the District Courts of The Hague, Gelderland, Rotterdam, Midden-Nederland and Oost-Brabant on the validity of the indexation of the rent by 14.5%. The broad outlines found in those rulings are described in this article and are as follows.

Tenants of commercial premises have raised two grounds in court to indicate their disagreement with the 14.5% indexation. First, an appeal is made for modification of the lease due to unforeseen circumstances. Second, an appeal is made to reasonableness and fairness.

The first ground fails in the various courts. There is no question of an unforeseen circumstance, because by including the indexation provision in the lease, the lessee and lessor of business premises have precisely taken into account the fact that energy prices (in this case partly as a result of the war in Ukraine) can rise sharply. The parties have explicitly agreed on the manner in which the rent change is calculated.

As a second basis, the tenants argue that the landlords’ reliance on the indexation provision is unacceptable by the standards of reasonableness and fairness. Nor do the courts go along with this. The courts rule in the various cases that there are no unacceptable consequences. Moreover, it is impossible to see why indexing the rent by 14.5% is not part of the tenant’s normal entrepreneurial risk. It is at the tenant’s risk that the parties opted for the CPI methodology without attaching a ceiling to it.

Conclusion

Courts in the Netherlands rule that indexation of the rent of business premises by 14.5% in accordance with the CPI is not unreasonable. There are no unforeseen circumstances and a reliance by the lessor on the indexation provision is not unacceptable by the standards of reasonableness and fairness. In other words, indexation of the rent by 14.5% is in principle allowed.

Advice for lessees and lessors of commercial premises regarding rent indexation

Lessees and lessors of business accommodations are free to make other arrangements in deviation from the indexation provision in the lease. It is not inconceivable that when indexation of the rent by 14.5% would lead to unacceptable consequences for the tenant of business premises, this percentage must be adjusted. In determining whether this is the case, all the circumstances of the case are taken into account. On the other hand, when adjusting the rent for 2023, the lessor in turn does not have to agree to indexation of the rent by 0.21% as of January 1, 2024. This, in turn, could lead to unacceptable consequences for the landlord. The parties should therefore consult with each other.

Is your personnel handbook up to date?

As an employer, it is important to record all internal rules within your company in a personnel handbook. Even if you only have a few employees, it is important to clarify what you do or do not accept within your company. Therefore, make sure you have a personnel handbook or regulations that includes your terms and conditions of employment and rules of order. This will prevent discussions and problems.

Dutch labor law is constantly evolving. For companies seeking to establish themselves in The Netherlands, it can be a challenge to implement their terms and conditions within the framework of Dutch labor law. Having your personnel handbook prepared or audited can be a great way to accomplish this.

Elements of the personnel handbook

If your company is not covered by a collective labour agreement, the personnel handbook lays down the (additional) terms of employment and other rules within your organization.

Does your company fall under a collective labour agreement? Then the personnel handbook is a handy elaboration or explanation of the collective labour agreement. It is also necessary to lay down, for example, sick leave regulations or other rules or regulations.

Has a works council been established? Then consultation with the works council is necessary before the personnel handbook can be introduced. This is because the personnel handbook almost always contains subjects, for which the works council has a so-called right of consent.

Why a personnel handbook?

  • All agreements clearly laid out in one document;
  • Contributes to a clear and consistent personnel policy;
  • Clarity for employees about rights, obligations and additional terms of employment;
  • Outlines the rules within which your staff performs their daily work;
  • In case of incidents, such as dismissal, you can fall back on the regulations or policies in the personnel handbook;
  • Provides guidance, clarity, transparency, certainty and convenience.

Have your personnel handbook prepared or audited for a fixed price

We can prepare a personnel handbook for your company or check the current handbook for changed laws, regulations or any applicable collective labour agreement. You have several options.

Do you want a personnel handbook in which all the rules and conditions of employment are legally defined? Then our employment lawyers will do this for a fixed price instead of an hourly rate.

  • Auditing starting at € 1.250,- excluding VAT;
  • Drafting starting at € 1.500,- excluding VAT.

Information?

Would you like to know more? Then contact one of our employment law specialists Jamie Janssen or Richard Ouwerling.

The summary proceedings in brief

In my previous article ‘Receiving a Subpoena? Five points of interest’ I discussed five points of interest for studying a subpoena. Among other things, I mentioned that one can be summoned in summary proceedings. In this article, I will take a closer look at ‘summary proceedings’ also known as ’emergency proceedings’.

I will discuss what summary judgment is, how to apply for summary judgment and the process of summary judgment.

Do you want to file an interlocutory appeal or have received an interlocutory subpoena? If so, consult an lawyer.

What is summary proceedings?

Because regular proceedings often take a long time, but one sometimes simply does not have that time, the possibility of ‘summary proceedings’ exists.

An interlocutory injunction is an emergency procedure in which the judge in preliminary relief proceedings (the judge in interlocutory proceedings) may grant a provisional injunction. ‘Provisional’ because, in principle, the decision of the preliminary injunction judge will stand until the claim in the main action is decided.

Examples of summary proceedings

An example of a situation in which you may initiate summary proceedings is when a prejudgment attachment has been placed on your bank account while you are required to make payments. Also, summary proceedings may be desirable if the seller/buyer refuses to cooperate with the transfer of a property or if there is a foreclosure sale scheduled that you want to stop.

For example, summary judgment may also be desired if something is published at short notice that you do not want published.

How is summary judgment requested?

Requesting summary judgment works as follows. An attorney prepares a draft summary judgment subpoena. That summons states what the plaintiff is claiming from the defendant (opposing party). It should also state why there is urgency to that claim.

The summary proceedings form

Meanwhile, a lawyer will ask the other party for the dates of the hearing to be scheduled. After doing so, the lawyer will send the draft summons to the preliminary relief judge of the court in question. To this, the lawyer attaches the so-called ‘summary proceedings form’. This form can be downloaded from the website of De Rechtspraak. The form includes the parties’ details and dates of prevention.

The judge in preliminary relief proceedings, in turn, completes the form further, indicating the case number, when the summary judgment hearing will take place and before which preliminary relief judge. Then the lawyer finalizes the summons.

The bailiff goes on the road

After the summons is final, the bailiff is sent out to serve the summons on the opposing party. The bailiff then announces to the opposing party when the hearing will take place.

The summary judgment hearing

Finally, the preliminary relief hearing takes place. Until no later than 24 hours before the hearing, the parties may bring further documents into the proceedings.

During the summary proceedings hearing, the parties are usually given the opportunity – by means of speaking notes – to tell their story. In most cases, the judge in preliminary relief proceedings pronounces judgment within 14 days after the hearing.

Need assistance from a lawyer in summary proceedings?

Have you received a summons or do you want to initiate summary proceedings yourself? Do not hesitate to contact us.

Managing director and works council: how to achieve effective cooperation?

Managing director and works council: how to achieve effective cooperation?

The works council is an important body within the organisation. They represent their members and have the necessary powers to do so, such as the right to consent and the right of advice. Effective cooperation makes it easier to implement important decisions within your organisation and ensures that those decisions are also supported within your organisation. So there is every reason to work on the cooperation with the works council, but how do you achieve that? The interests of the works council and the director are sometimes opposed, and the works council is therefore often seen as an opponent of the director. In this article we will tell you how to get closer to an effective cooperation.

Inform yourself in time about the rights of the Works Council

If you are aware of the rights and obligations of the works council, it will be easier for you to cooperate with the works council. After all, there need be no (or at least less) discussion about the content of those rights and duties. Do you have doubts about these rights and how far they extend? Please contact an employment lawyer to have this checked before communicating with the works council. Also give the works council the opportunity to turn to an employment law specialist.

Works council rights

Right to information: This means that the works council is entitled to information to enable it to perform its duties. The works council can request information itself (active information right) and the employer is obliged to provide information about the financial and economic position of the company and the social policy pursued (passive information right).

Consultation right: The managing director and works council are obliged to meet in a consultation meeting within two weeks after a reasoned request by one of them. Compliance can be requested from the subdistrict court.

Right of initiative: The works council has the right to make proposals. The works council cannot force the director to accept these proposals.

Right to advice: The Works Council has a right to advise on certain intended decisions. Section 25 of the Works Councils Act contains a list of decisions about which advice must be requested.

Right of consent: The Works Council has a right of consent to certain proposed decisions. Section 27 of the Works Councils Act contains a list of decisions for which consent must be requested.

Facilities: the works council has the right to call in experts, the right to training, the right to retention of salary while working for the works council and the right to conduct legal proceedings free of charge.

Regularly involve the works council in decision-making

Sparring informally

In addition to the rights under the Works Councils Act that have just been discussed, a director can also involve the Works Council in issues other than those on which it has the right to advise and consent. After all, the Works Council has a stimulating task with regard to subjects that affect the staff, such as terms of employment, working conditions, equal treatment and more. The more regular the consultation with the works council, the better. The works council should not feel like an afterthought; that creates the idea that the works council has no influence on decision-making. Regular and timely involvement of the Works Council creates trust. This can be done simply by planning a fixed moment to consult.

Works council involvement without right to advice or consent

Please note: is the works council involved without the right to advice or assent? As a director, it must be made clear that no advice or assent is requested, but that the director merely wants the works council to think along on a certain subject. Therefore, always assess first whether the subject requires advice or consent. Uncertainty? Richard Ouwerling of LVH Advocaten will be glad to help you.

Works council agreement

The powers of the Works Council can also be extended through a Works Agreement. The involvement of the Works Council can thus increase and this can be positive for your organisation. Primary employment conditions, for instance, are not a subject on which the Works Council has the right to advice or consent. However, the managing director could agree with the works council that the terms of employment are submitted to the works council for approval. This could make it easier for the staff to accept.

Formation of a tacit business agreement

Please note: a company agreement can be created tacitly. If the directors repeatedly request consent or advice, in writing, unambiguously and without reservation, on a subject that falls outside the right to consent and advice, a corporate agreement may be created. Therefore, always make a reservation if you, as a director, wish to informally spar with the works council and state that no consent or advice is requested.

Need a lawyer in Rotterdam in the field of works councils and employee participation?

Co-determination is a promising tool for every manager if it is used correctly. Richard Ouwerling of LVH Advocaten in Rotterdam is happy to help you set up works councils in the right way within your organisation. Richard Ouwerling can help you with the establishment of the works council, the conclusion of a works agreement, as well as he can guide you in the process of advice and consent.

(Written) assignment agreement: in good faith or well regulated?

Entrepreneurs like to work together “in good faith.” In other words, agreements are made verbally and the parties immediately start working together. That’s great, after all we want to get to work quickly and deal with legal matters as little as possible. However, it only has to go wrong once and regrets surface. If only I had put that in writing in a commission contract with the contractor / client.

So too with the commission contract. Our advice to entrepreneurs is therefore: good faith is nice, but well organized is better! Discuss the conditions with each other and have them put on paper by a lawyer. An important message here is that a commission contract does not have to be pages long. You put the basic agreements on paper (can also be done by e-mail) and the law will fill in the rest.

In this article, we would like to provide some points that can be covered in the assignment agreement.

Duration and termination of assignment agreement

An important agreement that you should lay down is the duration of the contract. Will a specific assignment be completed or will the parties continue to work together for a longer period of time? This information is important, not only for the future perspective, but also for the possibilities of terminating the assignment.

For example, a contractor may, in principle, only terminate the open-ended contract and the fixed-term contract may only be terminated for important reasons. A client may cancel the assignment contract (indefinite and definite term), unless it concerns a professional client and deviating arrangements have been made. For example, the parties can agree that both parties can cancel the contract (possibly under certain conditions) with due regard for a notice period.

Compensation contractor

Of course, as a professional contractor, you also want to be paid. It is therefore wise to agree on that remuneration in writing. Are you going to work on the basis of an hourly rate, a piece rate or a fixed amount for the assignment. Also think about the expenses. Are they included in the fee or will they be for the account of the client or contractor.

If you do not agree on a fee, the contractor can still claim a reasonable fee. Of course, this is not a desirable situation and it is wise to put the agreed remuneration in writing.

Intellectual Property Contractor

As a contractor and client, you will have to deal with intellectual property rights. The main rule is that the creator (the one who delivers a creative performance) is the owner of the intellectual property rights, even if the client has commissioned the creation of a text, design or invention. It is possible to deviate from this main rule. After all, the client wants to use the intellectual property. So agree for what purpose the client may use the work delivered (user license) or arrange a transfer of copyright.

Please note that if the performance was created under the direction and supervision of the principal, then the copyright could lie with the principal. This depends on the instructions given and the freedom the contractor had.

Non-competition and relationship clause in assignment contract

We are all familiar with non-competition and non-solicitation clauses from employment contracts, but they can also be used in assignment contracts. Case law provides a similar test for assessing the legal validity of a non-competition clause. A non-competition clause is not automatically valid. It must be in writing and may not violate the fundamental right of free choice of employment (Article 19 of the Constitution). This may be the case if the duration of the clause is unnecessarily long or otherwise too broadly formulated.

The rule for the contractor is therefore: do not just sign a non-competition clause. And for the employer the following applies: a non-competition clause may be used to protect the business interests, but do not formulate the clause too broadly so that it does not infringe on the contractor’s freedom to choose his work.

Need help drafting assignment agreement?

We would be happy to help you draw up a contract of assignment so that you can focus on your business. Would you like more information or a free consultation about the possibilities? Please contact Richard Ouwerling of LVH Advocaten. She can tell you everything about working relationships, such as the commission contract.

Hidden defects: what to look out for?

It happens to almost everyone; you buy a product, car, house, machine, boat or appliance where at first glance nothing seems wrong, but later it turns out that there is a ‘hidden defect’ to the purchased product.

The question is then who is liable. In this article I give examples of hidden defects, explain what the obligations of the buyer and seller are and what one should pay attention to.

Definition of hidden defect

A hidden defect is a defect that becomes apparent after the purchase contract has been concluded.

Examples of hidden faults

Examples of hidden defects may include leaks, undiscovered cracks, rotten wood and asbestos in a home. Cars can also have hidden defects. Examples include reversed mileage, rusted through underside, engine problems or faulty brake line.

Machinery may also have hidden defects, such as missing control boxes/control units.

Whether something is a hidden defect always depends on the circumstances of the case. Do you doubt whether something is a hidden defect? Gentia Niesert, attorney at law in contract and procedural law, can advise you on this.

Obligation of the seller to disclose latent defects

The seller has a ‘duty of disclosure’. This means that if the seller is aware of a defect or could reasonably be aware of it, he/she must inform the buyer of it at . If the seller does not do this, the seller can be held liable for the damage suffered by the buyer as a result of the hidden defect.

Obligation of the buyer to investigate hidden defects

On the other hand, the purchaser has a ‘duty to investigate’. This means that the buyer must investigate whether there may be any defects. If a defect is visible, the buyer must ask the seller questions. For example, if the purchaser sees traces of leakage, but it is not immediately clear whether there is anything wrong, he/she must investigate. If the buyer does not fulfil this obligation to investigate, there is a chance that the buyer cannot recover damages from the seller.

What to look out for in hidden defects?

It is always advisable to check the contract of sale. Some purchase agreements contain clauses that say something about hidden defects. Think of an age clause in contracts of sale of houses, in which the seller is protected against hidden defects in ‘old houses’.

It is also advisable to keep an eye on the period within which the hidden defect must be reported.

Need advice on hidden defects?

Are you the purchasing party and have you discovered a hidden defect or are you the selling party and are you being held liable in connection with a hidden defect? Then you have come to the right place. Gentia Niesert, lawyer in contract law and procedural law, will be happy to advise you.

New regulation VAT supplements applicable as of January 1, 2025

New regulation VAT supplements applicable as of January 1, 2025

From January 1, 2025, a new obligation will apply with regard to VAT supplementations: if it is found that too little VAT has been declared and paid, this must be corrected within eight weeks by submitting a VAT supplementation to the Tax Authorities. This significantly tightens the replenishment deadline, or at least there is less room for ambiguity. Failure to comply with the replenishment obligation may result in the imposition of fines. In the case of intent or gross negligence, there may even be a fine of up to 100%.

How was replenishment regulated through 2024?

Since January 1, 2012, Article 10a of the Algemene wet inzake rijksbelastingen (hereinafter: AWR) stipulates that taxpayers are required to ‘spontaneously’ notify the inspector of inaccuracies or incompleteness in data and information relevant to the taxation, which are or have become known to them.
Article 15 of the Turnover Tax Implementing Decree 1968 (hereinafter: the Implementing Decree) stipulates that as soon as a taxpayer learns that a turnover tax return has been filed incorrectly or incompletely in the past five calendar years, resulting in an overpayment or underpayment of tax, he must still provide the correct and complete information, data or instructions. The appropriate way to do this is to file a supplement. This supplement must be filed before the taxpayer “knows or should reasonably suspect” that the inspector is or will become aware of the inaccuracy or incompleteness in question.
How is it regulated now?

The aforementioned provisions continue to apply in full. As of January 1, 2025, it has been added that the supplement must be filed no later than eight weeks after the taxpayer discovers the inaccuracy or incompleteness. In other words, if a businessman finds that too little VAT has been declared and remitted, he is obliged to correct this via a VAT supplement within eight weeks. Failure to do so could result in a fine. Up to and including 2024, the rule was that filing a supplement had to be done as soon as possible. As of 2025, this observation deadline is clearly defined: within eight weeks of the observation, the VAT supplement must be submitted.

How will the replenishment work in practice from 2025?

The cabinet decided to set the deadline for filing a suppletion at eight weeks from the moment it is established that a situation exists that leads to a suppletion. According to the Cabinet, this adjustment prevents entrepreneurs from sitting idle after preparing their balance sheet while knowing that they need to file a supplement. The new deadline of eight weeks is in line with the deadline for filing a correction notice for payroll taxes. Both regulations use the same deadline starting in 2025.

The eight-week period will apply as of Jan. 1, 2025. For entrepreneurs who have already found before this date that a VAT supplement is necessary, the period starts to run on January 1, 2025. This means that the VAT supplement must be submitted by February 26, 2025. If a VAT supplement leads to a VAT amount to be paid, tax interest will be charged.

For replenishments for tax year 2024, tax interest can be avoided by filing the replenishment before April 1, 2025. If it has previously been determined that a replenishment is necessary, it must be filed within eight weeks to avoid an overpayment penalty. The new rules for VAT replenishments from 2025 bring more clarity and uniformity, but also set stricter requirements for timely corrections.

Need help?

Do you have any questions? Please contact our tax advisor David Harreman.

The future labour market

The future labour market

Minister Van Gennip (Social Affairs and Employment) sent a package of labour market measures to the Lower House on 3 April (Kamerbrief over voortgang uitwerking arbeidsmarktpakket | Kamerstuk | Rijksoverheid.nl). The Minister largely follows the so-called ‘Borstlap Committee’ and the SER Advice and gives an advance insight into what the labour market should look like (at the latest) in 2025, according to the Cabinet.

The future of the labour market: level playing field between permanent contract and self-employed/flex worker

The playing field between the self-employed and the employee must be levelled so that employees are not (forced to) wrongly choose one form of contract or the other. The tax benefits of self-employment are being phased out. Moreover, a compulsory disability insurance for the self-employed is being worked on.

The differences between permanent and flexible contracts will also be reduced. As a result, employers will – the minister expects – more often opt for a permanent contract. That remains to be seen, as the dismissal law will not be further relaxed and the legal obligation to continue paying wages in case of illness will remain at two years. In addition, many employers need certain flexible shells to cope with the ups and downs in the workload.

1. Flexible workers get more security

On-call contracts, such as zero-hours and/or min-max contracts, will be abolished from 1 January 2025. These will be replaced by a ‘basic contract’, which has yet to be fleshed out. Scholars and students can still continue to work on the basis of current on-call contracts. The employer’s flexible shell will thus be further curtailed. This is again expected to lead to an increase in self-employed workers.

2. Smaller firms’ obligations for long-term incapacitated workers are reduced.

From 1 January 2025, small and medium-sized employers (up to 100 employees) may determine by mutual agreement that reintegration with their own employer (‘first track’) is no longer reasonable and focus entirely on reintegration with another employer (‘second track’). Employers, on the other hand, remain obliged to continue paying wages during illness for two years. They are also co-responsible for the reintegration process. The incapacitated employee retains the right to return to his own job, should he recover in the second year of illness and if the employer has not yet permanently filled his original position.

3. In a crisis or calamity, a company can retain employees

There will be a Crisis Staff Retention Scheme (‘CP’), formerly part-time unemployment. Employers can claim this if there is at least 20% less work across the company. The scheme will be aimed at coping with crisis and calamities, which fall outside the regular business risk (e.g. in case of another lockdown due to a pandemic). The CP implies that only 80% wages need to be paid on the number of hours not worked in a crisis situation. Of this, the employer can then claim back 60% under the scheme.

4. So-called false self-employment among self-employed workers will be reduced

There are almost 1.2 million self-employed in the Netherlands. Among them are also a large number of “false self-employed”. In fact, Deliveroo’s meal deliverers, Uber’s drivers were also pseudo self-employed.

The lack of protection in case of illness and dismissal and the fact that these self-employed workers (wrongly) only contribute to social security to a limited extent is seen as problematic.

There will therefore be legislation, which will define the ‘organisational embeddedness of the work and the worker’. This is the decisive criterion on the basis of which a commission contract may turn out to be an employment contract after all. In addition, this should combat false self-employment. Moreover, it will become easier for self-employed persons to claim an employment contract. Indeed, there will be a civil-law legal presumption of an employment contract linked to an hourly rate (a possible rate below €35 per hour). If the zzp’er’s hourly rate is higher, this will be a contraindication for a contract for services.

Finally, the enforcement moratorium by the tax authorities will finally be lifted in 2025 and the (to be adapted) DBA Act will be enforced again. The question is, however, whether the tax authorities will then have sufficient capacity to actually enforce it.

Questions about the future of the labour market and implications for your organisation?

In short; another set of far-reaching labour market changes are on the agenda. Do you have questions about how these labour market changes will affect your organisation? Then contact Richard Ouwerling, employment law lawyer at LVH Advocaten in Rotterdam for more information.

Deferral of tax payment during corona

Deferral of tax payment during corona

During the corona crisis, the Emergency Measures Corona Crisis Decree included conditions under which a deferral of payment could be requested from the Tax Administration. In order to qualify for this scheme, the entrepreneur had to meet these conditions. One of these conditions is that no dividend may be paid at the time of the deferral. In addition, no bonuses may be paid.

As of April 1, 2022, all new payment obligations must be met again

As of October 1, 2021, the special deferral of payment expired. As a result, taxpayers who had special deferrals due to the corona crisis must again meet all new and current tax payment obligations. A new payment obligation exists if a tax return is filed on or after April 1, 2022. For example, the VAT return for the first quarter of 2022 falls under this, as this return for this quarter must be made after April 1. This also applies to the wage tax return for the month of March.

Tax debt payment schedule effective October 1

As of October 2022, the tax debt deferred as a result of the special deferral scheme must be repaid. For this purpose, a payment scheme has been established. Entrepreneurs pay off the debt in 60 monthly equal installments. After these 60 months (on October 1, 2027), the tax debt must be completely repaid. A question that arises is whether during this payment scheme there are still conditions that the entrepreneur must observe, such as the condition that no dividend may be distributed.

May dividends be paid during the payment plan?

The Decree on Emergency Measures in the Corona Crisis states that no bonuses and dividends may be paid until the moratorium is withdrawn. So the question is when can it be said that the deferral has been withdrawn. On October 1, 2021, the deferral was withdrawn and on October 1, 2022, the repayment of the debt begins.

Taking this into account, dividends should be allowed to be paid again. However, it seems that the State Secretary thinks differently about this. In the latest version of the decree it has been included that the previously mentioned conditions apply in full during the payment scheme* and that no bonuses and/or dividends may be distributed.

If the conditions are not met, the payment arrangement may be terminated

If the entrepreneur does pay dividends or bonuses or does not meet the other conditions, the Recipient can claim that the conditions have not been met. The payment scheme may then be terminated. It follows from the Parliamentary Letter Monitoring fiscal measures in connection with covid-19 that if the conditions for the payment scheme are not met, the entrepreneur will be contacted to see if there are possibilities to meet the payment scheme after all. The entrepreneur therefore does not have to be afraid that without consultation the entire tax debt will suddenly have to be repaid.

Need advice from a tax lawyer in Rotterdam?

Do you have questions about the implications of the payment plan? If so, please contact our tax attorney David Harreman.

* Decision on emergency measures for the corona crisis, Decision of the Secretary of State of January 26, 2022, no 2022-20850, Government Gazette 2022-1588, par 3.1

High fuel prices and fuel shortages: what can airlines expect under Regulation (EC) No 261/2004?

In early May, the European Commission published guidelines intended to clarify how existing EU regulations (including airlines’ obligations to compensate passengers) should be applied. This followed the conflict in the Middle East, which has led to disruptions in the energy supply (high fuel prices and shortages).

This article first examines the implications of the current European Regulation. It then sets out the content of the guidelines and, finally, discusses the consequences for airlines.

Regulation (EC) No 261/2004

Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 protects passengers’ rights regarding compensation, care and reimbursement in the event of aviation disruptions, such as flight delays, cancellations or denied boarding. The Regulation sets out the rights to which a passenger is entitled. It also clarifies the obligations of an airline.

In the event of a flight cancellation, a passenger has the right to choose between a refund of the ticket price or rebooking onto another flight, and is also entitled to assistance at the airport. If the cancellation takes place within 14 days of the scheduled departure time, the passenger is, in principle, also entitled to compensation. This does not apply if the cancellation is caused by extraordinary circumstances that could not have been avoided, despite the airline having taken all reasonable measures. In that case, the airline is not obliged to pay compensation.

To clarify the concept of ‘extraordinary circumstances’, these are circumstances that are not inherent in the normal course of a carrier’s operations. The term ‘reasonable measures’ means that the carrier has taken all measures that could reasonably be expected of it to prevent or minimise the consequences for passengers.

High fuel prices and fuel shortages

The question is whether high fuel prices and fuel shortages can be classified as extraordinary circumstances. The European Commission has ruled that increased fuel prices cannot be regarded as extraordinary circumstances within the meaning of Article 5 of the Regulation, as fuel forms part of an airline’s costs and is therefore automatically subject to significant (price) fluctuations. Managing these fluctuations falls within the scope of an airline’s normal business operations, according to the European Commission.

The European Commission further states that a large number of airlines already hedge against these fluctuating fuel prices. According to the European Commission, airlines can anticipate this by passing on these costs in their ticket prices, referring in this regard to the system of free pricing.

The European Commission further emphasises that airlines may not adjust ticket prices retrospectively to compensate for increased fuel costs.

What may, however, be regarded as extraordinary circumstances is a local fuel shortage that prevents a flight from taking place. After all, such a shortage is not inherent to the normal operations of an airline. In such a case, the onus of proof rests with the airline to demonstrate that there was a fuel shortage and that this was in fact the cause of the cancellation.

Consequences for airlines

The foregoing implies that cancelling a flight due to high fuel prices cannot be regarded as an extraordinary circumstance, whilst a local fuel shortage may, under certain circumstances, qualify as such. This will always have to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. The guidelines therefore oblige airlines to carefully align their operational and commercial strategies.

The aviation team at LVH Advocaten advises airlines on the legal interpretation and practical application of these guidelines. Please feel free to contact Bram van Ruijven without obligation.

My debtor won’t pay

My debtor won’t pay.

Being right and being right are two different things, it is sometimes said. This is not entirely true, but it shows that a court ruling is not always considered satisfactory. If the verdict remains the same even on appeal to the Supreme Court, there is not much that can be done about it. The judgment must be enforced. If a company has been convicted, it is up to the director of the company to do the same. At most, it could be considered whether a payment arrangement can be made, a commercial solution can be found or the damage can be passed on by holding someone else liable for it.

But what if a debtor fails to comply with a court order? Then the bailiff can be called in and measures for collection can be taken, such as attachment of the company’s bank account, stocks or real estate. The bank must pay the seized money in the bank account to the bailiff, stocks and real estate can be sold by auction, etc.

In practice, a judgment is usually obeyed and paid voluntarily after the court’s ruling. Sometimes it is necessary to involve the bailiff. But this does not always lead to the desired result, for example because the company is in financial difficulties and there is simply nothing to collect. The approach with the best chance of success then is to file for bankruptcy of the company, so that the few financial resources that may be left are used to pay your claim instead of that of another creditor with more patience.

Unwillingness to pay

However, it may also be that the company that needs to pay does have the ability to do so, but chooses not to take advantage of it while the company is structured in such a way that collection measures by the bailiff cannot be effective. Consider, for example, a structure in which all the assets of the operating company are owned by the holding company and leased to the operating company, while also the financial resources – at the discretion of the holding company – may or may not be made available to the operating company or the specially formed project company. Such a construction can be clever and permissible, but it can also get a little too clever. If this is abused, the director may be liable in private for the amounts that cannot be collected from the operating company or project company.

Inability to pay

Liability of the director can also arise in a situation where there is no more money and thus no situation of unwillingness to pay. Then there is force majeure, but is it right for a supplier or other creditor to be the victim of this?

The director of a company can be held personally liable by a creditor if he entered into obligations on behalf of the company at the time he knew or should have understood that they would not be met and the company would have no recourse. An example is the director who receives an order on behalf of his limited liability company from a new customer. He immediately sends an invoice for the first installment, but at that time the bank has already cancelled the credit or there is a huge tax debt for which subpoenas have been received. The customer pays the first installment, but a few weeks later the company goes bankrupt and cannot fulfill its obligations to the customer. For the customer’s damages, the director may be liable in private. The relevant question is whether, at the time of sending his invoice, the director still had a realistic prospect of a solution, for example because another meeting was scheduled with the bank at which a proposal would be discussed or because a deferral of payment could still be obtained from the tax authorities. Depending on the exact situation, a director in such a case may or may not be sued privately to compensate the damage suffered by the customer because he has paid an invoice but has not received delivery. Or to compensate the damage of a supplier who delivered in good faith when the director should have already known that things would go wrong and the company would not be able to pay the invoice for this delivery.

Something else again is the situation where the company cannot fulfill its obligations, but the director knowingly allowed this situation to arise. The director can also be held privately liable for the resulting damages. For example, consider the situation where you buy a property from a company, but it is not delivered because the director decides to still sell this property to another party who apparently made a better offer. If this goes wrong and the damages you suffer as a result cannot be collected from the company, the director may be liable in private.

Selective payment

What is allowed is selective payment of certain creditors and leaving others unpaid. This is different again when the company has decided to cease its activities. Then it may not choose to pay claims from related parties (e.g. those of a shareholder) and leave claims from regular creditors unpaid in part because there is too little money. Or to pay off the bank debt for which the director stands surety and not to pay a supplier or to pay only part of it.

Under circumstances it may be that the director should have taken future liabilities into account, for example by making a provision for them. If the director fails to do so and spends money that is not actually there, he can also be held personally liable for this. Again, this is especially true in a situation where related parties do get paid or debts are paid off in which the director has a personal interest, such as the aforementioned example of the bank debt for which he stands surety.

Questions about debt collection or director liability?

If you are dealing with a customer who does not pay or a contracting party who does not fulfill its obligations, we can help you. Even if the regular collection process fails, there may still be possibilities to obtain payment or compensation for your damages.

If, on the other hand, you are the director who, in your opinion wrongfully, is held privately liable, we are also there to defend your position.

Whether a director is just liable or not always depends on the specific circumstances. Doing business is also taking risks and that is allowed, according to the Supreme Court. But if someone can be personally blamed, he must privately compensate for damages. The dividing line is thin and this is where we can make the difference for you. If you need us to do so, please contact Bouwe Bos.

Pitfalls for directors and supervisory directors in a leveraged buyout

Introduction and description of a leveraged buyout

In a leveraged buyout, the shares of a target company are acquired by a specially created acquisition vehicle (the acquisition holding company), with the purchase price being financed largely with debt and, to a lesser extent, with equity.

Advantages of a leveraged buyout

The advantage of this financing method is that a relatively small investment of equity capital can generate a relatively high return on the share capital, provided that the (indirect) buyer of the shares of the target company (usually a private equity fund, via the purchasing holding company) succeeds in selling the shares at a profit after a certain period of time.

Bank financing for a leveraged buyout

The portion of the purchase price that is financed with borrowed capital is usually provided by the bank in the form of a loan to the purchasing holding company. The purchasing holding company is usually an empty shell with no assets other than the shares in the target company.

Collateral provided by the target company in a leveraged buyout

In a leveraged buyout, the bank requires collateral when granting the loan to the purchasing holding company. This is done by the purchasing holding company granting the bank a pledge on the shares it holds in the target company. The bank often requires that the target company and its subsidiaries also guarantee the interest and repayment obligations of the purchasing holding company. In that case, the target company provides security on its assets for the benefit of the bank.

Rules for directors and supervisory directors when providing security

The target company’s guarantee for the purchase holding company’s obligations towards the bank and the provision of security on its assets to the bank are subject to rules laid down by the Enterprise Chamber.

Firstly, advice must be sought from the target company’s works council. Furthermore, rules apply to the directors and (if applicable) supervisory directors of the target company.

It is important for the director(s) of the target company to bear in mind that a leveraged buyout involves a considerable (potential) financial burden for the target company. In the interests of the target company, the directors must therefore consider it their duty to weigh up all the advantages of the leveraged buyout against the (potential financial) disadvantages. This weighing of interests is not only a question of whether the continuity of the target company is sufficiently assured by the provision of the securities, but above all whether the continued success of the company will benefit from the leveraged buyout and whether the leveraged buyout will enable the target company to implement its strategy.

What is expected of directors and supervisory directors in a leveraged buyout

Directors are expected to ask themselves repeatedly from the start of the takeover process whether the decision in favor of a leveraged buyout and the specific terms and conditions thereof are in line with the interests of the target company. The directors must take a proactive stance in this regard and, where necessary, counterbalance the parties involved in the leveraged buyout, including the private equity fund and the bank.

This is where the dynamics of the takeover process come into play, as directors are often required to make last-minute decisions with far-reaching consequences, even though they were not involved in the preparations for these decisions, or only to a limited extent.

In practice, the private equity fund usually negotiates with the bank on the terms of the loan to finance (a large part of) the purchase price of the shares of the target company. It is not uncommon for the directors of the target company to only be informed of the financing conditions shortly before the intended acquisition date and to be expected to take a decision “overnight” on the provision of security by the target company and its subsidiaries.

All this while the Enterprise Chamber expects the directors to take careful decisions, whereby the directors have obtained sufficient insight into the possible consequences of providing security prior to the decision-making.

Specifically, the directors are expected to:

  1. Make a careful and transparent inventory of the obligations arising from the provision of security;
  2. Have the advantages and disadvantages for the target company associated with the security (and the fact that it could consequently become liable for the obligations of the purchasing holding company under the acquisition financing) assessed objectively and externally;
  3. Make a specific assessment of the risks of the security for the interests of the target company and its business, weighed against the benefits to be gained.

In doing so, the directors are also expected to stand firm and be able to counterbalance the often emphatic wishes of other parties involved in the leveraged buyout to complete the acquisition without delay.

The supervisory board (if applicable) is generally expected to carefully weigh all interests involved and to perform its supervisory and advisory role in a meaningful manner. This means, for example, that the supervisory board is familiar with relevant documents and that it adequately assesses the management decision to provide security against the interests of the target company. The supervisory board must also carefully weigh the advantages and disadvantages of providing security.

Risks for directors and supervisory board members in leveraged buyouts

The consequences for directors and supervisory board members if they fail to meet these expectations and the transaction subsequently fails are serious: they may be accused of mismanagement, for which they may be held liable.

Following on from this article, see also Deficiencies in participation – LVH advocaten Rotterdam.

Information

If you have any questions about this article or this subject, please contact Peter Verheijden.

Dismissal of statutory director: reasonable grounds for dismissal?

Dismissal of statutory director: reasonable grounds for dismissal?

The dismissal of a statutory director occupies a special position within labor law. For example, the protection against dismissal that a director under the articles of association has is designed differently from normal employees. It is no different in that there must be reasonable grounds for a legally valid dismissal. The absence of reasonable grounds can cost the employer dearly.

In this article, we discuss the special position of the statutory director, the requirements of dismissal of the statutory director and special attention is paid to the existence of reasonable grounds for dismissal.

Employment law and corporate law bond of statutory director

The special position of the statutory director is characterized by the existence of a corporate and an employment law bond, both of which must be severed in the event of dismissal. In order to sever both with one act, the dismissal decision, it is important that the relationship is intertwined and not split. A split bond exists if the director performs work exclusively for the company where he is a director and does not perform work for the company with which he has an employment contract. In that case, in addition to the dismissal decree, employment termination is required.

Note: Always check whether there is actually a corporate appointment as a statutory director. There is only a statutory director if there is an appointment and acceptance of that appointment.

No preventive dismissal test for statutory director

The director has less severance protection than the normal employee. There is no preventive test. This means that no permission from the UWV or dissolution by the court is required. The consent of the director is also not required. However, there must be a reasonable ground for the dismissal, the notice prohibitions (e.g. illness) apply, the reemployment obligation applies and a notice period must be observed.

Reasonable grounds for dismissal of statutory director

There must be reasonable grounds for a legally valid dismissal of the statutory director. In the absence of such grounds, the statutory director cannot apply to the subdistrict court for restoration of the employment contract. However, the director can claim fair compensation. The compensation can be high. Therefore, always seek advice regarding the dismissal of a statutory director.

The reasonable ground for dismissal of a statutory director can, for example, be a difference of opinion on the policy to be pursued, dysfunction, disagreement with other directors, or a loss of confidence from the shareholders. This reasonable ground must be included in the resolution to dismiss.

Please note that there are various company law requirements attached to the dismissal decision (AGM notice period, advisory and hearing rights). Our lawyers can advise you further on these, as well as on the existence of reasonable cause.

By way of illustration, reference is made to a judgment of the Overijssel District Court dated August 29, 2023. The employee in this case had joined the company in 2014 and was appointed CFO and statutory director in 2022. In 2023, he received an invitation to the general meeting of shareholders (AGM). On the agenda was his resignation. Employee did not attend the meeting, but filed a defense. The subdistrict court reviewed reasonable cause in the proceedings. The subdistrict court considered that after the share transfer, a “different wind started blowing.” The new shareholder expected a different approach. However, the CFO had not been sufficiently informed about the desired expectations from the shareholders. Nor had it been made known what changes were to be implemented in what time frame and whether these changes were of a permanent nature. Partly in view of a director’s autonomy, the Subdistrict Court found this to be incorrect. Only when it is clear that the director does not want to conform to the policy to be pursued, an unworkable situation arises and the employment contract can be terminated.

In short, termination of the employment of a statutory director is not simply possible. The reasonable ground must – as with an ordinary employee – be able to be properly substantiated. It must be clear that the employment contract cannot reasonably be continued.

Advice on dismissal of statutory director

The employment lawyers at LVH Advocaten in Rotterdam regularly advise on the dismissal of employees, statutory directors and other matters relating to personnel. If you have any questions or would like more information about the dismissal of employees, please contact LVH Advocaten.

Bill to lift pledge bans

On June 11, 2024, the House of Representatives adopted the Bill to Remove Pledge Prohibitions. As a result of the proposed regulation, it will no longer be possible to agree that receivables cannot be transferred or pledged.  This article explains the proposed regulation.

Transferability claims

Virtually all claims are subject to assignment and pledge. There are some exceptions to this. In some cases, because of the nature of the claim, it is assumed that transfer is not possible. This is the case, for example, with a claim which the trustee in bankruptcy has against a director pursuant to Article 2:248 of the Dutch Civil Code regarding improper management.

Appointment exclusion portability

Under current law, parties may agree that a claim is nontransferable.  For example, a party may state in purchase conditions that claims against that party are not assignable.

In a judgment dated July 1, 2022, the Supreme Court considered that it also follows from a clause to the effect that a claim is non-transferable that the claim cannot be pledged. In doing so, the Supreme Court referred to the law, which stipulates that a pledge can only be established on goods susceptible to transfer (Art. 3:228 BW).

It may be convenient for a party if a claim against him cannot be transferred or pledged. In that case, it is always clear to whom payment can be made and there is also no reason to change payment information in the records. In addition, the party with whom the contract is made is well informed about the situation, whereas an outsider (such as a factoring company) is usually less well informed.

It is important for lenders to obtain ample coverage for the credit extended through collateral provided. The more collateral that can be provided, the more credit can be obtained. In practice, pledging receivables is an important form of security. However, if two parties doing business with each other agree that assignment (and/or pledging) is not possible, then no pledge will be established.

Background bill lifting pledge bans

The restrictions imposed by the agreements on non-transferability and non-pledgeability of claims are seen by legislators as undesirable economic side effects. Added to this is the fact that in our neighboring countries the possibilities to limit transferability have already been abolished or further restricted. The rationale behind the bill is that by abolishing nontransferability and non-pawnability, there will be a significant widening of credit potential for business. This could then prevent unnecessary liquidity problems and provide more room for investment and innovation.

Consequences of bill to lift pledge bans

The bill contains a new provision. According to this provision, exclusion of transferability or pledgeability is not possible if it concerns a registered monetary claim arising from the exercise of a profession or business.  Nevertheless, if it is agreed between creditor and debtor that such monetary claim is nontransferable or cannot be pledged, that agreement is void. This means that such an agreement has no legal effect.

An agreement aimed at preventing alienation or pledging is also void. This might, for example, be an agreement to the effect that the creditor is prohibited from assigning the claim and/or a penalty becomes payable if the creditor does so.

The provision therefore shows that it only concerns monetary claims arising from the exercise of a profession or business. Suppose someone provides a money loan from a private capacity, then it may be agreed that the claim for repayment is non-transferable.

There are additionally some exceptional cases mentioned in the bill. One example is the claim from a checking or savings account. If one has a positive balance in a bank account, this is considered a claim of the account holder against the bank. Banks may still stipulate that such claims are not transferable and cannot be pledged.

Written notice to debtor about assignment of claim

The bill provides that if a monetary claim (registered and arising from the exercise of a profession or business) is transferred, notice must be given to the debtor of the claim. This notice must be given in writing. Only after the notice has been given will the debtor have to pay to the new creditor. In this way, the legislature hopes to accommodate the debtor’s interest in having clarity about the payment address.

Effective date and effect on existing contractual non-transferability agreements

For now, the law will not take effect yet. First, the bill still has to pass the Senate. Once the law enters into force, it will also affect clauses in contracts concluded prior to the entry into force of the law. Three months after the entry into force of the law, clauses contrary to the law will become null and void.

Negative pledge still possible

A negative pledge clause means that the borrower promises to the lender not to create security interests in property owned by the borrower in favor of other creditors. For example, in liens on receivables, banks stipulate that the borrower/pawnbroker will not create liens on receivables in favor of others. Such agreements will still be permitted even after the new law comes into effect. The new law refers only to stipulations “between creditor and debtor.

Resuming Act on Lifting Pledge Bans.

After the Act on the Abolition of Prohibitions of Pledge takes effect, stipulations between creditors and debtors regarding the non-transferability and non-pledgeability of claims will no longer be legally valid. Whether this will actually have a significant positive economic effect will have to be seen in practice.

Looking for an attorney in the field of securities?

If you have questions about pledging, collateral and assignment of claims, please contact Peter de Graaf of LVH Lawyers.

Forfeited penalty payment can serve as a support claim

Forfeited penalty payment can serve as a support claim

A creditor can proceed to file for the bankruptcy of a debtor. To do this, an application must be filed with the court. To do so successfully, hoForfeited penalty payment can serve as a support claim weaver, the creditor must make it plausible that the debtor is in a state of cessation of payments. This always requires another claim (a support claim) in addition to the claimant’s claim. The Supreme Court recently handed down a judgment on whether a claim in respect of a forfeited penalty payment can serve as a support claim.

The penalty payment in bankruptcy

Creditors of the bankrupt can submit their claim to the trustee for verification. The trustee places the claim on the list of creditors. If sufficient estate assets are realised, a distribution can be made to the creditors.
The legislator has stipulated that penalty payments may not participate in bankruptcy (Art. 611e Code of Civil Procedure). A penalty payment cannot be forfeited during bankruptcy. And penalties forfeited before the declaration of bankruptcy may not be included in the liabilities of the bankruptcy. So this means that this claim cannot be included in the list of recognised creditors.
In 1996, the Supreme Court issued a judgment in which it held that a bankruptcy petition cannot be based solely on a claim for payment of forfeited penalties. The idea is that that creditor has no reasonable interest in the bankruptcy. After all, that creditor cannot expect payment from the bankruptcy.
If a claim in respect of penalty payments may not participate in bankruptcy, can it serve as a claim in support of the bankruptcy petition? This is in fact the question the Supreme Court addressed in the recent judgment.

Support claim in bankruptcy petition

The Supreme Court has always strictly adhered to the requirement of a support claim. In 2017, the Supreme Court issued a judgment on the situation where the bankruptcy petitioner had a claim against the debtor of €2.1 million, but there was no support claim. The Supreme Court ruled that the bankruptcy petition was rightly rejected by the court and the court of appeal. It pointed out that the purpose of bankruptcy is to distribute the debtor’s assets to its joint creditors. With that purpose, declaring bankruptcy of a debtor who has only one creditor is contrary. The Supreme Court saw no reason to go back on established case law.
No high requirements are imposed on the support claim itself. If the bankruptcy petitioner has a claim due and payable, the support claim does not have to be a claim due and payable. Of course, it does always apply that the court will have to assess whether there is a state of cessation of payments. In the 2015 Berzona judgment, the Supreme Court ruled that for a support claim to be valid, it is sufficient that it is a claim that can be submitted for verification in bankruptcy.

Forfeited penalty payment as maintenance claim?

Now back to the recent Supreme Court judgment. The bankruptcy applicant in that case had a money claim and also argued that the Flemish government had a claim against the debtor (of no less than €260,000) for forfeited penalty payments. The court declared the debtor bankrupt and, on appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld this judgment. The Court of Appeal ruled that while it may be the case that a penalty payment may not participate in the bankruptcy, it can be used as a basis for claiming that the debtor is in bankruptcy.
The debtor also argued that in the Berzona judgment, the Supreme Court held that a support claim must always be a claim that can be submitted for verification.
However, according to the Supreme Court, this is not how the Berzona judgment intended. In short, the Supreme Court indicated that Section 611 e Rv. does not prevent a third-party claim in respect of forfeited penalty payments from being used as a support claim by the applicant.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court has clarified that a forfeited penalty payment can serve as a support claim in a bankruptcy petition.
A bankruptcy petition can be a good lever to force payment by a debtor. As lawyers, we assist both parties seeking to file for a debtor’s bankruptcy and parties seeking to defend against a bankruptcy filing. If you have any questions on this topic, please contact Peter de Graaf.

Work-at-home policies and the role of the works council

Since the beginning of the corona crisis, hybrid working has been the norm. The number of corona infections is slowly increasing again. It is not inconceivable that some companies will soon again require their employees to work wholly or partially from home.

Agreements on working from home

Employers and employees should make their own arrangements for an appropriate division between on-site and home work. Currently, only half of companies have a home-working policy. Research shows that a large majority of employees believe that working from home should be well regulated. Flexibility in this policy is a must, even given the ever-changing government recommendations.

Role of works council

The works council (OR) can also play an important role here. Not only can the Works Council push for an adequate complete homework policy, but it has a right of consent under Section 27 of the Works Councils Act (WOR) when introducing or changing a homework policy or arrangement. After all, these are regulations on working conditions and conditions of employment. For example, a homeworking policy will often include rules on working hours, working conditions, assessment systems and employee tracking systems. Even though homeworking is not mentioned as such in the WOR, the Works Council is still required to give its consent because this policy affects working conditions and terms of employment.

No consent

Without consent, the business owner cannot implement the work-at-home policy, which looks at the above points. Does the entrepreneur do this anyway? Then the Works Council can invoke the nullity of this decision within one month after the announcement of the homework policy. The entrepreneur may be able to go to the subdistrict court for substitute consent if the Works Council withholds its consent.

‘Right of initiative’ works council

If the employer does not want to introduce a homework policy or homework regulation, the Works Council can take the initiative with the so-called ‘right of initiative’. A proposal to this end must be substantiated in writing by the Works Council (and discussed at least once in a consultation meeting). The employer is not obliged to implement the Works Council’s initiative proposal, but must give reasons why it refrains from doing so.

Advisory right

The strange thing is that for a new home-working policy to be introduced, the Works Council is also obliged to advise on certain points (see Article 25 WOR). For example, if working from home leads to an important change in the organization of the company or to the introduction or modification of an important technological facility (think of switching to a new work system). Or perhaps the home working leads to important investments for the entrepreneur and he must therefore seek advice.

Conclusion

In short, it is important for both the entrepreneur and the works council to consider the consequences of hybrid or home working and what rights (consent or advice) may be associated with it. In smaller companies, the staff meeting or staff representation may have certain co-determination rights. It is therefore important to involve these co-determination bodies in the process about working from home at an early stage.

More information or advice on a work-at-home policy?

Would you like to know more about the rights of the Works Council with regard to homeworking policies? Or do you want to introduce such a policy within your company and have it drafted or monitored? Contact Richard Ouwerling, employment law attorney at LVH Advocaten.

The transfer of operations within a corporate group

In a previous article, I wrote about the risks associated with an inherently risky structure. By distributing a company’s assets and activities across various group companies, there is a risk that a creditor will have little or no recourse for debts.

Recently, the Court of Appeal in The Hague issued a ruling on the question of whether recourse may be frustrated by the transfer (“reallocation”) of activities by one group company to another group company.

Background

Customs broker Eurotransit is performing services on behalf of logistics company Ahlers. In doing so, Eurotransit handles the customs declaration for the import of certain goods for a client of Ahlers. By mistake, an incorrect commodity code is used, resulting in insufficient import duties being collected initially, and the tax authorities impose a back tax assessment of €1.3 million on Eurotransit. Based on the Fenex terms and conditions, Eurotransit claims the amount of the back tax assessment from its client, Ahlers. This takes place in 2005.
Following this incident, a restructuring takes place within Ahlers’ company. Ahlers’ activities and assets are transferred to LV Ahlers, a group company within the Ahlers group. LV Ahlers and Ahlers have the same directors. After this transfer in 2005, no further activities take place within Ahlers.
Lengthy legal proceedings follow, but in 2013, the Court of Appeal in The Hague orders Ahlers to pay Eurotransit €1.5 million in damages. Ahlers cannot pay this amount because all assets were transferred and operations ceased in 2005. A few months later, the company Ahlers is even completely dissolved. Eurotransit is left empty-handed. Eurotransit does not give up and sues (the board of) LV Ahlers for frustration of recovery; the transfer of operations within the group, leaving Ahlers empty and no longer offering any recourse for Eurotransit’s claim.

LV Ahlers’ Liability for Impeding the Ability to Seek Redress

Eurotransit held LV Ahlers (and its board) liable for wrongful acts, and the court granted Eurotransit’s claim for damages. An appeal was filed against this ruling. In the appeal proceedings, the focus was on the issue of “frustration of recourse”—the obstruction of recourse options after an obligation has arisen.

Administrative discretion

The court finds that, taken on its own, the group’s decision—following the separation from Ahlers—to transfer operations to a new company rather than continue them within the existing company cannot be regarded as a tortious act against Eurotransit. The court finds that a restructuring falls within the group’s freedom of organization. The board may exercise that freedom, even if there was the threat of a claim by Eurotransit. This is the starting point.
However, what may be required of the board in this context is that, when transferring significant assets, the value of those assets be determined correctly, for example through an appraisal by external experts. The value thus determined must, certainly if the activities are terminated, subsequently remain available to the creditors. The value could, for example, have been set aside. Ahlers did not do so.
The Ahlers board knew or should reasonably have known that the transfer of the activities would result in Ahlers being unable to fulfill its obligation at all and thus offering no recourse. Although the obligation toward Eurotwist was in dispute, the board had to take its existence seriously into account. By failing to take this into account, they are seriously at fault. The fact that the claim was disputed by Ahlers at the time of the transfer of activities and had not (yet) been established in court does not alter this. LV Ahlers must compensate Eurotwist for the damage suffered as a result of the unlawful conduct.

Damage

With liability having been established, things seemed to be turning out well for Eurotransit. But nothing could be further from the truth. The court had assessed Eurotransit’s damages at 1.3 million euros. However, due to “contributory negligence” on the part of Eurotransit, a 50% reduction was applied. This reduction for contributory negligence was imposed because the court held that Eurotransit was itself to blame for the lack of recourse. Eurotransit had the opportunity to secure recourse. Eurotransit failed to do so, thereby taking a risk itself, and that risk materialized. Thus, instead of full compensation, Eurotransit is only entitled to 50% of the damages. Things get even worse for Eurotransit at the court of appeals. The court questioned the value of the assets and operations transferred by Ahlers to LV Ahlers in 2005. The court had the damages assessed by experts. With the help of experts, the court determines that the damages resulting from the frustration of recovery amount to only €132,147. That was the value of the transferred assets in 2005, and that amount should have been set aside in 2005 so that Eurotransit could (still) recover its losses from it.

Looking for a corporate law attorney?

Would you like to know more about liability in bankruptcy? Feel free to contact Rob Steenhoek of LVH Advocaten. He specializes in insolvency and corporate law and will be happy to assist you.

Defense Against Passenger Claims

Regulation 261/2004 and Montreal Convention?

Is a flight delayed or canceled or does a passenger face a denied boarding? Then Regulation 261/2004 and the Montreal Convention (Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air) govern the rights of passengers vis-à-vis tour operators and airlines. Passengers can claim compensation (lump sum) and care or assistance (e.g. accommodation, meals and refund of ticket price or a replacement flight). Furthermore, the Regulation and the Convention sometimes also offer the possibility of compensation for other individual damages.

They may file these claims with the airline or a tour operator. In short, airlines and tour operators regularly face claims, which are not always (fully) assignable. After all, there are numerous factors at play in aviation that airlines can face that disrupt flight operations.

The attorneys at LVH Lawyers have long handled these passenger claims for airlines. We take over the entire handling from the subpoena. This allows the airline to focus on its core business. To give you an idea of what our lawyers have to deal with, a number of topics are discussed below. These come into play in passenger claims arising from Regulation 261/2004 and the Montreal Convention.

Extraordinary circumstances?

At LVH Lawyers, we have now seen all types of extraordinary circumstances pass by. Therefore, we can advise and litigate on the existence of extraordinary circumstances. Strikes, bad weather, power outages, acute medical situations or problems with passengers. Nothing is too crazy. We test the existence of extraordinary circumstances on the basis of the case law of the Court of Justice, as well as lower case law.

It is becoming increasingly clear when an extraordinary circumstance exists. It is therefore easier to assess whether an extraordinary circumstance exists. Nevertheless, there is still some regular discussion about this. Think of the effect of bad weather, the impact of changing an EOBT or a change of aircraft.

What is more difficult, on the other hand, is whether all reasonable measures were taken to mitigate the delay. This varies widely in case law. What about using substitute aircraft, when is there a reasonable alternative? When should a flight be offered from a third airline? Our aviation specialists will be happy to answer these questions and more for you.

Schedule change?

Another topic that comes up with some regularity is schedule amendments. LVH Advocaten is of the opinion that a schedule change is not automatically covered by the Regulation. Therefore, passengers are not always entitled to compensation. A schedule change can in some situations be equated with a cancellation or delay. However, this is not necessarily so.

Additional benefits beyond compensation?

The compensation that follows from Article 7 of Regulation 261/2004 is a lump sum. Discussion of the amount is therefore not an issue. In contrast, this does come into play with the compensation for care costs and the compensation that passengers can claim under the Montreal Convention. Passengers cannot claim all costs. After all, the costs must have been reasonable and necessary. For example, a passenger cannot book a hotel at Transavia’s expense after reaching the final destination because the passenger finds it too late in the evening to go home. It is notable that claim agencies often file all costs, but judges, when sufficiently reasoned defenses are presented, do not award all costs.

Consider, for example, the cost of a replacement ticket. Each airline charges different prices for its tickets. Has a passenger purchased a relatively cheap ticket from an airline? Then the airline cannot be required to bear the cost of a ticket in a completely different price range. After all, the Regulation speaks of a replacement flight with comparable transportation conditions.

Claim bureaus

Several claims agencies operate within the world of passenger claims. These agencies bring many claims to the competent court. LVH Advocaten is familiar with these agencies and can advise you on how to deal with these claims. The agencies all have different working methods, so it is important to be aware of this.

It also remains important to adequately contest the claims. Otherwise, the frameworks of Regulation 261/2004 and the Montreal Convention will be stretched too far. It is good that passengers’ interests are protected, but within the confines of the law.

Conclusion

In short, it is a dynamic area of law when knowledge within aviation is very important. LVH Advocaten has this knowledge. The lawyers do not shy away from METAR messages, IATA delay codes, closing messages and other documents from Eurocontrol. Our lawyers use these documents to tell a clear story in court about the rejection of the claim towards the passengers. Besides knowledge of aviation, LVH Advocaten in Rotterdam is a full service office for entrepreneurs. We have all specialties in-house. This allows us to properly handle all facets of a procedure.

Want to learn more about what our aviation specialists can do for your airline? Feel free to contact Gentia Niesert of LVH Advocaten in Rotterdam for more information about passenger claims handling.

Litigating on behalf of a company: a legal pitfall?

Litigating on behalf of a company: a legal pitfall?

Under company law, a legal entity can participate independently in legal transactions. This implies, among other things, that a company can conduct legal proceedings. However, conducting proceedings on behalf of a company requires careful compliance with both internal decision-making rules and rules on external representation. It may sound like a minor detail, but it can make the difference between an admissible claim and a painful rejection by the court. A recent ruling by the Limburg District Court on 18 December 2024 illustrates this.

The case: internal management dispute

In the case in question, two shareholders, who were also directors of a company, got into a conflict. One of them instructed a lawyer to assist her in her capacity as a shareholder. The lawyer then drew up a summons, not only on behalf of her client personally, but also on behalf of the company itself.

The defendant, i.e. the other director, rightly objected to this. The defendant argued that the company’s claims were inadmissible, as no legally valid decision had been taken to initiate proceedings. After all, the lawyer had been engaged by only one director, while the articles of association stipulated that the board was only authorised to act jointly. The other director had not granted power of attorney.

What went wrong?

The court made a clear distinction between two aspects:

1. External representation

External representation concerns acting on behalf of the company towards third parties, such as engaging a lawyer. According to the articles of association, both directors had to act jointly. In this case, only one director instructed the lawyer.

However, this did not lead to inadmissibility, as an appeal on the grounds of unauthorised representation under Section 2:240(3) of the Dutch Civil Code can only be made by the company itself.

2. Internal decision-making

Internal decision-making concerns the taking of decisions within the board, such as initiating legal proceedings. This is where things went wrong. The company’s articles of association stipulated that a board decision had to be taken by an absolute majority of votes of all directors entitled to vote. If a director has a conflict of interest, as was the case here, the decision must also be taken by the general meeting of shareholders (GMS). In this case, no board meeting had been held at all, let alone a board decision, nor had a GMS been convened. The court therefore ruled that the company’s claims were inadmissible due to the lack of a legally valid internal decision.

And what about the lawyer?

A striking detail in this ruling is that the defendant is also a director and shareholder of the company and, naturally, does not want the company to bear the legal costs. The defendant therefore requested the court, pursuant to Article 245 of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure, to order the plaintiff’s lawyer to pay the legal costs. This was because the company did not appear in court in a legally valid manner, as an unauthorised co-director acted on its behalf and gave the instruction to bring legal proceedings. The court granted this exceptional request.

Practical implications

This ruling emphasises that directors must be aware of the formal requirements when initiating proceedings on behalf of the company. Failure to comply with the rules laid down in the articles of association can have far-reaching consequences, including inadmissibility and personal liability for legal costs.

If a director wishes to initiate proceedings against a fellow director, but the articles of association require joint decision-making, the conflict of interest rule may offer a solution. If it is established that the other director has a conflict of interest, he or she may not participate in the decision-making process. The decision can then be validly taken by the competent body, for example the general meeting of shareholders.

Is a right of usufruct on claims a meaningful alternative?

Is a right of usufruct on claims a meaningful alternative?

A right of usufruct gives the right to use goods belonging to another person and enjoy the fruits thereof. The Supreme Court recently handed down a judgment on the question whether a usufruct on receivables can serve to appropriate what has been collected. The case involved claims relating to rent payments. The Supreme Court is of the opinion that this is not possible. After all, that would be tantamount to the collected property being both the asset on which the usufruct rests and the usufruct at the same time.

What is a right of usufruct?

A literal example is if I establish a usufruct on my apple tree (the usufruct object) for the benefit of someone else. The holder of the usufruct (the usufructuary) may then use my apple tree and have the apples growing on the tree.

Suppose you want to put your property in the name of your children, but you yourself still want to continue living in the property, you can arrange this right of use by having a usufruct established.

What is a usufruct on a let property?

With a usufruct on a rented property, the usufructuary is entitled to the rental payments arising from it. In that case, the rental payments are the fruits.

Case of right of usufruct on claims

Simplified, the case that led to the Supreme Court’s judgment was as follows. KPN sometimes places telecom antennas on land belonging to landowners. In return, KPN must then pay rent to the landowners. Telecom Vastgoed has concluded agreements with the landowners whereby, in exchange for a one-off surrender sum, a usufruct is established for the benefit of Telecom Vastgoed on the rent payments owed by KPN.

The relevant article in Telecom Realty’s agreement with the landowner read:

“The right of usufruct rests on the periodic rental payments, as well as on all other pecuniary obligations arising as rights of claim of the Owner under the Lease.”

It is clear that it was intended that Telecom Realty would obtain a right to collect claims against KPN itself.

Telecom Vastgoed charged the rental fees to KPN. KPN, however, refused to pay Telecom Vastgoed and transferred the rental payments to the landowners.

Court and Supreme Court rule on usufruct on claims

According to the Court of Appeal, the manner in which Telecom Vastgoed has established usufruct, or at least wishes to implement it, cannot stand the test of criticism. The Supreme Court follows the Court of Appeal’s view. The main consideration of the Supreme Court is:

“Art. 3:201 BW stipulates that usufruct gives the right to use goods belonging to another person and to enjoy the fruits thereof. Whatever is received by collection of claims subject to usufruct belongs to the principal beneficiary and is also subject to usufruct (Art. 3:213 paragraph 1 of the Civil Code). It follows from these provisions that the usufruct on claims cannot serve to appropriate what is received by collection of those claims. After all, that would be tantamount to saying that what is collected is simultaneously the property on which the usufruct rests and the usufruct. The closed system of rights in property law entails that no usufruct can be created that does not meet the legal description.”

Thus, a usufruct on claims cannot serve to appropriate the collected. Going back the literal example of the apple tree: The usufruct on my apple tree gives the usufructuary the right to enjoy the apples of my apple tree. It does not give the right to appropriate my apple tree. The usufruct object cannot also be the fruit.

But what about the example of usufruct on the rental property? The important difference is that the usufruct object in that case is the house and not the rental payments themselves.

Claims can simply be assigned, right?

The case raises the question of why Telecom Realty did not simply have the claims of landowners transferred to it by deed (or assignment). Claims can, in principle, simply be sold and transferred, including future claims. It is conceivable that KPN, in its leases with the landowners, excluded (as a matter of property law) that the landowners could transfer their claims against KPN to another party (within the meaning of Article 3:83(2) of the Civil Code).

Lifting of Pledge Prohibitions Act

Incidentally, a bill is currently under discussion to make the non-transferability of receivables largely impossible (Lifting of Pledge Prohibitions Act). The idea is that there will be wider opportunities for (bank) financing of companies if companies cannot be restricted in transferring / pledging receivables to financiers.

Looking for property law lawyer in Rotterdam?

Thus, the Supreme Court has made it clear that usufruct on claims cannot serve the purpose of transferring the collected to the usufructuary. This made it clear that establishing a usufruct on claims is not a good alternative to the ordinary transfer of claims (assignment).

If you need advice or legal assistance in the area of property law, such as the transfer of property or the creation of security, please contact Peter de Graaf.

The judgment discussed can be found here.

The on-call worker as a flexible shell; 6 points to consider

The on-call worker as a flexible shell; 6 points to consider

If your company’s staffing requirements fluctuate widely, an on-call agreement can be a solution. With an on-call agreement, a flexible layer of employees can be formed and employees can be deployed for a varying number of hours each time.

There are various on-call agreements, such as a zero-hours contract and a min-max contract. The use of on-call agreements has some legal concerns.

1. Call and notice period

The standard rule is that the employee must call for work at least 4 days in advance, e.g. by e-mail or WhatsApp message. The notice period for a zero-hours contract is the same as the on-call period: 4 days.

2. Minimum payout of 3 hours per call

Every time you call up an employee, you must pay the employee a minimum of 3 hours’ pay. Even if he only works for 1 hour.

3. Exclude legal presumption of work scope

In principle, the employee can invoke the legal presumption of work scope. This means that the contract automatically changes in hours to the number of hours the employee has worked on average over the past 3 months. You can exclude this legal presumption in the first 6 months of the contract.

4. Notification and higher WW contribution

As an employer, you are now obliged to report on the payslip that the employment contract is an on-call contract, and you also pay a higher WW premium for on-call workers than for permanent employees.

5. Fixed scope of employment

You must make your employee employed by you on an on-call contract a written offer of a fixed scope of work after every 12 months. When calculating those 12 months, you must include the period of hiring and/or legal predecessors.
The written offer for the fixed scope of work must be at least equal to the average scope of work in those previous 12 months. It is up to the employee to respond to it with a refusal or acceptance of the hours offer within one month.

Did you fail to make the offer or make it too late, or you cannot prove that the offer made was refused? Then, even after a longer period of time, your employee can still claim the salary that was lost as a result from that thirteenth month. The employee has then not worked that difference in hours, but still has a wage claim to recover from your company.

6. Duty to report unpredictable work pattern

Since 1 August last, the Transparent and Predictable Terms of Employment Act has come into force under a European Directive of the same name. This law stipulates that in case of an unpredictable work pattern, the employer must agree on a reference period (days and hours) during which the employee can be called up. If the employer does not comply with this or the employee is called outside the framework, the employee may refuse the call.
Need help drafting an on-call contract?
So far, the main points of interest in an on-call contract. As an entrepreneur, do you want to use on-call employees and need help drafting a watertight contract? Contact Richard Ouwerling, lawyer at LVH Advocaten in Rotterdam for more information.

Stalemate between directors who are also shareholders: what to do?

Stalemate between directors who are also shareholders: what to do?

A common situation. A limited liability company with two directors who are both equal shareholders. The relationship between the two becomes disturbed. Even after calling in a corporate finance advisor, no (third) investor is found who wants to take over all or part of the share capital. Despite an appraisal of the company’s value, no agreement can be reached between the two parties on a buyout. And of course a (clear) dispute settlement in the articles of association or shareholder agreement is also missing.

The parties want to part ways, but at the right price. Meanwhile, the business must be continued without loss of value. The parties want to part ways in a normal way by avoiding escalation, but are still forced to hire a lawyer. What to do in a deadlock between directors who are also shareholders? Corporate lawyer Justin de Vries tells you more.

Options for forced transfer of shares

Attorneys are cautiously pointing out a number of ‘possibilities’ to enable the transfer of shares. In “brackets,” because actually the law does not provide an adequate solution to this “deadlock situation.

Transfer of shares in inquiry proceedings

One option is to initiate inquiry proceedings before the Enterprise Chamber. Although the existing inquiry procedure does not have the forced transfer of shares as a provision,[1] submitting such a dispute can lead to a (forced) transfer of shares.

Transfer of shares through statutory dispute resolution

Another option is to use the statutory dispute resolution procedure. In this procedure, shareholders can file an expulsion or exit claim.[2] Case law shows that the exit ground is interpreted restrictively. Not only is the procedure time-consuming, but the onerous standard used is considered a major objection.

This is odd. Does the situation have to escalate further before an expulsion or exit claim can be granted? Is there no other way to separate efficiently? Is there a rule for the situation where parties have entered into an engagement with good intentions but have become stuck with no real hope of restoring original understanding? No, there is not (as yet). [3][4]

Procedure court deadlock situation

In the proceedings before the Gelderland District Court dated June 8, 2022[5] , the “deadlock” situation described above played out. One of the shareholders decided, albeit in the alternative, to use the statutory dispute resolution procedure. This is proceedings on the merits which, as mentioned above, can take a long time and the outcome of which is uncertain.

Claim for appointment of temporary director

To ensure a workable situation during the proceedings, the shareholder decides to file an incidental claim for the appointment of a temporary director. According to the shareholder, it is important that an independent third party be appointed as a director. This third party will play a positive stimulating role for the company and will be able to exercise a decisive vote if decision-making by the incumbent board cannot take place or takes too long. In the shareholder’s view, an “incompabilité d’humeur” has arisen. For non-francophiles: this means that there is insufficient basis for fruitful cooperation. The other shareholder who is also a director puts up a reasoned defense and believes that decision-making is not hindered by the poor relationship between the parties.

Power of court appointment of temporary director

The existence of an “incompabilitie d’humeur” is not the standard by which the court should judge the dispute. But then, what should be the standard? And does the court even have jurisdiction to proceed with the appointment of a temporary director? Or is this reserved for the Enterprise Chamber?[6]

To begin with the last question. In the proceedings, the court considers itself competent to rule on the incidental claim for the appointment of a temporary director of a private limited company. The court considers that this judgment is actually reserved for the Enterprise Chamber, but that the court can also anticipate the inquiry proceedings to be conducted at the Enterprise Chamber. The outcome is correct, but the path towards it questionable. In this regard, see also Mr. Kemp’s annotation to this ruling.[7] Although this is not clear from the literature, it can be assumed that the legislator’s intention was that the preliminary relief judge and the Enterprise Chamber should both have jurisdiction in such cases.[8] There is also the possibility of applying to the Enterprise Chamber for an immediate injunction, without the need for a subsequent investigation.[9] The latter is no longer desirable and too costly in many cases.

Immediate appeal to the Enterprise Chamber: speed

Incidentally, the impression should not be created that in the proceedings before the Enterprise Chamber no quick immediate remedy can be taken. This was not the option chosen in this case. The primary claim in the proceedings before the court concerned performance of an alleged agreement on the transfer of shares from one shareholder to another. With the idea that proceedings on the merits had already been initiated, it is not surprising that an incidental claim was filed in the same court.

Review standard appointment of temporary director

Then the substantive standard of review. By what should the court test whether a temporary board should be appointed? In this case, the court tests against the “mismanagement standard” of the inquiry procedure. This is remarkable. If a standard has to be reviewed at all, it should be the standard used by the Enterprise Chamber for immediate relief. This also fits the nature of the measure to appoint a temporary board. The maladministration standard does not fit this. In principle, this judgment follows only after completion of the investigation in an inquiry procedure.

Court’s review of ‘mismanagement standard’

The court ruled that the plaintiff did not sufficiently prove that the other shareholder was guilty of “mismanagement. That the claim is dismissed with the application of this onerous standard is not surprising. Although the wrong standard appears to have been applied, the outcome of the proceedings is easily digestible. The fact that there is a disturbed relationship between the directors does not automatically mean that it impedes decision-making. It is up to the plaintiff to prove this. Further, it is also not obvious that the appointment of the third-party director provides any guarantee of an improvement in the relationship. This too is up to the plaintiff to substantiate.

Conclusion

Back to the beginning. The underlying problem in a “deadlock situation” is a lack of a legal arrangement that allows the corporate relationship to be terminated in an efficient manner, without the company’s affiliated business having to suffer and without the tension rising so high that indeed an exit claim is granted in a dispute resolution case. The first step to avoid this is to include a proper contractual dispute resolution provision, preferably in the articles of association and/or shareholders’ agreement.

[1] Art. 2:356 BW.

[2] Art. 2:335-343c BW

[3] With regard to the dispute resolution scheme, I refer to interesting articles by Schreurs and Bulten: 1) mr. F. Schreurs, The revised dispute resolution scheme and the long road to a corporate divorce law, WPNR 2017/7158 2) and an article by Bulten: C.D.J. Bulten, ‘The dispute resolution scheme – I feel like a long-playing record’; De Wulf et al. in: Corporate Law in the Low Countries, What can we learn from the Belgians? (Institute for Business Law No. 117), pp. 143-161, Deventer: Wolters Kluwer 2020, ISBN 9789013155389.

[4] See Preliminary draft Law on Adjusting Dispute Resolution and Clarifying Admissibility Requirements Survey Procedure

[5] ECLI:NL:RBGEL:2022:2904.

[6] Art. 2:349a paragraphs 2 and 3 and Art. 2:356 sub c BW.

[7] JOR 2022/231 with annotation by Kemp, B.

[8] Incidentally, there is no unanimity  in the literature on the question of whether the interim relief judge has jurisdiction to appoint a temporary director in addition to the Enterprise Chamber.

[9] It goes too far to go into that in depth in this article.

Tips and tricks for a cooperation agreement

Tips and tricks for a cooperation agreement

Under the guise of “together you are strong,” parties regularly enter into cooperation agreements. In this article, contract law attorney Gentia Niesert explains what a cooperation agreement is and provides some tips and tricks for drafting one.

Definition of cooperation agreement

A cooperation agreement is an agreement, in which parties make arrangements regarding their cooperation. It is important that the agreement matches the specific wishes of the parties. Gentia Niesert can draw up a customized cooperation agreement for you.

Topics in a cooperation agreement

What topics should be included in a cooperation agreement depends on the type of cooperation between parties. Below are a number of topics that appear in almost all cooperation agreements:

1. Purpose of cooperation

First, it is good to state what the purpose of the collaboration is so that it is clear to both parties.

2. Duration and termination of cooperation

Furthermore, it is important to include something regarding the duration of the cooperation agreement. For example, an agreement can be for an indefinite period of time or for a definite period of time.

It is also wise to agree on the possibility of terminating the agreement.

3. Financial compensation and payment period

The cooperation agreement can also include agreements on prices and payment terms and how to proceed if a party fails to meet his/her payment agreements.

4. Liability

It is also advisable to include in the cooperation agreement the liability of the parties.

5. Exclusivity

A cooperation agreement may further state whether or not the cooperation is of an exclusive nature, that is, whether the parties are also free to cooperate with other parties.

6. Intellectual Property

It may also be wise to arrange something regarding intellectual property rights.

7. Dispute resolution

Finally, it is advisable to include in the cooperation agreement how to proceed if parties have a dispute under the agreement. It can be included, for example, that in such a case the parties will submit their dispute to the competent court or engage a mediator.

Need advice on drafting/reviewing your collaboration agreement?

Are you looking to have a partnership agreement drafted or reviewed? Then you have come to the right place. Gentia Niesert, contract law attorney, will be happy to assist you.

Directors’ liability after turboliquidation

If there are no longer any assets at all at a legal entity, a turboliquidation may take place. This is when a dissolution takes place without a liquidator being appointed. Recently, the North Holland District Court ruled on an issue in which a turboliquidation had taken place and a creditor (landlord) subsequently held that the directors were liable. We will first briefly explain what turboliquidation is and then discuss the judgment.

When turboliquidation?

As mentioned, a turboliquidation can take place when a legal entity no longer has any assets. Turboliquidation can also take place if the legal entity is still indebted to creditors. The legal regulation on turboliquidations was amended (temporarily) on 15 November 2023. Turboliquidations are still possible, but some additional formalities need to be observed.

If the legal entity still has assets and needs to be wound up then a liquidator needs to be appointed. If the liquidator finds that the debts are likely to exceed the assets, he must (in principle) file a bankruptcy petition. It is then up to a bankruptcy trustee to wind up the bankruptcy, including an investigation into legality issues.

If a legal entity has been terminated, it can be revived if the legal entity still has a potential benefit. You can read another article on our website about reopening the liquidation.

Turbo liquidation of catering business

The case that led to the court’s ruling involved the following. A catering business had started operations in early 2021, entering into a lease agreement with a landlord for the rental of the premises. Just under two years later, the management of the catering business decided to cease operations. The directors tried to sell the business, but were unsuccessful. As of 30 October 2023, the lease was terminated by 15 November 2023. However, this termination was not possible according to the lease.

The board led it to sell the available inventory. These proceeds have been divided among the creditors in proportion to their claims. The landlord was paid 4.76% of the assets present, amounting to €642.15. Subsequently, there were no more assets.

The landlord believes that wrongful acts were committed, holds the management of the catering business liable and starts proceedings to claim damages.

Directors’ liability in turboliquidation?

The landlord argues that the turboliquidation was unlawful and that an obligation to file for bankruptcy would not have been complied with. He points to the legal obligation incumbent on a liquidator to file for bankruptcy if debts exceed income. He further points out that he would have had an estate claim and a preferential position in bankruptcy.

The directors argue that there is no rule of law under which they were obliged to file for bankruptcy. The benefits were divided fairly among the creditors. The rule requiring a liquidator to file for bankruptcy did not apply because the company had ceased to exist by operation of law and no liquidation took place.

The court rejected the landlord’s claims and found in favour of the directors.

In doing so, it points out that directors’ liability in respect of detriment requires that a serious personal fault can be attributed to the director. The court points out that turboliquidation is possible and does not in itself lead to personal liability of the board. This was also the appropriate course of action, as there were no more assets. The provision on the obligation on the liquidator to file its own declaration of bankruptcy does not apply, as there was no liquidation (nor a liquidator).

Nor was there any unlawful selective payments. The small benefits were divided proportionally among the creditors. There was no question of the directors having favoured themselves or parties in which they have a personal interest. This conduct is still within the board’s policy freedom (even if that policy freedom is limited in insolvency). Thus, the directors cannot be seriously blamed for the landlord remaining unpaid.

Corporate and insolvency law lawyer

If you would like to know more about directors’ liability, winding up companies or reopening a liquidation, please contact Peter de Graaf of LVH Advocaten. The ruling discussed can be found here.

Supreme Court rules again on calculation method for rent reduction due to coronavirus for commercial leases

Supreme Court rules again on calculation method for rent reduction due to coronavirus for commercial leases

On 4 July 2025, the Supreme Court issued another ruling on the calculation method for rent reductions for commercial premises due to COVID-19. The Supreme Court ruled that, depending on the circumstances of the case, the court may choose which method to use to calculate the rent reduction in a specific case.

Rent reduction due to coronavirus: what was the situation again?

Earlier, on 24 December 2021, the Supreme Court ruled on preliminary questions about rent reduction during the coronavirus pandemic. The Supreme Court ruled that the circumstance that a tenant is unable to use the rented property, or can only use it to a limited extent, as a result of the coronavirus measures is an “unforeseen circumstance” that the parties did not take into account when concluding rental agreements before 15 March 2020. In such cases, the court may adjust the lease agreement by reducing the rent for the period of the loss of turnover. The reduction in rent had to be calculated in accordance with the fixed costs method. With the latter, the Supreme Court intended to provide a tool with which tenants and landlords of commercial premises could mutually agree to adjust the rent to the changed circumstances.

Deviating from the fixed costs method is permitted in the case of, for example, turnover-related rent.

In the case that led to the judgment of 4 July 2025, the dispute concerned the lease of a hotel. The rent consisted of a percentage of the turnover or a minimum rent (if the turnover was insufficient).
The tenant of the hotel claimed a reduction in the rent payment obligation for a period starting on 15 March 2020 (first lockdown) due to the coronavirus pandemic and the related government measures.

The court ruled that the hotel tenant’s turnover was so low that no turnover-related rent was due and that the fixed costs method and the 50/50 distribution should be applied to the minimum rent.

However, when the case was referred to the court of appeal, the court saw grounds to deviate from the calculation of the rent reduction according to the fixed costs method. After all, no fixed rent had been agreed, but a turnover-related rent.

Rent reduction must be based on change in value

The court explained that, under normal circumstances, the hotel would have had to pay a higher (because turnover-related) rent if its turnover had been higher. Due to the coronavirus measures, the hotel achieved a lower turnover, but this was offset by a lower rent.The disruption of the value ratio is therefore considerably less serious than in cases where a fixed rent has been agreed. The court therefore takes the lower rent into account when calculating the rent reduction.

The court explained that the landlord does not have to compensate the tenant for the fact that the latter is facing significant losses as a result of the coronavirus measures. A landlord of commercial premises must compensate the tenant for the fact that the coronavirus measures have reduced the “value” of the rented property for the tenant and the “value” of the rent has not decreased to the same extent.

Formula for rent reduction due to coronavirus in the case of turnover-related rent

The court ruled that when entering into the lease agreement, the landlord and tenant had assumed that the minimum rent would apply if the turnover did not exceed €13 million. The minimum rent and the percentage of the turnover were subsequently indexed.

To calculate the rent reduction, the turnover during the coronavirus period is compared with the turnover that would apply if the minimum rent were due. Before indexation, the turnover during the coronavirus period would therefore have to be compared with £13 million. This results in a percentage of turnover loss. This percentage is then divided by two and deducted from the minimum rent.

The Supreme Court upheld the court’s decision. This means that the court has the discretion to choose its own method for calculating rent reductions due to the coronavirus, if circumstances so require.

Scope of collective bargaining: which collective bargaining agreement do I fall under as an employer?

In a previous article, we wrote about the importance of a scope review and avoiding a financial noose. In that article, it was about Booking.com facing mandatory affiliation with the industry pension fund for the travel industry.

This time it is the online supermarkets Picnic, Flink, Gorillas, Getir and Hofweb that are facing the collective bargaining agreement Food Industry. In this article, we discuss the judgment of the Central Netherlands District Court of February 28, 2024, as well as the importance of a scope review.

Assessment court scope of scope collective agreement

In the proceedings before the District Court, the supermarkets claimed a declaratory judgment that they do not fall within the scope of the collective bargaining agreement for the food industry. It follows from the relevant CBA that “employers who operate one or more stores that meet the description in Article 2 under a”. The Court indicated that this provision should be interpreted using the “collective bargaining standard.”

Interpretation via collective bargaining standard

The collective bargaining standard means that a provision of a collective bargaining agreement must be interpreted according to objective standards. The reason for this is to protect third parties who were not present at the collective bargaining negotiations and thus are not familiar with the parties’ intentions. Such an explanation does not assign significance to documents other than the text of the collective agreement and explanatory notes, as follows from the DSM/Fox judgment.

The court considered that from the text of the CBA in conjunction with the definitions, that the CBA applies not only to employers who themselves operate a (virtual) store, but also to employers who are part of a group whose activities are related to the operation of a store by another legal entity in the group. Thus, operating oneself is not a requirement to fall within the scope. Since Picnic c.s. is predominantly engaged within the group in the sale of food through a virtual store and home delivery and the other companies perform activities related to that, they are covered by the collective bargaining agreement.

The importance of a proper scope study thus follows from this ruling. In its absence, an organization can be unpleasantly surprised with the applicability of a collective bargaining agreement with all its consequences. Picnic et al. have to apply the collective bargaining agreement that has been declared generally binding for the period of the declaration. This will require Picnic to make various changes to salary payments, rosters and more.

More information about the collective labor agreement and industry pension fund?

If you would like more information about the possibilities of a scope investigation for your organization to see if you are covered by a collective agreement or industry pension fund, please contact labor lawyer Richard Ouwerling.

Conflicts and conflicting interests between shareholders

Conflicts and conflicting interests between shareholders

The relationship between shareholders in a corporation is sometimes like a marriage. Often things go well, but it also happens often enough that after a short or long time a conflict arises between shareholders and parties no longer want to continue with each other. Like a marriage, this can lead to a “fighting divorce” or “parting as good friends” and everything in between.

In an earlier article “Stalemate between directors who are also shareholders: what to do?” it was pointed out that the law does not as yet offer an adequate way out for shareholders in a relationship crisis. There is, however, a bill in which a shareholder can be obliged to leave via the Enterprise Chamber of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal (Overheid.nl | Consultatie Wet aanpassing geschillenregeling en verduidelijking ontvankelijkheidseisen enquêteprocedure (internetconsultatie.nl). It is expected that this bill will be submitted by the end of 2023. However, it remains to be seen to what extent this legislation will be able to provide fast and adequate solutions for shareholders in a conflict situation. What is certain is that every situation is different. In court, all the circumstances of the specific case always play a role.

This article discusses various points to consider during a relationship crisis.

The shareholders and the board

In the SME business, the shareholders are often also the directors of the company. But this does not always have to be the case.
Of importance is the board’s own role. Although shareholders own the company and therefore feel that they are in control, policy is set by the company’s board. Minority shareholders who are not directors have only limited rights.

The independent role of the board means that in a conflict between shareholders, the situation can easily arise where the shareholder who is not a director feels aggrieved. The shareholder who is a director tends to think that his personal interest is equal to the interest of the company. For example, consider the situation where the company needs new business premises and “coincidentally” the director has a property available for lease by the company.

If the director agrees an excessively high, non-market rent on behalf of the company with himself in his capacity as owner and lessor of the property, that is a legally valid agreement, but one that puts the company at a disadvantage. This is not allowed and in order to prevent such situations, a director must comply with the legal regulation on conflict of interest (The legal regulation of conflict of interest in a B.V. (and foundation and association). Often the articles of association or shareholders’ agreement also contain provisions intended to protect the company. If such provisions are violated, the director may be liable to the company in private.

On the other hand, it may be precisely the minority shareholder who has a priority other than what is best for the company. For example, when long-term investments need to be made while the minority shareholder would rather receive short-term dividends or a good price for his shares. Each shareholder is free to vote as he wishes in the General Shareholders’ Meeting. Because shareholders, unlike directors, are not obliged to serve the interests of the company, the conflict of interest rule does not apply. According to the Enterprise Chamber, however, the decision-making process within the company must proceed with due observance of the standards of reasonableness and fairness applicable between the shareholders. What that means in the concrete case is always something that can be discussed.

Information in the event of a conflict between shareholders

In the SME company, the shareholder who is not a director is not only entitled to information during the Annual General Meeting of Shareholders. Information must also be provided to this shareholder outside the AGM. Carefulness, transparency and openness by the board is required, according to the Enterprise Chamber. The company has a duty of care to the minority shareholder and must also provide information proactively. This applies especially in special situations, such as when the company is in financial dire straits, when investments have to be made or when other important decisions are being made.

At the same time, the management’s policy freedom must be respected. The shareholder does not determine the company’s policy. When his rights are respected, the court must be cautious in reviewing the decisions taken by the company’s board. For example, the board may not want to provide certain information for sufficiently compelling reasons. Consider, for example, business-sensitive information that a shareholder could use to compete with the company after his departure.

Competing activities and corporate opportunities

In a conflict situation, a shareholder may tend to want to independently exploit business opportunities that arise. Viewed in isolation, it is not prohibited to set up new activities. But it may be different if these new activities compete with the company’s activities. Or when they are activities that are in line with what the company is already engaged in and which could therefore also be developed by the company. Business opportunities that are part of the possible activities of the company should not be exploited outside the company. This will put the company at a disadvantage and it can take action against it.

On the other hand, shareholders in a conflict situation who want to part company will also want to be active and continue doing business in the future. Restrictions on competition and not being allowed to use the company’s corporate opportunities can stand in the way of this or, on the contrary, create new conflicts. The line between what is not allowed and what is allowed is thin. However, the consequences of just or just barely crossing this line are great.

The business and profitability of the company

Whereas in a fighting divorce the children are often the victims, in a conflict between shareholders it is often the company. Time, negative energy and costs associated with the conflict have a negative impact on the company’s operations and profitability. From that perspective, the common interest of shareholders in a conflict situation is not to escalate the conflict into endless wrangling, but to bring it under control and resolve it as quickly as possible. This can be done by making agreements, but also by a legal procedure in which the knots are cut by a judge. Sometimes there is a tendency to think that, above all, there should be no litigation and matters should be settled amicably, but the very act of continuing to negotiate, discuss and fruitlessly attempt to strike a deal can involve an enormous amount of time and negative energy. It can also be very pragmatic to clearly write down the positions on both sides. The court can then decide or – in urgent cases – order interim measures to bring the situation under control.

How to deal with a conflict between shareholders?

There is no golden rule on how best to handle conflict between shareholders. Account must be taken of the rules set by the law and the courts. Conflicts should be kept under control as much as possible and escalate as little as possible. Negotiating a settlement can be useful. However, legal action may also be the remedy that is appropriate and necessary. Emotions are a poor counsellor and the true interests of all parties involved should be considered and sought as much as possible.

In a long-term conflict, an involved shareholder once made the statement, “I feel like I have been driving around the traffic circle for years and there is no exit in sight.” Such a situation should be avoided as much as possible. This is best done by having a clear approach and strategy, making the right choices in time, and responding appropriately and pragmatically to actions of the other party.

Information

Would you like assistance and advice on how to handle a conflict between shareholders as wisely as possible? Then please contact Bouwe Bos.

Receivers V&D ordered to surrender SENZ umbrellas

< terug naar overzicht

In a judgement of 10 May 2016, the Court in Preliminary Relief Proceedings of the District Court of Amsterdam ordered the receivers of V&D B.V. to surrender the umbrellas that Senz Umbrellas B.V. delivered to V&D and have not been paid to Senz Umbrella’s B.V..

The Court in Preliminary Relief Proceedings allowed Senz Umbrellas B.V.’s reliance on its right to file a claim in full, and found that the position adopted by the receivers was unacceptable based on the principles of reasonableness and fairness.

New rules on wage transparency

New rules on wage transparency on the way

EU directive on pay transparency and the pay gap remain a persistent phenomenon. Despite existing legislation stipulating equal pay, figures from Statistics Netherlands show that women still earn on average 10.3% less than men for equivalent work. That is why European legislators have not been idle: on March 26, 2025, the Dutch government published a draft bill to implement the European Pay Transparency Directive (EU) 2023/970. These new rules will bring about radical changes for employers.

The EU Pay Transparency Directive and the pay gap in the Netherlands create new obligations for employers. The core of the directive is that employers must be more transparent about their remuneration structures and must be able to justify pay differences. This means (among other things) that employees are entitled to information about remuneration criteria and that employers are obliged to report periodically on pay differences between men and women. The most important change is that the burden of proof is shifting. From now on, employers must demonstrate that they pay equally. If they cannot do so, they must explain the difference.

The Netherlands should have implemented the directive by June 7, 2026 at the latest. However, implementation has been postponed. On September 15, 2025, the Informal Council on Employment and Social Policy announced that the Netherlands needs more time to implement the EU Pay Transparency Directive. Therefore, the target date for entry into force is now no later than January 1, 2027. However, the European Directive will already apply on June 7, 2026, and employees will be able to invoke this directive directly from that date. So now is the time to take a close look at your remuneration policy, also in the context of attractive employment practices.

Which (large) employers will be subject to the new rules?

The directive and the reporting obligation it contains initially apply to employers with 100 or more employees. However, the directive also contains an information obligation for employers with more than 50 employees (see point 3 below).

When are there 100 or more employees?

For the purposes of the Directive and the upcoming Dutch implementation legislation, the decisive factor is whether a company “as a rule” has at least 100 employees in the Netherlands. This criterion is in line with existing legal provisions, such as Article 2:153(2)(c) of the Dutch Civil Code and Article 2:263(2)(c) of the Dutch Civil Code (structural arrangement). This refers to the average number of employees over a financial year. Both full-time and part-time employees are included, as are temporary workers who are actually working within the company. Employees working abroad are not included in this threshold.

EU directive on pay transparency and the pay gap in the Netherlands: what will change?

Our government has opted for a ‘pure implementation’ of the European directive. This means that national rules will not be stricter than strictly necessary. Nevertheless, the consequences are significant. The most important changes are listed below:

  1. Objective and gender-neutral pay structures
  2. Employers will be required to use pay structures based on objective, gender-neutral criteria such as skills, efforts, responsibilities, and working conditions. These criteria must be clearly defined, for example in a collective labor agreement or job evaluation system.
  3. Transparency before employment
  4. Applicants must be given clarity in advance about the starting salary or salary range, based on objective criteria. Employers are no longer allowed to ask about an applicant’s current or previous salary, precisely to prevent a repeat of wage differences. Of course, applicants are still allowed to share their salary history of their own accord.
  5. Wage transparency within the organization
  6. Organizations with at least 50 employees must give employees the right to request written information about their own wages and the average wages of colleagues in similar positions. If the employer does not comply with these transparency obligations, the burden of proof in a claim for unequal pay is reversed: the employer must then demonstrate that no prohibited discrimination has taken place.
  7. Reporting obligations for larger employers
  8. Employers with 100 or more employees must report periodically on pay differences between men and women, including bonuses. These reports are partly made public via a national website. The frequency of reporting varies depending on the size of the organization. See below:

Number of employees Reporting period First report no later than

100 – 149 Every 3 years June 7, 2031

150 – 249 Every 3 years June 7, 2027

250 or more Every year June 7, 2027

  1. Mandatory wage evaluation in case of differences
  2. If the report shows that there are unjustified wage differences, the employer must take measures within a reasonable period of time, in consultation with the works council. In case of differences of 5% or more that still exist after six months, a mandatory wage evaluation will follow, including an analysis, an action plan, and an evaluation of previous measures. The works council must agree to this plan.
  3. Role of the works council
  4. The works council will play a central role in ensuring equal pay and monitoring compliance with the new obligations. This includes the right of consent to the remuneration policy, helping to resolve unjustified differences, and assessing the pay reports. In collective bargaining situations, trade unions can take over these tasks, provided that the collective bargaining agreement provides for this.

Practical tips and preparation

It is wise to take action now:

  • Identify the number of employees: Calculate the average number of employees over the financial year, including part-timers and temporary workers.
  • Document job classification system: Clearly define job descriptions and equivalent positions.
  • Analyze remuneration structures: Investigate whether there are any unexplained wage differences and establish objective remuneration criteria.
  • Implement reporting systems: Ensure that systems are in place that make it easy to report on remuneration differences on a regular basis.
  • Involve the works council in good time: Discuss the current wage structures and the objective criteria.
  • Evaluate regularly: Conduct internal audits and draw up improvement plans where necessary.
  • Inform and train the HR department and management: Ensure that those responsible are aware of their obligations and know how to answer questions from employees.
  • Communicate with employees: Inform employees in good time about their rights and how equal pay is guaranteed.

Conclusion

For companies with 100 or more employees in the Netherlands, it is essential to anticipate the Pay Transparency Directive in a timely manner. By anticipating the EU Pay Transparency Directive and the pay gap in the Netherlands in a timely manner, large employers can limit risks (such as claims for back pay) and comply with future legislation. Do you have questions about adjusting your remuneration policy in response to the Pay Transparency Directive? Please feel free to contact LVH Advocaten. We are happy to assist you.

Covenant on ancillary activities; greater clarity desired

Since August 1 of this year, the law (Section 7:653a of the Civil Code) has provided that the employment contract may no longer contain a prohibition on ancillary activities (“ancillary activities clause”) unless there is an “objective reason for doing so.

This means work in addition to the current position with the employer. This may also include work that the employee performs independently.

Ban on ancillary activities

The ban on ancillary activities is certainly not absolute. An additional work clause may be included in case of an objective reason, which does not necessarily have to be included in the employment contract in advance. The employer may also communicate the objective reasons at the time the employee requests permission for the ancillary activities.

Examples of “objective reasons,” according to the explanation of the law, include the health and safety of the employee, the protection of the confidentiality of company information, the integrity of a public service, the avoidance of a conflict of interest, or the violation of a legal requirement. For the last example, consider a violation of the Working Hours Act.

If the work is performed during the employer’s regular working hours, a ban on ancillary activities need not be accompanied by an objective reason. After all, Section 7:653a of the Civil Code deals with ancillary activities ‘outside the work schedule’ or ‘outside times when work is performed’. It may therefore be advisable to make a distinction in the ancillary activities clause between ancillary activities within and outside normal working hours.

The case law that has appeared to date on ancillary work is very limited. Below is an overview

Being transparent about ancillary activities

In a case before the Den Bosch Court of Appeal, there was no ban on ancillary activities, but the employee was expected to be transparent about the ancillary activities he performed. The employee was employed by an aircraft manufacturing company. He was required to make many business trips. His employer expected employees to complete an annual form to report any outside activities. The worker had filled out the form in 2015 and 2016 that he would perform translation work for his partner’s family business. His employer found out in 2021 that the employee had additionally been registered as a statutory director for that family business since 2015. The failure to report this was considered culpable by the Court, resulting in the termination of the employment contract. Not as seriously culpable, which did give the employee the right and entitlement to the transitional compensation.

Integrity of public services and an objective justification

In a case before the Zaanstand subdistrict court, an arborist employed by the Municipality of Zaanstad claimed that it should be ruled that his ancillary employment clause was void and invalid. The Subdistrict Court rejected the claim. In the opinion of the Subdistrict Court, the employer, a municipality, may in this case prohibit the employee from performing ancillary activities within the area of the municipality. In addition to his position with the Zaanstad municipality, the civil servant had consistently performed ancillary activities since 2014. Those ancillary activities amounted to him working on commission as an arborist for companies and individuals in and outside the municipality of Zaanstad, which included pruning work and caring for and maintaining greenery in gardens. Prior to 2017, he had verbal permission for these ancillary activities and from 2019, he received written permission for the two-year period.

Effective May 31, 2021, the official’s position was changed from Arborist to Supervisor Green. Given this promotion, higher demands were placed on the official’s integrity and he was no longer allowed to perform outside activities within the municipal boundaries of Zaandam. The employee challenged this new ban before the subdistrict court.

On June 8, the subdistrict court ruled that the ban on ancillary activities must be appropriate, suitable and necessary to protect the employer’s interest, also in light of the fact that this is a restriction of a fundamental right. The interests of the employee must also be taken into account.

The Subdistrict Court ruled that the integrity of government services could provide an objective ground of justification for the municipality as referred to in Section 7:653a (1) of the Civil Code and the Transparent Employment Conditions Directive. After all, that integrity of public services is specifically mentioned in Article 9 (1) of the Directive as objective reasons to restrict certain ancillary activities. Also in the legislative history of article 7:653a BW, integrity of public services is mentioned as an objective reason to prohibit ancillary activities. In short, the prohibition of ancillary activities is objectively justified and upheld.

Case law from before August 1, 2022

From case law before the new legal regulation on ancillary activities came into force, we also saw a certain line in the case law of circumstances that can be considered an objective reason to prohibit ancillary activities (even without an ancillary activities clause):

Normally, ancillary activities are prohibited if:

  • The employee’s ancillary activities compete with the employer.
  • The employee performs ancillary work for competitors.
  • The employee’s ancillary activities result in damage to the employer’s image.
  • The employee’s ancillary activities result in the employee not performing well at his full-time job.

Conclusion

Whether ancillary activities are permissible and what qualifies as an objective reason for a legally valid ancillary activities clause can be inferred primarily from existing and future case law. As a result, it is unclear to most employers and employees what the rules on ancillary activities are. To avoid an employment dispute over this with an unpredictable end, please contact Richard Ouwerling, lawyer specializing in employment law.

Director’s liability for tax debts

Destruction of legal acts by the receiver

Directors of troubled companies are usually aware that acts performed in the face of bankruptcy (if it comes to that) will be examined by a receiver. Unobligatory legal acts that have harmed creditors may be reversed by the trustee.

Liability to the estate

Directors are also usually aware that it is important to publish financial statements on time and have the administration in order. After all, failure to publish financial statements (on time) or not having proper records can lead to directors’ liability. In these cases, manifestly improper management is established and there is a legal presumption that this improper management is a major cause of the bankruptcy. It is then up to the director to make it plausible that the bankruptcy was caused by something other than manifestly improper management. If this fails, the director will be liable for the estate shortfall. This is regulated in Article 2:248 of the Dutch Civil Code.

Liability towards the tax authorities

Less well known is that the Tax Collection Act also contains a regulation that may lead to liability of the director for tax debts. Directors of commercial legal entities are jointly and severally liable for (among others) payroll and turnover tax debts of those legal entities if the non-payment of those tax debts is due to improper management. There is a legal presumption of improper management if the director has failed to make timely notifications of inability to pay. Notifications of inability to pay must be made by completing and submitting the form on the tax authorities’ website. The notification must be timely, i.e. made within 2 weeks of the day the taxes due are due. This liability is regulated in Section 36 of the Tax Collection Act.

Two regulations but slightly different

The regulation under the Invorderingswet is similar to the regulation under the Civil Code:

  • if you, as a director, have not (timely) fulfilled the publication obligation or have not fulfilled the accounting obligation, the director is liable for the estate deficit.
  • if, as a director, you have not reported a payment default in time, then you are liable for tax debts.

Yet there is an important difference. The director held liable by a receiver can negate the legal presumption of mismanagement by making it plausible that there were other causes of the bankruptcy. But the director who is held liable by the receiver must first pass an important hurdle; he must make it plausible that the failure to report the inability to pay on time is not attributable to him.

With few exceptions, this is an almost impossible task. In any case, you cannot defend yourself by arguing that you had another task within the board.

Only if you, as a director, succeed in making it plausible that the failure to report in time is not attributable to you, you will be given the opportunity to rebut the presumption of improper management. If the director cannot make it plausible that the failure to report in time is not imputable to him, he will not be given this opportunity, even if there were objectively other causes of the bankruptcy. Because of this strict rule, there is a sanction here for failure to report in time rather than a sanction for manifestly improper management.

Background

It is somewhat harder to imagine in this day and age that the penalty for failure to report has such a large effect but this regulation was introduced as an anti-abuse provision in a period before the computer age. In those days, it could take a long time for the tax authorities to know about late payments. Hence, the idea; the director himself should quickly report that there is an inability to pay so that the tax authorities can quickly take recovery action.

But now we are many years down the line and, thanks to automation, the tax authorities are quickly aware of late payments. The force majeure notification actually plays no role in this. So is it still reasonable to impose such a severe sanction on what is in many ways a minor offence?

Is Section 36 Recovery Act still of our time?

Although in practice the regulation is applied less often and less strictly than the text of the Act suggests, there is resistance to the regulation and the question is whether the regulation does not violate European regulations, more specifically the principle of proportionality. The Supreme Court has now asked the Court in Luxembourg whether the rule of Section 36 of the Tax Collection Act, under which a director who has merely failed to report a payment default on time and therefore can hardly escape liability for high tax debts, is proportionate. The answer to this question will take some time. Meanwhile, the legislator would do better to align this regulation with the presumption of improper management in case the company’s administration is not in order. This is an equal criterion that also applies to receivers. This might also prevent a concurrence in which a director is held liable by both a receiver and a receiver or, on the contrary, only by the one of these parties because it happens to be in a better evidential position.

Looking for an insolvency lawyer?

Would you like to know more about the notification of insolvency or the liability of a director in case of bankruptcy? Feel free to contact Rob Steenhoek of LVH Advocaten. He specialises in insolvency and corporate law and will be happy to help you.

Received a subpoena? Five points of attention

Received a subpoena? Five points of attention

Have you received a subpoena from the bailiff and are you wondering what to pay attention to when studying the subpoena?
In this article, we will give you five tips for studying a summons.
You can infer a lot from a summons, such as by what date you must respond to the summons, what happens if you don’t respond, and whether or not you are required to be assisted by a lawyer.

1. Parties in the subpoena

A writ of summons first of all states on behalf of which party (plaintiff) the bailiff has issued the writ of summons to you. From the summons, you can therefore deduce by whom the proceedings against you have been initiated. If that party is assisted by a lawyer/authorized representative, this will also be mentioned in the summons.
We advise you to always check carefully whether you are the right party being summoned by the plaintiff. For example, it is possible that you are director of several companies, but that the other party has subpoenaed the wrong company from you.

2. Roll date and appearance in court

Furthermore, the subpoena will also include by what date and before what court you must appear. Below is an example of such a passage:

“to appear, in person or represented by an agent, at the public hearing of the District Court of Rotterdam, Subdistrict Section, location Rotterdam, on Wednesday the twenty-eighth of August, at 10:00 a.m., sitting there at Wilhelminaplein 100-125 in Rotterdam”

The date, as mentioned in the summons (in the example 28 August 2022), is also called ‘the court date’. By this date, you must respond to the summons, barring any postponement. In subdistrict litigation, you may defend yourself orally before the court on the date and time stated, but it is also possible to submit a written defense (called a ‘statement of claim’) to the court by this date.

In the case of a commercial case, your lawyer will have to file a statement of defence. In most cases, you will also be able to request a postponement of the delivery of the Opinion.

Please note: does it concern a summary proceedings subpoena? Then the date mentioned in the summons is the date on which you must appear in court.

3. Assistance from a lawyer

In the same passage in the summons, you can also read whether or not you are required to be assisted by a lawyer. For example, in commercial and civil appeal cases you are required to be assisted by a lawyer. In subdistrict cases, on the other hand, you may litigate in person or be assisted by an attorney. Of course, it is often advisable to be assisted by a lawyer.

4. Notice

The summons will also contain a ‘notice’. This will state, among other things, whether and how you can respond to the summons (see also paragraph 2. Roll date and appearance in court). It will also state whether a court fee will be charged if you appear in court. It will also explain what will happen if you do not appear in court. Finally, the notice will state whether or not you are required to be assisted by a lawyer (see also paragraph 3. Assistance by a lawyer).

5. The petitum (the conclusion of the summons)

Finally, it is important to carefully study the conclusion of the summons. This is also referred to as the ‘petitum’. The petitum of the summons states what the plaintiff claims from you. An example of a petitum reads as follows:

“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: your court may order the defendant to pay a principal sum of € 10,000.00 by way of a judgment, executable in law.”

Need legal advice with a summons?
Have you received a subpoena and do you want advice about it or do you want to subpoena a party yourself? Do not hesitate to contact us. Gentia Niesert, attorney at law, will be happy to help you.

 

Director’s liability for breach of obligation under purchase agreement to deliver crane

In principle, if a company fails to fulfill a contractual obligation, only the company is liable for the resulting damages. Thus, the basic principle is that the director is not liable. Under special circumstances, a director may nevertheless be liable. An example of such circumstances was at issue in a matter on which the Rotterdam District Court recently rendered a judgment. The director was personally ordered to pay €250,000 to an aggrieved party.

Case non-delivery sold construction crane

A buyer purchased a construction crane from a limited liability company (I call it “Seller B.V.”) for €250,000 in July 2022. The estimated time of delivery of the construction crane to the buyer was August 2022. The purchase price was paid to Seller B.V. by the buyer. Seller B.V., in order to deliver the crane to the buyer, still had to purchase the crane itself.

However, delivery to the buyer remains undelivered. Seller B.V. keeps the buyer on hold for a while longer. In January 2023, a substitute agreement is made according to which Seller B.V. repays the purchase price of €250,000 received to the buyer. This agreement is also not fulfilled by Seller B.V. Not a penny is repaid.

The buyer starts proceedings, claiming payment not only from Seller B.V., but also from the director (jointly and severally). The claim against the director is based on tort (Article 6:162 of the Dutch Civil Code).

Evidentiary position of creditor in director’s liability case

In the case of director liability, it is in principle up to the creditor to prove that the director acted unlawfully. This can be a difficult position to prove. The bar for directors’ liability is high. Case law has crystallized some types of situations in which directors’ liability can be assumed. For example, there is directors’ liability if the director knew or should have known at the time of entering into the agreement that the company would not fulfill the obligation under the agreement and would have no recourse for the non-performance (the Beklamel standard). Another type of situation is where the director frustrated remedies. Selective default (unwillingness to pay) can also be considered. In all of this, the creditor usually has no insight into the debtor’s administration and financial affairs. This complicates the position of proof.

Director had B.V. pay other due debts

However, the judgment of the Rotterdam District Court shows that the director himself provided the necessary information in the proceedings. He has stated that the €250,000 received was used to satisfy various creditors of Seller B.V.. An amount of €70,000 was paid to the Tax Office because of an impending bankruptcy. An amount of € 55,000 was paid to the accountant because he ceased his activities. And €20,000 was paid to transporters. The remaining 105,000 was used during the year 2023 to pay various other current debts.

Court ruling on directors’ liability

The court finds that the director of Seller B.V. is personally at fault. The court agrees with the buyer that the director did not respect the buyer’s interests by using the amount received from the buyer, which was intended to buy a crane from, for other purposes. The court further considered that the money was used to deal with acute financial problems. The director did not ensure that sufficient funds remained, or could be realized, to still fulfill the purchase agreement with the buyer or to fulfill the subsequent repayment agreement.

The director still argued that there were many orders in the pipeline at the time. The court considered that this had not been concretized by the director, whereas it would have been in his path, since that information was in his domain.

Furthermore, the court held that the director put the buyer on the line, while in the meantime using the purchase price to make ongoing payments. In doing so, the director did not demonstrate that Seller B.V. would be able to fulfill the contractual obligations (including the later agreed repayment) or provide recourse for this. The court considers this contrary to what is socially acceptable.

Directors’ liability and the Beklamel standard

The fact that an agreement on repayment (or, for example, a payment schedule) is not fulfilled by the company need not, in principle, lead to directors’ liability. In my opinion, in the matter discussed, the harm had already been done at the time of entering into the purchase agreement with the buyer. Apparently, at that time there were already significant debts to the Tax Office and the accountant. The company was already at risk of bankruptcy. The purchase price received was used to pay the most pressing debts, but the consequence was that the crane could no longer be purchased (and it could not be delivered to the buyer). And in all this, the director was apparently unable to convince the court that he had a reasonable expectation that funds would still come in to purchase the crane. In my view, the conclusion that the director acted unlawfully is based primarily on the Beklamel standard: the director is liable if, at the time of entering into the agreement, he knew or ought to have known that the company would not fulfill the obligation under the agreement and would have no recourse for the non-performance.

Lawyer corporate law and insolvency law in Rotterdam

If you have questions about directors’ liability or have a conflict with a trustee please contact Peter de Graaf.

How final is the final discharge in termination agreements?

How final is the final discharge in termination agreements?

If employer and employee wish to terminate an employment contract by mutual agreement, they sign a termination agreement. A termination agreement often includes a final discharge clause. A final discharge clause ensures that parties do not have to renegotiate rights and compensation after the execution of the termination agreement. But how final is the final discharge clause in a termination agreement?

This article first discusses the importance of a final discharge clause in the termination agreement. It then discusses when a claim falls under the final discharge and the best way to formulate a final discharge clause. Finally, an illustrative reference is made to a judgment of the Court of Appeal of Den Bosch.

The importance of the final discharge in a termination agreement

Once employer and employee have decided to part company by mutual agreement, it is undesirable to have to renegotiate rights and obligations at a later date. The final discharge agreed in a termination agreement is intended to ensure that the parties have nothing more to claim from each other.

However, the final discharge in the termination agreement is not always final in practice. There are situations in which a discussion can arise about the question whether a claim does or does not fall under the final discharge, for example in the case of a “forgotten” claim.

What is covered by the final discharge in a termination agreement?

To determine whether a claim is subject to final discharge, the circumstances of the case must be considered. When interpreting the termination agreement the Haviltex-criterion is applied, which means that a judge not only interprets the final discharge clause linguistically, but also looks at the intentions of the parties and what they were entitled to understand between themselves. Various circumstances will be assessed, such as: the extensiveness of the negotiations, assistance by an agent, the knowledge and position of the parties and whether reservations were made.

Formulation of final discharge in a termination agreement

The discussion about which claims are subject to final discharge should therefore be limited as much as possible. This can be done first of all by recording in the stipulation what the parties have discussed. In other words, record all subjects which, according to the parties, are covered by the final discharge. This way the stipulation can be explained. In addition, specific subjects can also be excluded, so that there need not be any discussion about them.

Court of Appeal on the question: Does immaterial damage as a result of burn-out fall under the final discharge?

The Court of Appeal of Den Bosch ruled on the question whether immaterial damage as a result of an employee’s burn-out was covered by the final discharge clause. Employer and employee had entered into a termination agreement to end two proceedings. In 2015, employee fell on the job, after which she had to reintegrate. Later, after her full reintegration, a disrupted employment relationship arose and proceedings followed regarding the dissolution of the employment contract. The employee also instituted preliminary relief proceedings. During the hearing the parties agreed on an amicable settlement. The parties concluded a final discharge and only excluded personal injury. After concluding the termination agreement, the employee claimed non-material damages as a result of burnout. The Court of Appeal ruled that the damage relating to the burn-out was not part of the concept of injury as expressed in the final discharge clause. The reason was the background and contents of the two proceedings. For instance, the parties agreed that the ban on giving notice due to illness did not apply, there were no medical limitations according to the company doctor and furthermore, the employee had indicated that her stress-related complaints were no longer an issue. Furthermore, there was no evidence of negotiations on this point prior to the conclusion of the termination agreement.

Need advice from a lawyer in Rotterdam regarding final discharge of termination agreement?

As has become clear in this article, it is important to think carefully about the wording of a final discharge clause. The parties can limit the discussion as much as possible by formulating it correctly and appropriate to the circumstances.

Are you involved in negotiations about a termination agreement and do you want to know how to formulate the final discharge or are you having a discussion about a claim while you have agreed on a final discharge? Contact Richard Ouwerling, an employment lawyer at LVH Advocaten in Rotterdam.

Land grabbing: the legal options when losing ownership of land

Land grabbing: the legal options when losing ownership of land

There may be a dispute between neighbors about who owns a particular piece of land. Such a dispute may arise if at any time one of the neighbors places a yard fence in such a way that it takes possession of a piece of land owned by the other. The owner has the option of claiming his property (or filing a revindicatory action). However, such a claim cannot be brought after a period of time due to acquisitive prescription.

Recently, the Supreme Court issued a judgment on a tort claim against the party who acquired the property at the expense of the other. Compensation in kind was claimed, in the form of redelivery of the land. In this article, I explain the relevant legal regulations and discuss the recent Supreme Court ruling and also an earlier ruling on land grabbing.

What is meant by ownership and possession?

In land grabbing judgments, the concepts of ownership and possession are important. I briefly explain these legal concepts.

What is a property right?

The right of ownership is the most comprehensive right a person can have over a thing (Article 5:1 paragraph 1 Civil Code). In principle, the owner is free to use the thing to the exclusion of all others (Article 5:1 paragraph 2 BW).

What is possession?

By “possession” is meant that a person keeps a good for himself (Art. 3:107 paragraph 1 BW). Whoever keeps a good is presumed to keep it for himself (Art. 3:109 BW). Possession can be obtained by taking possession. One takes possession of a good by exercising actual power over it (Art. 3:113 paragraph 1 DCC). If possession is provided to another person, the acquirer is enabled to exercise the power over the thing that the provider of possession could exercise over the thing (Art. 3:114 BW). Whether someone is a possessor must be answered according to the conception of traffic, the legal regulation on the subject and, for that matter, on the basis of external facts.

Ownership and possession may be in different hands

Ownership and possession need not be in one hand. Suppose I own a piece of land, but my neighbor, by erecting a hedge, has actual power over a piece of my land, I am still the owner, but my neighbor is the possessor of the piece of land he has demarcated for himself.

How can you claim your property?

An owner of an object is authorized to claim it from anyone who holds it without right (Art. 5:2 Civil Code). This is called a revindicatory claim. This claim can also be brought in court. So in the example of my piece of land that has been taken into possession by my neighbor, I can claim that the land be returned to my control. This will then mean that the hedge must be removed so that I regain actual power over my piece of land.

Loss of property due to acquisitive prescription

As mentioned above, ownership and possession sometimes diverge. The legislature intended that such a situation should not continue indefinitely. The legal and factual situation must come together again at some point, is the idea. The legal situation then follows the factual situation (and not the other way around).

Therefore, the law provides that a possessor in good faith acquires rights to the property at a certain time (Art. 3:99 paragraph 1 of the Civil Code). If a person thinks in good faith to have become the rightful owner of a movable thing (and bearer or order rights), he can acquire the right to the good after possession of three years, other goods by an uninterrupted possession of 10 years.  There is a different rule for cultural goods. On this good faith possession I will not go into further detail.

Loss of property to bad faith possessor

Even a possessor who is not bona fide can obtain the good. Indeed, Article 3:105(1) of the Civil Code states, “He who possesses a good at the time when the prescription of the legal action terminating the possession is completed shall acquire that good, even if his possession was not in good faith.”

Statute of limitations for bad faith possession

The limitation period applicable in that case is twenty years (art. 3:306 BW). It concerns a claim for termination of possession by a non-owner. The period starts to run on the day following the day on which the immediate removal of that situation can be claimed (Article 3:314 paragraph 2 BW).

Thus, in the example concerning my neighbor placing a hedge on my land, the term begins to run on the day after the hedge is placed.  Thus, my neighbor who is not in good faith can acquire ownership of my piece of land after 20 years of being a possessor of it. This also means that I can no longer bring a revindicatory action (after all, only an owner can bring such an action).

Tort claim as remedy for land grabbing

In 2017, the Supreme Court issued a ruling on acquisitive prescription. In that case, the municipality of Heusden had lost its title after 20 years to persons who had not taken possession of a plot of forest land in good faith. A plot of over 400 m2 belonging to the municipality had been fenced off by the persons behind their own plot, with the strip of land only accessible through a small gate that the persons could lock. In this way, de facto power had thus been exercised by the persons over the piece of land.

In a superfluous consideration, the Supreme Court indicated that the municipality may still have a claim in tort. In doing so, it indicated that it would be obvious that compensation would be claimed in the form of transfer of the property to the person who lost ownership.

Case of loss of property by acquisitive prescription

The Supreme Court recently handed down a judgment on a dispute between neighbors, where it was already established that one neighbor (“A”) had lost a piece of land to his neighbor (“B”) as a result of acquisitive prescription. The case was abbreviated as follows.

When a vacation park was still under development (March 1991), B purchased a plot of land at that park. Attached to the deed of conveyance was a drawing showing a plot with a rectangular shape. A only later (in 2000) became the owner of an adjacent plot of land on the park. He bought the plot from someone who in turn bought it while the park was still being developed.

In early March 1991, the Land Registry measured the cadastral boundaries. Then the boundaries were made visible in the field with iron pipes driven into the ground with wooden pickets. Also in June 1992, the boundaries of the plot were measured. On a drawing accompanying the account of it, the plot looked like a rectangle.

The cadastral boundaries of the plot

B was still not comfortable with the size of his plot around August 1992. He then asked the sales agent to designate the boundaries of the plot. He then installed 50 conifers around September 1992 to demarcate the plot and a much larger number in May 1993. This property boundary was sloping (i.e. this did not line up with cadastral data).

In December 2012, A had a boundary reconstruction performed by a company and later (in 2014) again by the Land Registry. This revealed that the cadastral plot boundary did not correspond to the plot boundary that was actually present (the conifer hedge). B had actually added 46 m2 of land that (later) belonged to A to his plot.

In a judgment dated March 30, 2016, the Limburg District Court ruled that the strip of land in question became B’s property by acquisitive prescription.

Tort claim for taking possession of land in bad faith

A then commences proceedings in which he claims from B that, by way of compensation in kind, the strip of land that belonged to him should be delivered back to him in ownership. A hereby argues that B acted unlawfully by taking possession of the strip of land between September 1992 and May 1993 in bad faith and then keeping it for a period of 20 years (or the limitation period for acquisitive prescription under Article 3:306 of the Civil Code). The court granted the claim.

The dispute in the proceedings centers on whether the action was unlawful and, in particular, whether B knew that he had taken possession of a piece of A’s land.

What does the wrongful conduct consist of?

To answer this question, the Court considers various factual circumstances. From these, the Court draws the conclusion that, at least until June 2, 1992, B actively knew where the boundary between his plot and the neighboring plot ran. B knew that he had a rectangular plot, but nevertheless constructed an angled yard fence. In this way, and by subsequently maintaining possession of the plot of land for 20 years, B acted culpably unlawfully. The court’s judgment granting A’s claims is thus upheld.

Supreme Court sticks to doctrine on damages claim after acquisitive prescription

B appealed in cassation to the Supreme Court and argued that the Supreme Court should reverse the judgment concerning the Municipality of Heusden. In that judgment, as explained above, it was held that a person who has lost ownership of a property as a result of unlawful seizure by another person may still have a claim for damages against that other person based on tort. The Supreme Court sees no reason to return to that ruling.

It was further argued in cassation that the Court of Appeal did not find that B had acted in bad faith. However, the Supreme Court is of the opinion that the Court of Appeal meant that B knew that the strip of land belonged to the neighboring parcel and that that judgment implies that B was acting in bad faith. The cassation appeal is therefore dismissed.

Can tort claims also be time-barred?

The claim in tort may also be time-barred. In land grabbing situations, it should be seen as follows: not only the unlawful taking of possession, but also keeping possession for a period during the 20-year statute of limitations is unlawful conduct. After all, by keeping possession for 20 years, the consequence (loss of ownership by the aggrieved party) eventually occurs. Thus, the wrongful act ends only at the time of transfer of ownership.

Thus, it is certainly not the case that the compensation claim is time-barred at the same time as the revindication claim.

What is the statute of limitations for tort claims in land grabbing?

The limitation period for claims based on tort is regulated in Article 3:310 (1) of the Dutch Civil Code. In view of this section of the law and the judgments discussed, the following applies with respect to prescription:

  • a five-year statute of limitations begins to run from the time the aggrieved person became aware of his property loss;
  • but in any case, the claim lapses twenty years after the completion of the limitation period of Article 3:314(2) of the Civil Code.

Thus, when property is lost to a bad faith possessor, one has the opportunity to revindicate the property for 20 years, after which there is still the possibility of recovering the lost property with an action in tort for a period of at most 20 years.

What to do as a victim of land grabbing?

Thus, there is still an ample period of time for an aggrieved person to take legal action against land grabbing. Nevertheless, the sooner one takes action against an unjust taking of land the better.

Lawyer needed for loss of property due to land grab in Rotterdam

If you have questions about property law, including situations concerning taking possession of parcels of land (land grabbing) and limitation periods, or tort claims, please contact Peter de Graaf.

The Supreme Court ruling discussed can be found here.

A dynamic incorporation clause remains in place during a transfer of an enterprise

A dynamic incorporation clause relating to a collective bargaining agreement is an agreement in the employment contract whereby the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement, as they will read from time to time (hence the term dynamic), are declared applicable to the employment relationship.

Employees transfer by operation of law and under the same terms and conditions of employment

With the transfer of all or part of an enterprise (within the meaning of Section 7:663 of the Civil Code), employees of the transferring party enter the employ of the acquiring party by operation of law. This takes place under the same terms and conditions of employment.

Collective bargaining agreement also continues to apply

This means that a dynamic incorporation clause will also apply to the employment relationship between the employees of the transferring party and the acquiring party. In other words, the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement that applied to the employment relationship between the employees and the transferring party will apply to the employment relationship between the employees and the acquiring party after the transfer of the enterprise. Óeven if the acquiring party’s enterprise does not fall within the scope of the collective bargaining agreement.

Terms and conditions of employment may not be changed at or because of the transition

It is important to note, that the acquiring party cannot prevent this by offering the employees at the transfer of the company a new employment contract that does not include the dynamic incorporation clause. Not even if the transferring party’s works council has agreed to it.

The reason is that the terms of employment may not be changed at the time or because of a transfer of all or part of an enterprise. Modification of terms and conditions of employment after the transfer of the undertaking is, however, permitted.

Post-transition adjustment via unilateral modification clause

This is possible, for example, if the (transferred) employment contract contains a so-called unilateral modification clause, which allows the transferee to modify provisions in the contract if the transferee has such a compelling interest in doing so that the interests of the transferred employees must reasonably and fairly give way.

Post-transition adjustment due to good employment practice

If the employment contract does not contain a unilateral modification clause, the transferred employees may under circumstances be required by the standard of good employee character to accept a reasonable proposal from the transferee to modify the terms and conditions of employment.

Include the effects of the dynamic incorporation clause in negotiations with the transferor

It is therefore uncertain, whether a dynamic incorporation clause can lapse after the transfer of the business. The consequences of “bringing in” collective bargaining provisions, even when the transferee itself does not fall within the scope of the collective bargaining agreement, can be great. For example, the transferee may be obliged to increase the salaries of the transferred employees in accordance with the collective bargaining agreements. It is therefore important to give due attention to these issues prior to the transfer of the business and to include the consequences in the negotiations with the transferring party.

Information

If you have any questions about this article or this topic, please contact Peter Verheijden, an employment law attorney at LVH Advocaten.

Dismissal of directors of foundations: new risks and opportunities under the WBTR!

With the introduction of the Management and Supervision of Legal Persons Act (WBTR), the legislature has taken important steps to improve the management and supervision of foundations. One of the most notable changes concerns the expansion of the grounds for dismissal for directors of foundations. In this article, we discuss the new statutory regulation, illustrate the regulation with a practical example, and explain the implications for directors and stakeholders.

The new statutory regulation (WBTR)

Given the old regulation, dismissing a foundation director was often difficult. According to the old legal text of Article 2:298 of the Civil Code, a director could only be dismissed in case of evidently wrongful acts or (financial) mismanagement. These strict requirements ensured that dismissal rarely occurred in practice.

With the amendment of the law, the possibilities for dismissal have been broadened. The new Article 2:298(1) of the Civil Code offers several grounds for dismissal. A director may be dismissed by the court in case of i) neglect of his duties, ii) other weighty reasons, iii) circumstances of which the continuation of the directorship cannot reasonably be tolerated, or iv) failure to comply or to comply properly with an order of the interim relief judge.

The request for dismissal must be made by an interested party or the Public Prosecutor’s Office. This regulation also applies to foundation commissioners.

A practical example

A recent ruling by the Arnhem-Leeuwarden Court of Appeal illustrates the expanded possibilities of the new law. Two nature lovers, simultaneously with their marriage, established a foundation together to support nature. Years later, without her husband’s knowledge, the wife decides to cut down some trees. The husband is furious. He decides to register the foundation in the Trade Register, with only himself as the sole and independently authorized director. This violates the articles of association, which stipulate that the husband and wife would be jointly authorized as directors.

The lawsuit

The wife, who could not register as a co-director with the Commercial Register without her husband’s cooperation, turned to the court and claimed her husband’s dismissal as a director of the foundation pursuant to Section 2:298 of the Civil Code. The court rules in her favor. The husband had neglected his duties by focusing on his own interests rather than the interests of the foundation. Moreover, he had acted in violation of the articles of association and the Trade Register Act, which required him to ensure that the information in the trade register was entered correctly and completely at all times.

As a result, the husband was dismissed and the wife, at her request, was appointed as a director. It is noteworthy that the foundation was not registered in the trade register until 20 years after its establishment, resulting in an economic offence under Article 1 WED, as directors are obliged to register the foundation within a week of its establishment under Article 20 of the Trade Register Act.

Implications for directors and stakeholders

This ruling shows that the WBTR can actually contribute to better governance of foundations. Indeed, the dismissal in the above ruling was granted on the basis of dereliction of duty, one of the new grounds for dismissal introduced by the WBTR. Directors must take their responsibilities seriously and ensure that they do not neglect their board duties. Interested parties now have greater opportunities to request the dismissal of a director through the courts.

Uncertainty about shareholder vote: is AGM resolution voidable?

Which bodies can make decisions?

This article is about the legal validity of decision-making in the private limited liability company. A private limited liability company has several bodies. A Management Board, a General Meeting (GM) and possibly also a Supervisory Board (SB), a Joint Meeting of Management Board and SB and, since the introduction of the Flex-BV, in appropriate cases, a BGA (a “Special” Group of Shareholders). These bodies are authorized to make decisions. The division of powers is determined by law, articles of association, regulations and resolutions. Within the bodies, agreements can be made on how decisions should be made. For example, in a shareholder agreement or voting agreement. For more information on the shareholder agreement I refer to previous articles on this website.

When is decision-making invalid?

It is important that valid decision-making is achieved. This is not always the case. Mistakes can be made in decision-making. For example, that those entitled to vote within the body, such as shareholders during an AGM, are not properly invited to the meeting at which the decision is taken. Or that the chairman of the body puts a proposal to a vote when the required quorum is not present. In such cases, the status of the resolution must be questioned. Is the decision valid, void or voidable? And if there is a defect in the decision-making process, can the defect be repaired? And what are the consequences if it turns out that a decision cannot be repaired and is therefore voidable or voidable?

Nullity and voidability of decisions

Nullity of decisions

There is an important difference between nullity and voidability of decisions. When a decision is void, it applies by operation of law. Nullity is a sanction that relates to the violation of fundamental requirements of a decision. Consider, for example, the aforementioned case of a quorum requirement not being met. Also consider the situation where the chairman of the GM fails to take into account an enhanced majority of votes, for example 75%. In these cases, the consequence is that the resolutions are null and void, meaning that the resolution never actually existed.

Destroyability of a decision

A voidable decision is valid until it is set aside by the court. The annulment has retroactive effect. It is not possible to nullify resolutions out of court.  Examples of voidable resolutions are failure to observe the correct notice period of the AGM or incorrect inclusion of items on the agenda for the meeting.  In principle, the sanction of such cases is nullification. Unlike nullity, these are non-fundamental creation provisions. Sometimes there are repair options by which the voidability of a resolution can be removed.

Case law: two directors vote on behalf of one shareholder

In the ruling of the Gelderland District Court dated May 18, 2022, there was a special situation. During the general meeting of Chainpoint B.V., two persons claimed to be able to validly cast a vote on behalf of one of the (legal entity) shareholders, JZ Investments B.V.. The two persons cast conflicting votes. The chairman of the general meeting then declared JZ Investments B.V.’s vote invalid in its entirety and marked it as ‘not cast’. The resolution to be voted on was eventually passed, but only the votes of the other shareholder were counted, and therefore not JZ Investments B.V.’s vote.

What is the role of the chairman of the AGM?

In the court’s opinion, the chairman mishandled this situation. It is not up to the chairman to give a legal interpretation to the situation that has arisen. This follows from the law, namely Article 2:13 paragraph 3 of the Civil Code. The chairman has a limited role. Although the opinion of the chairman of the general meeting is decisive when it comes to counting the votes cast, it is not decisive when it comes to assessing the validity of the votes cast. However, a chairman could be expected to signal if there are conflicting explanations of votes and to raise this, for example with reference to the law, articles of association, regulations, resolutions or other contractual agreements.

Is the decision of the AGM voidable?

In the proceedings before the court, the chairman did give a decisive legal opinion on the outcome of the vote. The chairman declared the votes cast on behalf of JZ Investments B.V. invalid in their entirety. This while one vote of the two votes cast may have been legally valid. It would have been in the chairman’s power to adjourn the meeting so that clarity could have been obtained about the casting of the vote. The parties would then have had the opportunity to present the issue to a judge. Unlike the chairman of the AGM, the Enterprise Chamber or the Court of Preliminary Relief does have jurisdiction to decide on the validity of the decision-making. The conclusion of the court is that the resolution passed during the AGM, whereby the vote of shareholder JZ Investments B.V. was declared invalid, is in violation of Article 2:15 paragraph 1 of the Dutch Civil Code under a. The resolution has been nullified and the nullification has retroactive effect.

Advice on decision-making within corporate bodies

The situation described above could have been avoided. For example, if the articles of association or shareholders’ agreement of JZ Investments B.V. had included a provision on representation in the general meeting of Chainpoint B.V. Perils regarding decision-making can lead to a period of uncertainty within a company and also result in a waste of time and money. It is therefore important that you seek proper advice on how decision-making can take place within a corporate body.

The penalty clause: where and when?

The penalty clause: where and when?

A penalty clause is a clause in a contract which states that a party must pay a penalty if it fails to fulfil a contractual obligation. Penalty clauses come in all shapes and sizes and can often be recognised simply by the word ‘penalty’. Penalty clauses can, for example, be found in lease agreements, purchase agreements, settlement agreements, money loan agreements, employment contracts and general terms and conditions.

In this article we will explain, based on three agreements, how to recognise a penalty clause and when it can be invoked:

1. Penalty clause in a contract of sale of a house

The following penalty clause is almost always included in NVM contracts for the sale of residential property:

“On dissolution of the contract of sale on the basis of attributable failure, the defaulting party shall forfeit for the benefit of the other party an immediately payable penalty of ten percent (10%) of the purchase price without judicial intervention.”

We regularly receive cases in which the seller claims the penalty because the buyer has failed to take possession of the property due to the fact that he/she is unable to arrange financing (and has not included a financing reservation). The starting point in that case is that the seller can dissolve the contract and claim 10% of the purchase price of the property.

2. Penalty clause in rental agreement

Penalty clauses are also regularly found in general terms and conditions of rental agreements (residential and business premises). Think of a provision with the following purport:

“The tenant shall owe an immediately due and payable penalty of €25 per calendar day for each obligation he fails to fulfil.”

If a tenant fails to pay his rental payments or uses the rented property contrary to its purpose, for example, the landlord can claim the penalty.

3. Penalty clause in money loan agreements

Penalty clauses also occur in money loan agreements. Consider the situation where party X borrows an amount from the bank to finance his/her home and owes penalty interest if payment is not made on time:

“In the absence of timely payment as referred to in Article (…), party X shall forfeit an immediately payable penalty interest of 6% of the overdue amount.”

For example, if X does not pay interest or repay on time, the bank can claim the penalty interest.

Mitigation of penalty

The starting point is that the full penalty must be paid. However, a court can decide to moderate the amount of the fine if granting the fine leads to an excessive and therefore unacceptable result. This depends on the circumstances of the case.

Do you need advice on penalty clauses?

Do you have a case in which you are claiming an amount of penalty or are actually owed the penalty? Or do you need help in drafting a penalty clause? Then you have come to the right place. As lawyers with experience in contract law, we regularly come across penalty clauses. Gentia Niesert, lawyer in contract law, will be pleased to help you.

Bankruptcy Transfer of Undertaking Act (Wovof)

Start of consultation

On 27 May 2024, the Transfer of Undertaking in Bankruptcy Act (Wovof) was submitted for consultation. All stakeholders will have the opportunity to respond to the bill until 22 July 2024. Thisis a follow-up to the earlier consultation in 2019. What is the purpose of this new legal regulation?

Current law; distinction business transition outside or inside bankruptcy

Business transition outside bankruptcy

Employees are protected during a business transfer. Pursuant to Art 7:663 of the Civil Code, the employees of the transferred company enter the employment of the acquiring party by operation of law. The employees do not have to do anything for this; they keep the same terms of employment and the date of commencement of employment is the date of commencement of employment with the original employer.

Transfer of business within bankruptcy

The aforementioned statutory regulation does not apply during bankruptcy. The legislator chose to make an exception to the above rules because otherwise a successful relaunch would be less likely to take place and thus more jobs would ultimately be lost. If a receiver sells the company after bankruptcy (also known as a restart), the acquirer of the company may choose whether to employ employees of the bankrupt, which employees to employ and under what conditions to employ the employees. This difference in treatment leads to the fact that a takeover from bankruptcy can easily give the impression that bankruptcy is mainly used to easily and cheaply part with unwanted staff.

Selection of employees

If not all employees are taken over in a relaunch, the criteria for selecting which employees will be taken over by the acquirer in a relaunch and which employees will not be taken over are not transparent. Administrators often try to steer this process but are not always in a position to impose sufficient requirements and safeguards on the transferee so as not to jeopardise the restart itself. Because the relaunching company in bankruptcy is reorganised without the cost of redundant employees, this leads to a competitive advantage over companies that have to apply the rules and related costs of regular labour law (demarcation principle, transition compensation) when restructuring. Research shows that young people (up to 25 years old), older people (over 55 years old), pregnant women and low-skilled people in particular are less likely to be hired by the restarted company.

New law: WOVOF

Purpose

The difference in protection of employees in a transfer of a company outside bankruptcy and a transfer of a company within bankruptcy is deemed undesirable by the minister, and the minister has prepared the preliminary draft ‘WOVOF’ (‘Wet Overgang Van Onderneming in Faillissement’). By amending the law, this preliminary draft aims to strike a better balance between, on the one hand, the interest in an easy restart and, on the other hand, the interest of employees in protecting their legal position.

Proposal

The bill regulates that the exception that currently applies to all bankrupt companies will be limited to an exception for those companies where the bankruptcy is aimed at liquidation (and therefore not a relaunch) and for small companies (less than 20 employees). In other cases, the party buying a business from the bankruptcy administrator will be obliged to take over all employees with it, unless this is not possible on the grounds of business economics. For that case, the law requires an objective selection method to be used to determine which employees receive an offer of employment. Also, if a vacancy arises within six months of the relaunch, a former employee would first have to be offered an employment contract.

Approval and participation

The liquidator will need approval from the supervisory judge before selling the company as part of a relaunch. Under the bill, the supervisory judge must hear the receiver, the acquirer and the works council before granting approval. The position of the works council is strengthened here. The supervisory judge assesses whether there are business economic reasons not to transfer all employees to the transferee and what selection criteria will be used.

Sanction

If the relaunching company wrongfully fails to offer employees of the bankrupt company an employment contract, the employee can claim from the subdistrict court that he still receives an offer or that he is awarded fair compensation.

Consequences of introduction

If the law is introduced in this form, it will have an impact on the restart practice of bankruptcy trustees. More investigation around a relaunch will be required to assess whether there are business circumstances that force the relauncher to make a choice in employees for economic, technical or organisational reasons. There will often be a combination of circumstances. The transferee will have to demonstrate to the supervisory judge that measures have to be taken and why not all employees can be taken over. If the acquirer fails to do so, it will have to take over all employees. The works council is also given more say. The works council must be given the opportunity to give its advice.

Procedure

The receiver, as liquidator of the assets of the bankrupt, enters into negotiations with the prospective restarters. Consequently, the liquidator must first assess whether there is a transfer of undertaking in bankruptcy. If that is the case, the liquidator must allow the works council to advise. Next, the liquidator must request the supervisory judge’s approval. If, according to the proposal, not all employees transfer to the re-starter, the supervisory judge must examine whether it has been made sufficiently plausible that there are business economic circumstances to take measures resulting in job losses. If this has been made sufficiently plausible, the supervisory judge must assess whether the method of selecting the employees is in line with the indenture principle to be applied or according to a plan approved by the supervisory judge.

Will it work?

Compliance with the new rules will lead to more transparency and supervision of the selection of employees involved in a relaunch. In itself, there is no objection to this except that more time will be involved in investigating and preparing a proposal to the trustee. The trustee will have to provide more information so that the candidate can assess whether there are economic circumstances that make it impossible to take over all employees. This will be the case in almost all bankruptcies. Next, the consultation process with the works council and the approval process by the supervisory judge require more time. Compliance with these new rules therefore costs time and money. These are precisely the two things that are lacking in a bankruptcy situation. There is no money and there is no time. The longer a relaunch takes, the less likely it is to be successful.
An earlier consultation (2019) on the Wovof raised particular concerns about the impact of the scheme on restart practice. The scheme is considered too complex and time-consuming to apply under high time pressure. There are too many uncertainties for the acquirer. In response to these expressed concerns, the proposal has been amended. Although it is undeniable that the procedure has been improved, the scheme remains complex, time-consuming and represents an obstacle for the relaunch candidate. The risk that the new regulation will hamper the restart practice and thus reduce the number of restarts remains.

Competition clause

Somewhat related is the problemative of the employee with a non-compete clause. If an employee transfers by operation of law to a new employer on the transfer of a company outside bankruptcy, a stipulated non-competition clause simply remains in place. If the employee is offered an employment contract with the new employer in a relaunch in bankruptcy, employee and (new) employer can make their own arrangements. But what happens to the non-competition clause with the employee dismissed by the liquidator but not offered an employment contract with the restarting company? This has been the subject of many proceedings. Although the provision is rarely enforced in full, in principle, the non-competition clause simply remains valid and the liquidator (provided it has a sufficient interest) can claim compliance. The Wovof provides for the inclusion of a new legal provision stating that a non-competition clause ends when the employment contract is terminated by the liquidator and the relevant employee is not offered an employment contract by the re-starter. This improves the employee’s position and creates clarity for all parties.

Entry into force

Following a previous round of consultation in 2019, this is a new consultation. The formal legislative process including approval in the Lower and Upper Houses of Parliament has yet to be initiated. Entry into force of the bill in its current or amended form will be some time away. That does not alter the fact that, in anticipation of and taking into account this new regulation, receivers can ask for more transparency from the candidates for a relaunch so that it can be explained to interested parties why there is no room for all employees in a relaunch. According to the Insolad practice rules, even now a trustee must be guided by interests of the estate the trustee takes into account interests of a social nature. Transparency in the selection of employees can be part of this.

Looking for an insolvency law lawyer?

Would you like to know more about filing for bankruptcy or making an offer on a company in bankruptcy? Feel free to contact Rob Steenhoek of LVH Advocaten. He specialises in insolvency law and will be happy to help you.

Bonus employees: how to create a good bonus scheme as an employer?

How to create a good bonus scheme?

The bonus is a nice incentive for employees that you can use as an employer. But you have to be careful. The bonus scheme can be risky if it is not put down on paper correctly. As an employer, you then face the question: is the employee entitled to the bonus and how high is it? Obviously, you do not want to have that discussion with your employees.
In this article, we discuss how you, as an employer, can draw up a good bonus scheme. We also discuss a number of important pitfalls that often occur in bonus schemes.

Determine the performance of the bonus scheme

A bonus is a variable reward linked to certain performances. This can be the performance of the organisation, the performance of an individual employee or a combination of both. So don’t use a standard bonus scheme, but attune the bonus scheme to the organisation and the function of the employees. Describe as clearly as possible the performances that must be achieved, leave no room for other interpretations and ensure that afterwards it can be verified whether those performances have been achieved.

Bonus scheme and subjective criteria

When determining performance, beware of subjective criteria, such as linking a positive assessment to the award of a bonus. If you do opt for this, make sure that you have a fixed assessment moment every year. Not giving an assessment and then not awarding a bonus is contrary to good employment practice as set out in Section 7:611 of the Dutch Civil Code judgment of the District Court of Amsterdam 6 September 2016.

Discretionary power in bonus schemes

In many bonus schemes we also see a discretionary power (freedom to make a decision at one’s own discretion) on the basis of which the employer may decide not to award a bonus or to award a lower bonus to the employee. It is good to include this, but the employer must take into account that this discretionary power to mitigate the bonus cannot be used just like that. It is established case law that this power to determine the bonus is subject to good employment practice. It follows from case law, Amsterdam Court of Appeal 18 January 2022, that good employment practices require the employer to make clear how the discretionary power is exercised. If this is not clear, the employer may not mitigate. Therefore, explain under what circumstances moderation is possible.

Termination of employment and bonus scheme

Another important point of attention with regard to the bonus scheme is that the employer can stipulate that the employee must be employed in order to be entitled to the bonus. If an employee leaves employment halfway through the year, he is not entitled to a bonus. It is also possible to opt for a pro rata claim to the bonus if the employee leaves employment halfway through the year. It is sensible to agree this in writing, all the more so if the bonus depends on a turnover which is only determined at the end of the year.

Beware of acquired rights in bonus schemes

Has an employee received a bonus year after year and does the employer at any time decide not to award a bonus? The employee may argue that this is an acquired right. Namely, that the bonus was granted every year and therefore became part of the fixed salary. This risk arises particularly if there are no clear agreements on the granting of the bonus. The advice for employers is therefore to clearly indicate with every bonus payment that it concerns a variable reward and not an acquired right.

Bonus scheme for sick employees

During illness, an employee is entitled to at least 70% of his or her salary for 104 weeks. But what about the bonus? After all, this is a variable bonus which (sometimes) depends on the performance of the employee. An employee may also be entitled to the bonus during illness if it depends on performance, as long as it is plausible that the employee would have achieved the performance if he had not been ill. An agreement in the bonus scheme that the employee will not receive a bonus if he is sick, is not possible. The obligation to continue to pay wages during illness is compulsory law (it cannot be contractually deviated from).

Need a lawyer in Rotterdam for drawing up a bonus scheme?

In short, do not use a standard bonus scheme. Tailor the bonus scheme for your employees to the organisation and the position of the employee. Choose for clear achievements and give yourself, as an employer, a clearly defined discretionary power.
Do you need help with drawing up a bonus scheme or do you have a conflict about the granting of a bonus? Please contact Richard Ouwerling of LVH Advocaten. He is an employment lawyer and will be pleased to help you with all matters relating to employment law.

The importance of a scope review: avoid a financial noose

Recently, the Hague Court of Appeal ruled that Booking.com must join the industry pension fund for the travel industry.

The company opposed this because it sees itself as an Internet company. The financial consequences for Booking.com are huge: The parent company estimates that the ruling will lead to an additional cost of 405 million euros. None of that can be charged retroactively to (former) employees. Booking.com must join pension fund PGB with retroactive effect (up to and including January 1, 1999).

Scope investigation CLA and pension

Many such claims can be prevented by a scope investigation for generally binding pension fund or collective bargaining agreement.

It is very important to investigate in case of a takeover, a transition to a new pension scheme or in case of various business activities within the same (group of) company(ies) whether a compulsory collective bargaining agreement or pension fund applies or will apply to your company.

It regularly happens that companies are obliged to follow a collective bargaining agreement and an industry pension fund, without knowing it. Some companies adamantly deny this without having this investigated. This poses a substantial financial risk to you and can mean a financial noose. So when in doubt, do not cross over and have your company find out whether you fall under the scope of a collective bargaining agreement or industry pension fund that has been declared generally binding.

Information?

If you would like more information about the possibilities of a scope of application investigation, please contact our employment lawyers Richard Ouwerling or Lisa Kloot.

Accountant’s liability for advice on group structure

The Arnhem-Leeuwarden Court of Appeal recently handed down a ruling on the liability of an accountant for advice on a group structure. Can an accountant (in this case it concerned an accountant, but it also applies to other advisors) be liable to bankruptcy creditors as a result of the advice he provided to the bankrupt company?

Advising on the establishment of an inherently risky group structure

The accountant advised a client. As a result of this advice, a group structure was created, with a production company in which all costs (purchase of materials, rent, personnel) were incurred without any assets being available for recovery. These assets were owned by other group companies and were leased from these other group companies. In addition to the production company, a sales company was also established. This sales company realized all sales to third parties, whereby only the materials produced by the production company would be sold. The source of income for the production company therefore consisted exclusively of the orders it would receive from the sales company. The sales company only had to pay a market price once it had received payment from the end customer. Ultimately, the production company went bankrupt and the debts in that production company remained (partly) unpaid. The trustee took the position that this was the result of the accountant’s advice. The recommended structure was inherently so risky that bankruptcy was inevitable.

Liability for debts?

How does it work again?

A private limited company is a legal entity and, in principle, creditors can only recover their claims from the assets of that legal entity. In exceptional cases, a director may be liable to creditors on various grounds, for example if he has caused a company within the group to be unable to meet its obligations because recoverable assets have been withdrawn. The trustee has argued that the special duty of care that a director has towards the company’s creditors can be extended to the advisor who provides the director with advice that entails disproportionately high risks for the creditors, whereby the advisor also knows that his advice will be implemented.

But can a third party, in this case the accountant who advised the director, also be liable to those creditors?

Standard for professionals

The standard for the liability of a professional (such as an accountant) is that he must exercise the care of a good contractor towards his client. An accountant can be expected to exercise the care that can be expected of a reasonably competent and reasonably acting professional. If an accountant’s advice falls within this standard, he is not liable to the creditors. Only in special circumstances can advice given by the accountant to the company (his client) also constitute a wrongful act (directly) towards the creditors, if that advice can be qualified as a wrongful act towards those joint creditors. In such a situation, a trustee may hold the accountant liable on behalf of those joint creditors.

As long as an advisor takes on the care of a good contractor and his advice is within the bounds of what may be expected of a reasonably competent and reasonably acting professional, he will not easily reach the high threshold of liability to creditors.

The court of appeal assesses the advice on the basis of the standard. Like the district court, the court of appeal believes that the chosen group structure is by no means unlawful. Separating assets in one group company and production in another group company is a structure that occurs much more frequently. Advice to set up a group in this way is therefore not advice that cannot be expected from a reasonably competent and reasonably acting professional. So no liability for the accountant.

The trustee had also raised other issues that led to the company’s bankruptcy and the lack of recourse for creditors. However, it was not established that these issues had been advised by the accountant. In any case, it was not clear that the accountant’s advice had such a significant influence that it determined the company’s policy. There was no evidence of specific advice from the accountant that made the bankruptcy inevitable.

In these proceedings, the outcome was favorable for the accountant. After the court initially rejected the trustee’s claim, the court of appeals upheld that ruling. Nevertheless, accountants (as well as other advisors) must be aware that their advice is not without obligation. Advice given to clients must meet the standard of care that may be expected of a reasonably competent and reasonably acting professional. If this is not the case, the accountant may also cause the company (his client) to commit a wrongful act (directly) towards the creditors, if that advice can be qualified as a wrongful act towards those joint creditors.

Looking for a corporate law attorney?

Would you like to know more about liability in bankruptcy? Feel free to contact Rob Steenhoek of LVH Advocaten. He specializes in insolvency and corporate law and will be happy to assist you.

Amend model employment contract in 2022? Implementation of EU Directive on transparent and predictable terms of employment

In June 2019, the European Parliament adopted a Directive on transparent and predictable working conditions. The Directive grants new rights to employees and this thus affects employees’ employment contracts, as well as any employment conditions regulations. This may lead to employers having to change their (model) employment contracts and employment conditions regulations in 2022.
In this article we discuss the changes contained in the bill and consider the changes employers must make to their (model) employment contracts.

Implementation of Directive 2019/1152

The directive must be implemented in Dutch law. The government published a bill on 12 November 2021. The intended entry into force of the law is 1 August 2022. Thus, we recommend to review the employment contract of your employees and applicable regulations before that time.

Legislative amendments from Directive on transparent and predictable employment conditions (2019/1152)

Training costs clause

Employers already had a training obligation, but it is expanded by the Directive. Employers can no longer agree on a study costs clause for training that is necessary for the performance of the job. The employer must offer this training free of charge and the time an employee spends on the training is working time.

The question is therefore, what constitutes training that is necessary for the job? In any case, this concerns a training which the employer is obliged to offer based on the law or collective bargaining agreement.

Side-activities clause

An ancillary activities clause in the employment contract is possible from August 2022 only if the employer can justify it on the basis of an objective reason. If there is no such justification, the clause is null and void. Note: The justification does not have to be given at the conclusion of the employment contract or be included in the employment contract. The justification may already be included in the employment contract, but may also be given at a later date. So does an employee request permission to perform ancillary work? Then the employer can still provide the justification at that time.

The rationale behind this change is that an employee is free outside of working hours to work for another employer or to work for himself. Thus, an employee may have multiple jobs unless the employer can justify a prohibition. A justification could be, for example, the threat of a violation of the Working Hours Act, the protection of confidential business information or the health of the employee.

Employer information obligation

The information obligation of employers is expanded. Employers must, in addition to the information in Section 7:655(1) of the Civil Code, also provide information about:

  • Working hours;
  • Work place(s);
  • Wage components (bonus and allowances);
  • Procedural aspects in the event of termination of the employment contract;
  • Right to training;
  • Leave arrangements(s).

The employer can include this information in the employment contract, terms of employment regulations and/or personnel handbook.

On-call agreement

Employees are only obliged to work unpredictable working hours if the employer has made these working hours known at the start of employment. The employer is therefore given a more extensive information obligation in this area. An on-call worker must therefore know at what times he is obliged to work. This can be included in the employment contract.

Request for predictable work

Furthermore, after 26 weeks a call employee can submit a request for predictable work. Employers do not have to agree to this and the work must be available. Employers must respond to the request within 1 month (or within 3 months for small employers) with a written motivation. If the response is lacking, the employee’s request must be acted upon.

Prohibitions on giving notice

There is a new prohibition on giving notice. An employee who invokes the above new rights cannot be dismissed for that reason.

Posted workers in the EU

If an employer wants to post an employee from the Netherlands within the European Union, certain information must be provided. The employer must inform the employee about the wages, allowances and reimbursement of expenses to which he is entitled. This can be included in the employment contract or terms of employment.

Need help updating your employment contracts?

It is always wise to have your model employment contract checked regularly by an employment lawyer. Labour law is constantly changing and this year too there are changes, namely the implementation of the EU Directive on transparent and predictable terms of employment. Richard Ouwerling of LVH Advocaten in Rotterdam will be happy to help you evaluate and adjust your employment contracts. He can also tell you more about the upcoming changes in employment law.

Everything you need to know about a unilateral modification clause

Everything you need to know about a unilateral modification clause

There may be reasons for you as an employer to unilaterally amend certain terms and conditions of employment if you are unable to reach an agreement with the employee(s). For example, to adjust the travel allowance because employees are working from home more often since the corona crisis. Then a ‘unilateral change clause’ from the employment contract can offer a solution

In principle, employers cannot simply change terms of employment unilaterally. After all, there is an agreement and both parties must respect the arrangements therein.
However, under circumstances, the employer must also be able to unilaterally amend the contractual agreements with an individual employee, in order to meet the interests of the collective of employees (e.g. the survival of the organisation). A unilateral modification clause can help the employer do this.

What is the unilateral modification clause

The unilateral modification clause allows the employer to make changes to the employment contract (in the future) without the further consent of the employee. Because the employer can easily include a unilateral modification clause in the employment contract and obtain the required consent of the employee upon commencement of employment to do so, the legislator set strict conditions for the use of this clause.

The employer can invoke a unilateral amendment clause if he has such a strong interest in the amendment that the employee’s interest, which will be harmed by the amendment, must give way to it according to reasonableness and fairness.

When may the employer unilaterally modify the employment contract?

Whether these conditions can be met depends very much on the factual circumstances of the case. As a starting point, if the works council (OR) agrees to a collective change in the employment conditions package, the employer’s overriding interest is deemed to be present. Does your organisation not have a works council? Then the assessment must be made whether the interests of the employee must reasonably give way to the interests of the employer.

Possibilities without unilateral change clause

If the employment contract does not provide for a unilateral amendment clause, it is only possible to unilaterally amend employment contracts by invoking the general standards of good employee conduct (Article 7:611 of the Civil Code).

Double test of reasonableness

However, the Supreme Court ruled in the so-called ‘Mammoet judgment’ that, when testing against Section 7:611 of the Civil Code, not only what can reasonably be expected of the employee in such a situation should be considered. The question of whether, given the situation, a good employer could have found reason to make a proposal to change the terms of employment should be considered first. It must then be assessed whether the proposal is reasonable, taking into account all the circumstances of the case.

This ‘double reasonableness test’ must be applied for each individual employee, which is particularly cumbersome if an employer wants to implement a collective change in the terms of employment. A unilateral change clause can then offer a solution, especially if the weighty interest of the employer appears to be present, because the works council has agreed to the collective change of the employment conditions package.

Therefore, check whether your employment contracts provide for a unilateral changes clause. Such a clause allows you to more easily realise unilateral collective changes to the employment conditions package, for instance in case of a change in the law or if business economic circumstances give reason to do so.

More information or advice on unilateral change clause ?
Want to know whether you can unilaterally change employment conditions, with or without a unilateral change clause? Contact Richard Ouwerling, lawyer at LVH Advocaten in Rotterdam for more information.

 

 

What possibilities are there for (interim) adjustment of the rent of medium-sized business premises

What possibilities are there for (interim) adjustment of the rent of medium-sized business premises

Leases for shops, catering establishments, takeaway or delivery services and crafts businesses are called medium business premises leases. Specific legal provisions apply to these types of leases, the basic principle being a high degree of protection for the tenant. One of these rules concerns the legal system of rent adjustment. This article explains which possibilities there are to adjust the rent of medium-sized business premises outside the statutory system.

Rent adjustment in medium-sized business premises

The basic principle in medium-sized business premises is that the lessor and lessee are free to agree on the initial rent and its increase. Once a rent has been agreed and the way it will be increased, it cannot simply be adjusted. In principle, this can only be done after the agreed rent period has expired and in other cases only after five years. This means that if an (initial) tenancy period of 10 years has been agreed, the rent can only be adjusted after 10 years have elapsed. If the landlord and tenant then fail to agree on a new rent, the rent will have to be determined by the court. This will require following the laborious rent review scheme. The rent review scheme will not be discussed in this article.

However, it also happens that the tenant and landlord of medium-sized business premises agree on a new rent before the agreed term has expired or within five years of the previous rent review. There can be various reasons for this. One example is that the lease does not provide that the initial rent can be increased and the initial lease period is long, while after some time the tenant is quite willing to pay more rent.

Deviation from statutory regulation of rent review for medium-sized business premises possible

It is possible to deviate from the statutory regulation of rent review for medium-sized business premises. This means that a new rent can be validly agreed even before the agreed rent period has expired or within five years of the previous rent review. There are at least three options for this.

Interim rent adjustment of medium-sized business premises with permission of the subdistrict court

If the landlord and the tenant of medium-sized business premises want to make sure that their agreement on the adjusted rent will stand, the subdistrict court can be asked for its prior consent. The subdistrict court should then be asked to declare the statutory regulation on rent review wholly or partly inapplicable.

Interim rent adjustment without permission of the subdistrict court

In practice, however, it is quite conceivable that tenant and landlord do not like this route. If there is sufficient trust between the parties, the price agreement made can also simply be laid down in an allonge to the lease. However, it should be borne in mind that such an agreement is voidable. Only the lessee of the medium-sized business premises can invoke such voidability. A limitation period of three years applies to invoke the voidability of the agreement on the adjusted, often higher rent made in deviation of the statutory regulation. The limitation period starts to run as soon as the landlord invokes the clause, but may also start to run at an earlier point in time if the tenant can actually exercise that power of annulment at an earlier point in time. This is usually from the moment the agreement on the higher rent is made or recorded or from the moment the landlord claims the higher rent.

Including an agreement on a new, often higher rent for medium-sized business premises in an allonge is therefore not entirely without risk for a landlord if the agreement is not in line with the legal regulation on rent review. For about three years, the landlord of medium-sized business premises has to reckon with the risk of the tenant appealing for annulment of that agreement.

Interim rent adjustment through a new lease agreement

If the parties want more certainty about the validity of the agreement made on the adjusted rent, but do not want to go to the subdistrict court for prior permission to do so, there is another option. The tenant and landlord of the medium-sized business premises can terminate the existing lease by mutual consent and then conclude a new lease. As mentioned, at the start of the lease, the parties are free to determine the amount of the rent. The new lease will then state the new rent. A point of attention is that in such a case, the terms that play a role in the termination of the lease also start running again.

Surveillance in the (home) workplace: what is an employer allowed?

Surveillance in the (home) workplace: what is an employer allowed?

Previously we wrote an article about the rules for camera surveillance in the workplace. The need for employer monitoring exceeds – partly in view of the corona pandemic – the mere checking of the workplace with cameras. Employers also have a need to monitor employees’ browsing habits, as well as the emails they send. And, of course, they want to prevent employees from spending hours Internet shopping and watching TV at the home workplace during working hours. But isn’t monitoring this a violation of the employee’s privacy, especially at the home workplace?
In this article, we address that question. Is an employer allowed to use monitoring tools and what rules must the employer abide by during a monitoring. To form a clear picture, we will also discuss case law.

When may an employer conduct structural workplace monitoring?

The employer must comply with privacy legislation, including the General Data Protection Regulation (AVG). Does the employer want to monitor the (home) workplace? If so, this must be announced in company regulations or the personnel handbook. In addition, the Works Council (if any) must grant permission for this monitoring. Finally, a legitimate interest is always required. And that legitimate interest is not always present, as case law shows.

Is an employer allowed to check an employee’s e-mails?

The District Court of Amsterdam awarded an employee compensation of € 10,000.00 after the employer had violated the privacy of the employee. The court ruled that the employer searched the employee’s mailbox without concrete suspicion, prior notice or consent. This was allegedly done to gather information about ongoing projects. However, the years 2016, 2017 and 2018 were also searched. According to the court, this violated Article 8 ECHR, especially since nothing shocking came to light. Also, the employer should have hired an external agency for the investigation, according to the court.

Is camera surveillance in the workplace permitted?

In determining the amount of the fair compensation, the North Netherlands District Court took into account the events surrounding the placement of cameras on the work floor. The employer had placed hidden cameras without notice to the employees and without the consent of the Works Council without having a legitimate interest in doing so. The hidden camera surveillance should also have been reported to the Personal Data Authority. Partly because of this, the court ruled that the employer was seriously culpable. Learn more about camera surveillance, read: rules for camera surveillance in the workplace.

Is an employer allowed to monitor the home workplace?

When deploying surveillance equipment, it does not matter whether the employee works in the office or at home. Working from home is not a reason for the employer to monitor more strictly. An employee is not obliged to agree to a home visit. An employer cannot impose sanctions for refusal. The same applies if the employer asks for a photo or video of the home office. Checking e-mails, telephone traffic, surfing behavior and behavior on social media is in principle not possible since this is private. However, when the employer complies with the requirements, control is possible.

Looking for an employment lawyer in Rotterdam?

In short, as an employer you cannot simply monitor your employees. The privacy of your employees must always be taken into account. Therefore, always contact an employment law specialist. They can check whether you meet the requirements.

Would you like to know more about the means of control you can use as an employer and how you can do this correctly? Please contact Richard Ouwerling of LVH Advocaten in Rotterdam. She will be happy to help you implement these means of control, including drafting an internet and e-mail policy and/or a personnel handbook.

Use of a contiguous site in violation of the zoning rules

Old buildings are increasingly getting a new function. An old school building becomes a restaurant in retro style, a dilapidated mansion revives as a hotel and an abandoned office building gets e and new life as a student complex.

Such a transformed building often still includes a disused piece of land. Years after a building has been given a new function, the need may arise to use the adjacent land. The old schoolyard could provide space for a summer terrace, the hotel wants a more spacious parking lot in the garden of the old mansion, the student complex could use some bicycle storage on an unused driveway.

Different planning rules may apply on the adjacent land, because the zoning plan assigns a different purpose to the land than to the building. In the past, a permit may also have been granted in favor of the transformation to deviate from the purpose of the building, but not of the adjacent land. Thus, unpleasant complications can arise.

Permit for conflicting use as a contiguous site

The opaque accumulation of rules and exceptions that we know as environmental law brings counsel if one knows where to look. The Environmental Law Decree, in the second appendix under the fourth article, gives a list of activities for which a permit may be given for activities that conflict with a zoning plan. The ninth section of that article mentions the use of land adjacent to a building in violation of the zoning rules applicable to that land.

The extensive procedure with the decision period of 6 months, which is the starting point for permits in activities in conflict with a zoning plan, does not have to be gone through in this case. The shorter, regular procedure is applicable, with a decision period of 8 weeks. This also means that if the application is not decided on in time, the requested permit is given by operation of law. In this way, the land near a building can be used for a purpose that deviates from the zoning plan, without having to undergo a rigid process of planning decisions.

Conditions for permit

This possibility of authorization has been curtailed within strict limits. The legislature and courts strictly enforce the requirement that the land for which the permit is sought is actually adjacent to a structure. This is how the owner of a piece of land, with a house, a garden and a garage on it, found himself. He applied for a permit to extend the garden to a strip of land behind the garage. This was rejected because the strip did not border directly on the house.

In addition, the change of use of the adjoining property must serve only the use of the structure to which the property adjoins. A terrace at the restaurant is sufficiently related to the function of the building and will be considered to serve the use for the restaurant destination. Similarly, parking spaces will be considered to serve the use of the hotel zoning and bicycle storage will also be embraced by the residential zoning.

But does the desired use serve, for example, to provide space for a new activity that the owner has added to his business, then the slower, more laborious path of the extensive procedure will have to be followed to obtain permission to deviate from the zoning rules.

So here too the inevitable ifs and buts apply. Nevertheless, the regulation deserves attention. Should you encounter complications because the desired expansion of a permitted activity in an adjacent building clashes with the zoning on the adjoining property, it is useful to consider whether an appeal can be made to this regulation.

This article was written by mr. D.C. van Genderen.

Information

Are you looking for legal advice? Then feel free to contact us. You can do so by phone, email, or by filling out the contact form. If you have any questions, please call LVH Advocaten on our general number 010-2092777.

Deficiencies in participation

Careless consultation with the Works Council may constitute mismanagement of the company’s management

Careless conduct and mismanagement

The Enterprise Chamber ruled in a case of a company takeover via a leveraged buyout that the management of the company had acted negligently (partly) due to defects in the co-determination process. The careless conduct was classified as mismanagement, because it violated the elementary principles of proper entrepreneurship.

Request for advice from Works Council in case of company takeover (financing and provision of security)

Pursuant to Section 25 (1), opening words and under a, i and j WOR, an employee participation body must be given the opportunity to advise on any decision to transfer control of the company, to attract significant credit for the benefit of the company and to provide security for significant debts of another entrepreneur, unless this is done in the normal course of business.

Duty to correct inaccurate, incomplete or misleading information

A request for an opinion should include the essence of the proposed resolution, the board’s rationale for it and an accurate description of its likely consequences. It is the responsibility of the board that the employee participation body is correctly and fully informed in the advisory process, according to the Enterprise Chamber. According to the Enterprise Chamber, this responsibility implies that incorrect, incomplete or otherwise misleading information must be corrected as soon as possible.

Subsequent relevant information must still be provided to the works council

In this case, the management board had become aware of further relevant information after it had asked the relevant employee participation body for (an initial) advice on a proposed sale of the company under Section 25 of the WOR. This further information related to the structure of the financing of the transaction, its significance, and the associated risks for the company. These risks were significant, in part because after the acquisition, the company became liable (due to merger with the buyer) for high loans (at very high interest rates) taken out by the buyer to finance the acquisition.

The Enterprise Chamber found that the board should have informed the employee participation body about this after submitting the request for advice. However, the board failed to do so. Even when a second request for advice was submitted (about the merger after the takeover), the board failed to inform the employee participation body carefully, correctly and completely. According to the Enterprise Chamber, the board should have done so.

Failure to inform the works council correctly and/or fully qualifies as mismanagement

The ruling shows that the Enterprise Chamber regards it as a serious matter if the management board of the company does not give the Works Council, by not correctly and/or fully informing it, insufficient opportunity to do its job and therefore does not sufficiently respect the participation rights. According to the Enterprise Chamber, this qualifies as mismanagement.

An important point for attention is that relevant information must also be shared with the Works Council afterwards, as soon as the management has become aware of it, at such a time that the requested advice can still have a substantial influence on the decision to be taken. And that the Works Council must subsequently be given sufficient time to provide further advice, if necessary, on the basis of the further information obtained.

Discharge granted may be annulled

It is worth mentioning that the Enterprise Chamber has annulled the resolutions of the shareholders’ meeting granting discharge to the management board (and the supervisory board), insofar as this discharge relates to the mismanagement established by the Enterprise Chamber.

Information

If you have any questions about this article or this topic, please contact Peter Verheijden, an employment law attorney at LVH Advocaten.

Rejection of homologation request WHOA agreement

Rejection of homologation request WHOA agreement

The Homologation Underhand Arrangement Act (WHOA) went into effect on January 1, 2021. In the meantime, a substantial number of rulings have been issued on it. It remains to be seen how practice will develop and whether it can be said whether the introduction of the Act has been a success. To date, the number of (published) granted homologation requests is still relatively small.

Below I will discuss a decision of 10 November 2021 of the District Court of Midden-Nederland, which rejected the request for homologation of a WHOA agreement on several grounds.

What is the WHOA?

The WHOA offers the possibility for a debtor to have a creditors’ agreement compulsorily imposed by the court. The mandatory imposition of the agreement is called homologation. Such an agreement may include, for example, that the creditors have to settle for a smaller payment than they were entitled to. Before the introduction of the WHOA this was only possible in the case of suspension of payments and bankruptcy. The WHOA is intended to settle debts at an earlier stage, so that a moratorium or bankruptcy can be avoided.

You can read more on our website about what the WHOA broadly entails and the role of the restructuring expert under the WHOA.

Case: request for mandatory imposition of WHOA agreement

Five private companies belonging to the same group have asked the court to approve agreements. There is one creditor, anonymously referred to in the judgment as ‘company 1’, who has a substantial claim of €9.5 million against the five debtors, whereby there is joint and several liability. The joint and several liability entails that company 1 has the right to sue each of the five debtors for the entire debt.

Classification in WHOA agreement

In the applications of all five applicants, the creditors are divided into two classes, namely the preferential creditors (creditors with rights of priority) and unsecured creditors. The Tax Authority is the only creditor in the class of preferential creditors. The other creditors, including Company 1, are divided into the unsecured creditor class. Company 1 was included in this for the claim of €9.5 million in all five applications and represents by far the largest portion of the indebtedness in the classes of unsecured creditors. In the event of a vote in the classes, Company 1 therefore has a casting vote.

The settlement offered would pay ,021% of the claims of the unsecured creditors and 6,93% of the claim of the Tax Authorities. Due to the fact that company 1 is a creditor of all five applicants (because of the joint and several liability), it would in fact receive 5.1% of its claim based on the settlement.

Special conditions for discharge

Further, the case shows that Company 1 financed the group companies. In addition, Company 1 has imposed special conditions on the granting of discharge (i.e., cooperation with the arrangement). Company 1 will only grant discharge if the Arrangement is reached and if it will provide the new financing. Details of the provision of the financing were not disclosed. Furthermore, the agreement is conditional on final discharge being granted to Company 1 and the management.

Creditors’ objections to homologation of WHOA agreement

There are four creditors who object to the offered agreements. The following aspects are particularly important in this regard:

  • The lack of information about, in particular, the position of Company 1;
  • the chosen class division and, in that regard, in particular the influence that Company 1 will have as a result on the outcome of the vote; and
  • The position of Company 1 and the board after the implementation of the agreement.

The importance of proper class scheduling in a WHOA agreement

Article 384 paragraph 1 Bankruptcy Act stipulates that a request for homologation of a settlement agreement can be granted, unless one or more of the grounds for rejection, referred to in Article 384 paragraph 2 to paragraph 5 Bankruptcy Act, occur.

The court indicates that this test lies primarily with the creditors themselves. Further, the court considers:

With a proper class division, the voting result in principle gives democratic legitimacy to the agreement. When the creditors are divided into a limited number of classes, as in this case, and thus little distinction is made between the rights of creditors, there is a risk that the vote of one or a few large creditors will determine the outcome of the vote. The importance of protecting the dissenting minority is then greater.

As far as I’m concerned, it’s good that the court is aware of this.

WHOA agreement must meet disclosure requirements

Art. 384 paragraph 2 sub c Bankruptcy Act stipulates that a request for homologation of the agreement will be rejected if the agreement itself and the documents submitted with it do not contain all the information mentioned in art. 375 Bankruptcy Act. This section of the law enumerates which information a settlement agreement must contain.

Missing explanation on why shareholders are not covered by WHOA agreement

When offering a settlement agreement, creditors or shareholders not covered by the agreement must be declared. The offered arrangement did not include the shareholders. However, there was no explanation as to why the shareholders were not covered by the arrangement. Therefore, the court considers the provision of information on this point insufficient.

What are liquidation value and reorganization value?

When offering the settlement, the reorganization value and the liquidation value must be quantified, among other things. The reorganisation value is the value that is expected to be realised if the settlement is reached. The liquidation value is the proceeds that are expected to be realized in a liquidation of the debtor’s assets by a bankruptcy trustee in bankruptcy.

Comparison of liquidation value with offer from WHOA agreement

By comparing the liquidation value and what is offered to creditors with the agreement, it can be assessed whether creditors will be better off with the debtor’s bankruptcy or with compliance with the agreement. Article 384 paragraph 3 Bankruptcy Act states:

At the request of one or more voting creditors or shareholders who have not themselves consented to the agreement or who have been improperly denied the right to vote, the court may reject an application for approval of an agreement, if it is summarily apparent that these creditors or shareholders are worse off on the basis of the agreement than they would be in a liquidation of the debtor’s assets in bankruptcy.”

This is called the Best Interest of Creditors test.

Insufficient information on liquidation value

In the discussed case, the liquidation value was calculated only concerning a limited number of applicants. One of the applicants is known to have inventory and claims on debtors, yet no liquidation value has been calculated. A liquidation value of another applicant has not been calculated either, while a balance sheet does show a claim on a related party of €5.7 million, without it being clear which party that is. It is also unclear what the value is of 100% equity interests held in other companies. At the hearing it was stated by the applicant that the shares are worthless, but the court cannot establish this. The court concludes that the information in the offered agreements is inadequate on this point.

Insufficient information on position funder agreement WHOA

Also, according to the court, the information provided about the position of Company 1 before and after the arrangement is inadequate. Company 1 is a creditor, but also the financier of the arrangement. According to the court, insufficient information has been provided about the financing and the conditions to be attached to it. Therefore the court concludes that too little insight has been given to enable the creditors to form an opinion about the arrangement.

Incorrect classifications under the WHOA

The court recalls that the request for homology should be rejected if the class division does not meet the legal requirements. Creditors must be assigned to different classes if their rights in a liquidation of assets in bankruptcy or those offered to them on the basis of the composition are so different that there is no question of a comparable position.

Creditors’ rights are too different in WHOA agreement

The court held that Company 1 should have been classified in a different class than the other unsecured creditors. Based on the arrangement, due to the joint and several liability of the five applicants, Company 1 would receive five times the distribution of 1.02% on the total claim (i.e. a total of 5.1%), while on the claims of other unsecured creditors, only once 1.02% would be distributed. Therefore, the rights of Company 1 are too different, according to the court.

Classification of SME creditors into separate class in WHOA agreement

According to the court, the SME creditors should also have been assigned to a separate class under the Bankruptcy Act. Furthermore, the court noted that with respect to one creditor, who was classified in the class of unsecured creditors, it applies that the claim is contractually subordinated. On this point, too, the class division is incorrect.

Severity of defects with respect to class assignment

Furthermore, the court ruled that it cannot be assumed that the defects with regard to the class allocation could not have led to a different outcome of the vote concerning four of the five applicants. In the case of four of the five Applicants, the unsecured class of creditors would not have agreed to the Arrangement if Company 1 had been classified in a separate class.

Grounds for rejecting homologation WHOA agreement

As can be seen from the foregoing, the court has found several problems, both with respect to the disclosure of the agreement, and the class certification. The court rejects the requests for homologation of the agreements.

Legal assistance with WHOA agreement

In addition to being able to cast a vote in the class of creditors, a creditor in a WHOA agreement also has the option (under certain circumstances) of requesting the court to reject the homologation of the agreement.

In the case discussed, four creditors raised various objections. The judgment shows that, based on some of these objections, the court has come to the conclusion that the request for homologation should be rejected.

Looking for a lawyer about WHOA agreement in Rotterdam?

If you need legal assistance in offering a settlement under the WHOA or if you wish to object to the settlement as a creditor, please contact Peter de Graaf.

Part-time layoffs and secondment as solution to energy crisis

Part-time layoffs and secondment as solution to energy crisis

Bankruptcies are slowly increasing again as a result of the energy crisis, high inflation and the cessation (and repayment) of government support measures. Retail, agrifood and business services are particularly hard hit. Entrepreneurs in these sectors should anticipate even worse business times. In that context, when part of the turnover is lost, two alternatives to a (final) reorganization can be considered, namely part-time dismissal and secondment.

Part-time layoff as a solution

The first option is to reduce the hours of your employees. This way you can reduce your personnel costs. Part-time dismissal can be done through the UWV or through a settlement agreement. You pay a partial transfer fee in exchange for a reduction in hours. For the reduction in hours, your employee will be entitled to unemployment benefits. If necessary, you can agree on a return guarantee to the old scope of work. For older employees in greenhouse horticulture, the seniority scheme is also an alternative. This arrangement allows an older employee to work 20% less while retaining 90% of the salary.

Secondment as a solution

Another solution is collegial secondment. This has been done a lot in recent years in the industry and certainly offers a solution for the coming winter. Record these arrangements well in a secondment agreement. A risk to secondment is that you as a hirer (in addition to the lender) are jointly and severally liable for payment of wages, income tax and sales tax for the hired employees. In addition, chain liability may follow for you if the lender as formal employer fails to pay wages. Other risks include transfer of undertaking, applicability of a different collective bargaining agreement and conditions of employment, incapacity for work or an industrial accident of the posted employee. Finally, all employers who provide workers for a fee have a duty to register with the Chamber of Commerce. If you fail to comply with this obligation, the Inspectorate SZW can impose a fine on you. This fine is as much as €8,000 for the first 10 loaned workers.

More information or advice about part-time dismissal or secondment?

Do you have questions about part-time dismissal or secondment? Please contact Richard Ouwerling, attorney at law at LVH Advocaten in Rotterdam for more information.

Reduction of amount for which the director is liable

Reduction of amount for which the director is liable

A director is liable under article 2:248 paragraph 1 of the Dutch Civil Code (BW) to make good the deficit in the bankruptcy if the board has manifestly mismanaged its duties and it is plausible that this was a major cause of the bankruptcy. Based on paragraph 4 of this article of law, the court can mitigate the amount for which the director is liable under certain circumstances. The Supreme Court recently issued a judgment on the possibilities of mitigation. In this article I will briefly discuss the legal regulation concerning directors’ liability in bankruptcy and I will discuss the judgment of the Supreme Court.

Directors’ liability in bankruptcy due to improper management

Article 2:248 of the Dutch Civil Code concerning improper management is relevant in the event of bankruptcy of a private limited liability company (Article 2:138 of the Dutch Civil Code in the case of an NV). On the basis of this article, each director is jointly and severally liable towards the estate to settle the estate deficit, if the board has manifestly mismanaged its duties and it is plausible that this was a major cause of the bankruptcy. Only the bankruptcy trustee can make such a claim.

Legal presumption of directors’ liability

On the basis of paragraph 2 of article 2:248 of the Dutch Civil Code, the trustee’s position is strengthened if the annual accounts have been filed too late or if the administration does not provide the required insight. In such cases, improper management is established and the legal presumption applies that the bankruptcy was caused by improper management. Read more about the distribution of the burden of proof in the article Disproving the legal presumption concerning directors’ liability in bankruptcy.

Mitigation of director’s liability

If the director’s liability is established, it may be relevant whether there is a reason to moderate the amount for which the director is liable. In principle, the director is liable to settle the estate deficit. This means the debts of the company, minus any available income. Paragraph 4 of article 2:248 of the Dutch Civil Code states about the possibility of mitigation:

“The court may reduce the amount for which the directors are liable if it considers it excessive in view of the nature and seriousness of the improper performance of duties by the management, the other causes of the bankruptcy, and the manner in which this has been disposed of. The court may also reduce the amount of liability of an individual director if it considers this excessive in view of the time during which that director held office as such in the period in which the improper performance of duties took place.”

The first sentence applies to the board as a whole (i.e. this is a collective mitigation variant). The second sentence applies only to an individual director (i.e. this is an individual mitigation variant).

Process of directors’ liability

The judgment of the Supreme Court on the possibility of mitigation was preceded by the following. A bankruptcy trustee took legal action against two directors of a bankrupt B.V. It was claimed that the directors had improperly fulfilled their duties and were liable for settlement of the estate deficit, as well as an order to pay the deficit. The court allowed the claims. The Court of Appeal upheld the judgment.

Appeal to reduce amount of directors’ liability

The Court of Appeal also dealt with an appeal by the directors to reduce the amount for which the directors are liable. The Court of Appeal was of the opinion that there are no grounds for moderation, because it has not become plausible that there were other important causes of the bankruptcy, nor is there any indication that the estate was incorrectly settled by the trustee.

The grounds for mitigation are exhaustive

The directors go to the Supreme Court. They argued that the grounds for mitigation in article 2:248 BW were not exhaustive. They argue that they have also pointed out other circumstances and that the Court of Appeal should have discussed these in substantiated terms. One of the circumstances is that the companies of the group are the largest victims of the bankruptcy.

The Supreme Court does not follow this view and dismisses the appeal. It considered that both the text and the parliamentary history of Section 2:248 (4), first sentence, of the DCC show that the grounds for reducing the amount for which the directors are liable are exhaustively enumerated in this provision. Therefore, the Court of Appeal did not have to examine the arguments of the directors that relate to grounds for mitigation that are not included in this provision.

Lawyers in corporate law and insolvency law

Should you have any questions about directors’ liability please feel free to contact Peter de Graaf.

The Environment Act & Disadvantage Compensation (part 2) The reference date and (planning) comparison

Introduction

As of Jan. 1, 2024, the Environment Act will be in effect. With its entry into force, it has been said that the largest legislative operation has been completed since the introduction of the Dutch Constitution law in 1848. Several previously existing separate laws and regulations have been combined into one law and four Orders in Council with the Environment Act. With a legislative operation of such magnitude, of course (principle) choices are made that bring about a change from the previously applicable law. So too in the context of the Environment Act.

One area of the Environment Act where (principled) differences between the old and new law clearly emerge on is the law of plan damage / loss compensation. In a number of separate contributions some of these changes will be discussed in more detail and the (mo equal) consequences for practice will be considered. In each of these subjects, the judiciary will probably still have an important task in settling fundamental (points of dispute). This aspect, in combination with the fact that the old law will remain in force for quite some time under the transitional law, will undoubtedly create a lot of dynamics in case law in the coming years.

In the previous contribution, some terminological differences between the old law and the Om gevingswet were discussed, and attention was also paid to Section 4.5 of the General Administrative Law Act (“Awb”), which also came into force on January 1, 2024. This contribution will discuss the reference date and the (planning) comparison to be made.

The reference date

The reference date is an important benchmark for answering the question of whether damage is suffered as a result of a planning/spatial development. Under the old law (the Wro), the reference date was the da tum on which the alleged damage-causing decision (e.g., a zoning plan) entered into force, regardless of whether the planning development that was permitted was actually realized. This interpretation of the reference date was abandoned when the Environment Act entered into force. Under the Environment Act, the reference date for loss compensation (after all, the term “planning damage” has been abandoned) is the moment that the damage actually occurs. That moment can be the moment the permit is granted, the start of the activities or the moment the competent authority is informed about the start of the activities.

The amended reference date under the Environment Act stems in part from the global scope of the environmental plan. After all, the environmental plan does not have to describe in detail what is or is not permitted at a location. The amendment of the reference date is particularly intended to tie in with the moment when something actually changes in the physical environment. Under the old law, planning damage could occur as a result of ‘merely’ changing the planning regime (e.g. the amendment of a zoning plan) without the permitted development being realized.   Under the old law, this could therefore result in compensation of theoretical damage. After all, what was permitted from a planning perspective could – although not (yet) realized – already result in planning damage as a result of the modified planological working conditions. With the introduction of the Environment Act, the possibility of theoretical damage has been abandoned with regard to the changed reference date.

The (planning) comparison

Besides a different reference date, the changed comparison under the new loss compensation scheme in the Environment Act also stands out. Illustrative of the comparison under the old law (Wro) is the ruling of the Administrative Law Division of the Council of State (“the Division”) in the Hardenberg case (ABRvS January 24, 2024, ECLI:NL:RVS:2024:225) in which it is considered: “For the assessment of an application for compensation for planning damage, it is examined whether the applicant has been placed at a disadvantage as a result of the relevant change in the planning regime and suffers or will suffer damage. To this end, a comparison is made between the post-impact modification of the planning regime, which is claimed to have caused damage, and the immediately preceding planolo _COPY0 gical regime. In that far ge comparison, in principle the most unfavorable in filling of the possibilities of the old and new planning regime is assumed. Only if the most un favorable fulfilment of these possibilities can be excluded with a probability bordering on certainty, there is reason to deviate from this starting point.”

The old planning damage regulation under the Wro thus had a highly theoretical assessment with a high level of abstraction whereby damages were, in principle, assessed in one go. An exception to the principle of plan maximization concerned the case where realization of the maximum construction or use possibilities could be excluded ‘with a probability bordering on certainty’ (e.g. as a result of private law obstacles). Under the Environment Act, at least in the case of indirect damage in the form of decrease in the value of an immovable property, a different course will be taken. Instead of the planological comparison (the maximum planological infill), under the Environment Act, Articles 15.3 and 15.4 are about comparing actual situations (in short, what has been and is being realized?). In this context, a parallel can be drawn with the other reference date discussed above, which after all corresponds to the moment when something actually changes in the physical living environment. Whether this method of comparison also applies to direct damage in the form of decrease in the value of an immovable property or in the case of loss of income has not been determined by the legislator and will therefore probably have to be determined by the administrative courts in the coming years.

Illustrative of the manner in which the (planning) comparison takes place under the Environment Act is the comment in the Explanatory Memorandum (Parliamentary Papers II 2018/19, 34986, no. 3, pp. 229 / 236) which notes: “………. in cases as referred to in Articles 15.1, second paragraph, ge read in conjunction with Articles 15.3 and 15.4, (damage) will not (…) be determined on the basis of a far equation between the maximum possibilities of the old and new regime, as is the case under the Wro. Instead, the determination of damages in those cases will focus, much more than is currently the case , on the actual situation. Determining the extent of the damage here ties in with the changes actually made to the physical environment. (…) Article 15.3 leads to the fact that in the case of indirect damage, the decrease in the value of an immovable property is determined on the basis of the actual situation before and after the granting of the environmental permit.

In practice, the comparison that will have to be made under the Environmental Law still raises the necessary questions. After all, if the actual situation must be taken into account, should the (previous) local planning regime be completely ignored (by a surveyor)? Even if that could have major consequences and to that extent already cast its shadow far ahead? Consider, for example, the pla no logical possibility of establishing a business at a short distance across from a detached house that would then have to be disregarded. Disregarding such effects of planning pressure on value ken can lead to a higher house value in an appraisal than if these effects had been taken into account (overestimation). Whereas the changed reference date prevents compensation of the o re ti sche damage (see above), the regulation of the Environmental Law with respect to the pla no lo gical comparison may result in compensation of theoretical damage because, in the example given above, the house value is overestimated / appraised (after all, abstracted from the disadvantageous planning possibility of establishing a business in the vicinity of the house). Among other things, the administrative law speech will have to provide clarity on this and related questions.

Closing Remarks

This contribution discussed the reference date, theoretical damage and the modified equation for assessing a request for loss compensation.  The next contribution will discuss the changes brought about by the Environment Act with regard to the concept of damage.

Learn more

This contribution was written by Ben van Nieuwaal of LVH Advocaten. If you have any questions about this contribution, please contact us at the general number 010 – 209 27 77.

Compulsory education and study-cost clause: all points of attention for employers

Compulsory education and study-cost clause: all points of attention for employers

As an employer, you like to keep your employees’ knowledge up to date. This is important for the sustainable employability of your personnel and it can create more productivity within the organisation. Thus, a win-win situation.

But staff training requires investment. If the employer invests in an employee, the wish is of course that the employee will remain in service for a long time. But what if that employee leaves anyway? Who pays for the training if the employee leaves the company during or after the training?

Labour law has the necessary rules to deal with this. In this article we discuss all the points of interest for employers regarding the training of employees, namely the legal training obligation, training costs and the study costs clause.

Training obligation of employees

The law (Article 7:611a BW) stipulates that the employer must enable its employees to follow (1) the training necessary for the performance of their duties and (2) the training necessary for the continuation of the employment contract when the employee’s position is no longer held, if this can reasonably be expected of the employer (training in connection with redeployment). This implies an obligation for the employer to invest in employees by means of training. An employee is expected to make efforts as a good employee to accept the training and to complete it successfully.

Attention: see also heading “Change to training obligation and study costs clause as per 1 August 2022”.

Training necessary for the performance of a function

We will now zoom in on the first part, the necessary training for the execution of the position. It concerns necessary training. This includes training that is compulsory by law or by an external party (collective labour agreement or governing body). In addition to offering the training, the employer must also enable the employee to follow the training. The employer must make regular working hours available for the training activities.

Does the organisation have a CAO? Check it for the specific rights and obligations with regard to training.

Training in case of malfunctioning

The aforementioned training obligation is also important in a situation where the employee does not function. If there is dysfunction and this can be resolved through coaching or courses, it is up to the employer to offer support in the form of training. Are you, as an employer, not making enough effort? This can lead to serious culpability and the associated fair compensation.

Training costs to be borne by employer or employee?

In principle, the employer has to finance the necessary training mentioned above and training in the context of redeployment. Is the training not necessary? Then the employer does not have to finance it. If the employer does pay for the training, this can, under certain conditions, be deducted from the transitional allowance.

Study Costs Clause

As mentioned, a training course is an investment. An investment that the employer would like to recoup. This is not possible if the employee leaves shortly after completing the training. To prevent this becoming an empty investment, a study costs clause can be agreed. The education costs clause provides that an employee, if he or she resigns (or if the employer’s resignation is at the employee’s risk), must repay the training costs to the employee. Please note: in principle, an employer cannot invoke the training costs clause if the initiative for dismissal or non-renewal of the employment contract lies with the employer, unless other agreements have been made. For example, it may be agreed that the employee must repay the study costs if he is summarily dismissed or in the event of serious culpability on the part of the employee.

This study costs clause is not (yet) regulated by law, but case law has laid down a number of requirements:

1. The financial consequences (concrete amounts) of the clause and when it comes into effect must be properly explained, preferably in writing;
2. The period during which the employer will benefit from the study (and the resulting knowledge and skills) must be established;
3. The repayment obligation must decrease proportionally on the basis of the established period mentioned under 2 (sliding scale).

Even if the foregoing has been arranged well, it may be that the employer cannot invoke the study costs clause. This is the case if after the study costs have been deducted, the employee’s salary falls below the statutory minimum wage. Furthermore, invoking the study costs clause may be unacceptable according to the standards of reasonableness and fairness.

Change to training obligation study costs clause as of 1 August 2022

On 1 August 2022, new rules will be introduced in Dutch law regarding the training obligation and the study-costs clause. Based on the European Employment Conditions Directive (click here for more information about this directive), the employer is obliged to offer a study free of charge if (1) the study is compulsory on the grounds of the law, the CAO or regulation of a competent administrative body and (2) the study is necessary for the performance of the duties. If a study costs clause is nevertheless agreed for this compulsory or necessary training, the clause will be null and void. These are clauses whereby the costs of training are recovered or set off against monetary income arising from the employee’s employment.

Please note: training or education that employees are obliged to take in order to obtain, maintain or renew a professional qualification, does, in principle, not fall under mandatory training as referred to under 1. Therefore, a study-costs clause would be agreed upon with regard to such training. The question is how this will work out exactly in the Netherlands if a course of study is not compulsory, but necessary for the performance of the duties.

Do you need a lawyer in Rotterdam to advise you on the obligation to study and the study costs clause?

The above shows that agreeing and invoking a study costs clause is not self-evident. So think carefully about the exact wording of the education costs clause and consult an employment lawyer. If you want to invoke the clause, first get advice on your chances. If you would like to know more, please contact Richard Ouwerling of  LVH Advocaten.

A declaration of intent; rights and obligations

How binding is a clause in a letter of intent stating that rights and obligations only arise once a signed agreement has been concluded? Not always binding, as it turns out.

A practical example

Two companies enter into a partnership. They want to jointly market a new product. They lay down a number of principles for this partnership in a letter of intent. To avoid any misunderstanding about the status of their (legal) relationship, the parties agree in the letter of intent in so many words that they cannot derive any rights from the letter of intent. Furthermore, the letter of intent states that it does not constitute an agreement. And finally, the parties stipulate in the letter of intent that rights will only arise after an agreement has been signed between the parties in which agreement has been reached on essential elements. It seems that all of this leaves nothing to be desired in terms of clarity.

Start of implementation

The parties then begin to implement the proposed collaboration even though no agreement has been signed. One party (the supplier) also invoices the other party (the customer) for work already carried out and services provided. These invoices remain unpaid. After a while, problems arise, after which the buyer extrajudicially dissolves the agreement, if such an agreement exists.

Claim

The supplier does not accept this dissolution and files a lawsuit to claim payment of the unpaid invoices, as well as compensation for damages suffered due to lost profit as a result of the premature termination of the collaboration.

The buyer’s defense is that the parties did not conclude a (written) agreement. According to the buyer, the parties got stuck in the negotiations and the buyer broke off those negotiations. The work carried out was supposedly only a pilot. The product had yet to be “proven”. If an agreement was ever reached, it was terminated by dissolution, according to the buyer.

Ignoring the requirement for a written letter of intent

The court ruled that the parties had reached agreement on the content of the documents to be signed (including a quotation and general terms and conditions issued by the supplier). The court then established that the parties had implemented the agreements made, while these were still being further developed and formalized. The parties also agreed on these agreements. In doing so, the parties tacitly ignored the requirement for a written agreement as stated in the letter of intent. The court ruled that the buyer can therefore no longer invoke this.

Work not performed without obligation

The court attaches importance to the fact that the requirement for a written quote in the letter of intent is very generally worded. For example, the letter of intent does not stipulate that if the supplier performs work prior to signing the agreement, he does so entirely at his own expense and cannot derive any right (to payment) from this. Furthermore, the court attaches value to the fact that the offer is formulated unconditionally. For example, it does not state that payment for the work only needs to be made (and exclusively) after the parties have determined that the pilot is successful.

Conclusion

The conclusion is that when parties implement agreements in the context of a cooperation that has not yet been formalized, this implementation cannot be regarded as non-committal by the buyer, (solely) by invoking a (generally formulated) requirement for a written declaration in a letter of intent. In other words, a buyer who wants to “keep his hands free” will have to explicitly stipulate this prior to the execution of agreements by a supplier.

Information

If you have any questions about this article or this topic, please contact Peter Verheijden, attorney at LVH Advocaten.

How do I substantiate the need for reorganisation?

How do I substantiate the need for reorganisation?

Support measures have stopped and energy crisis and high inflation are putting many entrepreneurs in financial trouble (again). Starting to reorganise on time can then be a ‘must’. But how do you substantiate the need for reorganisation?

Do you need to reorganise due to business economic circumstances? If so, one of the options is to terminate the employment relationship with some of your employees by applying for individual dismissal permits from the UWV.

Substantiation for dismissal in the event of reorganisation

A request for dismissal for economic reasons must be substantiated with annual accounts and a profit and loss account for the past three years. You should also explain the number of jobs to be cut in relation to the minimum amount to be cut. In addition, you must provide insight into your company’s organisation and staff composition, indicating the different positions, their possible interchangeability, age and years of service.

Assessing dismissal in the event of reorganisation

Dismissal for economic reasons usually involves a poor financial situation or reorganisation. The business decision to reorganise is not always easy to assess. Therefore, there is a certain degree of policy freedom for an entrepreneur. In any case, the UWV may not sit in the employer’s chair and can therefore only marginally assess the reorganisation decision.

This policy freedom comes into play with an entrepreneur’s motive for dismissal, the size of the proposed staff reduction and the selection of the categories of jobs in which redundancies will take place. The UWV respects in principle that an entrepreneur must be able to take the appropriate decisions, which are necessary for healthy and efficient business operations, also in the longer term. Not only the corporate interest, but also the labour market interest and the employment interest may come into play here.

Which employee will be dismissed?

You cannot choose the employees for whom you apply for a dismissal permit. The UWV’s policy rules state that when determining which employees are to be nominated for dismissal, the employees must be classified by business location into so-called ‘interchangeable job categories and age groups’ based on the principle of mirroring. The age groups are classified as:

  • 15-25 years;
  • 26-35 years;
  • 36-45 years;
  • 46-55 years;
  • older than 55 years.

Within each age group, the employee with the shortest tenure is put forward for dismissal first.

Reassignment in the event of reorganisation

Finally, in the UWV procedure, you as an employer must make it plausible that there are no possibilities for redeployment of the employees proposed for dismissal. This involves redeployment both within and outside the employer’s company. This assessment will also address whether other measures have been taken to maintain employment.

Notice period for dismissal due to reorganisation

The UWV dismissal procedure generally takes six to eight weeks. Does the UWV grant a dismissal permit for the employees? Then you still need to take into account the notice period of the employees concerned when terminating their employment. If a dismissal permit is granted by the UWV, the employer may reduce the notice period by one month, as long as at least one month remains.

More information or advice on reorganisations?

A letter of dismissal must be adequately substantiated and you must nominate the right employees for dismissal. The employment law specialists at LVH Advocaten can take this off your hands and, of course, advise you accordingly. Contact Richard Ouwerling, employment law lawyer at LVH Advocaten in Rotterdam for more information.

The end of the Wob and the arrival of the Woo in a nutshell

Public access to government information

As of May 1, 2022, the era of the Open Government Act (“Wob”) has come to an end. After years of serving as the legislative framework for the right to government information, the Wob has been replaced as of May 1, 2022 by a new law, which entered into force under the name of the Open Government Act (‘Woo’).

The departure of the Wob will not cause the public in need of information too much heartache. Not infrequently the Wob proved in practice to be a legal “shield” behind which a closed government evaded or tried to evade public scrutiny. In administrative practice, the Wob has therefore not been able to fully live up to the promise of a transparent government. The courts have regularly had to confirm or enforce the citizen’s fundamental right to information in judgments.

Purpose of the de Woo

The Woo has an ambitious goal. The new regime is intended to initiate an open administrative culture and a more accessible government apparatus. To put this intention into practice, the Woo provides for several changes – of a more or less substantial nature – compared with the old regime (Wob). First of all, there is a shift in emphasis in the approach to government information; an active disclosure obligation will apply to a large group of information types. For types of information whose disclosure must be requested, the Woo procedure shows some innovations of a procedural and substantive nature. In addition, the Woo modifies on a number of points the assessment framework used by the administrative body to decide whether information should be disclosed and, if so, in what form. We discuss the most relevant changes below.

Starting point of the Woo: active disclosure

Under the Wob, the so-called Wob request was the focal point. The duty of disclosure only took shape if a request was made. Beyond that there was only a best-efforts obligation to disclose information of one’s own accord, compliance with which could not be enforced and which therefore left the administrative body free to decide at its own discretion. Article 3.3 of the Woo does away with this when it comes to information belonging to one of the categories mentioned there. If an information type falls into one of these categories, the administrative authority must make the information public of its own accord.

In part, this relates to information that administrative bodies already tend to disclose, such as decisions of general application, generally binding regulations and administrative reports. However, the Woo goes further than is usual in current practice, for example by stipulating that draft decisions on which external advice has been requested must be made public, as must the external advice and the accompanying request for advice. Also of importance is that investigation reports about the performance of an administrative body’s duties will be subject to the active disclosure obligation. At least as valuable is the obligation to actively disclose a series of types of decisions, such as, and perhaps most important for practice, the environmental permit.

The information must be sufficiently accessible to the public. Article 3.3 of the Woo regulates that the relevant documents are made accessible through an online platform. The platform, called PLOOI, is a central location where all public government information should be able to be consulted by the public.

With this duty of active disclosure, the Woo aims to set in motion a cultural change. Administrative bodies will have to keep track of information and organize it so that it is regularly made public.

Disclosure on request under the Woo

Anyone can request an administrative body to disclose information, without the requester having to declare an interest. This does not change with respect to the Wob.

The Woo brings the formalities concerning the submission of requests into line with the requirements of the digital age by explicitly providing that a request for information may be submitted electronically. Although submission by electronic form or email is now quite common, the Wob allowed administrative bodies to demand an old-fashioned written submission. Consequently, various administrative bodies continued to cling to a dated formality. The Woo will put an end to this.

If the administrative body intends to grant a request, the disclosure is automatically suspended if a third party wants to prevent it and requests a preliminary injunction against this from the administrative court. Pursuant to Section 4.4, subsection 5, of the Woo, the suspension lasts until the preliminary relief judge has ruled or the request has been withdrawn. Suspension was already common practice under the Wob, but was not prescribed by law. Because the internal coordination within the government bureaucracy sometimes failed, publication was sometimes a fait accompli. The new provision in Section 4.4 guarantees the protection of third parties more explicitly.

In addition, the procedural differences between requests for environmental information and other information in the Woo have been eliminated as far as possible. For example, the deadline for responding to an environmental information request has been made the same as the deadline for any other information request.

Grounds for refusal under the Woo

The Woo maintains most of the grounds for refusal from the Wob in the assessment framework for information requests.

To this, the Woo adds a new ground for refusal, according to which the administrative body can withhold the disclosure of information if the interest of doing so is outweighed by the protection of the environment. For example, it may be necessary not to share with the public information about reproduction areas and the habitat of rare species. The Woo also stipulates that disclosure can be refused if the interest of disclosure does not outweigh the proper functioning of the State, other public law bodies or administrative bodies. In practice, this new ground for refusal amounts to a statutory elaboration of existing case law, which has been applied for years in assessing whether the administration was right to refuse a request for information in order to prevent disproportionate harm to the government.

Under the Wob, the prevention of disproportionate harm or advantage was a ground for refusal so widely used that it degenerated into an all-purpose excuse for withholding information. The Woo is intended to change this. Information may no longer be refused on the grounds of disproportionate benefit to those involved or third parties, as was the case in the Wob. In addition, if the environment is not at stake, information may only be refused on the grounds of disproportionate harm to those involved or third parties in exceptional cases. The ground for refusal may therefore no longer be used as a “catch-all” provision.

In determining whether information should be refused because of competitive sensitivity, the Woo provides for a minor change. Environmental information that has not been provided to the government in confidence is no longer covered by this ground for refusal.

Abuse of the Woo

The Wob had its excesses. On the far side of the closed government, stood the private querulant or opportunist, who abused the Wob as a means to stall and harass the public administration with an endless influx of information requests. This was already a reason for the legislator to break the link between the Wob and the Late Payment and Appeal Act in 2016. The legislator added an anti-abuse provision in the Woo. If it is evident that the requester’s objective in the context of the Woo is other than to obtain public information, or if the request does not concern an administrative matter, the administrative body may decide to ignore the request altogether. Practice will have to show how administrative bodies will interpret this anti-abuse provision, and more specifically the “obviousness”.

Expectations of the Woo

It is not the intention to continue the existing Wob practice under a new banner. The legislator has a structural change in the handling of information in mind. Ultimately, a certain balance must be struck between transparency and the careful handling of other public objectives. The approach of the Woo seems realistic in this respect, by emphasizing shifts in emphasis and not striving for lofty reforms.

Within 5 years of the Woo’s entry into force, the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations will share an evaluation of the law with First and Second Chambers of the States General. This will have to show the extent to which the objectives of the new law have been achieved.

Information

This article was written by Ben van Nieuwaal of LVH Advocaten. If you have any questions about this article, please contact us at our general number +31 10 209 27 77.

Commercial contracts: ‘the assignment contract’ (series 5/5)

In this final article of the ‘Commercial Contracts‘ series, Gentia Niesert, attorney at contract law, discusses the ins and out of ‘the assignment agreement’. How does it differ from the building contract and the employment contract, and what provisions do you find in an assignment agreement?

The assignment agreement

A assignment agreement is an agreement between a client and a contractor in which the parties agree that the contractor will perform work commissioned by the client. Assignment agreements are found, for example, in the following industries: consulting, coaching, IT, marketing, events industry, healthcare, creative, legal and financial services.

The difference with the building contract

In a previous article, we discussed what the difference is between the building contract and the assignment agreement. The difference is primarily in the “material”. In a building contract a work of a material nature is created, whereas in a assignment agreement, work of a non-material nature is performed.

The difference with the employment contract

An assignment agreement also involves a different type of agreement than the employment contract. The most distinctive difference is that an employment relationship involves a relationship of authority between employer and employee, while in a assignment agreement this relationship does not exist.

Provisions in contracts of assignment

What provisions one includes in the assignment contract depends, of course, on the intentions of the parties. Listed below are a number of topics that one may encounter in assignment agreements:

  1. Description of the assignment
    It is important that the engagement agreement provide a clear description of the work/services to be performed and what the objective is.
  2. Obligations of the contractor and the client
    It is also advisable to state in the assignment agreement the obligations of the contractor, such as what the client may expect with regard to the quality of the work, within what time period the work must be performed, in what manner the contractor must report to the client and whether the contractor must observe confidentiality.

Employer obligations may include providing certain information and all necessary cooperation. Payment terms may also be agreed upon.

  1. Duration and termination
    It is wise to include in the agreement the duration for which the agreement is entered into, whether and how the parties can terminate the agreement (prematurely) and in which cases the agreement can be dissolved.
  2. Liability
    It may also be advisable to include in the assignment contract something about which party is liable if damage occurs during the performance of the assignment, whether certain items of damage are excluded, and whether or not the amount of compensation is capped (e.g., up to the amount paid out by the insurance company).
  3. Intellectual property rights
    Finally, the assignment agreement may include a provision on intellectual property rights. It can be agreed which party is the owner of the intellectual property rights and whether or not the intellectual property rights are transferable.

Advice on an assignment agreement

Would you like to have a contract of assignment drafted or reviewed? Then Gentia Niesert, attorney at contract law, will be happy to help you.

Ground rent due during bankruptcy is not an estate debt

Recently, the Supreme Court issued a ruling on the question of whether a ground lease rent that became due after the date of bankruptcy is an estate debt. In this article, I first explain what estate debts are and the relevance of the question answered by the Supreme Court for practice. I then discuss the judgment.

What are estate debts?

Estate debts can be considered the cost of bankruptcy. Only when the estate debts can be paid in full can it be acceded to distribution to creditors with priority rights (or preferential creditors). Only when the preferential creditors can be fully satisfied can it be acceded to payout to creditors without rights of priority, or unsecured creditors. In the vast majority of bankruptcies, there are insufficient financial resources to make a payment to unsecured creditors. The chance that an estate claim will be satisfied is therefore much higher than the chance that an ordinary unsecured claim can be satisfied. Moreover, in principle, estate claims must be paid immediately. This is in contrast to ordinary preferential and unsecured claims, which have to be submitted for verification.

By the way, pledge and mortgage holders have a special position, called the separatist position, by which they basically do not have to worry about other creditors.

What are the grounds for creating estate debts?

The law provides in some cases that a debt of a bankrupt is an estate debt. This is the case, for example, insofar as amounts become due after the date of bankruptcy, for rent and leases (Article 39 Bankruptcy Code), as well as an employee’s salary (Article 40 Bankruptcy Code).

In the important 2013 Koot Beheer v. Tideman q.q. ruling, the Supreme Court clarified when estate debts exist. These are only those debts that give an immediate claim to the bankruptcy estate, either

  • (i) pursuant to law,
  • (ii) because they were entered into by the trustee in his capacity (in the sense that his will was directed thereto),
  • (iii) because they result from an act of the trustee in violation of an obligation or duty to be observed by him in his capacity.

The right of leasehold and ground rent

The right of leasehold is the right that gives the leaseholder the authority to hold and use another person’s immovable property. In the case of ground lease, it can be agreed in the deed of establishment that the ground leaseholder must pay a ground lease rent. This is a sum of money that must be paid all at once or at regular or non-regular intervals. The law does not stipulate that ground rent from after the date of bankruptcy is an estate debt (unlike rent and lease).

Does ground rent from after date of bankruptcy create an estate debt?

The situation on which the Supreme Court recently handed down a judgment involved a leaseholder who had gone bankrupt. The leaseholder’s receiver refused to consider the ground lease rent that had become due during bankruptcy as an estate debt. The leaseholder initiated proceedings and claimed payment. The trustee mounted a defense and was vindicated in the District Court and the Court of Appeal.

In cassation it was argued by the ground lease lessee that ground lease is similar to lease and rent and would therefore similarly give rise to an estate debt. It was also argued that a canon payment obligation is property law in nature and therefore can be enforced outside the concurrence of unsecured creditors.

The Supreme Court does not agree and dismisses the appeal. It notes that in the set of the Civil Code, the obligation to pay ground lease rent is not an obligation under property law, but a qualitative obligation resting on the ground leaseholder. Furthermore, the Supreme Court points to the special regulation on payment and termination in the case of ground lease. According to the Supreme Court, the payment of ground rent insofar as it becomes due after the date of bankruptcy is therefore not an estate debt pursuant to or by virtue of the Civil Code or the Bankruptcy Act.

Payment and termination for ground leases

As noted above, the Supreme Court referred to the special regulation governing payment and termination of the ground lease. Briefly, this regulation means that the ground lease can be terminated by the owner if the ground leaseholder defaults in paying the ground rent for the two consecutive years or seriously fails to fulfill his other obligations. Furthermore, the law provides that after transfer of the leasehold, both the transferee and the predecessor in title are jointly and severally liable for the canon owed by the predecessor in title that became due and payable during the previous five years. This rule also simply applies in the event of a leaseholder’s bankruptcy.

Increasing clarity on estate debts

With the Koot Beheer v. Tideman q.q. ruling in 2013 and subsequently, the Supreme Court has created more and more clarity about estate debts. For example, in 2015 the Supreme Court ruled that rent of movable property after the date of bankruptcy also constitutes an estate debt. And in 2021, the Supreme Court held that interest on an estate debt is also an estate debt. And now there can also be no doubt that – in a situation where there is already an emphyteusis on date of bankruptcy – emphyteusis rent that becomes due after date of bankruptcy is not an estate debt.

Looking for a lawyer insolvency law in Rotterdam?

If you wish to seek advice in the area of insolvency law, such as on the rights of the landlord in the event of a tenant’s bankruptcy, estate debts, security interests and the ranking of creditors, please contact Peter de Graaf of LVH Advocaten.

Transportation industry workforce shortage solutions

Like many other industries, the transportation industry is understaffed to keep up with growth. Job openings remain high and retirement attrition continues to increase. In this article, I discuss possible solutions.

Peer hiring

Peer hiring can be a solution when staff shortages occur. Collegial hiring is a variant of hiring personnel, where one entrepreneur makes his or her own personnel available to a fellow entrepreneur “on a non-profit basis”.  Peer hiring does not involve the hiring out of personnel by the lender on a professional or business basis. Peer hiring is a temporary affair.

Peer-to-peer hiring involves the risk of hirer liability. This concerns liability for the payment of contributions and taxes on the hired employee’s wages. Agreements on this and, for example, employer liability should be made in a hiring agreement.

Employing self-employed truck drivers

In the transport sector, it is becoming increasingly common for carriers to hire self-employed drivers so that no employment contract needs to be concluded. However, when regularly or repeatedly using a self-employed driver, a transporter runs the risk that the tax authorities and/or a judge will subsequently determine that it is an employment contract rather than a contract for services.

According to the Road Goods Transport Act (Wwg), however, a transport company is prohibited from carrying out transport operations with drivers who are not employed by the company. This is the so-called requirement of employment.

To make it clear that an employment relationship exists, the transportation company and the driver must jointly prepare a statement that:

  • the transport is carried out at the transport company’s expense and risk
  • a pay and authority relationship exists between the transportation company and the driver;
  • the driver is employed by the transport company, which has a Euro permit for professional transport.

Own transportation

Under the Road Goods Transport Act, it is permissible to hire a self-employed person as a driver in own transportation. In own transportation, the requirement of employment does not apply. Own transportation is the transportation of goods owned by the company or which the company trades, rents, leases, handles, processes or repairs.

ZZP-er

ZZP-ers must have their own Euro permit and their own truck. In practice, this last requirement in particular often causes problems because it requires a very large investment. Therefore, the form of leasing or renting is often chosen. A model agreement for professional freight transport has existed for some time: vbvo_beroepsgoederenvervoerder_branchemodel_dv10211z4ed.pdf (belastingdienst.nl)

This agreement contains all kinds of provisions that the parties must meet in order to demonstrate the self-employed driver’s independence (including a license, own car, own fuel, right to outsource transport again, etc.) This is where the shoe pinches. It is known that in the transport sector many self-employed drivers do not (cannot/will not) meet these requirements. If, in practice, the conditions of the model agreement are not met, there is a risk of retrospective taxation by the Tax Authorities regarding missed payroll taxes, although the DBA Act is currently not enforced by the Tax Authorities unless there is ‘malicious intent’ on the part of the client.

TLN wants an exception for professional freight transport in the cabinet’s new rules for self-employed workers. Licensed freight transport is already subject to quite a few rules.

Payrolling

In payrolling, a company’s staff is “employed” by the payroll organization. Legal employership and payroll administration are entirely the responsibility of the payroll organization. However, payroll companies are obliged to apply a number of elements from the industry’s collective bargaining agreement to payroll contracts: the so-called hirer’s remuneration. The problem is that the hirer does have to take care of recruitment and selection of the relevant employees itself, which remains difficult with an already growing staff shortage.

Moreover, payrolling is not entirely without risks. For example, the client is partly responsible for payroll taxes for the payrolled employees, among other things. If the payroll company does not pay these to the tax authorities, the tax authorities can come and collect them from the entrepreneur. Moreover, the payroll restriction is sometimes seen through, if the construction is set up solely to take away the labor law protection of the employees. Also, situations where it is unclear to the employee with whom he has an employment contract are not allowed: the employee must clearly and unambiguously agree to this construction.

Broadcast

The difference between payrolling and staffing is mainly in the recruitment of the workers. In payrolling, the transportation company recruits the workers itself; in temporary staffing, they are recruited for the employment agency.

Under the ABU collective agreement, the temporary employment agency is obliged to apply the hirer’s remuneration from day one. As a result, temporary workers in professional freight transport are entitled to the hirer’s remuneration in accordance with the Professional Goods Transport collective agreement from the first working day.

Incidentally, only temporary employment agencies, which are designated by the Minister of Infrastructure and the Environment, are allowed to dispatch drivers. A driver then needs a declaration of posting. He must be able to show this on the road during inspections. Finally, the temporary employment agency must have a designation from the Kiwa Register. In itself, temporary employment is a safe construction if a certified and specialized agency is used, but it often turns out to be quite expensive, with margins that are simply too small.

Conclusion

Thus, each form of engagement has its advantages and disadvantages. If you have any questions or would like legal advice, please contact Richard Ouwerling, telephone number 0031 10 209 27 77.

Lifting of pledge ban

Trade receivables as collateral for corporate financing

A very large percentage of SMEs (figures 2022; 82%) have financing from a bank. Naturally, a financing bank wants security that the credit provided will be repaid. An important form of security is the provision of a pledge on trade receivables. By law, pledging of receivables is possible if a receivable is transferable.

Transferability of receivables

The premise of the law is that all receivables can be transferred – and therefore pledgeable – unless the nature of the receivable or the law prohibits it. An example of an untransferable receivable is the NOW subsidy. This subsidy was intended to enable employers to keep employees in permanent employment. It was, as it were, a concession on the employee’s salary. The subsidy is thus intended for the employee, and then by its nature this subsidy claim is non-transferable, and the employer cannot transfer the NOW claim to a third party. With this, the NOW claim is also not subject to pledge.

Exclude transferability

There is another important category of nontransferable receivables; these are those where the parties themselves have agreed that a receivable is nontransferable. Many parties are often unaware that a receivable is nontransferable. The non-transferability then appears to be included in the general terms and conditions declared applicable to the contract.

Why exclude transferability and pledge

When a receivable is transferred or pledged, there can be ambiguity about to whom payment should be made. It is also possible that a payment has just crossed a notice to pay to another or even that the notice to pay to another is missed altogether. As a result, payment may be made to a creditor while the receivable has been transferred to a third party. Payment is then made to the wrong address and the debtor runs the risk of having to pay again. Whether these are good reasons to exclude the transferability of a receivable is questionable, but often parties have no choice, especially if the non-transferability is included in general terms and conditions.

Consequences of non-transferability of claims

If a receivable cannot be transferred, the receivable cannot be pledged either. This affects a company’s ability to obtain financing from a bank. The introduction states that a large majority of SMEs have financing from a bank. It makes a difference to the size of the financing and the price of the financing (risk premium) whether a company can pledge receivables (as security for repaying the bank) or not. A simple calculation example: if a bank is willing to finance up to 50% of the debtor balance, a company with a debtor balance of 500 has a borrowing capacity of 250. If at the same company 20% of the trade receivables are not susceptible to pledge, the bank will not count those receivables as collateral. The receivable balance to be pledged is then only 400 and the borrowing capacity drops to 200. Another form of business financing is factoring. Then the receivable is transferred directly to a factoring company. This form of financing is not possible if the parties have agreed that a receivable is non-transferable.

Thus, companies have an interest in minimizing restrictions on the transferability (and pledgeability) of receivables.

Law on lifting pledge bans

The disadvantages of a pledge ban have long been known and the government has set itself the goal of improving financing based on trade receivables. The idea is that lifting pledge bans will provide SMEs with up to €1 billion in additional financing space. This could lead to an investment boost. Already in 2018, the internet consultation on the preliminary draft of the Act on lifting pledge bans was launched. Several market participants responded to preliminary draft of the law. In June 2020, a bill was submitted to the 2e chamber and on June 11, 2024, the 2e chamber passed the bill. On March 4, the bill was passed by the 1e chamber of parliament.

New arrangement

Two new paragraphs are added to art. 3:83 Dutch Civil Code which stipulate that exclusion of transferability and pledgeability of money receivables in name arising from the exercise of a profession or business is not possible. Some receivables are legally excluded from the law and for those receivables it remains possible to exclude transferability or pledgeability. Consider, for example, the balance of a g-account. Contractual clauses to that effect are null and void. The expected effective date is July 1, 2025. As of this date, nullity applies to new clauses. For existing agreements, there is a short transition period. Old stipulations will be void as of 3 months after the law enters into force.

Negative estate issue

The removal of pledge bans has an important effect on the resolution of bankruptcies. It is a problem that in many bankruptcies there are no or insufficient assets available to meet the trustee’s costs for performing legal duties (legality investigation). Currently, in many bankruptcies, the proceeds of unpledged claims are an important source of income. From these proceeds the costs of the bankruptcy can (partly) be paid. This act removes the restriction on pledges, and this results in fewer assets flowing into a bankruptcy estate. As a result, the negative estate issue increases. While recognizing the urgency of the negative estate problem and that this act bill will affect the negative estate problem lemma, no solution is offered. The solution would have to come from other ongoing studies and subsequent measures. The estimated benefit of broadening financing in SMEs is considered to outweigh this disadvantage. For the trustees who now must perform work in a negative estate for which no remuneration is paid, this is unpleasant.

Dismissal during illness versus dismissal due to illness

Dismissal during illness versus dismissal due to illness

The employment contract of a sick employee can (despite the prohibition on giving notice during illness) be dissolved by the subdistrict court. That is, if (a) there is a legal ground for dismissal (for example, a disturbed working relationship or dysfunction) and (b) the request for dissolution is not related to the illness.

Dismissal not related to illness

When is there no connection? In practice, this connection is interpreted differently by judges. Ranging from no connection, secondary connection, sufficient connection, to even decisive connection.

An employer had better take a safe course. And explain that and why the facts and grounds on which a request for dissolution is based, are completely separate (can be abstracted) from the employee’s disability.

Example 1: no dismissal due to illness

An employee is dysfunctional in the opinion of the employer. The employee disagrees. During an improvement process initiated by the employer, the employment relationship becomes seriously and permanently disturbed. As a result, the employee becomes unfit for work.

In this example, there is first a disturbed working relationship and then disability. For this reason, there is no connection between a request for dissolution to be filed by the employer and the circumstances covered by the prohibition on notice. Unless the employee’s conduct that led to the disrupted employment relationship was the result of the employee’s incapacity for work

Example 2: yes dismissal due to illness

Employer and employee have a disagreement about the employee’s disability. The working relationship becomes disturbed as a result.

A request by the employer to dissolve the employment contract will not be successful in this case. After all, the disturbed working relationship is not completely unrelated to the disability.

Exception to ban on notice during illness

When a sick employee does not fulfill his reintegration obligations, even after the employer has stopped paying wages for that reason, the employment contract with the employee can be dissolved. While in that situation, the dissolution request is not independent of the employee’s disability.

Address and address potential grounds for dismissal in a timely manner

It is up to the employer to make it plausible that the facts and grounds of a dissolution request are completely unrelated to the employee’s disability. It is important (also) for this reason, that the employer addresses, addresses and documents a situation of dysfunction or a disturbed working relationship in a timely manner.

More information about dismissal during illness versus due to illness?

If you have any questions about this article or about this topic, please contact Peter Verheijden, employment law attorney at LVH Advocaten.

New ROZ model Huurvereenkomst Winkelruimte en andere bedrijfsruimte in de zin van Artikel 7:290 BW (Dutch Civil Code): the changes and focal points in outline

In December 2022, the Real Estate Council (“ROZ”) adopted a new model for the lease of retail space. The model is intended for the lease of retail space and other business premises within the meaning of Section 7:290 of the Dutch Civil Code, mostly stores and catering establishments. The ROZ models are drawn up by specialists with extensive knowledge and experience and are widely used in leasing practice. This model has been drawn up from the landlord’s point of view. The previous model dates from 2012 and was due for renewal. This new model takes into account social developments, amended legislation and case law. Think of corona, amendments to the Winkeltijdenwet (Shopping Hours Act) and court decisions on the validity of a signature or on the interpretation of the penalty clause.

This article first discusses the use of the ROZ model Huurvereenkomst Winkelruimte. Then some changes and additions compared to the ROZ model retail space from 2012 are mentioned and then explained. Finally, a number of points of interest follow.

How do I use the new ROZ model Huurvereenkomst Winkelruimte en andere bedrijfsruimte in de zin van Artikel 7:290 BW, version 2022?

The model Shopping Space Lease Agreement can be used by landlord and tenant for the lease of business space that – in short – is intended as retail space or catering, such as pubs or restaurants. Landlord and tenant should fill in the model with the details of the parties and of the leased property. The lease also sets out agreements on the rental period and the rent. It is possible to make additional agreements or deviate from the model provisions. Deviations must be included in the preamble and in Article 17 of the lease.

In addition to a new model lease agreement, the ROZ has also renewed the General Provisions accompanying the lease agreement. The General Provisions are declared applicable to the lease agreement. It is important that a landlord provides the tenant with the General Provisions before signing the lease. The tenant will have to sign for receipt. The ROZ has also published a manual. This provides a brief explanation of the provisions in the model lease to be completed by the landlord and tenant.

What are the changes in the ROZ Model Retail Lease Agreement 2022 compared to the 2012 version?

Provisions have been added to the 2022 model on new topics such as electronic signing, privacy, government measures and opening hours. The sustainability article has been expanded and the ROZ provides an appendix to that article in which landlord and tenant can record what measures they have agreed upon in the context of sustainability. The ROZ also provides a turnover rent provision that can be included in the lease when parties agree on a turnover-related rent. The website of the ROZ also provides for the downloading of an official report of completion that the landlord and tenant can use at the start of the lease. The General Provisions include an article on undermining.

I discuss some of the changes and their background below.

The changes to the ROZ model Huurvereenkomst Winkelruimte

Additional barrier for tenant who wants to sue landlord

The ROZ model raises an additional barrier for a tenant who wants to sue a landlord for breach. The ROZ model uses the term “culpable serious shortcoming. In principle, this means that the tenant cannot sue the landlord in the event of an attributable shortcoming (as required by law), but that this shortcoming must also be ‘serious’. When this is the case will have to be assessed on a situation-by-situation basis.

Opening hours

Article 13 of the lease of retail space allows the landlord and tenant to establish in advance what opening hours apply to the tenant. These appear to be minimum opening hours. There seems to be no objection to a tenant wishing to be open to the public beyond the agreed opening hours, albeit at its own expense (Article 11.1 General Provisions). The background lies in a provision added to the Shopping Hours Act as of January 1, 2022. This states that a shopkeeper cannot be obliged to keep his business open longer or at different times if he has not expressly agreed to this. This prevents anyone other than the tenant, such as the landlord or shopkeepers’ association, from deciding on his opening hours. By including the opening hours in the lease, the tenant of 7:290 business premises has agreed to those opening hours.

Corona determination

Article 14 of the lease of retail space contains a provision on government measures, the so-called “corona provision. That article states that the lessor and the lessee of 7:290 business premises must consult with each other if there is a loss of rental enjoyment as a result of generally applicable government measures. These are government measures that mean that the lease cannot be maintained unchanged due to a conflict with reasonableness and fairness. This provision was included as a result of the measures taken by the government in connection with corona, such as the mandatory closure of the catering industry, lockdowns and regulations regarding 1.5 meters distance. The article is broader than corona. Even when another situation arises as a result of which the government takes measures that impede the tenant in the use of the leased property, the landlord and tenant must consult with each other. The article does provide that until other arrangements are made, the tenant will simply have to pay the full rent.

Sustainability

Article 15 of the retail lease provides for a regulation regarding the legal obligations regarding sustainability that follow from the Activities Decree Environmental Management. Energy-saving measures that can be objectively recovered within five years must be taken. In principle, these costs are borne by the tenant (Article 15.3). On the other hand, energy-saving measures taken by the tenant do not in principle have to be undone at the end of the lease. If the energy-saving measures were installed less than five years prior to the end of the lease, the tenant should in principle receive compensation for them. However, the landlord has the option of attaching conditions to his permission to install energy-saving measures.

Electronic signature

In practice, it often happens that the landlord and tenant sign the lease separately from each other. The signed lease is then scanned and sent by e-mail. To prevent one of the parties from later taking the position that the scanned signature is not legally valid, there is the option of including in the lease agreement that a scanned signature (or other type of electronic signature) is also legally valid.

Clarification of penalty clause

Regarding the penalty clause from the previous model agreement, there was a lot of ambiguity in practice and a lot of case law. The ROZ has sought to eliminate this lack of clarity. The current penalty clause in Article 28.3 of the General Provisions reads as follows: “Each time an amount due by the tenant under the lease is not paid promptly on the due date, the tenant shall forfeit to the lessor by operation of law an immediately payable penalty of 1% per month on the amount then due, with a minimum of €300 per month, with each month commenced counting as a full month.

In the manual to the lease of retail space, the ROZ provides a calculation example for clarification. It is as follows: if a lessee fails to pay the monthly rent of € 14,000 for the months of January, February and March, the lessee owes the minimum penalty of € 300 for both January and February under Article 28.3. In March, the arrears total €42,600, i.e. three months’ rent and two penalties. In March, the tenant then owes a penalty of € 462, being 1% of the arrears.

With this, the ROZ makes it clear that there cannot be a cumulative penalty. Thus, a tenant does not owe a penalty of €300 for every month that he has not paid (in full). As an example, if the aforementioned tenant does not pay the rent for January, he owes €300 in penalties. If he still hasn’t paid the January rent in February (and the February rent has), he won’t suddenly owe a €300 penalty.

Points of attention to the new ROZ model Retail lease agreement 2022

Finally, a few points to consider when using the new ROZ model Retail Lease Agreement 2022.

  • Prior to or at the start of the lease, make sure you have a good record of completion. This prevents discussions at the end of the lease. If no official report of acceptance has been drawn up at the start of the lease, the tenant must hand over the leased property in a well-maintained condition, without defects and free of damage at the end of the lease. This is subject to wear and tear and normal aging or if the tenant can prove that the leased property was not in good condition at the start.
  • The starting point is that the business premises are leased as shells. Only the structural parts, such as walls and roofs, are part of the leased space. In principle, the front of the premises is not part of it. It is recommended that the parties clearly specify in the lease what, in addition to the shell, is also part of the leased space, such as floors or installations. Then it is a matter of shell plus. If this has not been laid down, maintenance, repair and renewal will be at the tenant’s expense.
  • Article 5.5 of the General Provisions allows a landlord to refuse the tenant access to the leased premises if the tenant has not yet fulfilled all his obligations at the desired moment of occupation. This is understandable with respect to, for example, rent payments, but can be more difficult if a tenant of catering space first wants to renovate and during the renovation does not yet have an operating license. It is wise to establish in advance that in such a case the tenant may already use the leased space while waiting for the permit.
  • If a tenant wants to change its legal form, prior written consent is required from the landlord. Consider a tenant who wants to convert his sole proprietorship into a limited liability company. Landlord and tenant should also inform each other in writing in a timely manner about other proposed changes in the organization or corporate structure.
  • The premise is that tenant is obliged to join the shopkeepers’ association or similar business association. If he does not, tenant must still contribute to it.
  • If the lessee and the lessor of the premises make additional arrangements during the term of the lease, the lessor may charge administrative costs of at least €300 for recording those arrangements, for example in an allonge.

An escape in contractual compensation for temporary workers?

Is there an escape route for companies that want to avoid the contractual fee when taking on temporary workers? Often temporary workers must work a minimum number of hours before they can be taken over by the hirer free of charge. Taking over earlier usually results in a contractual fee. One painting company thought it had found a way to get out from under this fee.

The ruling of the Gelderland District Court of December 18, 2024 focuses on the aforementioned situation. What exactly preceded it?

Agency agreements

Temporary employment agency BaanMeesters (also trading under the name SchilderMeesters) concludes a temporary employment contract with painting company A on December 10, 2021. On this contract, a minimum hiring period of 1750 hours is agreed upon. The general terms and conditions of SchilderMeesters are also declared applicable.

The temporary worker resigns in July 2022, having worked 908 hours under the aforementioned contract. On August 1, 2022, the temporary worker enters the employment of painting company B.

Painting company A and B have no legal relationship with each other, but the directors are the same. Moreover, both companies are located at the same address.

On July 21, 2023, the foregoing construction is repeated: Painter Masters enters into a hiring confirmation with painting company B, subject to a minimum hiring period of 2080 hours. The general conditions are also declared applicable to this agreement.

The temporary worker enters the employment of painting company A in January 2024, having worked 725.25 hours under the temporary contract.

Judgment of Subdistrict Court

JobMeesters went to court and claimed compensation for the hours not worked, plus 25% over the hourly rate. Painting company A argues that no group or subsidiary relationship exists between it and painting company B, which allowed the temporary worker to be employed by painting company B.

However, the district judge dismissed painting company A’s reasoning. Although formally there is no group or subsidiary relationship between the companies, both companies have the same directors/shareholders and are located at the same address. This makes the companies so affiliated that they can mutually agree on “shifting” personnel to avoid contractual fees.

All this leads to the conclusion that the claims of BaanMeesters can largely be awarded. The Subdistrict Court orders painting company A to pay €20,961.58, plus the legal costs of €2,745.22.

It can be concluded that this so-called “mouse hole” did not have the desired effect for the painting company.

Information

Are you looking to hire temporary workers or seconded employees and are you subject to contractual restrictions? Jamie Jansen and Richard Ouwerling, employment law specialists at LVH Advocaten, advise you on the options available to you.

Does the WHOA apply to claims by industry pension funds for pension premium arrears?

The Supreme Court recently issued a ruling on the question of whether the Homologation Underhand Agreement Act (WHOA) applies to claims by industry pension funds for pension premium arrears. The question was answered in the negative. This article discusses the judgment.

What is the Homologation Underhand Agreement Act (WHOA)?

On January 1, 2021, the Homologation Underhand Arrangement Act (WHOA) entered into force. With this regulation included in the Bankruptcy Act, a new restructuring instrument has been introduced. Its purpose is to prevent companies from being declared bankrupt while they are still (partly) viable. Under the scheme, the court can impose a compulsory agreement on creditors and shareholders. This is called homologation. An arrangement may change the rights of those involved. For example, a creditor may have to settle for partial payment of his claim against the debtor.

The WHOA and the position of workers

Section 369(4) of the Bankruptcy Act provides that the scheme of the WHOA does not apply to rights of employees employed by the debtor arising from employment contracts. Thus, the WHOA can be used to settle various debts, but not debts to employees.

Under the WHOA, contracts can also be amended or terminated (Article 373 Bankruptcy Act). However, due to article 369 paragraph 4 Bankruptcy Act, this does not apply to employment contracts.

Are pension contributions covered by the WHOA?

The judgment of the Supreme Court was rendered in response to a preliminary question from a district court. The proceedings involved the following. A hotel company offered a WHOA settlement. In the settlement offer, the Stichting Pensioenfonds Horeca en Catering was put in a class of unsecured creditors. This class was offered payment of 20% of the claim. All classes voted in favour of the settlement with a sufficient majority. The Pension Fund voted against the settlement and filed a defense against the homologation request. The Pension Fund argued that the WHOA does not extend to claims for pension contributions, because of what is stipulated in Section 369(4) of the Bankruptcy Act.

Thus, the legal question arose whether the WHOA applies to pension contributions. Are there here rights of employees employed by the debtor arising from employment contracts? The court referred this question to the Supreme Court.

Rights of employees arising from employment contracts?

The Supreme Court briefly discusses the establishment history of the statutory provision. Based on this, the Supreme Court concludes that with rights of the employees in the sense of article 369 paragraph 4 Bankruptcy Law nothing else is meant than with obligations of the debtor towards its employees.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court pointed out that a pension agreement, pursuant to Section 1 of the Pensions Act, is that which has been agreed between an employer and employee regarding pensions. The Explanatory Memorandum to that Act states that it makes no difference to the reciprocal rights and obligations between employer and employee whether they actually agree the pension themselves or whether the organizations representing them do so. Therefore, the Supreme Court takes as a starting point that, also in the case of participation in an industry-wide pension fund on the basis of an obligation, a pension agreement applies between an employee and an employer.

Pension is a condition of employment and is part of the employment relationship

The Supreme Court continued:

“Pension is an employment condition and as such the pension agreement forms part of the employment relationship between the employee and the employer. It follows from the foregoing that the rights and obligations of the employee and the employer arising mutually from compulsory participation in an industry pension fund under the Wet Bpf 2000 must be regarded as rights and obligations arising from an employment contract.”

Furthermore, the Supreme Court points to the triangular relationship that exists between the employee, the employer and the pension provider (such as an industry pension fund). In this relationship, the employer is also obliged to the employee to pay to the pension provider.

Claims for pension fund contributions in arrears fall outside the scope of WHOA

The Supreme Court considered that involving claims by a pension fund for premium arrears in a WHOA agreement would impair the employee’s corresponding right against the employer. It could also jeopardize the pension accrual of employees. This would not be in line with the intention of the legislator, according to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court therefore concludes that the WHOA regulations do not apply to a claim for premium arrears from an industry pension fund, and that such a claim cannot be included in a private settlement as referred to in Article 370 (1) of the Bankruptcy Act.

WHOA cooling-off period cannot extend to workers’ rights

A cooling-off period is – in short – a period during which creditors cannot take recourse against assets of the debtor (unless an authorization has been issued by the court). Also, during the cooling-off period, a petition for bankruptcy filed by a creditor against the debtor is suspended. The debtor who has started a WHOA process (or the restructuring expert) can request the court to declare a cooling-off period (section 376 Bankruptcy Act). In practice, the proclamation of a cooling-off period is requested relatively often.

Can the cooling-off period extend to pension contributions?

In the judgment discussed, the Supreme Court also noted that a cooling-off period declared by the court cannot extend to the rights of employees under section 369(4) of the Bankruptcy Act. Therefore, the cooling-off period cannot extend to claims of an industry pension fund for pension contributions either, according to the Supreme Court.

Thus, it appears that even if a cooling-off period has been declared under the WHOA, pension funds may continue to take collection action against the debtor, including taking recourse and filing for bankruptcy.

Remediation of debts to pension funds for pension premium arrears not possible

The judgment of the Supreme Court seems to me to be correct. It was the intention of the legislator that the position of employees cannot be affected by the WHOA and it is therefore appropriate that pension entitlements remain unaffected.

Of course, the fact that the debts to the pension fund cannot be restructured by means of a WHOA agreement may be a reason for a debtor to choose to file for bankruptcy on its own anyway.

Looking for a lawyer about WHOA agreement in Rotterdam?

Thus, the Supreme Court has made it clear that claims relating to overdue pension contributions of industry-wide pension funds fall outside the scope of the WHOA. If you need legal assistance in offering a settlement under the WHOA or if you wish to object to the settlement as a creditor, please contact Peter de Graaf or one of our other insolvency law specialists.

Temporary law on transparency turboliquidation

Temporary law on transparency turboliquidation

A boom in bankruptcies was expected at the beginning of the Covid pandemic. This expectation did not materialise, partly due to the many support measures that the government has rigged for business. Many companies took advantage of NOW, TVL and also special tax deferral schemes. These schemes have now expired and companies have to stand on their own feet again and possibly repay excess support received. From 1 October 2022, entrepreneurs will also have to repay deferred taxes. For this, they have a deadline of five years. It was revealed this week that tens of thousands of companies have not yet started repaying these deferred tax debts. The tax authorities recently sent warning letters.

Despite the end of support measures, there has not yet been a big increase in bankruptcies. For now, there is only a slight increase. The introduction of the WHOA (Homologation of Private Arrangements Act) has only limited reach so far and cannot be seen as a cause of the low number of bankruptcies.

However, a trend of entrepreneurs themselves deciding to quit can be observed. For the private limited company, this brings turboliquidation back into the picture. In August 2021, LVH reported in an article on turboliquidation that a draft bill Temporary Turboliquidation Transparency Act had been drafted. On 16 February 2023, the second chamber passed the bill as a hammer piece. On 14 March 2023, the first chamber disposed of the bill as a hammer piece. The date of entry into force will be further determined. The purpose of the bill is to increase the protection of the position of creditors and transparency on the scheme and thus prevent abuse.

Turboliquidation

Turboliquidation is a quick way to dissolve a private limited company. This form is designed for companies that have no assets. Since there are no assets, there are no assets that need to be liquidated. There will be no liquidator and the company is immediately dissolved and deregistered from the Chamber of Commerce. This method of dissolution is settled in a few days. Creditors often only notice later that the company on which they have a claim has been deregistered and no longer exists.

Reopening liquidation

If a creditor does not agree with the way the company’s assets have been liquidated – and in the case of a turboliquidation, no liquidation has taken place – the creditor can request the court to reopen the liquidation. Any creditor can make such an application. However, if these proceedings show that there are no assets that can still be liquidated, reopening the liquidation is pointless. There is no interest. The creditor must therefore make a plausible case that there is still a potential benefit to be expected. The court must exercise restraint in assessing this potential benefit. The presence of such a benefit may be assumed quickly.

Company in liquidation

If the company grants the application to reopen the liquidation, the company will revive (in liquidation), but only for the purpose of settling the reopened liquidation.

Appointment of liquidator

The court will appoint a liquidator who will have to examine whether there are any assets and, if so, distribute those assets. Not infrequently, the court will draw from the known pool of liquidators when choosing a liquidator.

Costs

A creditor should not proceed too lightly to request the reopening of the liquidation. The company whose liquidation has been reopened has no funds (yet) so the creditor will have to pay the liquidator’s costs. If the liquidator subsequently concludes that there are no assets that still need to be liquidated, the creditor will have had a lot of costs without any proceeds (a benefit still to be distributed).

Impact temporary law transparency turboliquidation

Under the new law, in the event of a dissolution without assets, the board must file a balance sheet and a statement of income and expenditure for the financial year in which the company was dissolved with the trade register within 14 days. This must include a description of the cause of the lack of assets at the time of dissolution, the manner in which the company’s assets have been realised and how the proceeds have been distributed.

Immediately after these documents are filed, the board of the company must notify the unpaid creditors in writing.

Penalties for liquidation in breach of the new law

If the board of the company does not comply with the obligations under the Temporary Transparency Turboliquidation Act, the court may, at the request of the public prosecutor’s office, impose a board ban or a fine if:

the board has not filed the previously mentioned documents;
the management board has significantly prejudiced creditors;
the board has been involved in a dissolution without assets at least twice before in the 2 previous years, unless the board is not to blame.

Changed position of creditors

Will the new Temporary Act on Transparency of Turboliquidation really improve the position of creditors now? That remains to be seen. The board of the company to be dissolved will have to take some additional measures. But the obligation to file documents and communicate to creditors does not take away the fact that the decision to dissolve has been taken and creditors are confronted with the consequences of this decision afterwards. If they believe the liquidation was not carried out correctly, the ball remains in the creditor’s court to apply for the liquidation to be reopened. The new law does not change this.

Looking for a corporate law lawyer?

If you would like to know more about the dissolution of a company, turboliquidation or a request to reopen the liquidation, please contact Rob Steenhoek.

International trade: the CMR Convention

International trade: the CMR Convention

In international trade, it is very important that transport is also well regulated. After all, at least as important as the quality or “conformity” of the goods is that these goods arrive at their destination correctly and on time.

When transport crosses borders, the question may arise as to which law applies to the transport contract. To avoid ambiguity in this regard, several international conventions have been created over the years in the field of transport. One such convention is the CMR Convention: “Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road” (“the Convention”).

What does the CMR Convention regulate?

The Convention aims to protect the best interests of all parties involved in the carriage. The Convention provides that the contract of carriage is recorded in a consignment bill and also regulates the requirements that the contract of carriage (i.e., the consignment bill) must meet. Furthermore, the Convention regulates the rights and obligations of the carrier, but also of the other parties involved, such as the sender and the consignee.

When does the CMR Convention apply?

The Convention automatically applies to agreements for the cross-border carriage of goods by road. Cross-border in this case has nothing to do with the identity of the contracting parties, but with the transport itself. If the place of taking delivery of the goods and the place of delivery of the goods are in different countries, there is cross-border transport. If at least one of those countries is a member of the Convention, it applies to the contract of carriage. Therefore, the applicability of the CMR Convention cannot be excluded.

The CMR Convention applies to transport by road. Other regulations exist for transport by sea or air. The CMR Convention does make an exception for the so-called “stack transport”: part of the journey is not by road, but the goods remain in the vehicle during that part. In that case, the CMR Convention also continues to apply to the transport.

Obligations and liability under the CMR Convention

The Convention regulates the obligations and therefore the liability of the parties involved in the transport. Among other things, the Convention states that the sender of the goods is responsible for the correct preparation of the consignment bill, the correct designation of the goods (and quantity thereof), as well as proper packaging. Should the consignor of the goods not have done this correctly, he is liable for any damage suffered by the carrier as a result.

On the other hand, the carrier has a duty to examine the goods upon taking delivery and must also include the findings of the examination in the consignment bill. In addition, the carrier – of course – has an obligation to perform the carriage properly. Therefore, with some exceptions, the carrier is liable for damage to the goods to the extent that such damage occurred during carriage.

Finally, the consignee must, in the presence of the carrier, ascertain the condition of the goods. If he fails to do so, or without timely reporting any loss or damage to the carrier, he is deemed to have received the goods in the condition as shipped. This makes it difficult for the consignee to complain afterwards about the condition of the goods or to bring an action against the carrier on that account.

Advice?

Would you like to receive advice on a (international) contract of carriage, the applicability or interpretation of the CMR Convention? Then please contact us. Jacolien Leuvenink will be happy to assist you.

When are the costs of additional work to be borne by the client in the case of contract work?

In a building contract between a contractor and a principal a contract price is usually agreed upon. It often happens that the principal wishes all kinds of changes or additions to the work during the execution. This is then extra work. But are the costs of this extra work for the account of the contractor or the principal?

The costs of additional work shall be borne by the client

If changes or additions to the work result in a price increase, the contractor may charge the costs of this additional work if:

  1. he has warned the principal about the price increase resulting from the additional work commissioned; or
  2. the principal himself should have understood that the additional work would lead to a price increase.

Example of the need to increase prices

For example, a client should understand that the price for the work will be higher if he asks the contractor to install gold taps everywhere instead of standard taps.

The contractor does not have to give such a warning in writing about a price increase as a result of additional work. Nor does the contractor have to provide insight into the extent of the price increase or the (concrete) additional costs to be expected (Supreme Court 1 July 2022). The latter applies both to the case where the contractor has warned about the price increase and to the case where the client himself should have understood that the work would turn out to be more expensive as a result of the additional work.

In other words: if the client has been warned by the contractor about the higher costs resulting from the extra work, or if the client should have understood that the extra work would involve higher costs, the bill for the extra work is for the client. In such a case the contractor does not have to indicate how much more expensive the work will be as a result of the extra work.

Client must ask for the costs of additional work

If the contractor has warned about the higher costs resulting from the extra work, or if the principal should have understood the necessity of the price increase himself, the principal must ask the contractor about the extent of the price increase (read: the costs of the extra work). Then the principal can decide whether or not he wants to carry out the additional work.

The principal must pay the contractor a reasonable price for the additional work

If the contractor has informed the principal in time of the price increase resulting from the extra work (without mentioning a concrete amount) or if the principal himself should have understood that the extra work would lead to a price increase, the principal must pay a reasonable price for the extra work. If a recommended price has been determined, this recommended price may not be exceeded by more than 10%.

Important for contractor and client to properly record agreements on the price of additional work

In order to avoid a discussion about the price of the extra work it is important that the agreements between the parties are properly recorded. Although a contractor is not obliged to warn in writing of a price increase as a result of the extra work, nor to indicate in concrete terms what the costs of the extra work will be, it is wise to inform the client of this in writing (or by e-mail) prior to the work.

The importance of the notice of default

Almost every entrepreneur has to deal with it at some point; a counterparty who does not fulfill his/her agreements. In this article Gentia Niesert, attorney at contract law, explains how you can act towards your counterparty in such a situation and what the importance of a notice of default can be.

The notice of default

Suppose you own a contracting company and have engaged a subcontractor to do work for you. The subcontractor gets to work, but does not perform his work in accordance with the agreements made. For example, the subcontractor does not deliver the desired quality and furthermore does not perform some of the work at all.

In such a case, it may be advisable to send your counterparty a “notice of default. This is a written reminder in which you give your counterparty one last reasonable period to fulfill its obligations under the agreement.

Default

If your counterparty does not comply with the formal notice, your counterparty is legally ‘in default’. Default is necessary to be able to dissolve an agreement and/or claim damages.

There are also cases, where a party is already legally in default and a notice of default can be omitted. This is the case, for example, if your counterparty has failed to meet a deadline and performance is permanently impossible.

In cases where your counterparty is not yet in default by operation of law (we can assess this for you), sending a notice of default may be essential to be able to take further steps, such as dissolving the agreement.

Important issues in a notice of default

It is important that the notice of default complies with a number of formalities. For example, the following are important:

  1. Describe clearly in the notice of default which obligations your other party has not fulfilled and which obligations he/she still has to fulfill (e.g. the proper painting of a window frame);
  2. In your notice of default, state a reasonable period within which your counterparty must comply (what constitutes a reasonable period depends on the circumstances of the case, on which we can advise you further);
  3. Send the notice of default in writing (preferably in a way that you can later demonstrate that your counterparty has actually received your notice of default).

Advice

Do you need help in drafting a notice of default or would you like advice on the notice of default you have received? Then you have come to the right place. Gentia Niesert, attorney at law in contract law, will be happy to assist you.

Qualifying employment contract: employee or not after all?

Qualifying employment contract: employee or not after all?

With the Deliveroo judgment of March 2023, the Supreme Court has once again given the practice more clarity on the qualification of the employment contract. Since that ruling, of course, various case law has again been rendered on whether there is an employment contract or yet another type of contract.

This article explains when there is an employment contract and, on the basis of two examples, further clarifies the qualification of employment relationships in order to get a better idea of when you are dealing with an employee or still with a ZZP or intern.

When is there an employment contract?

First of all, just the basics. We speak of an employment contract only when the following cumulative requirements of Article 7:610 of the Civil Code (BW) are met:

  • labor;
  • pay;
  • authority (employed);
  • for a certain amount of time.

These elements are left to be fleshed out by case law.

Viewpoints assessment employment relationship

In the Deliveroo ruling, the Supreme Court provided points of view that answer the question of whether an agreement should be classified as an employment contract. The points of view are as follows:

  • The nature and duration of the work;
  • The manner in which work and working hours are determined;
  • the embedding of the work and the person performing the work in the organization and business operations of the person for whom the work is performed;
  • The existence or absence of an obligation to perform the work personally;
  • How the contractual arrangement of the parties’ relationship was established;
  • The manner in which remuneration is determined and paid;
  • the amount of these rewards;
  • whether the person doing the work is at commercial risk in doing so;
  • Also of importance may be whether the person performing the work behaves or can behave as an entrepreneur in economic life, for example, in acquiring a reputation, in acquisition, in terms of tax treatment, and considering the number of clients for whom he works or has worked and the length of time for which he usually behaves.

It also follows from the ruling that only provisions that actually have meaning for the parties are relevant in the assessment.

Then to the examples.

Security guard is self-employed and has no employment contract

The East Brabant District Court ruled that a security guard did not have an employment contract, but performed his work as a ZZP’er. Various elements in the employment relationship pointed to an assignment contract. The security guard had a lot of freedom. He had no obligation to work a minimum number of hours, he himself determined which days and times he worked, and he had no maximum number of vacations.

Furthermore, the court found it significant that although security work was the core business of the work provider, the security guard was not embedded in the organization. In addition, his fee was substantially higher than the salary of the employee with similar work and the security guard was at commercial risk because he had no claim to a fixed number of hours.

Finally, the court concluded that the security guard could conduct himself as an entrepreneur in the course of business by being allowed to work for other clients.

Internship agreement qualifies as employment contract

The Central Netherlands District Court ruled that, an employee whose last employment contract was not renewed was already in permanent employment. The first “internship agreement” qualified as an employment contract. In fact, after that first agreement, the employee had received three more temporary employment contracts and the last extension automatically resulted in an indefinite contract.

The agreement was qualified as an employment contract because the employee’s work during the internship agreement was not substantially relevant to the employee’s training. From the outset, the employee performed much of the work that was part of the position of entry-level production manager. Study was not a primary concern. There was no plan and the employer had no knowledge of the training requirements. Thus there was employment within the meaning of Section 7:610 of the Civil Code. Thus, the employer still had to pay the minimum wage over the internship agreement, because only an internship allowance had been paid.

Clarifying assessment of employment relationships and legal presumption

The legislature is also not sitting still in this area and aims to give more interpretation to the concept of “employed” (relationship of authority) in Article 7:610 of the Civil Code. The legislator proposes the following interpretation of the term:

  • he who performs the work under work-related direction from the employer; or
  • he or labor that is organizationally embedded in the employer’s organization; and
  • he who does not perform the labor for his own account and risk.

The bill also introduces a new legal presumption. Anyone who performs work for remuneration not exceeding €32.24 per hour will be presumed to be working on the basis of an employment contract under a new Section 7:610aa of the Civil Code to be introduced.

Seek advice qualifying employment relationship?

In doubt about the qualification of an agreement? Contact Richard Ouwerling of LVH Advocaten in Rotterdam. Richard Ouwerling is an Employment Lawyer and advises entrepreneurs on labor relations and employment contracts.

After two years of illness, no further holiday entitlement under a ‘dormant employment contract

On 5 February 2026, the subdistrict court in Dordrecht (ECLI:NL:RBROT:2026:1215) ruled that an employee who has been unfit for work for more than two years and has what is known as a ‘dormant’ employment contract no longer accrues new annual leave days. This ruling is therefore consistent with previous case law from, amongst others, the subdistrict courts in Groningen and Rotterdam. The decision differs from an earlier ruling by the Arnhem Subdistrict Court in 2025, which had held that holiday entitlement could indeed be accrued during a dormant employment contract. There now appears to be a consistent line in case law, and we await a similar ruling from a Court of Appeal.

What were the facts of this case?

The employee in this case had been employed by his employer since April 2017. In October 2022, he became unable to work and has not performed any work since then. Following the expiry of the 104-week qualifying period, he began receiving an IVA benefit on 9 October 2024. From that point onwards, the employment relationship was deemed to be ‘dormant’: the employment contract remained formally in force, but the core obligations – to work and to pay wages – were no longer being fulfilled.
The employee repeatedly asked his employer to cooperate in terminating the employment contract with the award of a transition payment (the so-called ‘Xella route’). When the employer refused, the employee took the matter to the subdistrict court. He sought the termination of the employment contract, payment of compensation equivalent to the transition allowance, and payment of outstanding holiday entitlement and holiday pay.

Termination and compensation

The subdistrict court ruled that the employer had no reasonable interest in continuing the dormant employment contract. In accordance with the principles of good employment practice, the employer should have cooperated in terminating it. The employment contract was therefore terminated and the employee was awarded compensation amounting to the net equivalent of the transition payment.

Accumulation and payment of holiday entitlement

The dispute centred in particular on the question of whether the employee had accrued any further holiday entitlement after the end of the waiting period. In total, the employee claimed 312 hours of unused holiday. Of these, 152 hours had been accrued before the end of the waiting period and 160 hours afterwards, i.e. during the dormant employment contract.
The subdistrict court judge drew a clear distinction here. The annual leave days accrued up to the end of the waiting period had to be paid out. For the period thereafter, however, the subdistrict court judge ruled that no annual leave had been accrued.
Section 7:634(1) of the Dutch Civil Code stipulates that annual leave is accrued only during periods in which the employee is entitled to wages. The employee argued that this provision should not apply as it conflicted with European legislation, in particular Article 31(2) of the EU Charter and Directive 2003/88/EC. The employee argued that the right to annual paid leave is a fundamental right under European law, which in principle continues to exist even during illness. He therefore contended that Article 7:634(1) of the Dutch Civil Code should not apply in this case and that holiday entitlement had continued to accrue even during the dormant employment relationship.
The subdistrict court did not accept this argument. Referring to case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the subdistrict court held that specific circumstances arise in the case of a dormant employment contract which justify a derogation from the fundamental right to annual paid leave.

No recovery function and no double entitlement

According to the subdistrict court, annual leave loses its core function in the case of a dormant employment contract. Annual leave is intended to allow an employee to recover from work performed. An employee with a dormant employment contract no longer performs any work and is not subject to any reintegration obligations. There is therefore no work from which to recover (the so-called ‘recovery function’).
Another factor is that, after two years of illness, the employee is entitled to a benefit (in this case an IVA benefit, part of the WIA), which also takes into account an entitlement to paid annual leave. If holiday entitlement were also to accrue with the employer during the same period, this would amount to a double entitlement. For this reason, the subdistrict court judge considers Article 7:634(1) of the Dutch Civil Code not to be in breach of European law.
The conclusion is that, after the end of the qualifying period, no further holiday entitlement is accrued and that the employee is not entitled to payment for these hours upon termination of employment.

Implications for practice

This ruling is in line with previous rulings by the subdistrict courts in Groningen and Rotterdam, which held that no further annual leave is accrued after two years of illness whilst on a dormant employment contract. This appears to indicate a consistent line of case law, although vigilance remains essential.

Would you like to know more or do you have any questions on this subject? Our employment law solicitors are on hand to advise you! Please contact Richard Ouwerling and Jamie Janssen, employment law solicitors at LVH Advocaten.

External entrepreneurship is fully taken into account when assessing pseudo self-employment

External entrepreneurship is fully taken into account when assessing pseudo self-employment

The Supreme Court has made an important ruling on the employment relationship between Uber and its drivers. This ruling has far-reaching consequences for self-employed people without employees and the question of whether they are truly self-employed or pseudo self-employed.

In the Deliveroo ruling, the Supreme Court mentioned 10 circumstances that are important in assessing whether an employment relationship is an employment contract or not. One of these criteria concerns the entrepreneurship of the worker. The question was whether this entrepreneurship also applies to the relationship outside of that with the client. In other words: do you also behave as an entrepreneur in ‘economic traffic’? The Supreme Court has now ruled that external entrepreneurship must also be considered as a circumstance in the assessment of false self-employment. So: external entrepreneurship is therefore a fully-fledged criterion.

How does this appear in practice?

  • The worker has several clients per year;
  • The worker spends time and/or money on acquiring a reputation and finding new customers or clients.
  • The worker has business investments of some significance.
  • The worker behaves administratively as an independent entrepreneur, is registered with the Chamber of Commerce, is a VAT entrepreneur and/or is entitled to the tax benefits of entrepreneurship (such as entrepreneurial facilities).

In a bill (‘VBAR’), external entrepreneurship (C+) only played a role if it could not be determined on the basis of the other assessment criteria whether there was an employment contract or a contract for services. Now the Supreme Court deviates from this.

In addition, the ruling means that when the activities of the self-employed person are embedded (the same as those of employees), this does not necessarily mean that there is likely to be disguised employment. After all, if the self-employed person can demonstrate his external entrepreneurship, he is also there.

Fortunately, this means that it is easier for the self-employed person to prove that he is truly self-employed. Client happy, contractor happy because he does not want to be an employee.

Information?

Would you like to know more or do you have questions about this subject? Then please contact Richard Ouwerling, Employment Lawyer at LVH Advocaten.

Prevent an earn-out from becoming a burn-out

Various (also not directly financial) reasons to enter into an earn-out arrangement

When selling a company, a difference of opinion about the results to be realized by the company in the future (and thus the value of the company) can be bridged by an earn-out arrangement, whereby part of the purchase price is only due if pre-agreed financial results are (timely) realized after the acquisition. But also other (not -directly- financial) uncertain circumstances that may influence the value of the company, may be reason to agree that part of the purchase price only has to be paid if an event occurs after the acquisition of the company. Consider, for example, the retention of key employees for a minimum period after the acquisition, the acquisition of an important license, or the winning of a strategically important order.

Advantages of an earn-out arrangement

The advantage of an earn-out arrangement for the buyer is the certainty that part of the purchase price only has to be paid after the agreed earn-out results have actually been realized. Conversely, an earn-out arrangement offers the seller certainty that if an earn-out result is realized, a higher purchase price will be received. So far only positive.

Problems in implementing an earn-out arrangement

But practice, as always, is recalcitrant. For example, there may be a difference of opinion between the seller and buyer as to whether or not an earn-out result has been realized (on time). It may also be, that the seller is of the opinion that the buyer did not make sufficient efforts after the acquisition to realize an earn-out result (or even frustrated the realization of an earn-out result). What is the seller’s position in such situations?

Risk for the seller in an earn-out arrangement

First of all, by entering into an earn-out arrangement, the seller accepts the risk, that part of the purchase price will turn out not to be due. Having said that, the seller can ensure that the risk of an earn-out dispute with the buyer is considerably reduced. It is very important that the earn-out arrangement(s) is/are properly worked out in the purchase agreement.

Uncertainty for the seller

Without specific agreements on this in the purchase agreement, the buyer may and must run the company in a way that puts the interest of the company first, but he must also take into account the interest of the seller in maximizing an earn-out arrangement in the considerations and policy decisions he makes. A role in this is that (market) circumstances may change and that the seller must take into account that this may lead to new insights. Expectations and predictions that existed when the purchase agreement was entered into can therefore be overtaken by new developments, as a result of which the buyer must adjust policy and respond to these in the interest of the company.

Also in such a situation, the buyer may be expected to reasonably accommodate the seller’s interests in the (maximization of the) earn-out. Despite this (general) obligation of the buyer, the situation of the seller remains uncertain and this can easily lead to disputes with the seller and ultimately to the (full or partial) loss of the earn-out.

Importance of a well-developed earn-out arrangement

The seller can avoid such a situation by including a well-developed earn-out arrangement in the purchase agreement, which clearly sets out the (concrete) efforts and actions required from the buyer to maximize the earn-out. Furthermore, in the earn-out arrangement it can be agreed which (policy) developments are and which are not taken into account when determining the earn-out result.

A tenant’s obligation to operate business premises: legal obligation or bargaining point?

When renting business premises, not only the amount of the rent and the duration of the contract play an important role, but also whether the lessee is obliged to actually operate the leased business premises. This so-called obligation to operate can have far-reaching consequences for both the landlord and the tenant of the business space. What exactly does this obligation entail, and under what circumstances can it be enforced or called into question?

What is the duty to operate?

The obligation to operate means that the lessee of business premises is obliged to actively and actually use the leased business premises and continue to conduct a business therein during the term of the lease. This prevents a landlord from being faced with a vacant property, which can be detrimental to a shopping center in which the leased property is located, for example.

Legal basis

The obligation to operate has no legal basis and thus must be explicitly included in the lease. Many standard lease agreements, such as the ROZ model, include an obligation to operate. As a tenant, you can make different arrangements with the landlord of the premises or negotiate the terms of such an obligation to operate.

Importance of landlord’s obligation to operate

For landlords, especially of retail and hospitality properties, an operating obligation is essential. An active business attracts customers and contributes to the success of other nearby businesses. If a tenant closes its doors without going out of business, it can reduce the overall attractiveness of a location.

Tenant and flexibility

For tenants, the obligation to operate can sometimes be a hindrance. Entrepreneurs want the freedom to terminate or temporarily pause operations when economically necessary. Therefore, possible exceptions, such as a right to temporarily pause operations for compelling business reasons, are often negotiated during contract formation.

What if a tenant does not comply with the duty to operate?

When a tenant fails to comply with the duty to operate, it can lead to legal disputes. Landlords may in some cases claim damages or even dissolution of the lease. The outcome of such disputes depends on the specific terms of the lease and the circumstances of the case.

The Environment Act & Damage Compensation A new regime & terminology

Introduction

From 1 January 2024, the Environment Act will come into force. With its entry into force, it has been said that the biggest legislative operation has been completed since the introduction of the Dutch Constitution in 1848. Several previously existing separate laws and regulations have been combined into one law and four AMvBs with the Environment Act. With a legislative operation of such magnitude, (principle) choices are naturally made that bring about a change compared to the previously applicable law. So too in the context of the Environment Act. One area of the Environment Act where (principled) differences between the old and new law are also abundantly clear is planning damage law. In a number of separate contributions, some of these changes will be discussed in more detail and the (possible) consequences for practice will be considered.

This first contribution will consider some telling terminological differences between the old law and the Environment Act. It will focus on Chapter 15 of the Environment Act, entitled: ‘Damage’. Attention will also be paid to the connection with Section 4.5 of the General Administrative Law Act (Awb), which also entered into force on 1 January 2024.
Later contributions will address differences with regard to the reference date, the (planning) comparison to be made, the concept of damage, assumption of risk, normal social risk and transitional law. In each of these topics, there will probably still be an important task for the courts to settle points of principle (of dispute). That aspect, combined with the fact that the old law will remain in force under transitional law for quite some time, will undoubtedly create a lot of dynamism in case law in the coming years.

Plan damage

One imaginative example under the old law of planning damage was the amendment of a zoning plan that changes the surroundings of, for instance, someone’s residential property. Where previously there was an unobstructed view of, say, farmland or a forest, this changes to a view of, say, a new housing estate or a residential tower. This development may result in a decrease in the value of the property for a nearby owner (indirect damage). If, as a result of a new zoning plan, the zoning of an owner’s own plot (also) changed, resulting in a decrease in value, this is direct damage.

Under the old Spatial Planning Act (‘WRO’), compensation for planning damage was still referred to. With the introduction in 2008 of the now defunct Spatial Planning Act (‘Wro’) as a result of the Environment Act, this changed to compensation for damage. In other words, the idea of full compensation in the WRO was abandoned by the legislator with the introduction of the Wro. Under the Environment Act, it is expected that even less will be granted to compensation for damages. Among the reasons for this are the changed level moment, the new planning equation and normal social risk. Later contributions will address each of these topics separately.

Whereas planning damage law under the old WRO was already to a large extent judicial law, this line has been continued under the Wro. This is also nicely illustrated in the summary judgment of the Administrative Law Division of the Council of State (‘the Division’) of 28 September 2016 (ABRvS 28 September 2016, ECLI:NL:RVS:2016:2582). In this ruling, the Division, because of “the need in legal practice”, gave a nice and practice-useful overview of its case law in the area of planning damage law. It is expected that this overview ruling, in parts, will also serve well under the Environment Act. In addition, this overview ruling will in any event remain important for cases that will still be dealt with under the old law in the coming years under the transitional law of the Environment Act. This transitional law will also be discussed in more detail in a later contribution.

Environment Act

With the entry into force of the Environment Act, goodbye to the ‘zoning plan’. Instead, with the entry into force of the Environment Act, the ‘environmental plan’ makes its appearance. In addition, with the entry into force of the Environment Act, the concept of ‘physical living environment’ also made its appearance. Incidentally, the legislator did not specify what exactly is meant by the physical living environment. However, the legislator has made it clear in Section 1.2 of the Environment Act what it means in any case (including buildings, infrastructure, water, soil, air and nature).

Compared to the zoning plan, the environment plan has a broader scope in which it can also regulate subjects for which there was previously no place in a zoning plan under the Wro. With the environmental plan, for instance, the legislator offers a municipality more room to provide customised solutions for each location (flexibility and room for consideration) and thereby enable certain spatial developments based on (intended) faster decision-making. In particular, the wider scope and flexibility of the environmental plan are the reason why Chapter 15 of the Environmental Law introduced the necessary (far-reaching) changes to what used to be called planning damage law. Among other things, new damage-causing decisions have been brought under the scope of the Environment Act, such as, for example, a rule from the environmental plan, a tailor-made regulation, an environmental permit or a project decision (section 15.1 Environment Act).

Damage compensation

Under the law in force before the Environment Act, planning damage law was housed in section 6.1 of the Wro. In addition to the planning damage law in the Wro, there was also a separate system of loss compensation. There were similarities between the two systems, but certainly also differences.

Whereas the legislative process of the Omgevingswet had already started in 2010-2011 and its entry into force thus lasted until 1 January 2024, the legislative process of section 4.5 Awb (the Compensation for Damage Act) was running almost simultaneously. The choice was made to introduce Section 4.5 Awb at the same time as the introduction of the Environment Act. This was based on the idea that the entry into force of section 4.5 Awb prior to the entry into force of the Environment Act, could possibly result in an increase as well as widening of claims for loss compensation. In the Environment Act, Article 15.1(1) explicitly states that the regulation of Title 4.5 Awb only applies to the causes of damage as included in the exhaustive list in Article 15.1 of the Environment Act. This provision ‘curbed’ fears of an increase and widening of claims for loss compensation.

With the entry into force of Chapter 15 of the Environment Act, the term ‘plan damage’ was dropped and replaced by the term ‘loss compensation’. Thus, where previously there was a distinction between planning damage and loss compensation, there is no longer any such distinction and, for the purposes of the Environment Act, only loss compensation is referred to.

Concluding remarks

In the foregoing, the old planning damage law (WRO / Wro), the distinction between direct and indirect damage and the new system under the Environment Act with ‘loss compensation’ as a central concept have been discussed. The next contribution will discuss the changes brought about by the Environment Act in the context of the reference date and (planning) comparison.

More information

This contribution was written by Ben van Nieuwaal of LVH Advocaten. If you have any questions about this contribution, please contact us via the general number 0031 10 209 27 77.

Seizure of a ship: an odd duck in the crowd

Seizure of a ship: an odd duck in the crowd

Ships are an unmistakable part of the Rotterdam landscape. Even ‘our’ view from the World Port Center is a daily reminder that Rotterdam is a true port city. In this article, we discuss the attachment of ships.

The requirements for garnishment

A garnishment order from the preliminary injunction court is required for the levying of a prejudgment attachment, an attachment for security purposes. For this, we as lawyers submit a petition. Want to know more about prejudgment attachment in general? Then read this article by our colleague Gentia Niesert.

Attachment to collect or enforce a claim can be done at a later stage. This requires a court judgment awarding that claim against the debtor. This judgment must also have been served on the debtor.

A separate category

Under the law, an attachment must be made in a different way on an object that can be moved (movable) than on an object that cannot (immovable) and may also be mortgaged.

A vessel is an object that can move. At the same time, a ship may also be a registry property and may be subject to a right of mortgage. Since ships are a special category, the legislator has made a separate regulation for the attachment of an object with the purpose of floating: a ship.

If a ship is part of the debtor’s assets, it can be attached. If a ship is registered – this is usually the case with larger and/or commercially used ships – the ownership of the ship can be established with the help of the Land Registry.

How does ship seizure work?

Ship seizures must be made on board the vessel. It is therefore important to locate the ship first. If that location is not known to the seizing party (or lawyer), the bailiff can find out where the ship is and when it enters the Rotterdam port, for example.

If it becomes known that the ship is here or will dock soon, the bailiff can move quickly and be there within a short time. The bailiff contacts the harbour master to make sure she can enter the port and get onto the ship. On board the vessel, the bailiff serves the judgment – or attachment order – on the captain or operator present there. The relevant captain (or any third party appointed by the bailiff) is then entrusted with the custody of the vessel. The attachment report is then served on the owner of the vessel. The arrest of a registered ship is also registered in the public registers.

Once the arrest has been made, the ship is no longer allowed to sail. Putting the ship in chains, as used to be the case, is out of the question nowadays. The custodian and Rotterdam port authorities prevent the ship from leaving.

Closing

In Rotterdam, ships can usually be seized easily and quickly. Would you like to receive advice on the (precautionary) attachment of a ship or on your possible subsequent options? If so, please contact us. Jacolien Leuvenink will be happy to assist you.

More about Rent and real estate

How does a purchase/contracting agreement work in real estate?

12 July 2021|

What is a purchase/contractor agreement? When parties agree that one of them will provide a piece of land and construct or finish a building on it for a fee, there is a contract for the purchase of the land on the one hand and a contract for work on the other hand with regard to the building. The part relating to the purchase of the land is governed by the legal rules of sale. On the part that relates to contracting work (building and delivery), the rules of contracting work apply. Therefore, it does not make much difference in practice whether one speaks of two linked contracts (purchase and contracting) or of one compound contract to which the rules for purchase and the rules for contracting apply in part.

What are the rights, obligations and liabilities of contractors and principals in contracting work?

12 July 2021|

A construction assignment to a contractor is considered a contract for work. This is an agreement whereby the contractor, on the instructions of the client - outside of employment - realizes and delivers a work of material nature. The legal relationship between the client and the contractor is - unless otherwise agreed - governed by the statutory rules for contracting work.

What are the rights, obligations and liabilities of clients and consultants in the commission agreement in a construction process?

12 July 2021|

At the start of a construction project, a client will often engage an architect, engineer or consultant to help him with the design (hereafter: 'consultant'). The legal relationship between the client and his consultant is - if nothing else has been agreed - governed by the legal rules for the commission contract. These legal rules can be found in the first section of title 7.7 of the Dutch Civil Code (art. 7:400 ff. of the Civil Code). The summary statutory regulation has a general and open character and is largely of a regulatory nature. It is therefore common for parties to make further agreements.

Go to Top